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ABSTRACT
Providing a socio-Iegal analysis of the issues, expert evidence and judgment in Reay and 
Hope v BNFL pic., the thesis offers an insight into the complexity of the toxic tort. 
Starting with an overview of the history of Sellafield, the thesis reflects on the scientific 
and epidemiological concerns surrounding the link between childhood cancer and nuclear 
installations. Drawing on scientific knowledge and epistemological considerations, the 
thesis moves on to the difficulties of verifying causation in science and the problems of 
establishing causation in law. Outlining the role of the expert witness and scientific expert 
evidence, the thesis proceeds with a case analysis, before broaching the thorny issue of 
judicial decision making and in particular, the difference between the 'discovery' and 
'justification' process. Moving on to the Judgment in Reay and Hope, attention is given 
to the potential application of probability theory to the judicial decision making process.
Lasting just short of one hundred days and including the testimony of numerous scientific 
experts, Reay and Hope marked new ground in a number of ways; it was the first personal 
injury claim to test the concept of genetic damage from radiation; the only time that a 
Queen's Bench Division Judge had been allocated a full-time judicial assistant; and one of 
the first trials to endorse a satellite video link for examination of international expert 
witnesses. As far as judicial management is concerned, the case was a forerunner in 
having Counsels' Opening Statements in writing in advance of the trial, as well as having 
written daily submissions of key issues from plaintiffs and defendants upon conclusion of 
oral evidence.
The circumstances that led to the trial relate to events in excess of thirty to forty years 
ago when the fathers of Dorothy Reay and Viven Hope were employed by the Defendants 
and their predecessors (the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority) as fitters for the 
Sellafield Plant. Intrinsic to the litigation was whether paternal preconception irradiation 
caused or materially contributed to a predisposition to cancer leading to Dorothy's death 
from leukaemia and Vivien Hope's non-Hodgkin's lymphoma. As a consequence of the 
various statutory provisions, the Plaintiffs did not need to prove negligence on the part of 
the Defendants. In order to succeed the Plaintiffs had to prove on the balance of 
probabilities that radiation from Sellafield was a material contributory cause of the 
Plaintiffs' disease. The fundamental issue therefore was causation.
In addition to the case analysis, two pieces of empirical research were conducted for the 
purposes of this thesis. The first, a Social Survey (consisting of thirty four questions) was 
circulated to 160 members of the Academy of Experts (quantitative research); the 
second, a letter, involved written communication with sixty five Judges from the Queen's 
Bench Division of the High Court (qualitative research).
Underlying this socio-Iegal case analysis are fundamental questions with regard to existing 
legal principles, liability and judicial decision making.
CONTENTS
List of Abbreviations i
Table of Cases ii
Table of Legislation iv
INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER Is HISTORY OF SELLAFIELD
1.1 The Histoiy of Sellafield 18
1.2 Potential Health Effects of Ionising Radiation 37
1.3 Childhood Cancer and Nuclear Installations 61
CHAPTER 2: SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE AND CAUSATION
2.1 Scientific Knowledge and the Challenge to Positivism 76
2.2 Scientific Explanation and the Problems of Causation 88
2.3 Causation in the Law 99
CHAPTER 3: EXPERT EVIDENCE
3.1 The Expert Witness 115
3.2 Scientific Expert Evidence 135
CHAPTER 4: CASE ANALYSIS
4.1 Synopsis of Reay and Hope v BNFL pic. 147
4.2 Occupational Dosimetry 160
4.3 Environmental Dosimetry 174
4.4 Epidemiology 188
4.5 Genetics 238
CHAPTER 5: JUDICIAL DECISION M AKING
5.1 Judicial Decision Making 277
5.2 The Judgment: Reay and Hope v BNFL pic. 298
5.3 The Application of Probability Theory to Judicial
Decision Making 331
CONCLUSION 354
Glossary 375
Bibliography 387
Appendices 1-8
ABBREVIATIONS
A.B.C.C. Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission
ALARA As Low as Reasonably Achievable
ALARP As Low as Reasonably Practicable
A.L.L. Acute Lymphoblastic Leukaemia
A.E.A. Atomic Energy Authority
B.E.I.R. Biological Effect of Ionising Radiation
BMJ British Medical journal
BNFL British Nuclear Fuels pic.
BPM Best Practical Means
C.C.S.G. Childhood Cancer Study Group
CLL Chronic Lymphatic Leukaemia
CoMARE Committee on Medical Aspects of Radiation in the Environment
DOE Department of Environment
E.B.V. Epstein Barr Virus
EURATOM European Atomic Energy Community
FI Children
F2 Grand Children
HSE Health and Safety Executive
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
I.C.R.P. International Commission on Radiological Protection
L.E.T. Linear Energy Transfer
MAFF Ministry of Agricultural Fisheries and Food
MoD Ministry of Defence
MRC Medical Research Council
mSv Millisievert
NAS National Academy of Sciences
NBR Natural Background Radiation
N.H.L. Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma
N il HM Nuclear Installations Inspectorate
N.R.P.B. National Radiological Protection Board
OSHA US Occupational and Health Administration
P.C. Probability of Causation
P.P.I. Paternal Pre-conception Irradiation
R.B.E. Relative Biological Effectiveness
RERF Radiation Effects Research Foundation
R.R. Relative Risk
S.E.A.M. Sellafield Environmental Assessment Model
S.I. International System of Units
Sv Sievert
U.K.A.E.A. United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority
UNSCEAR U.N. Scientific Committee on effects of Atomic Radiation
TABLE OF CASES
Alfred Crompton Amusement Machines Ltd. v. Custom and Excise Comrs. [1974] AC 
405.
Bamettv. Chelsea and Kensington Hospital Management Committee [1969] 1 QB 428. 
Carter v. Boehm (1766) 3 Burr, 1905.
Cassidy v. Dunlop Rubber Co. Ltd (1971) 11 KIR 311.
Chaplin v. Hicks [1911] 2 KB 786.
Constantine Steamship Line v. Imperial Smelting Corp. Ltd [1942] AC 154.
Conway v. Rimmer [1968] AC 910.
D. v. National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children [1978] AC 171.
Dale v British Coal Corp. [1992] PIQR 373.
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. (1993) 113 S Ct. 2786.
Davie v. Edinburgh Corporation [1953] SC 34.
Deburkarte v. Louvar 393 NW  2d 131 (Iowa 1986).
Duncan v. Cammell Laird SC Co. Ltd [1942] AC 624. 1942 1 All ER 587.
Eckersley v. Binnie (unreported, CA 18 Feb. 1988, Lexis).
English Exporters (London) Ltd v. Eldonwali Ltd [1973] Ch 415.
Falcon v. Memorial Hospital 462 NW  2d 44 (Mich 1990).
Folkes v. Chadd (1782) 3 Doug. KB 157.
Forbes v Wandsworth Health Authority [1997] QB 402.
Frye v. United States (1923) 293 F. 1013.
Helliwell v. Piggott-Sim [1980] FSR 356.
Hennessy v. Wright (1888) 21 QBD 509.
Herskovits v. Group Health 664 P 2nd 474 (Walsh 1983).
Hotson v. East Berkshire Area Health Authority! 1985] 3 All ER 167, [1987] AC 75, 
[1987] 2 All ER 909.
Ibrahim v. R. [1914] AC 599.
ITC Film Distributors v. Video Exchange Ltd [1982] Ch 431.
Li Shu-long v. R. [1989] AC 270.
Loveday v Renton (1990) 1 Med LR 177.
Lord Abinger V  Ashton (1873) 17 LR Eq. 358.
McGhee v. National Coal Board [1972] 3 AH ER 1008, [1973] 1 WLR 1.
Merlin v. British Nuclear Fuels Pic [1993] AH ER 711.
Myers v. DPP [1965] AC 1001.
National Justice Cia Naviera SA v. Prudential Assurance Co. Ltd.
"The Ikarian Reefer" [1993] 2 Lloyd Rep. 68.
Newis v. Lark (1571) Plowd 403.
R. v. Abadom [1983] WLR. 126.
R. v. Chief Constable of West Midlands, ex p Wiley [1995] 1 AC 274.
R. v. Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, ex parte Duddridge and Others 
[1994] QBD.
R. v. Silverlock [1894] 2 QB 766.
R. v. Turner [1975] QB 834.
R. v. Wright (1821) Russ. SC Ry. 456.
Reay and Hope v. British Nuclear Fuels [1993] Ail ER 711.
Reay and Hope v. British Nuclear Fuels [ 1994] 5 Med LR.
ii
re "Agent Orange" Prod Liab. Litig., 565 F Supp. 1263 (E.N.D.Y 1983). 
re Northern Dist. of Cal. "Daikon Shield" IUD Prods. Liab. Liti., 526 F. Supp 887 (N.D. 
Cal 1981). vacated, 693 F. 2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982) cert, denied 103 S. Ct 817  
(1983).
re "Three Mile Island" Litig., 557 F. Supp. 96 (M.D. PA 1982).
Rogers v. Secretary of State for the Home Office Department [1973] AC 388.
Sindell v. Abbott Labs 26 Cal 3d 588, 607 P 2d 924. 163 Cal Rptr 132 (1980). 
Thorne v Worthing Skating Rink Co. (1877) 6 Ch. 415.
Wilsherv. Essex Health Authority [1987] QB 730, [1986] AH ER 801, [1988] 2 WLR 
557.
Wright v. Dunlop Rubber Co. Ltd (1972) KIR 255.
TABLE OF LEGISLATION
The Atomic Energy Act 1946
The Atomic Energy Act 1954
Civii Evidence Act 1968 
Part 1. 
s. 1(1) 
s. 4(1) 
s.l 8(5)
Civil Evidence Act 1972 
s. 3 
s. 4(1) 
s. 5(3)
Civil Procedure Act 1997  
(Chapter 12) 
s. 1(1)
s. 1(2)
Court and Legal Services Act 1990 
s.58
Criminal Law Act 1967  
s. 13 
s. 14
Fatal Accidents Act 1976
Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions Act) 1934
Limitation Act 1980  
s.33 (l)
Nuclear Installations (Licensing and Insurance) Act 1959 
Nuclear Installations (Amendment) Act 1965 
Radioactive Substances Act 1960
Rules of the Supreme Court 
Order 25 
r 8
Order 38 
r 3 
r 36 
r 37 
r 38 
r 41
Order 45 
r 5
US Atomic Energy Act 1946
INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS
European Convention on Human Rights 
Art. 10
PENDING LEGISLATION 
Access to Justice Bill 1998
v
INTRODUCTION
Traditionally tort cases have been regarded as isolated disputes concerned with individual 
harm, where the law's role was simply to allocate losses between tortfeasor and victim 
according to principles of corrective justice1. In addition to notions of corrective justice 
however, damage prevention (through general deterrence) and the 'public law' function 
of the tort system have also been identified (Cane 1993). In world where risk assessment 
and cost benefit analysis play their part in determining the optimum level of any 
precautionary action taken at the bequest of the tortfeasor, the demands upon an already 
burdened civil justice system look set to grow.
Notwithstanding the problematic nature of the tort system as "too cumbersome, costly and 
haphazard" (Rosenberg 1984:854), the advent of the 'toxic tort2', has led to a 
fundamental challenge to the traditional basis of causation3, where under negligence 
or strict liability, a toxic tort plaintiff (like all tort plaintiffs) must establish a causal 
connection between the tortious conduct and the loss for which recovery is sought.
In terms of the 'but for' test, this means that the plaintiff must show on the balance of
1 Aristotle identified 'corrective justice' as:
"The law never looks beyond the question,
'What damage was done?" Consequently 
what the judge seeks to do is to redress the 
inequality, which in this kind of justice is identified 
with injustice" (Nichomachean Ethics, Book 5, 
Chapter 5, p. 148 - ].A.K. Thomson (1971) 
Translation).
2 A  cause of action which arises when a plaintiff 
has developed a disease following exposure to 
a toxic physical agent (chemical or in the form 
of energy).
3 See: Rosenberg 1984; Stapleton 1988; Hill 1991; 
Reece 1996.
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probabilities that 'but for  ^ the action of the defendants, the damage would not have 
occurred.
When applying the traditional 'balance of probability test' to a toxic tort, two potential 
problems arise. First, the test does not work where there are multiple or even alternative 
possible causes of a plaintiff's injury. Here the all or nothing approach, the 
preponderance of evidence rule, demands a degree of certainty in excess of fifty per cent 
in a area where estimates, probabilities and scientific uncertainty are the norm.
Second, difficulties occur in trying to establish the origin of the plaintiff's disease, in 
particular, the biological mechanism responsible for initiating or mobilising the illness. 
Here, nature, nurture and luck are called to account where often, as the link between 
smoking and lung cancer has proved, the exact causal mechanism remains elusive.
Underlying the basis of all toxic torts, distinct areas of scientific knowledge, grounded in 
an epistemological and procedural framework, provide the evidence upon which the 
expert offers his opinion. Whatever the discipline, be it genetics, epidemiology, 
dosimetry, radiobiology, a presumption exists that in addition to having a professional 
standing among his peers, the expert is also capable of being a competent expert witness. 
Therefore, implicit in expert testimony is the expectation that the scientific witness can 
cope with an adversarial system that on occasion, may seek to undermine both his 
integrity and his authority.
From a judicial perspective, the judge, in addition to decision maker, has the role of
2
arbitrator and case manager. Often however, because toxic torts involve large scale 
corporate activities which bring into being questions of accountability, the judge also has 
to balance, public and policy considerations. With the increasing interaction of science 
and law, the judge must also be aware of the 'account' of science which informs judicial 
decision making, and be able to differentiate between the substance of the evidence as it 
applies to the case, and the status of the scientific expert witness or 
corporate/governmental body represented by the expert.
Reay and Hope v British Nuclear Fuels pic. (BNFL), a highly complex toxic tort case, 
offered an opportunity to consider these issues within a wider socio-Iegal framework. In 
addition to the case analysis, the thesis also incorporates the findings from two empirical 
studies carried out for the purposes of this work. The first derives from a Social Survey 
conducted with members of the Academy of Experts. The second based on more 
qualitative research, involves members of the judiciary from the Queen's Bench Division 
of the High Court.
The basis of the case revolves around two families bringing claims against BNFL4. The first 
Plaintiff, Elizabeth Reay, was the mother of Dorothy Reay who was bom in 1961 and died
4 Today, British Nuclear Fuels pic is one of two 
organisations in the western world providing a 
complete fuel cycle service. BNFL's Head Office 
is located at Risley, near Warrington, Cheshire 
and the Company's production facilities are at 
Capenhurst, near Chester; Springfields, near 
Preston; Sellafield in Cumbria; and at 
Chapelcross, Dumfriesshire. The Atomic Energy 
Act 1971 transferred to BNFL the production and 
reprocessing sides of the nuclear industry 
from the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority 
(UKAEA) who had control of the sites, including 
Sellafield, from 1954.
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from Leukaemia the following year aged 10 months. The second Plaintiff, Vivien Hope, 
was born in 1965. In 1988 she was diagnosed as suffering from non-Hodgkin's lymphoma 
(NHL), a disease with a similar aetiology to leukaemia. She has never made a complete 
recovery.
The first Plaintiffs claim was for damages under the now amended Fatal Accidents Act 
19765, and also the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 19346. In addition, 
Elizabeth Reay claimed damages for injury to herself, and on behalf of the estate of her late 
husband, for injury to him. The claim for parental injury is based on trauma consequent 
on the conception, birth and death of a Ieukaemic child.
The second Plaintiff, Vivien Hope, claimed damages for past and future suffering and
5 The Fatal Accidents Act 1976 provided that 
dependents could sue the wrongdoer for earnings 
and other monies that the fatally injured person 
might have expected to have received. Dependents 
were defined as husband, wife, parent, child, 
grandparent, grandchild, sister, brother,
uncle or aunt. The law required some form of 
financial relationship with the deceased from 
which there was derived some benefits to the 
dependent. The 1976 Act dates back to the 
Fatal Accidents Act 1846, which also allowed 
Executors or administrators of the estate to 
bring an action on behalf of the dependents.
6 Under the Law Reform (Miscellaneous) Provisions Act 
1934 the deceased's administrator or representative 
may sue. The 1934 Act provides for the survival
of a cause of action in certain torts. The Act 
embraced a 'loss of years' concept and damages were 
awarded on the basis of a claim for Tost years'. 
Normally, where the injured party dies, the action 
must be brought within three years of death under 
the Limitation Act 1980. However, in the Reay and 
Hope case the Defendants did not plead the protection 
of limitation.
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disability consequent upon her lymphoma.
As a consequence of the various statutory provisions dating back to the Atomic Energy 
Act 19467, including: The Atomic Energy Act 19548; The Nuclear Installations 
(Licensing and Insurance) Act 19599; The Nuclear Installations (Amendment) A rt 
196510, the Plaintiffs did not need to prove negligence on the part of the Defendants. 
In order to succeed the plaintiffs had to prove on the balance of probabilities that
7 The first statutory provision provided for the 
development of atomic energy and the control of 
such development but contained no statutory duty 
of care to the public.
8 This Act established an atomic energy authority
for the United Kingdom (UKAEA), and made provision 
for its powers, duties, right and liabilities.
Section 5(3) established the first statutory duty 
of care to the public which was absolute in character. 
The A rt came into force on the 1st August 1954.
9 Although essentially concerned with the 
introduction of a system whereby persons or 
bodies other than the UKAEA might be licensed 
to instal or operate atomic energy plants.
Section 4( 1) substantially reproduced the 
absolute duty in the 1954 Act.
10 The 1965 A rt was passed to give effect to a 
series of international conventions (the 
Paris Convention 1960, the Brussels 
Convention 1963 and the Vienna Convention 
1963. Section 1 refined and developed the 
statutory duty while preserving its absolute 
character. It subdivided liability into
firstly, an absolute duty upon the licensee 
to ensure that no occurrence involving nuclear 
matter caused injury to any person whether 
through radioactive properties alone or from a 
combination of radioactive and toxic, explosive 
or other hazardous properties. Secondly, no 
ionising radiations from anything "caused or 
suffered by the licensee to be on the site 
which is not nuclear matter" or from waste 
discharged on, or from the site, causing injury 
to any person. Statutory 1 (4) applied that duty 
to the Authority (UKAEA).
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radiation from Sellafield was a material contributory cause of the diseases contracted by 
the plaintiffs. The fundamental issue therefore was causation.
The novel feature of the Reay and Hope action was that both Plaintiffs based their case 
on paternal pre-conception irradiation (PPI), which they maintained, caused a 
predisposition to leukaemia and/or NHL in the next generation. This 'germ-line' 
hypothesis (frequently referred to as the 'Gardner hypothesis') is named after Professor 
M.J. Gardner, who was principal author of the study. An Epidemiologist11, Professor 
Gardner was Head of the Medical Research Council, Epidemiological Unit, University of 
Southampton. This was the first time that a personal injury claim had tested the concept 
of genetic damage from radiation exposure.
As far as damages were concerned, these were agreed in advance of the trial. Subject to 
liability, £150 ,000  for Elizabeth Reay, and £125,000 for Vivien Hope.
The thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter One reviews the history and background 
of the Sellafield plant. Chapter Two considers the construction of scientific knowledge 
and the problems of causation at both the scientific and legal level. Chapter Three looks 
at the role of the expert witness and scientific expert evidence. Chapter Four offers a
11 Epidemiology is the field of public health 
that studies the incidence, distribution and 
aetiology of disease in human populations.
An Epidemiologist therefore seeks to understand 
disease causation and by so doing prevent disease 
in groups and individuals. Increasingly, 
epidemiological findings are relied upon to 
assist the court in establishing whether 
exposure to a toxic agent caused the disease 
under consideration.
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descriptive and analytical account of the case. Chapter Five presents a theoretical and 
empirical discussion of judicial decision making, before moving on to the Reay and Hope 
v BNFL Judgment.
Chapter One
Referring the reader to events prior to the Second World War, the first section charts the 
discovery of nuclear fission, the development of the atomic bomb, and the alliance that 
took place between the British, Canadian, and United States governments. Later, with the 
passing of the US Atomic Energy Act 1946, and the breakdown of Anglo-US-Canadian 
co-operation, the ending of further collaboration. Outlining the impact of the Atomic 
Energy Act 1946, the thesis explains how over a period of six years, three nuclear power 
plants (including Windscale, later known as Sellafield) were found, constructed and put 
into operation.
Documenting a number of incidents/accidents that have taken place at Sellafield, Sec 1(1) 
offers two observations in relation to Reay and Hope. First the circumstance of events 
correspond to a time when the fathers of Dorothy Reay (George Reay) and Vivien Hope 
(David Hope) were employed at Sellafield. Second and particularly relevant to the 
dosimetry part of the case, allegations made against the Defendants (BNFL) of a 'cavalier 
approach' with regard to radioactive discharges; inaccurate dose information; incomplete 
and/or inadequate records.
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Moving on from the history of Sellafield, 1 (2) considers the potential health effects of 
exposure to ionising radiation. Concentrating on cancer, this section outlines the full 
impact of exposure, and the effects of different forms of radiation at the biological level. 
Outlining the importance of international standards and in particular, the work of the 
International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP), the thesis reviews the 
principles underlying risk assessment and dose limitation, and the move by nuclear 
agencies towards a more financially orientated 'cost/ benefit' risk analysis. Without some 
appreciation of the potential health effects of ionising radiation it would be difficult to 
evaluate the significance of the estimated exposure levels received by George Reay and 
David Hope during their working life.
The final section of Chapter One (1 .3), considers the controversy surrounding the link 
between childhood cancer and nuclear installations. Concentrating on the many 
epidemiological studies conducted during the 1980s as a consequence of the Yorkshire 
Television programme 'Windscaie - the Nuclear Laundry', this section discusses some of 
the research findings in this country and abroad. For the first time scientific debate 
moved from questioning the existence of a cancer excess around Sellafield, to finding an 
explanation for the excess. The plaintiffs, relying on the epidemiological findings of the 
Gardner Report, based their claim on paternal preconception irradiation causing a 
mutation in the spermatagonia which in turn, via paternal sperm, caused a predisposition 
to leukaemia in Dorothy Reay and a predisposition to NHL in Vivien Hope. 
Epidemiology, and in particular the Gardner study were therefore central to the case.
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Chapter Two
Having considered the background of Sellafield, and realized how divided scientific opinion 
remains over the potential health effects of low level ionising radiation and its relationship 
with childhood cancer, Chapter Two, adopting a more theoretical perspective, takes up 
some of the more fundamental issues raised in the previous chapter, with regard to 
scientific uncertainty.
Concentrating on the foundations upon which scientific knowledge is based, the first 
section (2 .1), looks at the construction of scientific knowledge, its epistemology, and 
recent attempts to deconstruct scientific ideology. Referring to the philosophical challenge 
that has taken place, the thesis briefly considers the work of Karl Popper; Thomas Kuhn; 
Imre Lakatos and Paul Feyerabend. The deconstruction of scientific knowledge helps us 
first, to appreciate the basis upon which to challenge the cognitive authority of science, 
and second, particularly important with toxic tort cases such as Reay and Hope, to 
recognise the limitations of the practice of science, and the problems this creates for the 
establishment of causal relations.
The second section of this chapter (2.2), expanding on the work in the first, concentrates 
on scientific explanation and causal relations. Drawing on some of the methodological 
problems that exist within both epidemiology and science, this section highlights the 
uncertain nature of applied and quantitative research, and the potential difficulties this 
poses for personal injury claimants.
The final section of Chapter Two, extending on issues raised in 2 (2 ), considers causation
9
in the law. Focusing on toxic torts, the issue of causation is perhaps one of the greatest 
difficulties to overcome. Under either negligence or strict liability (as with Reay and 
Hope), the plaintiff must establish the existence of a causal connection between the 
defendant's action (release of a toxic agent) and the loss (disease/mortality) upon which 
the plaintiffs base their claim. Unfortunately for the plaintiffs however, many claimants 
relying on the traditional basis of causation fail to establish causal relations. First the 
defendants may argue there is no proven biological causal mechanism. Second the 
defendants may contend, on the basis of probabilities, given life style and genetic factors, 
that the plaintiffs would have contracted the disease anyway. Third the defendants may 
contest on the basis of unassessability of contribution of risk. Fourthly, the defendants may 
suggest cumulative causation. Applying recent case law, this section proceeds by 
evaluating, and then challenging the traditional approach to causation. Moving on to 
alternatives such as 'loss of chance', the thesis supports the view that this could offer a 
more realistic framework upon which toxic tort plaintiffs, such as Elizabeth Reay and 
Viven Hope could mount their claim. Building on the theoretical discussion in previous 
sections, there is a rejection of the purely individualistic, non utilitarian view of the tort 
system.
Chapter Three
Chapter Three considers the role of the expert witness and scientific expert evidence. 
Incorporated throughout this chapter are findings from a Social Survey which was 
conducted via the Academy of Experts based at Gray's Inn. In total 160 scientific and
10
medical research experts were contacted for the purposes of this thesis12. The 
questionnaire involved a total of thirty four questions, with additional space for further 
information, should the expert so choose. In addition to evaluating the role and general 
experience of the scientific expert witness, the research was also interested in the experts' 
opinion of the judiciary. The results of these findings are disseminated throughout this 
chapter, and also Chapter Five, which looks specifically at the judiciary and judicial 
decision making.
Chapter Three, drawing on the work in Chapter One and Two, considers the expert 
within the dynamics of science/law interaction, and in particular, the problems of scientific 
knowledge (when presented as expert evidence) within an adversarial setting that often 
demands proof of specific causation. Section 3(1) begins by looking at the ambivalent 
role of the expert witness, and how increasingly, scientific experts are expected to be both 
good experts, and good witnesses. Required to cope with the legal deconstruction of their 
knowledge base, experts frequently find themselves accused of partisanship and bias.
Section 3(2) is exclusively concerned with scientific expert evidence, in particular, 
problems associated with the validity of scientific knowledge, including: poor 
methodology, novel or new areas of scientific research (as with the Gardner hypothesis 
in Reay and Hope), and misrepresented or fraudulent scientific claims. Underlying 
scientific evidence (as discussed in Chapter 2) is a knowledge base in a constant state of 
flux. The difficulty this poses for the plaintiff, seeking to prove their case on the balance
12 In total there were 99 responses (62% ), 
of which 7 (3%) were incorrectly completed.
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of probabilities is often (as the testimony in Reay and Hope confirmed) experts hold 
contrary opinions and give contradictory evidence.
Chapter Four
Providing a descriptive and analytical account of Reay and Hope, Chapter Four (building 
on the work of previous chapters) brings together four complex areas of scientific expert 
evidence including: Occupational Dosimetry (4.2); Environmental Dosimetry (4.3); 
Epidemiology (4 .4 ), and Genetics (4 .5). Beginning with a synopsis of the Reay and Hope 
case (4 .1), the purpose of Chapter Four is to provide a day by day account of events as 
they took place. Relying on the transcript of the trial, which lasted short of one hundred 
days, and included the evidence of numerous expert witnesses, the chapter highlights the 
role and contribution of the experts, as well as identifying some of the more important 
aspects of the trial, which led the presiding judge to his ultimate conclusion.
Drawing on every stage of the evidential process, the trial reveals a history of ongoing 
concerns expressed by the plaintiffs over: non-disclosure, misinformation, questions of 
neutrality and accountability, public health/safety and risk assessment. As far as the 
experts are concerned, allegations ranged from poor methodology to fraud and 
incompetence.
The complexity of the evidence, coupled with the politically sensitive nature of the subject 
matter, ensured a high level of public interest throughout the trial. In addition, specific
12
non-governmental organizations (NGOs)13, smaller pressure groups14, and others, 
including, nuclear workers and residents living near nuclear installations, had a particular 
interest in the judgment. As far as BNFL were concerned, they always encouraged 
acceptance of their operations, as well as nuclear power, and to this end embarked upon 
a marketing programme which included high profile advertising campaigns, local area 
financial support, and in-house experts giving some 400 talks a year to schools, businesses 
and local groups. To counter allegations that emerged from the case, and also deter any 
further attacks upon their already tarnished public image, BNFL were willing to spend huge 
unspecified amounts15 to protect their name.
13 NGOs included Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth 
Both organizations are international and high profile, 
and both employ professional staff at the scientific, 
media and legal level. In addition, these NGOs are not 
specific interest groups, they are concerned with global 
environmental issues.
14 A  particularly important and active pressure group 
involved directly with Sellafield is Cumbrian Opposed
to a Radioactive Environment (CORE). CORE was originally 
formed in 1980 as the 'Barrow and District Action Group 
against the Impact of Nuclear Waste' to investigate 
potential health hazards with regard to the Sellafield 
site.
15 BNFL secured the services of Freshfields 
Solicitors, Mr. K.S. Rokison QC and Mr. M.
G. Spencer QC. Although not confirmed, it 
has been estimated that the case cost in 
excess of £20m. Mr. justice French referring 
to the expense of the trial, said "it would 
need thousands of football pool wins to make 
any significant effect on the costs of this case"
(Oral judgment 8th October 1993 p.79A).
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Chapter Five
Chapter Five is concerned with the process of decision making (5 .1), the Reay and Hope 
Judgment (5 .2 ), and the application of probability theory to future decision making (5 .3). 
Concentrating on 'hard' or novel cases, where as with Reay and Hope, there are 'gaps in 
the law', Section 5(1) begins by considering the distinction between the 'discovery' and 
'justification' process. Drawing on the observations of US and English judges including: 
Justice Cardozo; Justice Posner; Lord Radcliffe; Lord Devlin; Lord Denning and Lord 
Griffiths, the thesis considers the work of the Realist Movement, and their contribution to 
the internal reasoning behind judicial decision making.
As far as 'justification' of judgment is concerned, the doctorate draws on the findings of 
a second piece of empirical research carried out for the purposes of this thesis. This 
research involves contact by letter with all sixty five Queen's Bench Division (QBD) 
Judges16. O f those who responded (34 per cent), nearly all were willing to offer their 
views of the decision making process.
Section 5(2) concentrates on the Reay and Hope Judgment. Outlining the scientific 
framework upon which Mr. Justice French based his decision making, this section considers 
the management and supervision of the case, before moving on to an analysis of the 
Judgment.
Having identified a number of factors which emerged from the Judgment, Section 5(3)
16 This was the total number of Queen's Bench 
Division Judges at the time of the research.
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moves on to consider the viability of an alternative basis of decision making for particularly 
complex cases (such as toxic torts), where scientific expert evidence, and multiple 
witnesses are the norm. Section 5(3), identifies 'Bayes Theorem' (although generally 
associated with criminal cases) as a possible way forward in assisting judges and lawyers 
cope with toxic torts. Drawing on the many areas already discussed, Section 5(3) 
considers the potential of probability theory, and again, relying on the findings of the 
QBD research, speculates on whether 'Bayes Theorem' as an analytical tool, or as a 
foundation for decision making, has any future in the eyes of the judiciary.
Although Lord Wooif chose not to separate toxic torts for 'Specialist Area' consideration, 
many of the recommendations in Section IV  of his Report17 (Chapter 15, Medical 
Negligence; and Chapter 17, Multi Party Action) have application to, and implications 
for, the toxic tort. Consequently, as illustrated by the many issues raised in Reay and 
Hope, toxic torts cannot simply be incorporated into a general 'personal injury' 
categorization.
Many of the concerns highlighted by Lord Woolf over: cost; the difficulty of proving 
causation; the degree of public mistrust (which in the case of toxic torts may be levelled 
at corporations and/or public bodies); delays; problems of pre-litigation procedures; and 
the discovery process; have as much relevance to the toxic tort plaintiff, as to the medical 
negligence claimant. Moreover, because of the scientific complexity of the toxic tort, 
many of the recommendations in respect of specialised judicial lists, specially designated
17 Access to Justice, Final Report to the 
Lord Chancellor on the Civil Justice 
System in England and Wales. July 1996.
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courts, appropriate judicial training could be argued for. Further, because toxic torts 
depend upon the authority and integrity of the scientific expert witness, problems 
identified by Lord Woolf, including polarisation and allegations of partisanship are of 
particular concern.
Therefore, given the complexity of such claims, it seems appropriate that the toxic tort, 
in addition to being designated a 'specialist area7, could also be included as a potential 
category for discussion in Chapter 17, Multi Party Action. Lord Woolf outlining his 
recommendations as regards multi party actions, identified the following objectives:
a) to provide access to justice where large numbers of people have been 
affected by another's conduct, but individual loss is so small that
it makes an individual action economically unviable;
b) to provide expeditious, effective and proportionate methods of resolving 
cases, where individual damages are large enough to justify individual action 
but where the number of claimants and the nature of issues involved mean 
that the cases cannot be managed satisfactorily in accordance with normal 
procedures;
c) to achieve a balance between the normal rights of claimants and defendants,
to pursue and defend cases individually, and the interests of a group of
parties to litigate the action as a whole in an effective manner.
Currently Lord Woolf alludes in his chapter on 'Multi Party Claims' to concerns over 
complexity, intractability of intrinsic subject matter, major discovery problems, escalating 
use of experts, cost and delay - all problems highlighted by Reay and Hope.
A t the time of writing, the White Paper, 'Modernising Justice', which deals with the
planned reforms of the legal aid scheme, and the Access to Justice Bill (currently being
16
debated in Parliament) are under consideration. In the conclusion of this research 
therefore, the thesis in addition to bringing together all the socio-Iegal issues raised by 
Reay and Hope looks forward, and reflects upon the post-millennium future of the toxic 
tort.
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1,1. THE HISTORY OF SELLAF1ELD
The purpose of Chapter One is to provide some background to events leading to the Reay 
and Hope litigation. Divided into three sections, the first part considers the history of 
Sellafield and its development as a nuclear power station. The second documents the 
potential health effects associated with exposure to ionising radiation, and finally, section 
three discusses some of the scientific evidence as regards childhood cancer and nuclear 
installations.
Since 1945, the uncertainty surrounding nuclear power has developed into an anxiety 
deeply rooted within twentieth century culture. For many, the atomic bombings of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki heralded the first realization of the immediate and long term 
effects of acute exposure to ionising radiation. Associated with the onset of cancer and a 
history of secrecy and misinformation, Sellafield, perhaps more than any other nuclear 
installation epitomizes the controversy surrounding nuclear power and the unseen, 
untouchable, insidious nature of chronic radioactive contamination.
Prelude to the Second World War
Prior to the Second World War, scientists had for many years wanted to tap into the huge 
store of energy locked up in the atom, however, it was not until 1939 says Jay (1954:3), 
that "the key to the lock was finally discovered in the form of nuclear fission"1.
1 When fissile materials such as uranium and plutonium are 
bombarded by neutrons, they split and release a huge 
amount of energy. Fission is therefore the splitting 
apart of a heavy atomic nucleus into two or more parts.
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With the threat of war looming, scientists, aware of the potential of this new discovery had 
drawn the Government's attention to the effectiveness of nuclear power as a weapon of 
war, as a consequence, in April 1940 a committee2 of scientists was set up under the 
Chairmanship of Sir G.P. Thompson.
The Committee was instructed to report on the feasibility of producing atomic bombs, 
having regard to two principal aims:
1. The nuclear data necessary for the development of an atomic weapon.
2. The most suitable method for the separation of uranium3.
In 1941, the Committee hastily endorsed a feasibility study in conjunction with the 
Scientific Advisory Committee of the War Cabinet, and the Chiefs of Staff. In September 
of that year, the Prime Minister4 asked Sir John Anderson5, to undertake personal 
responsibility for the supervision of the project, with the direction of the work being 
entrusted to the newly created Department of Scientific and Industrial Research (DSIR)6.
2 Originally under the Air Ministry and later under the 
Ministry of Aircraft Productions.
3 Uranium is the fundamental material in all atomic energy 
work, in particular uranium 238 (U238) and uranium 235 
(U235).
4 Winston Churchill.
5 Later Lord Waverley responsible for the Waverley Committee 
which undertook an evaluation of the transfer of atomic 
energy from the Ministry of Supply after the war.
6 A  newly created Directorate whose function was disguised 
under the name Directorate of Tube Alloys.
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In the meantime, independent, parallel atomic research was also underway in the United 
States, leading to a collaboration between the British and American scientific community. 
In late 1942, for reason of efficiency, it was decided that the slow neutron7 part of the 
British research should be transferred to the American team, which in turn, led to a further 
union in 1943, between the British and Canadian/French research establishments, under 
the direction of the National Research Council of Canada8. However, despite this new 
Anglo-Canadian/French alliance, both the American and British-Canadian research teams 
retained close working relationships, as a result, within a few months, further collaboration 
and consolidation was proposed, resulting in virtually all members of the slow neutron 
group being moved again, this time to Canada.
Later in the same year, after yet further discussions between Sir John Anderson, the 
American authorities, the Prime Minister and the President of the United States, it was 
decided for strategic, resource and security considerations to relocate the whole of the 
research and production of the atomic bomb to the U.S.A. (Jay 1954). Consequently, 
in 1943, the British research team moved en masse to the US, effectively putting a stop 
to any atomic energy research in the United Kingdom.
7 There are thermal and fast reactors. In thermal reactors 
the neutrons are slowed down by means of a moderator (such 
as carbon or hydrogen) to a state of equilibrium with their 
surrounding matter. Fast reactors contain no such moderator.
8 The Quebec Agreement (1943) enabled the UK to 
become involved in the Manhattan Project. It also 
laid down that the President would decide any sharing 
of post-war advantages. Subsequently, in September 
1944, President Roosevelt and the Prime Minister 
signed the Hyde Park Aide-Memoir which promised full 
collaboration between the two countries in the 
development of nuclear technology.
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Over the next three years, the success achieved by this scientific collaboration resulted in 
the translation of nuclear theory into engineering practice with the dropping of two atomic 
bombs on Japan in 19459. However, despite this co-operation (and the fact that the basic 
physics of atomic energy had been published in the scientific journals of 1938-19 3 9 10), 
only the Americans completely understood the technical methods by which the bomb had 
been produced (as they had contributed the greater part of scientific expertise) and only 
they had the knowledge necessary for delivery of the bomb, as they had built the plant and 
equipment leading to its development.
In 1945, after the death of Roosevelt, the American Government under President 
Truman, decided to limit access to atomic research, thereby restricting the amount of 
information and knowledge available to other countries. In 1946, the American Congress 
passed the US Atomic Energy Act (the McMahon Act), which resulted in the breakdown 
of Anglo-US-Canadian atomic co-operation and ended further collaboration.
9 Hiroshima 5th August 1945 (Uranium base) Nagasaki 
9th August 1945 (Plutonium base).
10 The results of splitting a uranium atom was discovered 
by two German scientists Otto Hahn and Fritz Strassman 
in 1938. Niels Bohr of Denmark and John Wheeler of 
Princeton published a theoretical explanation of the 
fission process in 1939. Meanwhile in Paris (1939) 
Joiiot Curie's team showed that spare neutrons were 
also released making a chain reaction possible. In
1940 two Austrian physicists, Lisa Meitner and Otto 
Frisch wrote a memorandum explaining the physical 
properties of nuclear fission.
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As a consequence of this incoming legislation and other factors11, the Prime Minister 
informed the House of Commons in 1945 that the Government had decided to set up its 
own research and development establishment at Harwell, covering all aspects of atomic 
energy within the UK., including the manufacture of plutonium12. From that date, ail work 
in this area was transferred from the DSIR to the Ministry of Supply.
Post Second World War
The Atomic Energy Bill was introduced into the House of Commons on the 1 st May 1946, 
and became law on 6th November 1946. The Atomic Energy Act gave the Minister of 
Supply wide powers to produce, use and dispose of atomic energy and also carry out 
research into any matters connected with atomic energy. Further, it empowered the 
Minister of Supply to make an Order (if necessary) prohibiting any activities connected 
with the production and use of atomic energy except under licence. However, the Act did 
not set up a Government monopoly as such; in the beginning the Government tried 
unsuccessfully to induce and encourage commercial firms to get involved in both the 
building and operation of atomic energy plants (Arnold 1975).
11 According to Arnold (1992) these factors included: 
the knowledge that there was no formal US commitment 
to defend the UK; the intensification of the Cold
War; the failure of the two year discussions on 
international control of atomic energy. Later, in 
1949, the detection (after testing) of the first 
Soviet bomb, and the 1950 Korean War, reaffirmed 
Attlee's belief that nuclear power was essential 
as a deterrent.
12 Plutonium was first manufactured in a laboratory in 1941 
by bombarding uranium with neutrons. In times of shortage 
of Uranium 235, plutonium can be recovered from the waste 
(spent fuel) of the nuclear reactors and mixed with ordinary 
uranium to make a fuel suitable for either power stations
or nuclear weapons.
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In early 1946, four key people responsible for the project were in place. Lord Portal of 
Hungerford, the wartime Chief of Air Staff accepted the position of atomic energy 
Controller in the Ministry of Supply; Dr. Cockcroft was appointed as Director of the 
research establishment at Harwell; Christopher Hinton13 became Head of Production 
Organization, responsible for the design and building of the nuclear plants, and the last 
member of the team, William Penney was entrusted with the making and testing of the 
atomic bomb. In the opinion of some (Gowring 1974; Arnold 1992), the achievements 
of these men (and their establishments), has gone down in nuclear social history as one of 
the most successful (technically productive) post war team efforts of that period.
However of particular importance to the project during this period, were Hinton and his 
engineering colleagues. Hinton's instructions were to build factories capable of carrying out 
four main processes:
1. To extract uranium metal (U 2 3 5 14) from uranium ore (natural uranium).
2. To irradiate the uranium metal in piles (in order to get plutonium).
3. To extract plutonium from the irradiated uranium and refine it by means of chemical 
reprocessing.
4. To separate uranium 235 by diffusion.
13 Hinton was a distinguished engineer who was lent from 
industry at the beginning of the war and by its end, 
was in charge of the building and operation of the Royal 
Ordnance Filling Factories. After the war he stayed on 
to run these factories down to a peacetime level, when 
he was invited to undertake responsibility for creating 
the new industry of atomic energy.
14 Uranium-235 as a fissile material, will split in the 
right circumstances and promote a chain reaction.
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In addition to building and constructing the factories, Hinton also had to take account of 
the geographical locations of the three sites, and the positioning of the headquarters15. 
Partly, this was to reduce vulnerability to the consequences of attack, but it was also to 
facilitate the appointment of contractors and design staff from any nearby existing heavy 
engineering and/or chemical industries.
Within six years says Arnold (1992:7), "men had been trained; sites found; a complex of 
factories designed, constructed and put into operation. There were plants to treat uranium 
ores, produce uranium metal and fabricate nuclear fuel elements; piles to produce 
plutonium; and chemical plants to produce irradiated fuel elements and extract and purify 
plutonium".
The first of these factories was based in Springfield, Lancashire, its task was to extract 
uranium from ore, to purify it and reduce it to metal. Following the completion of this 
process, the metal was cast into rods and encased in aluminium cans to form fuel elements.
In choosing the location for the second plant, Hinton opted for a relatively unpopulated 
area near Whitehaven which became known as the Windscale Works and was based near 
Sellafield in Cumberland. Prior to this, the land had been the home of a Second World 
War munitions factory and was at the time (1947), still owned by the Army. The nearby 
river Calder provided the necessary source of water for the plant and in addition, there
15 The headquarters of the production organization was situated 
in RIsley in Lancashire. From here the design, construction 
and operation of the three factories was planned.
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were already existing railway sidings as well as office and service buildings. The factory 
occupied some 300 acres.
The third factory was based at Capenhurst near Chester16. The task for this plant was to 
enrich the uranium by increasing the proportion of fissile uranium (Li-235). Enrichment 
had two purposes firstly, it allowed the recycling of depleted uranium (spent fuel) and 
secondly, high enrichment produced uranium suitable for both nuclear power stations and 
nuclear weapons.
In little more than six years since the original meeting of Cockcroft, Hinton and Penney, 
plutonium for the atomic bomb test had been delivered to Penney's staff. The first British 
nuclear device, code named Hurricane, was exploded on the Monte Bello Island off the 
north-west coast of Australia in October 1952.
In the early 1950s Churchill was persuaded that the work on nuclear energy should be
transferred from the Ministry of Supply to a new body set up for the task. In April 1953,
the Prime Minister appointed a committee to make its recommendations. In November
1953, the committee reported on 'The Future Organization of the United Kingdom
Atomic Energy Project, and in 1954, the Atomic Energy Act created the United Kingdom
Atomic Energy Authority. The White Paper stated:
....However crude and primitive our first nuclear power reactors may appear 
to future generations, we can look forward with confidence to the time when
16 Mr. Harold Disney (rather than Hinton) was in charge of 
the design of the diffusion plant, part of which came into 
operation at Capenhurst.
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industrial power from the atom will be a major factor....Indeed, it is not too much 
to say that the exploitation of nuclear energy may come to be regarded as the most 
important step taken by man in the mastery of nature since the discovery of fire"17
Sellafield
Probably of all the sites in this country, Windscale18 has proved the most controversial. 
Dominated by Pile 1 and 2, the first Pile (which began operation in October 1950) went 
critical in October 1951, the second Pile (which began operation in 1951) went critical 
the same year. Described by Hinton, as 'monuments to our initial ignorance', these events 
marked the beginning of a catalogue of incidents which have continued to undermine public 
confidence in nuclear safety.
Standing over 400 feet high, like vast chimney stacks, each pile contained a central core 
of graphite blocks with horizontally laid rows of approximately 170 tons of uranium metal 
held in some 70 ,000  aluminium cans (cartridges). The aim of the exercise was to 
transform the irritated uranium into plutonium. In addition to the two piles, there were 
also underwater storage facilities for the irradiated fuel discharged from the reactors (Pile 
Ponds), and de-canning sheds for stripping off the aluminium cans (in preparation for the 
separation of the irradiated uranium). Following de-canning, the chemical reprocessing 
plant (B204) continued the process of chemical separation and plutonium purification by 
isolating the plutonium, uranium and unwanted radioactive by-products.
17 Cmnd. 8948 HMSO, November 1953.
18 Hereafter Windscale will be referred to as 
Sellafield.
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Because of the large amount of heat generated by this process, cold air19 had to be blown 
over the reactors to keep them cool; it was then discharged through a filtered gallery built 
on top of the chimneys20. Known as the 'Cockcroft follies'21, these filters were later found 
to be totally inadequate, releasing far greater levels of radioactive particles22 into the 
environment than was ever realised or anticipated. In 1986, Dr. Derek Jakeman wrote to 
the British Medical Journal23 outlining the full extent of these emissions:
The release ...was substantial, consisting of thousands of millions of highly 
radioactive particles which were deposited within a few kilometres... predominately 
of long lived fission products...Large numbers of radioactive particles were found 
in gardens and homes, including the larders in Seascale. In 1955, when the 
particles were first found, only recently deposited activity was measured....no 
attempt was made to trace the full extent of the radioactivity within the local 
environment or the transfer to the food chain. A  decision to monitor was not taken 
until July 1957, some three years after the particles were believed to have been 
released.
19 The air flow from each chimney stack was approximately 
one ton per second at a flow rate of 20 miles per hour.
20 The central core becomes intensely radioactive when 
running and the cool air discharged is therefore also 
radioactive. The reason for having the chimneys 400 
feet high is to dilute any radioactivity before it 
reaches ground level.
21 Named after Sir John Cockcroft.
22 Including iodine, strontium and caesium. It 
was not until 1955 that the full extent of 
this long term leakage was realised, and only
then by chance, when Dr. Derek Jakeman, a Windscale 
employee happened to take a Geiger counter to his 
Seascale home. Further details of this event 
came out in the trial, see Chapter 4( 1) and 4(2) 
for additional information.
23 Jakeman, D. (1986) ,'New Estimates of Radioactive 
Discharges from Sellafield' British Medical Journal, 
293:760.
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He went on to say:
...levels of radioactivity in milk and other foods in the mid 1950s would have been 
extremely high at Seascale. They may have been more than ten times the maximum 
permissible levels in milk for one or two years....the cumulative dose received by
children may have been in the region of 50mSv [this] probably represents the
worst known example of exposure to radiation for members of the public from the
operation of a nuclear plant for the group of children born in the 1950s, this
dose could have exceeded that from natural background by a factor of 10.
The middle 1950s also saw the acknowledgement of another two major problems with
regard to the design and construction of the Sellafield plant. The first concerned, what
became known as 'Wigner energy'. Although it was recognized there was a growth of the
graphite core upon irradiation, another phenomenon, 'Wigner energy' had not been
realised. This related to a potential increase in energy (due to the displacement of atoms)
when the graphite was bombarded by neutrons. Unless this energy was released therefore,
it could accumulate in a spontaneous and potentially dangerous release of energy, perhaps
seriously over-heating the reactor.
The second problem was burst fuel cartridges. According to Arnold (1992:34), if a can 
burst, and "the uranium metal was exposed, it would oxidise, releasing fission products into 
the coolant air stream, contaminating the pile and perhaps - unless removed - causing a fire 
in the channel". In addition to burst cartridges however, cans could also get displaced or 
damaged, creating an equally serious situation24.
In one incident in 1955, part of a vital screening system which checked for burst cartridges 
inside the reactor was found to be sheared. According to Cutler and Edwards (1988:26),
24 This is particularly relevant to the litigation.
See Ch.4 for additional information.
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this necessitated "two hundred and fifty one volunteers crawling into the core in relays" in 
order to rectify the situation. Thirteen discharged fuel elements (instead of falling into the 
discharge duct and being removed in the skips) had overshot and lodged in the air duct. 
Large quantities of uranium/uranium oxide ranging from 150-600 days old were found at 
ground level in, and around the local environment (Arnold, 1992).
The first major accident however, occurred at Sellafield in October 1957 when, as a 
consequence of a fire at the reactor core, an estimated three tonnes of uranium was set 
alight, which over a two day period, resulted in the dispersal of radioactive particles 
throughout England, Wales, Ireland and Northern Europe (Busby 1995). In the 
immediate aftermath of the accident, iodine-131; xenon 133; strontium-90; caesium-137 
were identified as the main health concerns25. Subsequently however, in a number of 
ongoing reappraisals and reassessments between 1957-198826, other particles were also 
added to the list including: polonium-210; tellurium-132; ruthenium-106; tritium; cerium- 
144.
In reality the full impact of the health effects of the 1957 accident will probably never
25 Command Papers include: Cmnd 302 (1957); 
Cmnd 338 (1957); Cmnd 342 (1958); Cmnd 471 
(1958); Cmnd 1225 (1960).
26 Beattie, 1963; Hill, 1965; Taylor, 1981; 
Chamberlain, 1986; Bobrow, 1986; Clark, 1988, 
1989.
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be known. What is clear, is that until Chernobyl in 198627, this incident was regarded as
the worst nuclear accident in the world28. Arnold (1992:124), in her analysis of the
accident identifies several "possible and cumulative causes":
...There were failures of knowledge and research, especially on graphite. The piles 
were used for purposes not envisaged when they were designed and lacked adequate 
instrumentation. There were deficiencies in staffing, organization, management and 
communications. The whole project was overloaded with too many urgent and 
competing demands - to expand and extend military production, develop new 
reactor types and support an arguably over-ambitious civil programme.
She goes on:
..It seems clear that we cannot say exactly what started the 1957 fire, various 
scientists hold differing views on the probable cause: some favouring graphite, some 
Iithium-magnesium cartridges, some a uranium fuel element. From among the mass 
of data accumulated in the years after the accident, evidence can be found to 
support each of these. We may never know the answer, even when 
decommissioning of the pile is completed29. Whatever the initiating cause, the 
sequence of events in the pile core must have been highly complex and interactive.
During this period therefore, workers, their families and others from the local community 
were exposed to sources of environmental pollution emanating from the following areas:.
1. The Pile stacks themselves which carried to atmosphere the effluent cooling air 
together with radioactive gases and particles during the Pile operation.
27 The worst accident to date occurred at Chernobyl, 
in the Ukraine on 26th April 1986. The reactor 
had no containment building and the fire burned 
for several days. Radioactive contamination was 
severe across Europe. The full health impact of 
this accident is still being assessed.
28 A  US nuclear incident (the Three Mile Island 
accident at Harrisburg, Pennsylvania in March 1979) 
was regarded as another major event. However, because 
of better containment, the radioactive discharges
were minimal in comparison with the 1957 accident.
29 As a consequence of the 1957 fire the original 
Piles are now redundant and in the process of 
being decommissioned.
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2. The Pile Ponds in which irradiated fuel elements were stored underwater, 
resulting in corrosion and the consequent release of some of the content into the 
water.
3. The de-canning shed where operations involved raising the fuel cartridges 
thereby releasing radioactive droplets and gases into the atmosphere.
4. The chemical separation and plutonium purification plants in which uranium fuel 
was subjected to a number of chemical processes. Gaseous and other wastes were 
discharged to the atmosphere through a separate stack.
5. The fire in Pile No. 1 which lasted two days.... resulting in (a) uncontrolled 
release of gases and fine particles to the atmosphere, (b) run-off of contaminated 
water to Pile Ponds and via the run-off pipeline to the sea, (c) contamination of 
areas adjacent to the Pile building and areas surrounding the plant to distances of 
many kilometres30.
In 1977, at the Windscale Inquiry31, British Nuclear Fuels (BNFL) listed some 177
incidents which had taken place between 1950 and 1976. These included: "numerous
spillages of plutonium and other radioactive materials, the contamination of many
individual workers, and a series of fires, explosions and other mishaps" (Cutler and Edwards
1988:38). In addition to the inquiry, the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution32
had already notified the authorities of its concerns with regard to radwaste management:
The Windscale plant deals routinely with highly radioactive and dangerous materials 
and ...incidents....inevitably occur...Nevertheless, it is important at such a plant that
30 Reay and Hope judgment p. 5-6.
31 The Windscale Inquiry was set up in 1977 under 
the Chairmanship of Mr. Justice Parker to 
consider the setting up of the Thermal Oxide 
Reprocessing Plant (THORP) at Sellafield. The 
inquiry sat for 100 days, during which time 
two issues dominated. First, the scientific 
justification for reprocessing, secondly, 
radiological protection of the general public
and employees.
32 The Flowers Report 1976. Cmnd 6618.
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the highest standards of good housekeeping should be employed and we feel bound 
to say that we do not gain the impression that this was so at the time of our visit.
Further, and around the same time, excavation work at the site in 1976 revealed high 
levels of soil radiation as a consequence of a radioactive water leak from a concrete silo. 
The Nuclear Installation Inspectorate (N il) found that the leak may have started as far 
back as 1972. According to Cutler and Edwards (1988), and also May (1989), BNFL 
delayed informing the Energy Secretary of this incident for up to six weeks.
In 1981, the Health and Safety Executive (HSE)33 pointed out that nearly half the 
incidents at ail Britain's nuclear installations over the previous two years had taken place 
at Sellafield. In February 1986, Friends of the Earth (FOE) published an advertisement 
listing a total of 274  incidents at Sellafield between 1950-19 8 6 34.
In the 1980s however, two events in particular galvanized public opinion with regard to 
health and safety concerns around Sellafield. The first concerned a Yorkshire Television 
programme entitled 'Windscale - the Nuclear Laundry' which was broadcast on the evening 
of the 1st November 1983 and confirmed the high levels of childhood leukaemia around 
the Sellafield site. Because of the serious nature of the claim, and prior to the evening 
broadcast, the Prime Minister, aware of the potential impact of the programme, on the 
afternoon of the 1st November 1983, assured the public that the issues raised would be 
examined. On the 2nd November 1983 therefore, Mrs Thatcher ordered an immediate
33 HSE 'Windscale: The Management of Safety'.
34 The Guardian, February (1986).
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inquiry35 which was annbunced that afternoon by the Secretary of State for the 
Environment.
The second incident, which occurred nine days after the programme, involved the 
contamination of four Greenpeace divers who were taking radioactive samples near the end 
of the Sellafield pipeline. The divers, who had been working from a dingy off the 
Cumbrian coast intended to block Sellafield's underwater discharge pipe into the Irish Sea. 
When they emerged from the water however, Greenpeace's Geiger counters revealed 
serious high levels of contamination. As a consequence of this incident BNFL initially 
closed the Seascale beach for twenty four hours. Notwithstanding these measures, 
subsequent analysis by the Department of Environment resulted in several miles of local 
beaches being closed for a further nine months, and food produce and marine life requiring 
constant monitoring.
In Parliament, the Secretary of State for the Environment announced his intention of 
referring the matter to the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP). In August 1984, the 
DPP confirmed that BNFL were to be prosecuted on four counts under the Radioactive 
Substances Act 1960,si 3(1) and the Nuclear Installations Act 1965,s4(6)36. In June 
1985, the jury found BNFL guilty of failing to keep discharge records, failing to take all
35 The Advisory Committee under its Chairman, Sir 
Douglas Black later published the Black Report, 
'Investigation of the Possible Increased Incidence 
of Cancer in West Cumbria1.
36 This was the first time in the history of the nuclear 
industry that criminal proceedings have been brought.
33
reasonable steps to minimise exposure of persons to radiation, failing to keep operational 
records, and failing to keep discharges to a minimum.
Since 1988, Sellafield has suffered a further series of incidents including radioactive 
discharge, fires, employee contamination and on one occasion the plant had to be put on 
amber alert37 (May 1989). More recently (1990-1998), the Health and Safety 
Executive issued a number of statements concerning nuclear incidents at the Sellafield 
plant38, including: radioactive discharges of ruthenium 106, plutonium39, 
iodine-129; contamination of employees, wildlife, air, clean water, external plant walls, 
roofs, road surfaces; fires; failures of safety mechanisms such as cell shield doors, and on 
one occasion the plant was deemed sub-critical and shut down.
37 This indicates an emergency situation in which 
there is a threat to the whole plant.
38 'Statements of Nuclear Incidents' E:48:91; E2:92; 
E107:93; E1:93; E161:93; E142-.94; E85:94; E36:94; 
E51:95; E l00:95; El 20:96; El 69:96; E46:96; El:96; 
E l08:97; E67:98; El 61:98.
39 Plutonium of all the substances released 
from Sellafield is probably one of the most 
long lasting and dangerous. With a half 
life of 24,000 years (the time for half the 
atoms to disintegrate), it is estimated that 
the total world (approximately thirty nations) 
inventory of plutonium, is about 1239 tonnes 
(Royal Society, 1998), of which 100 tonnes is 
in the UK.
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Today, Sellafield still produces large quantities of high level40, medium level41 and low 
level42 waste. Until recently Sellafield's radioactive disposal (as in the 1950s), included 
sea dumping43 of radioactive waste through the great pipeline (two and half miles long) 
into the Irish Sea, and later, land burial44 of waste at Drigg (south of Windscale) which has 
taken place since 1959. Currently the UK has a waste burden second only to the USA, 
which according to Blowers (1998:3) accounts for nearly 17% of the global total. 
Although twenty years ago, the Flowers Report (197 6 )45 made it clear that any expansion 
of the nuclear programme should be dependant on safe containment of radioactive waste,
40 High level (heat generating) waste are defined
in the UK as those wastes in which the temperature 
may rise significantly as a result of their 
radioactivity.
41 Intermediate (medium) level wastes are wastes 
which exceed the boundaries of low level waste, 
but which do not require heating to be taken into 
account in the design and storage of disposal 
facilities.
42 Low level wastes, are wastes containing radioactive 
materials other than those acceptable for dustbin 
disposal (very low level). These may include 
combustible (packaging, safety clothing) or
non combustible (redundant plant items).
43 Sea dumping remained at the heart of both military 
and civil radwaste disposal policy until 1983. 
According to Elsworth (1990:299) the Irish Sea had a 
"quarter to one-third of a tonne of highly radioactive 
plutonium" pumped into it from Sellafield. In addition 
there was also sea-dumping of radioactive material 
wrapped in concrete or steel containers accounting for 
"67,337 tonnes of waste" dropped from the side of a 
ship.
44 There are burial sites at Drigg (south of Windscale) 
where low level radioactive waste has been buried 
in shallow soil trenches since 1959.
45 Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution
(1976) Cmnd 6618.
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there is still no decision on the best method of disposal46, or where any potential repository 
should be based. Sellafield, although the favoured option by the nuclear industry was 
turned down by John Gummer, Secretary of State in 1997, in light of 'scientific 
uncertainties and technical deficiencies'.
Apart from being the main producer and storer of solid waste, Sellafield also gives rise to 
"the largest liquid and gaseous discharges of all British nuclear sites" (Berkhout 
1991:134). According to Busby (1995), over sixty per cent of the total exposure dose 
from isotopic waste to the European community also comes from Sellafield.
For people living near any hazardous plant, the principal consideration is the risk to 
themselves and their families. As far as Sellafield is concerned, the main hazard for the 
local community and those employed by the nuclear industry is exposure to ionising 
radiation. Despite being one of the most regulated and controlled toxic substances 
worldwide, there are no guarantees that ionising radiation is safe, or that the current 
protection standards are adequate. As Caufield (1989:xii) says, "There are still 
unanswered questions about the genetic effects of radiation, about its behaviour at very low 
doses, and about its link to cancer".
46 Consensus of opinion is concentrating on deep geological 
disposal, particularly for the longer-lived wastes.
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1.2 POTENTIAL HEALTH EFFECTS RESULTING FROM EXPOSURE TO IONISING
RADIATION
Although a naturally occurring phenomenon47, ionising radiation, particularly from artificial 
sources such as nuclear power48 probably engenders more fear than any other hazard in 
the environment. According to Professor Blowers (1998:1), the impact, whether it arises 
from deliberate, accidental or routine releases of radioactivity generates greater anxiety 
than "any other socially induced risk in the modern world". Increasingly regarded as a 
'dread risk' (Slovic et ai. 1980), radiation is perceived of as something insidious and 
invisible which, through pathways of water, atmosphere and the food chain pollutes the 
environment, covering wide areas and crossing all national boundaries.
In addition to the anxiety created by radioactivity however, McEIveen and Eddy 
(1984:29) also identify cancer, "a disease characterized by the progressive and 
unrestrained growth of populations of abnormal ceils, [as] ...probably the most feared 
disease". First and foremost this is because "cancer is frequently fatal, and when it is not, 
it requires aggressive and expensive therapy.... Second, over the last several decades, 
cancer has become an increasingly common cause of death and disease. Third, despite the 
expenditure of billions on research, the causes of cancer in humans are really not known, 
nor are the mechanisms by which cancer develops" (Ibid).
47 Natural radiation includes cosmic rays from outer 
space, soils and rocks, and potassium in foods.
48 Other artificial sources include medical, 
occupational and miscellaneous sources 
such as air travel, domestic smoke 
detectors, coal burning.
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Notwithstanding the lack of consensus over the causes of cancer, most scientists 
acknowledge the potential carcinogenicity of high doses of ionising radiation49. When it 
comes to exposure at lower doses of radiation however, the data becomes more ambiguous 
with the immediate and long term effects of any correlation becoming less certain.
Therefore, while it is recognised that all doses of ionising radiation, however small, may 
represent a risk to health, radiation-dose limits at the lower end, are set according to what 
are deemed... a socially acceptable level of risk - "usually a probability of death in one year 
of between 1:100,000 and 1:1,000,000" (Berkhout 1991:3). In calculating levels of 
risk and probabilities, such assessments are compounded by problems of definition with
49 All matter is made up of atoms. Each atom contains a 
nucleus consisting of protons and neutrons, around which 
revolve electrons. The electrons are negatively charged 
and move at high speeds. They are attracted to the protons 
which are positively charged. The neutrons are electrically 
neutral. Some nuclide are unstable, that is, they do not 
readily maintain their number of protons and neutrons in the 
nucleus. On losing protons, they are then converted into 
nuclide of a different element. Radioactive decay 
(radiation) is produced in the process of a nuciide making 
its transformation towards a more stable state. Ionisation 
is the process whereby, as a consequence of radioactive decay, 
there is a release of radioactive particles and electromagnetic 
waves which interact with matter in their path. It is this transfer 
of energy that cause damage. The main effect of this loss of energy is 
the disturbance of (negatively charged) electrons in the atoms of 
the substance in the path of the radiation. This disturbance may 
result in the atoms themselves losing electrons and becoming positive 
ions.
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regard to radiation terms50, concepts of dose51 and spatial variations52. For this reason 
distinctions are made between non-stochastic effects53, and stochastic effects54 and somatic 
effects (on the individual) and genetic effects55.
Therefore, while there is broad agreement that ionising radiation has the capacity to induce 
cancer, both the damage caused and the extent of the damage will depend upon the 
intensity and the type of radiation, as well as the time over which it was received.
50 Different types of unit are used to measure radiation and 
its effects. The quantity of radioactivity emitted = the 
becquerel (Bq) represents a direct measurement of the 
number of radioactive disintegrations per second. The 
biological effects produced on exposure to radiation at 
high levels = gray (Gy) (old unit = rads).
For low levels of radiation exposure the sievert (Sv) (which 
replaced the rem in 1977) is used. The Sv is a method by which 
the absorbed dose can be converted into a biological dose 
equivalent. A  miilisievert (mSv) is one thousandth of a sievert.
51 The "committed effective dose equivalent" is a composite 
figure in which all the doses from different types of 
radiation to different organs are combined. The "collective 
dose" is the individual dose equivalents and the number of 
individuals exposed. The "collective" dose commitment is 
the dose commitment multiplied by the number of individuals 
in the specified population.
52 Differences in geology, altitude, latitude can ail affect 
background as well as manmade radiation levels.
53 For non-stochastic effects, a minimum radiation dose 
(threshold) has to be exceeded. Effects occur within 
days or weeks after exposure.
54 Stochastic effect of radiation are usually delayed 
and do not appear for several years. There is no 
threshold dose.
55 The hereditary or genetic effects of ionising 
radiation are those which, while not being expressed in 
the irradiated individual, are transmitted to his or her 
children through alternations in chromosomes within the 
genetic material.
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Different forms of radiation (Alpha, Beta, Gamma, Neutron) have different abilities to 
travel and therefore different penetrative effects on the human body. Alpha emitting 
particles, although one of the least penetrative, poses particularly serious health risks if 
absorbed into the body through an open wound or inhaled, or swallowed. Beta particles, 
while a hundred times more penetrative than Alpha particles (like Alpha particles) can also 
be stopped by relatively thin layers of water, glass or metal, but again, can be hazardous 
if taken into the body. Gamma rays (electromagnetic energy waves at higher frequency 
than light or X-rays) in contrast to Alpha and Beta rays, go through almost anything before 
being absorbed and therefore, because of their particularly penetrative affect, require thick 
layers of lead or concrete to prevent serious health risk. Neutron rays unlike Alpha, Beta 
or Gamma radiation do not cause ionisation directly. Indirectly however, ionising may 
occur as a consequence of neutron particles colliding with other atoms causing the struck 
atom to disintegrate and release a host of radioisotopes into the atmosphere which may 
create a potentially lethal cocktail.
Therefore, the common factor with all radioactive material is that it is unstable, it decays 
(giving off alpha, beta or gamma radiation) and eventually becomes stable again56 (thereby 
losing its harmful effects). However, it is the rate at which the different forms of 
radioactivity decays that is so important in respect of the human body. While some forms 
of radioactive material become harmless relatively quickly, other types take longer to
56 See Footnote 49 for an explanation of the 
decaying process.
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decay, thus remaining active for much longer periods57. An important consideration for 
long-lived materials is whether they become lodged in the human body or are rapidly 
excreted through normal biological processes. The amount of material received externally, 
in addition to the materials retained in the body represents the 'effective dose'58. The 
'effective dose', the 'sievert'59, is particularly relevant as a 'larger dose unit' in assessing 
'acute' radiation biological damage (as for example in the case of Hiroshima or Nagasaki), 
but is not appropriate, for measuring exposure to individuals in non-acute circumstances. 
For this reason effects on individuals of non-acute exposure are usually measured in 
millisieverts (mSv), one thousandths of a sievert, and it is this lower level of exposure that 
is of primary concern at Sellafield.
In order to appreciate the impact of different doses of radiation on the whole body, Bertell 
(1985:42-43) identifies the probable health effects resulting from acute exposure to 
ionising radiation as:
(10 sievert and above) Immediate Death (Frying of the Brain).
57 For instance Plutonium 239 has a half life of 
24,400 years; Caesium 137 - 30 years; Iodine 131 
- 2 hours.
58 Effective dose is defined by the HSE (1992:15) 
as the "energy absorbed in body tissues, modified 
to allow for the different effect on the body of 
different kinds of radiation and for the different 
sensitivity of different organs of the body".
59 The 'Sievert' is named after Rolf Sievert of Sweden, 
who in 1925 estimated the dose of Natural Background 
Radiation (NBR), that people were exposed to each year. 
This dose was reached without experimentation, or 
scientific evidence. On the basis of this figure,
he later proposed that manmade radiation should be 
linked to levels of NBR radiation. A  principle that 
has been followed ever since.
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(6 to 10 sievert) Death: 10 Davs
(weakness, nausea, vomiting and diarrhoea followed by apparent improvement. After 
several days; fever, diarrhoea, blood discharge from the bowels, haemorrhage of the 
larynx, trachea, bronchi or lungs, vomiting of blood and blood in the urine).
(2 .5 to 6 sievert) Death: 50% Victims within 5 weeks
(nausea, vomiting, diarrhoea, epilation, weakness, malaise, vomiting of blood, bloody 
discharge from the bowels or kidneys, nose bleeding, bleeding from gums and genitals, 
subcutaneous bleeding, fever, inflammation of the pharynx and stomach, and menstrual 
abnormalities. Marked destruction of the bone marrow, lymph nodes and spleen causing 
decreases in blood cells especially granulocytes and thrombocytes).
A t the non-acute level, effects on the body may not be immediately noticeable. The
number of red and white blood cells may be reduced, damage to reproductive organs may
occur. There may be premature aging, a shortened lifespan and genetic injury60. In
contrast to immediate effects therefore, long term somatic/genetic effects are more
difficult to determine, with some organs of the human body being more susceptible than
others. For example, while the kidneys, bladder and cartilage in a healthy adult absorb
relatively low amounts of radioactivity, the reproductive organs, liver, eyes and red bone
marrow are more sensitive. Also, children, the elderly, those with an already compromised
immune system and foetuses are always at greater risk. Bertell identifies the impact at
lower levels of exposure as:
(1.5 to 2.5 sievert) Shortened Life Expectancy
(nausea and vomiting on the first day. Diarrhoea and probable skin burns. Apparent 
improvement for about two weeks thereafter. The healthy adult recovers to somewhat 
normal health in about three months. He or she may have permanent health damage, may 
develop cancer or benign tumours, and will probably have a shortened lifespan. Foetal or 
embryonic death if pregnant. Genetic and teratogenic effects. Possible sterility for up to
60 The genetic material of the 46 chromosomes 
may be damaged by radiation. Experiments 
on fruit flies and mice have shown the 
development of abnormalities in the offspring 
of those exposed. See C.4(5) for further 
discussion.
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three years).
(0.5 to 1.5 sievert) Shortened Life Expectancy
(less severe radiation and burns, spontaneous abortion or stillbirth if pregnant; long term, 
possible benign or malignant tumours, premature ageing, shortened lifespan, genetic 
damage).
(0.1 to 0 .5  sievert) Risk of Tumours and Genetic Damage
(most people experience little or no immediate reaction. Sensitive individuals may 
experience radiation sickness; long term possible ageing, genetic effects and some risk of 
tumours).
(under 0.1 sievert) No immediate Health Effects
long term effect may include premature aging, some off spring mutation, risk of tumours 
later in life).
Appreciation of the hazards of radiation exposure can be traced back to the early pioneers 
in nuclear physics (and subsequent work) which highlighted concern over the effects of 
radiation caused to both radiographers and patients61. As a consequence of this 
recognition, the International Congress on Radiology was set up in 1925 with the aim of 
standardizing units and maximising doses of radiation. Today, every country with a nuclear 
industry has at least one regulatory agency overseeing radiological protection at national 
level, while at international level, the United Nations has a minimum of four agencies 
concerned with radiation exposure62.
Central to international standards, and having primary importance however, the 
International Commission on Radiological Protection was set up in 1928 to make
61 The first organization to consider evidence of damaging 
biological effects was the British X-ray and Radium 
Protection Committee (1921), which set standards for 
the protection of those employed in the medical 
application of X-rays and radium.
62 The Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic 
Radiation, the World Health Organization, the 
International Atomic Energy Agency and the UN 
Environment Programme.
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proposals, and offer advice, on risk assessment guidelines. Because of its autonomy from 
governments, and the international and professional standing of its membership, the ICRP's 
recommendations have always been relied on by the global scientific community. However, 
after the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the ICRP really came into its own. From 
deciding risks of exposure on behalf of themselves and their colleagues, its remit extended 
to recommending standards for nuclear employees as well as the public at large. 
According to Caufield (1989), the aftermath of the Second World War therefore marked 
a watershed for the ICRP, from a body concerned with technical judgments, to one 
concerned with political judgment. The ICRP's risk assessment model derives from existing 
data and the expertise of their own membership (a select, self appointed body of fewer 
than 50 international scientists who are chosen from the ICRP's own sub-committees such 
as The International Congress of Radiology and other selected agencies63).
Since 1955 the ICRP has produced a number of recommendations regarding maximum 
permissible doses of radiation exposure to individuals and whole populations. In the 
beginning the ICRP calculated cancer deaths in excess of those which would have occurred 
anyway and identified permissible levels of dose to individuals based on background 
radiation levels. However, by the middle 1960s, after some criticism, the ICRP (1966:9) 
were making:
 the cautious assumption that any exposure to radiation may carry some risk for
63 The environmental movement has continually 
questioned the closed membership of the ICRP, 
as well as their lack of public accountability.
O f particular concern is the fact all members 
have a professional interest in supporting and 
promoting the use of nuclear technology.
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the development of somatic effects, including ieukaemia and other malignancies, 
and of hereditary effects. The assumption is made that, down to the lowest levels 
of the dose, the risk of increasing disease or disability increases with the dose 
accumulated by the individual. This assumption implies that there is no wholly 
"safe" dose of radiation. The Commission recognizes that this is a conservative 
assumption, and that some effects may require a minimum or threshold dose. 
However, in the absence of positive knowledge, the Commission believes that the 
policy of assuming a risk of injury at low doses is the most reasonable basis for 
radiation protection.
In the 1970s new theories on the aetiology of cancer64 coupled with a growing rejection 
of an 'acceptable threshold dose' resulted in fundamental changes to the assessment of 
biological risk as a consequence of radiation exposure. The effect of this knowledge was 
twofold, first, it brought into being the concept of risk as regards radiation protection. 
Second, it resulted in a re-evaluation of existing quantitative regulations within a risk-benefit 
analysis. This process led to the publication of new recommendations by the ICRP (which 
still forms the basis of radiation protection today65), and have been adopted by the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA66), incorporated in a European Community 
Directive67, and following National Radiological Protection Board (NRPB)
64 In particular, somatic-cell mutation theory and 
microscopic cell damage and division to sensitive 
genetic material.
65 The Radioactive Substances Act 1993 (which 
consolidated a number of amendments to the 1960 
Act) made no references to the revised principles 
upon which the ICRP make their recommendations. 
However, various White Papers (Cmnd. 8607 &  
Cmnd 9852), in addition to the NRPB endorsed 
the 1977 and 1990 ICRP recommendations.
66 IAEA, Basic Safety Standards for Radiation Protection, 
Vienna, IAEA Safety Series No. 9 (1982).
67 Council Directive of 15 July 1980 amending the 
Directives laying down the basic safety standards 
for the health protection of the general public and 
workers against the dangers of ionising radiation.
O ff J Eur Communities, 23 No. L246 17-09-80.
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advice68, included in a Government White Paper on Radioactive Waste Management69.
The principle upon which the ICRP recommendations are based, is that risks to individuals 
and to the general public should be kept to acceptable levels. In order to achieve this 
objective, ICRP recommend a system of dose limitation which has three main 
requirements:
(a) justification - no practice involving the use of radiation shall be adopted unless its 
introduction is judged to produce a net positive benefit;
(b) optimization - all exposures to ionising radiation shall be kept as low as reasonably 
achievable (ALARA), economic and social factors being taken into account; and
(c) dose limitation - the radiation dose to individuals shall not exceed the limits 
recommended by the International Commission on Radiological Protection. 
(ICRP: 1977).
This system applies to all practices involving radiation exposure, with the exception that 
the quantitative dose limits do not apply to medical irradiation, exposure to natural 
background radiation or accident situations.
Although optimization of protection of the public has been identified as the requirement 
having paramount importance (NRPB 1977; Berkhout 1991; Mountfield 1991). Since
68 NRPB, Recommendations of the International Commission 
on Radiological Protection (ICRP Publication 26): Statement 
by the NRPB on their acceptability for application in the UK.
(1977). NRPB, The application of ICRP recommendations: 
Advice to the expert group reviewing the White Paper 
Cmnd. 884 "The control of radioactive wastes" (1978).
69 Great Britain Command Paper: Cmnd 8607.
Radioactive Waste Management (1982).
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the publication of the ICRP recommendations, other factors have also been put forward 
with regard to the practical application of the ALARA principle, and the financial cost of 
protection70 for public, and nuclear employees71.
Mountfield (1991 ), in evaluating the cost-benefit analysis, wonders whether this balancing 
of the financial cost as against, protection of public (and the cost of further dose 
reduction), has resulted in an underlying acceptance by the ICRP, the nuclear industry and 
its regulatory body of what has been termed the de minimis approach72 (Clark 1985; 
Lindell 1985); this approach correlates the level of risk, with level of dose. If the risk 
involved is regarded by the nuclear industry as trivial or negligible in proportion to the 
financial cost, then the risk will be tolerated. The adoption of this approach may help 
explain the gradually move in principle from: "exposure to ionising radiation shall be kept 
as low as reasonably achievable" (ALARA), to the more ambiguous "as low as reasonably
70 Mr. David Alton when sitting on the Environmental Select 
Committee (13th May 1985) questioned Mr. C. Allday 
of BNFL with regard to information he and other committee 
members had received at the Sellafield Plant. Members 
were informed that it costs £1 /4  billion to save two lives.
7} NRPB, Cost-benefit analysis in the optimisation of protection 
of radiation workers. (1982) Clark, M.J. Optimisation of the 
radiological protection of the public. NRPB-R120 (1981). ICRP, 
Cost Benefit analysis in the optimisation of radiation protection. 
ICRP Publication 37. Ann ICRP. 10 No.2/3 (1983).
72 Adapted from "de minimis non curat lex" (the law does 
not concern itself with trivialities) which in turn is 
possibly a corruption from "de minimis non curat praetor" 
the prosecutor is not concerned with triviality.
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practicable" (ALARP), to, by the "best practical means" (BPM)73.
Critics of the ICRP argue that the assessment of risk and international protection standards
should not reside in a small, non-elected group of scientists, who effectively disregard and
marginalise any contrary scientific opinion. In a letter to a fellow ICRP member in 1971,
Bo Lindel, the ICRP's then Vice Chairman acknowledged such criticisms when he said:
We react like mechanical puppets or like insects shown a stimulus triggering 
reactions, when we are faced with statements or ideas which are not branded with 
the mark of the old truth. Should we not instead be curious and appreciative? 
News media in the USA and throughout the world are full of records of a debate 
which was started by insignificant contributors but has been carried on persistently 
by individuals such as Sternglass, Gofman and Tamplin74. In the ICRP records, 
these persons hardly exist and we have reacted in a very highbrow and rather a 
stupid way....Who are we that we can afford to smile at this from our lofty 
distance...To the outsider it looks like a well protected mafia of big power interests, 
operating without being scrutinized and criticized75.
73 ALARA, ALARP, BPM all relate to discharge limit 
requirements authorised by various bodies 
including: Department of Environment (DOE),
Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food 
(MAFF) (under the Radioactive Substances Act 1960), 
and the ICRP/NRPB. According to the Environment 
Committee 1985-86 Report Vol 1, p. xxi these.... 
"serve no useful purpose either as a meaningful 
guide to the plant operator as to how much 
radioactivity can be routinely discharged to the 
environment, or as a discipline on the plant 
operators to keep discharges down".
74 Lauriston Taylor one of the founders of the ICRP 
and an avid supporter of the radiation protection 
establishment dismissed dissenters such as Dr.
E. Sternglass (University of Pittsburgh), Dr. ]ohn 
Gofman (Associate Director of the Lawrence Livermore 
Laboratory), Dr. Arthur Tamplin an associate of Dr. 
Gofman, as pseudo, one time scientists; no longer 
part of the radiation protection community.
75 Cited by Caufield (1989:171). This letter from
Lindel appears in S. Lauriston Taylor (1979) 
'Organization for Radiation Protection1 10-389.
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According to Caufield (1989 :178), the public evaluates its own assessment of'acceptable'
risk upon the basis of its confidence in the nuclear authorities representing them. In the
case of radiation protection standards she believes:
 public confidence in nuclear officialdom has been declining for the past 30
years, largely due to the public's repeated discoveries that it has been lied to. 
Lauriston Taylor's (ICRP) argument 'that at the time information was concealed or 
distorted, there were considered to be acceptable political or economic reasons to 
warrant it', offers no comfort to those who fear they that they are still not getting 
the whole story.
Currently, the ICRP recommends a maximum dose for members of the public (excluding
Natural Background Radiation (NBR) and medical exposure) of 5 mSv per year (1977),
which by 1985, had been reduced to 1 mSv per year76. The occupational recommended
level is a maximum of 50 mSv per year77. Following revised estimates from the ICRP
however, the Health and Safety Executive (HSE), acting on the advice of the NRPB
recently published revised guidelines on dose limitation under which the doses received by
workers should be "limited to 20 mSv per annum or less"(HSE: 1992:21).
Today, the majority of risk estimates arrived at by the ICRP and other agencies depend on
data from five problematic sources (Sumner 1987).
The survivors of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings which were collected from 
October 1950.
Radiation in Medicine.
76 However, it is permissible to use the dose limit 
of 5 mSv in a year for some years, provided that 
the average annual committed effective dose 
equivalent over a lifetime does not exceed 1 mSv 
a year.
77 Exposure levels for radiation workers are based on the 
assumption that there is employee selection criteria for fit 
and healthy people able to withstand higher exposure rates. 
Further that workers know the risk they are taking.
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Occupational Exposure.
Natural Background Radiation.
Chernobyl.
The A-Bomb Studies
It is difficult to estimate with any accuracy the total number of deaths that followed the 
dropping of the atomic bombs (Little Boy on Hiroshima on the 6th August 1945, and Fat 
Man, three days later on Nagasaki). What is clear, is that in addition to the chaos 
that one might expect from weapons of such destruction, early evaluation of the impact 
of the bombs was compounded by the various restrictions placed on investigations by the 
occupying forces. From 1945 until 1951, the General Headquarters of the Allied Forces 
also prohibited any publications, including the release of medical data, outside its own 
control. Therefore, figures in the first four days after the bombing of Hiroshima, of 
118,661 people dead, and another 30,524 severely injured within 5 km of the centre 
of the explosion78, must be taken on trust.
Further, despite early denials of long term radiation effects (Beral 1985; Busby 1995), 
by 1947, the US Government had designated 'Fishcake Castle' in Hiroshima as its 
headquarters for the Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission (ABCC). Set up in 1948 with 
the explicit aim of studying the effects of the bombing on survivors and their children, the 
ABCC still exists, now under a different name, the Radiation Effects Research Foundation
78 Committee for the Compilation of Materials on
Damaged Caused by the Atomic Bombs in Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki, 1981:113.
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(RERF)79.
Notwithstanding official restrictions and early denials however, other factors such as the 
lack of any systematic studies of survivors until five years after the bombings80 also cast 
doubt on the accuracy of the records. As a consequence of this delay, several cases 
(particularly those involving genetic mutations resulting in possible spontaneous/deliberate 
abortions, stillbirths or infant deaths) may have been missed or omitted from the research 
altogether.
Another group, also suspected of being under-reported were exposed people, labelled by 
the derogatory term, 'hibakusha'81. Many A-bomb survivors, aware of growing 
discrimination, moved away from the area to avoid any stigma/shame to their relatives of 
having their name associated with any possible hereditary degeneration of the family line82.
79 Two scientists particularly involved with the 
ABCC Study from its inception were Professor 
J. Neel (from 1948) and Professor J. SchuII 
(from 1950). Both men made a significant 
impact on the Court when they appeared as 
defendant expert witnesses in the Reay and Hope 
trial.
80 Missing years are significant, particularly since 40%  
of the excess leukaemias and other cancers appeared 
in the first five years of exposure.
81 Damaged bomb people.
82 Moving from the bombed areas in the early days 
meant that the hibakusha could conceal any live 
births and/or subsequent infant deaths from 
the authorities.
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To complicate the situation, other factors such as individual differences to exposure 
sensitivity; doses from fallout; the impact of increased radioactivity on natural background 
radiation (NBR) levels; and synergism (a joint or co-related action of two or more 
influences on the human body) were not included in the original research. Added to 
which, accurate patient records, access to trained medical personnel, and the procurement 
of any diagnostic equipment were fraught with difficulties in post-war japan, casting yet 
further doubt on the reliability of the data.
Regardless of these uncertainties however, the A-bomb study is nonetheless regarded as 
one of the most comprehensive surveys of its type ever undertaken. Today, five decades 
later, results from the 41 ,000 Japanese survivors83 are still relied on by the nuclear 
industry, nuclear agencies and the ICRP, as a primary research base for consideration in 
assessment of radiation protection standards.
Radiation in Medicine
There are four main uses of radiation:- Diagnostic radiology84, Nuclear medicine85, Dental 
radiography86 Radiotherapy87 (Sumner 1987:65). Patients receiving radiation for either
83 Ackland, L. Radiation: how safe is safe?
New Scientist 5th May 1993, 1873:34.
84 X-ray pictures of various part of the body.
85 The use of radionuclides for diagnosis.
86 X-rays pictures of teeth.
87 The use of ionising radiation in the treatment of 
cancer.
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diagnosis or treatment form by far the largest component of artificial radiation to the 
general public accounting for between 87 per cent and 90 per cent of all non-NBR levels.
Although providing an essential data base on the biological effects of ionising radiation, 
some of the most valuable information, according to Caufield (1989:15) comes "from 
studies of large groups of people needlessly irradiated for minor problems". Among the 
various benign conditions treated with radiation between 1949-1960 were "ringworm, 
acne, birthmarks, bursitis, and sinusitis" (Caufield 1989:141).
One of the most influential studies highlighting the potential harmful effects of medical X- 
rays was a British survey of more than 14,000 people who were subjected to radiation 
treatment from the 1930s to the 1950s for ankylosing spondylitis88. Researchers found 
significant numbers of leukaemia deaths (60 as opposed to the 5.4 deaths expected in such 
a population), twice the number of lung cancer rates, and increased levels of stomach 
cancer (Caulfield 1989).
Women with benign gynaecological conditions were also subject to radiation treatment, 
with many dying later of leukaemia and cancer of the intestine89. Other studies, 
such as the one carried out by Alice Stewart in 195890 showed that babies whose mothers
88 Although a painful spinal condition, ankylosing 
spondylitis is not fatal. Court Brown, W.M. SC 
Doll, R. BM] Vol 5474 (1965) 1327-1332.
89 National Academy of Sciences (1977) Vol 1, 5.
90 Stewart, A. 'A  Survey of Childhood Malignancies', 
British Medical loumal (1958) 1 1495.
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had pelvic X-rays while pregnant were also particularly vulnerable, suffering an increased 
risk of developing leukaemia later in life.
Today it is recognised that any X-ray taken for diagnostic purposes includes some risk of 
causing cancer. The BMA (1990) state that the average dose of X-ray used in diagnosis 
is about 0 .7  mSv taken as the effective whole body dose. The risk of causing a fatal cancer 
in a man of 40 years on the basis of this dosage is estimated to be 1:250,000. However, 
according to Shrimpton et al. (1986 ), somebody having a barium meal procedure in 
which a patient swallows barium sulphate and is X-rayed as the sulphate moves through the 
stomach and intestine is at far greater risk (breast 2.25 mSv; lung 8.65 mSv; ovaries 3.60  
mSv; red bone marrow 2 .60  mSv).
When it comes radiation treatment, exposure will depend on diagnosis, disease, hospital, 
make of equipment, age of equipment. What is clear, is that radiation dosage used in 
radiotherapy is far higher than dosage used for diagnostic purposes. Often radiotherapy 
results in burning of the skin, nausea, loss of weight, hair loss, impaired fertility. A  person 
subject to radiotherapy therefore, may well exceed all international dosimetry guidelines. 
Such doses are justified on the basis that both the doctor and patient agree that the benefits 
of high radiation exposure outweigh any potential risks involved.
Occupational Exposure
According to the Reich (1991:159), within most organizations, there is a gap between 
"potential problem discoverers and problem resolvers", with the result that both private
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and public institutions (whether by accident or design) may delay discovery and response
to toxic contamination of their workforce. Agreeing with the view of the US Occupational
Safety and Health Administration that:
The goals of occupational safety and health are not adequately served if employers 
do not fully share the available information on toxic materials and physical agents 
with employees.
and that:
 lack of information has too often meant that occupational diseases and methods
for reducing exposure have been ignored and employees have been unable to 
protect themselves or obtain adequate information from their employers91
Reich goes on to highlight the closed policy of many corporations, and their reluctance to 
disclose any information about, or to their workforce, which may expose employers to 
financial liability.
Despite evidence dating back to the 1890s on the occupational risks of radiation exposure 
(uranium miners, radiologists, X-ray tube makers, scientists, doctors, radiation dial painters, 
military personnel92), the nuclear industry has been less than candid with employees over 
the possible long terms effects of radiation induced injury. Indeed, it was only in 1982 
that BNFL conceded the setting up of a 'mortality' based Compensation
91 US Occupational Safety and Health Administration
21 ]uly 1978. 'Access to employee exposure and medical 
records'. Proposed Rule - Federal Register 43:31371.
92 Studies include: NRPB (1976); Smith and Doll (1981); 
Aoyama et al. (1983); Mancuso, Kneale and Stewart (1977); 
Gofman (1979); Tolley et al. (1983); Beral et al. (1985); 
Darby, Doll and Pike 1985); Smith and Douglas (1986); 
Darby and Doll (1987).
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Scheme for Radiation Linked Diseases93, which in 1987, was finally extended to include 
non-fatal cases94.
Notwithstanding the introduction of employee compensation schemes however, it is always 
possible to manipulate occupational data, thereby minimizing the full extent of 
occupational illness. In the opinion of Draper (1991 :4 1), identifying a workers condition 
as arising from either personal habit or genetic disposition is increasingly relied on. Other 
practices include "highlighting smoking effects95, excluding non-whites96 and excluding old 
people97 from cancer studies". By omitting these people from analysis, researchers are able
93 BNFL set up the Compensation Scheme in 1982, and in 
1987 at the same time as the Scheme was extended to 
include non-fatal cases, the UKAEA joined. In 1993 
Nuclear Electric and Scottish Nuclear Ltd. joined.
In 1994, the Ministry of Defence and the Atomic 
Weapons Establishment joined. Other associated 
companies linked to BNFL are also affiliated to 
the Scheme. Currently the main operators of the 
UK nuclear industry are members of the Compensation 
Scheme.
94 Cancers now recognised under the Scheme include 
leukaemia (not Chronic lymphatic leukaemia - CLL), 
thyroid cancer, respiratory cancers, cancer of other 
tissues and skin cancer (not malignant melanoma).
95 Smoking is held to be the cause for cancers rather 
than any occupational hazard. Exposure to a known 
occupational carcinogen is rejected even as confounding 
factor.
96 Non-whites perform a higher proportion of hazardous 
jobs and in addition suffer from inequality in health 
care resulting in a higher cancer mortality (and illness) 
than whites.
97 Exclusion of old people removes a large percentage 
of the working population who have been exposed for 
long periods and are therefore more likely to have 
cancer induced from occupational hazards.
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to produce statistics which suggest a low ievel of occupational disease, birth defects and 
mortality emanating from the workplace environment.
According to Cutler (1988:56 ), the first official study of long term health effects of low 
level radiation for British nuclear workers (carried out by the NRPB in 1976), consciously 
left out of its calculations ail workers between 1950 and 1974 who "had either departed 
from Seilafield to work elsewhere, ceased working because of illness, or retired". Cutler, 
goes on to say, "It was therefore obvious that the study was biased, as it excluded the very 
group of workers most likely to have suffered radiation's ill-effects: the sick and the old" 
(Ibid).
Later, the same study was re-visited by an independent advisor (Dr. Peter Smith) from the 
London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine98. In contrast to the NRPB's finding of 
'a below average number of cancer deaths in the nuclear industry1, Smith found there was 
a high rate of bone marrow cancer, leukaemia and bladder cancer among Seilafield 
workers, and further, that the risks seemed to increase in relation to the amount of 
radiation received. Often the time lag between radiation damage to a cell, and a detectable 
cancer, was more than fifteen years.
Natural Background Radiation
As far as NBR99 is concerned, as much as 82-87 per cent of the average radiation dose
98 Smith, P.G. sc Douglas, A.J. (1986) 'Mortality 
of workers at the Seilafield plant of British 
Nuclear Fuels' British Medical loumal 293 
845-854.
99 Natural background radiation includes: Cosmic radiation, 
Gamma radiation, Radionuclides, Radon and its decay 
products.
comes from natural or background radiation, with the largest single amount, 55 per cent 
coming from radon. While there is no ongoing national monitoring of all radioactivity in 
the environment, it is known that NBR is widespread and may become assimilated in water 
supplies, soils, rocks, vegetation and foodstuffs100.
Because NBR levels vary from district to district, certain areas have far higher levels of 
radiation than others. According to the HSE (1992), the UK's average exposure dose 
from ail risks of natural background radiation is 2 mSv per year. However, in certain parts 
of the country such as Cornwall, Wales, the north of England and Scotland, this figure is 
considerably higher. In some instances where an area is above sea level (resulting in greater 
doses of cosmic radiation) and particularly where there are high concentrations of 
radioactive decay of uranium (resulting in radon gas), exposure may be as high as 20  mSv 
per annum.
Although NBR levels are measured across the country, there is no definitive dose estimate 
as such, rather information is collected from a variety of sources which together provide 
an average figure which should be taken into account, in addition to exposure from non­
natural sources.
Chernobyl
The explosion at the Chernobyl nuclear power station in the Ukraine in April 1986, is
100 AH of which could equally be affected by discharges 
from nuclear power stations and other institutions 
such as hospitals which have radioactive waste.
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generally regarded as the world's worst nuclear accident to date. Since the accident, data 
has been amassed on acute radiation effects, treatment of the severely exposed, emergency 
containment, and the importance of effective communication and management in critical 
situations.
As a consequence of Chernobyl's fallout, up to twenty countries, 2000  km away were 
affected by the radioactivity (including: tellurium-132, ruthenium-103, ruthenium 106, 
iodine-131. caesium-134 and caesium-137) emitted from the stricken plant. According 
to the Nuclear Energy Agency (1 995 ), the long term health effects remain as uncertain 
now, as they were in 1987, when Dr. Robert Gale (a US scientist flown in to assist in the 
treatment of causalities) predicted an extra 60 ,000  cancer related deaths, 1000 birth 
defects, and 5000 cases of genetic abnormalities, with some 40 per cent of deaths 
occurring in the old Soviet Union. More recently, estimates of cancers generated by 
Chernobyl range from between 16 ,000 in the northern hemisphere (Sumner 1991:143), 
to 970 ,500  worldwide (Gofman 1990:36). Busby (1995) believes that until detailed 
results of environmental monitoring, radioactivity levels in foodstuffs and direct 
measurement of radioactivity in humans are available, it is impossible to make any accurate 
predictions of the number of terminal or other cancer worldwide.
Because of the uncertainty surrounding the health effects of low level radiation, and the 
ongoing scientific debate over what constitutes an acceptable/tolerable level of risk, 
many people says O'Riordan (1985 :529), have developed a deeply held distrust of the 
nuclear industry which he identifies at two levels:
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a) radioactivity is feared because it is simply not understood by most lay people; it 
cannot be seen, felt or smelt, it is known to be associated with cancer and other 
genetic diseases, and it is regarded as uncontrollable, insidious and potentially lethal 
to large number of entirely innocent and trusting people;
b) radioactivity is associated with a technology and an industry that appears remote, 
self confident, yet unaccountable. A  substantial number of people are beginning 
to distrust "high" science, and technologies that seem too complicated as to be 
beyond the capacity of elected representatives to understand them and therefore 
be in a proper position to make sound and informed judgments about them. The 
public does not like to see political decisions in effect determined by 
non-accountable experts.
When the Yorkshire Television Programme was broadcast in the early 1980s, it confirmed 
what many residents and others suspected, that radioactive discharges from the Seilafield 
Plant were responsible for the childhood cancers. Since the documentary, a number of 
studies, initiated by the impact of the programme, have attempted to resolve the question 
of whether there is a causal connection between childhood leukaemia and nuclear 
installations. In the final section of this chapter therefore, attention will focus on the decade 
of scientific research, following the broadcast of the documentary in 1983, and delivery 
of the Reay and Hope Judgment in 1993.
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1.3 CHILDHOOD CANCERS AND NUCLEAR INSTALLATIONS
Within three weeks of the broadcast of the Yorkshire Television programme 'Windscale -
the Nuclear Laundry', the Government, under an avalanche of public, political and media
pressure had set up an independent committee under the Chairmanship of Sir Douglas
Black. The terms of reference for the inquiry were:
To look into the recently published claims of an increased incidence of cancer in the 
vicinity of the Seilafield site:-
i) examine the evidence concerning the alleged cluster of cancer cases in the
village of Seascale;
ii) consider the need for further research;
iii) make recommendations101.
Upon completion of the inquiry, the Black Advisory Group Report published in July 
1984, confirmed the existence of an excess of childhood leukaemia in and around the 
village of Seascale102, but, having established a "best estimate" of the average radiation 
dose received by a model population, did not support the view that the radiation released 
from Seilafield was responsible for the observed incidence of leukaemia in Seascale and its
101 Report of the Independent Advisory Group 
'Investigation of the Possible Increased Incidence 
of Cancer in West Cumbria' (1984) Ch. 1 (2) p.7.
102 The Black report identified a total of 14 cases 
of leukaemia, eight cases of lymphoma, and ten 
cases of hempoietic cancers, all under the age 
of 25 years. This represented approximately a 
fourfold increase rate of leukaemia in people 
under 25 years in the district of Millom 
between 1968-1978, and a tenfold increase of 
leukaemia in the Seascale population aged 
under ten years of age.
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neighbouring area103. However, the report did acknowledge there were:
  uncertainties concerning the operation of the plant, which were
highlighted in the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate of the November 1983 
incident104, and also problems attendant on the functioning of the plant.
Further, there were:
  questions concerning the adequacy of the controls over present
permitted levels of discharges; the quantitative assessment of apparent 
excesses of cancer; and possible genetic risks.
In addition the Committee:
 found some evidence of lack of co-ordination between the various
agencies with an interest in this industry and considering its impact on the 
health of the community105.
With regard to further recommendations, the Black Committee proposed:
A  study of all children born since 1950 to mothers resident in Seascale at the time 
of the birth to examine incidence and mortality. (Birth Cohort Study).
A  study to examine the incidence of cancer amongst school children in Seascale. 
(School Cohort Study).
A  study to look at the records of those cases of leukaemia and lymphoma which 
have been diagnosed among young people up to the age of 25 resident in west 
Cumbria. These cases should then be compared with suitable controls in respect of
103 The conclusions of the Black Committee were based 
on incorrect figures (supplied by the NRPB) which 
were later amended after new dose figures were 
presented by Dr. Jakeman, a UKAEA employee who had 
been based at Seilafield in the 1950s. See Ch.4(3) 
for a full assessment of the impact of this data.
104 This refers to an incident identified earlier in 
the thesis Ch. 1(1), in which high levels of 
radioactive contamination resulted in Greenpeace 
divers being contaminated, and several miles of 
local beaches being closed for nine months.
105 Black Report, Chapter 6( 13).
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factors that could be relevant to the development of leukaemia and lymphoma 
(Case Control Study).
In addition to the epidemiological recommendations however, the Black Report also 
proposed the establishment of The Committee on Medical Aspects of Radiation in the 
Environment (COMARE), to investigate the release of radioactive discharges, and assess 
their impact on the local population.
The Gardner Research
As a consequence of the epidemiological recommendations of the Black Report, Professor 
Martin Gardner, Head of the Medical Research Council Environmental Epidemiological 
Unit, University of Southampton106, was asked to undertake the three studies (Birth 
Cohort107; School Cohort108; Case Control Study109) in relation to the Seilafield excess.
106 Professor Gardner was a member of Sir Douglas 
Black's Advisory Group, and later became a 
member of the Committee on the Medical Aspects 
of Radiation in the Environment (COMARE) which 
was also established on the recommendations of 
the Black report in 1985.
107 Gardner, M.J. Hall, A.J. Downes, S. Terrell, J.D. 
'Follow up study of children bom to mothers resident 
in Seascale, west Cumbria' (Birth Cohort) British 
Medical lournal 1987; 295:822-7.
108 Gardner, M.J. Hall, A .). Downes, S. Terrell, J.D. 
'Follow up study of children bom elsewhere but 
attending schools in Seascale, west Cumbria'
(Schools Cohort) British Medical Journal 1987; 
295:819-21.
109 Gardner, M.J. Snee, M.P. Hall, A.J. Powell C.A. 
Downes, S. Terrell, J.D. 'Results of case-control
study of leukaemia and lymphoma among young people 
near Seilafield nuclear plant in west Cumbria'
British Medical Journal 1990; 300:423-9.
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The first study sought to identify all people born in Seascale since 1950 (attempting to 
trace anyone who had moved away from the area) to ascertain how many of them had 
developed cancer. The second study sought to identify all children born since 1950, who 
had attended school in Seascale, but had been born elsewhere, charting their development 
in a similar way to the first study. The third study, embarked over a six year period, to 
establish whether the excess of leukaemia and lymphoma diagnosed in children and young 
adults near Seilafield was associated with any particular characteristics related to the Plant. 
The study involved 97  people born within the west Cumbrian district, and diagnosed with 
either leukaemia or lymphoma before their 25th birthday between 1950-1985, and 
resident in west Cumbria at their time of diagnosis110. Factors taken into account included 
antenatal abdominal X-ray examinations, viral infections, lifestyles, proximity to Seilafield 
and employment risks of parents working at Seilafield.
In their first study of the children born in Seascale, Gardner et ai. (1 987a) found that the 
children were ten times more likely to develop leukaemia than the average, and three times 
more like to develop other cancers.
In their second study, Gardner et al. (1987b) found no increase in leukaemia (or other 
cancers) in those children who went to school in Seascale, but were born elsewhere.
In their third piece of research, Gardner et al. (1990), found that the risk of childhood
110 The 97 cases (leukaemia 52; non-Hodgkin's
lymphoma 22; Hodgkins disease 23) were compared 
with 1001 controls matched for sex and age, 
taken from the same birth registers as the cases.
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leukaemia increased in relation to the fathers' exposure to external sources of ionising 
radiation, before the child was conceived. The report identified an eightfold increase, 
based on a recorded cumulative dose of 100 mSv (or 10 mSv or more in the six months 
before conception).
In his conclusion, Professor Gardner suggested that:
The raised incidence of leukaemia and [to a lesser extent] non-Hodgkin's lymphoma 
among children near Seilafield was associated with paternal recorded external dose 
of whole body penetrating radiation during work at the Plant before conception 
(Gardner et al. 1990a:423).
The significance of the Gardner research cannot be overstated, not only did it confirm a 
link between the excess of childhood leukaemia and Seilafield, but it also established that 
children, whose fathers had worked at Seilafield before their conception, had a higher risk 
of developing leukaemia or NHL than the control group. It further showed that the risk 
increased with the fathers' preconception occupational radiation dose.
COMARE
In addition to the epidemiological recommendations, the Black Report also targeted 
radioactive discharges in the environment for special consideration. As a consequence, the 
Committee on the Medical Aspects of Radiation in the Environment was established in 
1985, under the Chairmanship of Professor M. Bobrow111. COMARE was primarily 
concerned with radiation exposure of local people living near nuclear facilities in west
1,1 Professor B. Bobrow was Prince Philip Professor 
of Paediatric Research at the United Medical and 
Dental Schools of Guy's and St. Thomas'.
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Cumbria, Dounreay112, Aldermaston and Burghfield113.
In 1986, as a first priority however, COMARE were invited to consider the implications 
of the historic dosimetry data114 (presented by Dr. ]akeman115), which had only come to 
light since the setting up of the Black Committee. As these figures had neither been 
submitted to the Black Committee, nor taken account of during preparation of the 
subsequent report, COMARE were asked to ascertain whether the new data affected the 
conclusions of the Black Report.
112 Dounreay is the only other reprocessing plant 
in the UK.
1,3 Both Aldermaston and Burghfield (in Berkshire), 
have Atomic Weapon Establishments in their 
locality. Although different from reprocessing 
plants such as Seliafield and Dounreay, both 
establishments are responsible for the release 
of radioactive material into the environment.
114 Please refer to Footnote 23 p.27.
1,5 In November 1984, NRPB were approached on 
a personal basis by Dr. D. jakeman who between 
1954 and 1956 had been an employee of UKAEA 
at their Seliafield site. During the period 
when the Black Inquiry was collecting evidence 
Dr. ]akeman had been abroad. It was not until 
his return to this country in 1984 that he was 
able to inform UKAEA, NRPB and BNFL that he 
had additional information. In 1985, Dr.
Jakeman produced a report which contained 
his interpretation of the radioactive discharge 
figures.
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COMARE, in their first report on Seliafield116 acknowledged that:
It is possible that important releases occurred in the past but went 
unrecorded or undetected by the rudimentary monitoring carried out in the 
early years. The events since the publication of the Black report increase 
our concern with this possibility, although it cannot be quantified. This 
emphasizes and underlines our concern regarding the uncertainty with regard 
to the validity of any conclusions117.
Despite the uncertainties with regard to the undisclosed releases of radioactive discharges 
however, COMARE nonetheless concluded that the doses were "still well below those that 
would readily explain the observed cases of leukaemia in Seascale using conventional risk 
estimates" (Ibid). Therefore the fundamental conclusions of the Black Report remain 
unchanged.
In their second report118, COMARE set out to investigate the possible increased incidence 
of leukaemia among young people living near the Dounreay nuclear establishment. As part 
of their remit, COMARE considered the authorised and accidental release of radioactive 
materials, chemicals, population effect, radiation dose, and occupational exposure.
Although the amount of radioactive material reprocessed is smaller than at Seliafield,
116 'The Implications of the new data on the releases 
from Seliafield in the 1950s for the conclusions 
of the Report on the Investigation of the Possible 
Increased Incidence of Cancer in west Cumbria' 
(1986) London: HMSO. (COMARE 1st Report)
117 Ibid Ch.5(11) p.24.
118 'Investigation of the possible increased incidence 
of childhood cancer in young persons near the 
Dounreay nuclear establishment, Caithness, Scotland'. 
(1988) London: HMSO (COMARE 2nd Report).
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Dounreay nonetheless offered an opportunity for independent and separate investigations 
of a similar environment. In addition to site similarities with Seliafield however, two studies 
(Heasman et al. 19 8 6 11S>; Darby et al. 19 8 7 120) also acknowledged an excess of childhood 
leukaemia around the Dounreay nuclear installation.
In 1988, COMARE submitted the findings of their 'Second Report', once again under the
Chairmanship of Professor Martin Bobrow. In their conclusion, COMARE found evidence
of a raised incidence of leukaemia among young people living in the vicinity of Dounreay,
but as with Seliafield, stated that the radioactive discharges were insufficiently high to
account for the leukaemia excess. Instead, COMARE indicated alternative explanations
such as chemicals or viruses. They went on to acknowledge however:
....the evidence of a raised incidence of leukaemia near Dounreay, taken in 
conjunction with that relating to the area around Seliafield, tends to support the 
hypothesis that some features of the nuclear plants that we have examined leads to 
an increased risk of leukaemia in young people living in the vicinity of those plants. 
Conventional dose and risk estimates suggest that neither authorised not accidental 
discharges could be responsible. There are, however, uncertainties about dose and 
risk calculations, especially with respect to exposure of the foetus and small child, 
high LET121 emission and prolonged low-level exposure122.
1,9 Heasman, M.A. Kemp, I.W. Urquhart, J.D. Black, R. 
'Childhood leukaemia in northern Scotland1 Lancet 
1986 i:266.
120 Darby, D.C. Doll, R. 'Fallout, radiation doses 
near Dounreay, and childhood leukaemia' British 
Medical “journal 1987 294: 603-7.
121 Linear Energy Transfer (LET) is the rate at 
which a charged particle loses energy as it 
passes through matter.
122 Ibid Ch.5(27).
68
In their third report123, again under the Chairmanship of Professor Bobrow, COMARE 
examined additional data on childhood cancers, as well as leukaemias in the areas of 
Aldermaston and Burghfield. In considering the conclusions of their previous investigations 
at Seliafield and Dounreay, COMARE looked at other factors including chemical 
carcinogens, demographic phenomena, and viruses.
In their published report of 1989, COMARE concluded that there was a small but 
significant increased incidence of leukaemia and other cancers in children under the age of 
five living within 1 Okm of nuclear establishments at Aldermaston and Burghfield. Despite 
this assertion however, COMARE went on to say, that in their opinion, neither the 
authorised nor accidental radioactive discharges were sufficiently high to account for the 
observed incidence of childhood cancer.
Having completed three reports at the request of the Government, COMARE concluded
their investigation by saying:
Our experience so far leads us to the conclusion that the distribution of cases of 
childhood leukaemia, or other childhood cancer, around individual nuclear 
installations cannot be seen in a proper context in the absence of comparable 
information about the general pattern, throughout the rest of the UK. We will 
therefore make recommendations for further work on the geographical distribution 
of childhood cancer on a nationwide basis and urge that high priority be given to 
their implementation124.
123 'Report on the Incidence of Childhood Cancer 
in West Berkshire and North Hampshire area, 
in which are situated the Atomic Weapons 
Research Establishment, Aldermaston and the 
Royal Ordnance Factory, Burghfield1 (1989) 
London: HMSO (COMARE 3rd Report).
124 COMARE, 3rd Report, Ch.4(14).
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Other Studies
Prompted by the findings of the Black Report, COMARE and the Gardner Study, other 
research was undertaken in the UK and abroad, to establish whether there was an 
association between paternal occupational irradiation and childhood leukaemia. 
Dounreay
In Scotland, Urquhart et al. (1 9 9 1 125), did support the existence of an excess of childhood 
cancer, in particular, an excess of childhood leukaemia and non-Hodgkin's lymphoma near 
Dounreay. However, in their conclusions, the study made it clear that "the raised 
incidence of childhood leukaemia and non-Hodgkin's lymphoma around Dounreay cannot 
be explained by paternal occupation at Dounreay, or by paternal exposure to external 
ionising radiation before conception". The authors emphasised however, that the results 
of the study neither confirmed nor contradicted the findings of Gardner.
Kinien et al, (1993a126), suggesting an alternative approach, proposed that the increase 
in childhood leukaemia in rural areas of Scotland may be associated with population 
mixing. Linked to Kinlen's hypothesis were other variables such as: infective agents; social 
class; density of children in the locality; and remoteness of the area. In a further study,
125 Urquhart, J.D. Black, R.J. Muirhead, M.J. Sharp, L. 
Maxwell, M . Eden, O.B. ]ones D.A. 'Case control 
study of leukaemia and non-Hodgkin's lymphoma in 
children in Caithness near the Dounreay nuclear 
installation'. British Medical “journal 1991
302: 687-92.
126 Kinien, L.}. O'Brien, F. Clarke, K. Balwill, A. 
Matthews, F. 'Rural Population mixing and childhood 
leukaemia: effects of the North Sea oil industry in 
Scotland, including the area near Dounreay nuclear 
site' British Medical loumal 1993 306: 743-8.
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Kinien et al. (1993b127) again failed to support the Gardner hypothesis, reiterating his 
earlier proposal that "an unidentified chemical leukaemogen and an (infective) epidemic 
promoted by unusual population mixing in an isolated area of high social class" were 
responsible for the excess.
Seliafield
McKinney et al. (1 9 9 1 128), in their study of west Cumbria, north Humberside and 
Gateshead reported an increased risk associated with fathers' exposure at work to ionising 
radiation and cancer in their children. Although the geographical area was wider than the 
Gardner study, it nonetheless had a large overlap with Gardner in terms of those exposed 
to radiation. Excluding the Gardner cases, the results showed a statistically significant 
excess, although the case numbers were small. The authors' concluded that their findings 
supported the hypothesis generated by the study of Gardner et al. that fathers' exposure 
to radiation before conception was causal.
Draper et al. (1 9 9 3 129), in line with other studies, confirmed the findings of the Black
127 Kinien, L.j. Clarke, K. Balkwill, A. 'Paternal 
preconceptual radiation exposure in the nuclear 
industry and leukaemia and non-Hodgkin's lymphoma 
in young people in Scotland'. British Medical 
loumal 1993 306: 1153-8.
128 McKinney, P. A. Alexander, F.E. Cartwright, R.A. 
Parker, L. 'Parental occupations of children
with leukaemia in west Cumbria, north Humberside, 
and Gateshead' British Medical loumal 1991 
302: 681-7.
129 Draper, G.J. Stiller, C.A. Cartwright, R.A. Craft, A.W. 
Vincent, T.J. 'Cancer in Cumbria and in the vicinity 
of the Seliafield nuclear installation, 1963-90'
British Medical loumal 1993 306: 89-94.
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Report that there was an excess of lymphoid leukaemia and non-Hodgkin's lymphoma 
among young people in Seascale, however, went on to say, they were unable to identify 
the cause of the excess. Their conclusions neither supported not detracted from the 
conclusions of Gardner et al.
In a further study by Kinien (1993c130), this time concentrating on Seascale, he too 
confirmed the existence of an increased incidence of leukaemia and non-Hodgkin's 
lymphoma around the Seliafield plant. However, rejecting the Gardner hypothesis, and 
referring to his previous research at Dounreay (1993b), Kinien again proposed the 
possibility of some unidentified carcinogen and infection, related to unusual population 
mixing as the most likely explanation.
The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) published their findings in October 19 9 3 131, one 
week after delivery of the Judgment in Reay and Hope. The purpose of the study was to 
examine the Seliafield fathers' exposure to external radiation and a number of other 
employment factors not considered by Professor Gardner, including: internal radiation 
levels, suspect carcinogens and other mutagenic chemicals. In addition, fathers' job 
histories (where they worked, type of occupation, involvement in known radiation 
incidents) were also taken into account.
130 Kinien, L.J. 'Can paternal preconceptional radiation 
account for the increase of leukaemia and non-Hodgkin's 
lymphoma in Seascale?' British Medical loumal 1993 
306: 1718-21.
131 'HSE Investigation of Leukaemia and other 
cancers in the children of male workers at 
Seliafield' 1993 London: HMSO.
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Although two of the findings of the paper were subsequently reviewed after consultation
with BNFL, the main conclusions of the study remain unchanged:
1. There is a clear distinction between the incidence of childhood leukaemia and non- 
Hodgkin's lymphoma in Seascale and elsewhere in west Cumbria.
2. The incidence in Seascale of these diseases in the children of Seliafield fathers being 
some 14 times the national average.
3. The strong association for the children of Seascale families between the fathers' 
cumulative preconception external radiation dose and the incidence of these 
diseases.
4. The concentration of the increased risk in the children of fathers who started work 
at Seliafield before 1965.
5. The absence for the non-Seascale subjects of an association with the fathers' 12- 
week preconception external radiation dose.
6. The absence of any positive association for cancers other than leukaemia and NHL.
7. The absence of any association with internal radiation dose.
8. The observation that the raised incidence in the children of Seascale fathers may, 
in some way, be associated with Seascale's unusually high proportion of in-comers, 
ie.non-Cumbrian born fathers.
Aldermaston and Burfield
Concern over what appeared to be an excess of childhood leukaemia in the local area of 
Aldermaston and Burfield had originally been identified by a Consultant Haematologist and 
her team at the Royal Berkshire Hospital in Reading. After contact with the London School 
of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine to investigate, preliminary findings132
132 Barton CJ. Roman E. Ryder H. Watson A. Childhood 
Leukaemia in West Berkshire. Lancet 1985;i:217-8.
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confirmed a small excess of childhood leukaemia. However, after completion of a more 
detailed report133, it emerged that the cancer excess was confined to children under five 
years of age. The fathers, monitored for exposure to ionising radiation prior to 
conception, offered some support for the Gardner hypothesis.
international Studies
Outside the UK, and prompted by the British studies, researchers in other countries began 
to investigate the occurrence of cancer in the locality of nuclear installations. Their 
conclusions however did not support the findings of the British studies with the result that 
France (Viel et al. 1990; Hill et al. 1990134); Germany (Michaelis et al. 1992135); the 
United States (Clapp et al. 1987; Milham 1989; Goldsmith 1989; Hatch et al. 1990(a); 
Hatch et al. 1990(b); Shulman 1990; Hatch et al. 1991; Jablon et al. 1991136) and 
Canada (MaLaughlin et al. 1 9 93 137) failed to find a significant increase in childhood 
leukaemia near certain nuclear installations.
133 Roman, E. Beral, V . Carpenter, L. Watson, A. 
Barton, C. Ryder, H. Aston, D.L. 'Childhood 
leukaemia in the West Berkshire and Basingstoke 
and North Hampshire District Health Authorities 
in relation to nuclear establishments in the 
vicinity' British Medical loumal 1987; 297; 
603-7.
134 La Hague nuclear waste reprocessing plant.
135 The German study looked and the incidence of 
childhood malignancies in twenty areas in 
west Germany.
136 In particular, Pilgrim (Massachusetts); Hanford 
(Washington); Tennessee; Three Mile Island.
137 Ontario.
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It has now been over a decade since James Cutler produced the Yorkshire Television 
Programme claiming a possible link between an excess of childhood leukaemia in the village 
of Seascale and the Seliafield Plant. When the documentary was originally shown in 1983, 
the experts were sceptical of the programme findings, effectively denying any excess of 
leukaemia or causal connection with Seliafield. Since that time, it has been accepted by 
the scientific community that there is a real excess of leukaemia and NHL in young people 
in Seascale. Further, not only are these excesses demonstrable over age ranges and 
geographical parameters, they are also persistent. Consequently, scientific debate has 
shifted from questioning the reality of these excesses, to finding an explanation for them.
Despite extensive research however, scientific opinion continues to be deeply divided over 
the causes of childhood cancer and its connection with nuclear installations. In order to 
understand why causation is so difficult to prove, and why there is such diversity of 
scientific opinion, it is necessary to appreciate how scientific knowledge is constructed, and 
the basis upon which scientists adhere to their rules of scientific method. Moving on, the 
next chapter will continue by focusing on the problems of cause and effect in science, and 
causation in law. As Loevinger (1995:187) rightly points out, "when causation is an 
issue, valid law requires valid science to reach a valid decision".
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2.1 THE CONSTRUCTION OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE AND THE CHALLENGE 
TO  POSITIVISM
It is clear that scientific opinion continues to be deeply divided over the potential health 
implications of ionising radiation, and also the relationship between childhood cancer and 
nuclear installations. To understand the reasons behind such difference of opinion, it is 
necessary to widen our discussion to the foundations upon which scientific investigation and 
its quest for objective truth are based, and in so doing, examine how scientific knowledge 
is constructed. Moving on, attention will focus on the problems of establishing causation 
in science (2 .2 ), to consideration of causation in the law (2 .3).
Setting aside for a moment the philosophical arguments about whether objective truth 
exists, we are concerned here with what Casti (1989) refers to as scientific ideology. 
According to Casti (1989:13), scientific ideology "is a collection of beliefs and ideals 
about the practice of science that the scientific community clings to with universal 
tenacity". The practice of science consists of a recognised cognitive structure based on 
facts, hypothesis, experimentation, laws and theory which together, with the process of 
verification and peer review establishes an ideology of science. However, these are not the 
only factors identified by Casti, he also refers to science as a social activity, and one that 
"has standards for what constitutes 'good science' as determined by the norms of a 
particular community" (Ibid:57).
According to Ziman (1968:9), the goal of science is the achievement of "a consensus of 
rational opinion". With this aim in mind, scientific investigation, carried out by "our
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recognized men of knowledge" (Barnes Edge 1982:3) may be seen as the rational 
pursuit of objective truth which may, or may not be explained through the development 
and testing of hypotheses using proven experimental methods.
Today, the practice of science provides us with extensive knowledge of our world and
universe, it offers both historical and future insight as well as consideration of the present.
However such knowledge is limited, what we desire to know is not only what happens, but
why it happens. The recognition that there is a knowledge of what and a knowledge of why
is implicit to the universal and essentialist belief that "science can provide explanations...
[and that] this is the primary goal of science" (Salmon 1984:3). A  view supported
by d'Espagnat (1979:158) when he said:
Any successful theory is expected to make accurate predictions;
Apart from experimental confirmation, however, something more is generally 
demanded of a theory. It is expected not only to determine the results of an 
experiment but also to provide some understanding of the physical events that are 
presumed to underlie the observed results. In other words, the theory should not 
only give the position of a pointer on a dial but also explain why the pointer takes 
up the position.
Fundamental to such beliefs, and part and parcel of this universal ideology is a rejection of 
any conflicting account of 'epistemoiogy'. Underlying this view is a conviction of an 
omnipresent, absolute in science, when in reality, as Barnes and Edge (1982:3) point out:
All the traditional conflicts of epistemoiogy, between realism and instrumentalism, 
rationalism and empiricism, deductivism and inductivism, and many more, find 
expression in endless modifications and combinations, as competing accounts of 
science. And each account implies a different foundation for the credibility and 
authority of science.
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In addition to epistemological conflict however, there is a recognition that the practice of 
science also involves personal choices and subjective value judgments, as a consequence says 
Jasanoff (1995:9 ), "individuals make decisions at the frontiers of established doctrine in 
accordance with their personal understanding of the existing tradition". Concurring with 
this view, Dunbar (1995 ) asserts that most scientists get their hypotheses from their own 
experience and from existing theoretical structures within their own discipline, in other 
words, scientists reflect their cultural milieu.
Notwithstanding this realization, many deconstuctionists (Merton 1973; Bloor 1976; 
Barnes 1974, 1977, 1982; Mulkay 1979, 1991; Hesse 1980; Collins 1981; Sharpin 
and Schaffer 1984; Lepenies, 1989; Wynne 1989) take as their starting point the 
assumption that science does represent 'objective knowledge' and that scientific thought 
is somehow more precise, more controlled, more rational than everyday thinking. Further, 
they acknowledge that the term 'science' has come to denote what Hamilton (1988:7) 
described as a "privileged realm of knowledge removed and seemingly sharply 
differentiated from other intellectual domains".
Moving on to challenging these assumptions, the authors go on to claim that scientific 
knowledge is culturally constructed; often corporately funded; a potential social tool for 
the benefit of powerful elites; and that it encompasses arbitrary compromises between 
conflicting beliefs systems. As a consequence, other interests (corporate, governmental, 
individual) are seen as encroaching on the quest for objective truth leading to the realisation
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that there is no 'pure knowledge form' and that scientific ideology is qualified and 
conditional. Scientists it seems, are influenced by the same complex series of personal 
choices and subjective judgements as everybody else, which may explain, says Lovelock 
(1988), why happenings as important as a hole in the ozone layer were missed. In 
delivering the Schumacher Lecture, Lovelock comments:
It is a scandal that the vast sums spent on expensive big science of satellite, balloon and 
aircraft measurement failed to predict or find the ozone hole. Worse than this, so sure 
were the computer programmers that they knew all that mattered about the stratosphere, 
they programmed the instruments aboard the satellite, that observed atmospheric ozone 
from above, to reject data that was substantially different from the model predictions. The 
instruments saw the hole, but those in charge of the experiment ignored it, saying in effect, 
'Don't bother us with facts; our model knows best'1.
This principle of selection also explains says Grayson (1995:vii), why frequently "scientists
reach diametrically opposed conclusions based on identical data". Therefore says Beck
(1995:119), if one poses an arbitrarily chosen question to a panel of scientific experts
"one will be given fifteen different answers from five scientists". Beck goes on to say:
This is neither by chance not by accident. It represents the state of science at the
end of the twentieth century A  different computer, a different institute, a
different employer; a different reality (Ibid).
The Philosophical Challenge
Over the years various philosophers2 have attempted to grapple with the problems of 
scientific ideology. For many however, the landmark of change came with the
1 James Lovelock 'Stand up for Gaia'. Schumacher Lecture 
1988. Reprinted by Resurgence (Ford House, Bideford, 
Devon).
2 In particular, Popper (1959); Kuhn (1970);
Feyerabend (1975); Lakatos (1976).
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publication of Karl Popper's, The Logic of Scientific Discovery3, in which Popper 
endeavoured to find a way of distinguishing between statements of science that had some 
external validity, and those based on pure belief. Popper realized that attempts to justify 
science through a process of induction (generalizations derived from observations) were 
inadequate. In place of induction therefore, he proposed that scientists generate 
hypotheses about the nature of the world, and then submit the hypothesis for rigorous 
testing. Accepting Popper's premise implies that scientific knowledge claims can never be 
proven or fully justified, they can only be refuted. Therefore, to be scientific, a hypothesis 
must be logically falsifiabie.
Thus scientific progress rests on the notion of refutation, as Popper (1968:280) says:
The advance of science is not due to the fact that more and more perceptual 
experiences accumulate in the course of time. Nor is it due to the fact that we are 
making even better use of our senses. Out of uninterrupted sense-experiences 
science cannot be distilled, no matter how industriously we gather and sort them. 
Bold ideas, unjustified anticipations, and speculative thought, are our only means for 
interpreting nature. And we must hazard them to win our prize. Those among us 
who are unwilling to expose their ideas to the hazard of refutation do not take part 
in the scientific game.
However, Popper warns against any idea of an ultimate explanation. For Popper, there can 
be no explanation which is not in need of further explanation. Popper makes it clear that 
the attainment of ultimate knowledge is in reality impossible, "The old ideal of episteme -
3 Popper's views were first published in 1934, 
The Logic of Scientific Discovery (translated 
into English in 1959). However, Conjectures 
and Refutations (1963) is generally regarded as 
encapsulating the essentials of Popper's 'method 
of falsification'.
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of absolutely certain, demonstrable knowledge - has proved to be an idol" (Ibid).
Thomas S. Kuhn
Later, in 1962, Kuhn's work entitled The Structure of Scientific Revolutions also had a 
profound effect, challenging the authoritative knowledge base of science. For Kuhn, our 
image of the rationality of science is affected by the history of science, in which an 
indoctrinated conservative, scientific elite guided by, and working within, an existing 
paradigm3 carry out their puzzle-solving, the sum of which constitutes 'normal science'4.
Kuhn's central thesis rests on the belief that advances in scientific knowledge comes not 
from scientific intellectual openness but from scientific intellectual closure. Normal 
scientific research, he argues, is guided by paradigms which are a series of related 
assumptions (theoretical, methodological and empirical) that are generally accepted by 
those working in a particular field of research, and includes beliefs, values and techniques. 
Therefore says Kuhn, most scientific research consists of attempts to solve problems 
without bringing into question its basic assumption. Thus scientists, accepting this 
framework reach internal agreements about what kind of problems, techniques and
3 The notion of a 'paradigm' includes: Shared 
symbolic generalisations; Models; Values; 
Metaphysical principles; Exemplars (concrete 
problem situations). The paradigm represents 
the structured whole, and also guides the research 
activities of scientific community.
4 Normal Science is according to Kuhn (1970:10), 
"research firmly based upon one or more past 
scientific achievements, achievements that some 
particular scientific community acknowledges for
a time as supplying the foundation for its practice".
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solutions are legitimate and by so doing establish a social network, which excludes from 
participation anyone who does not adopt or accept the framework.
From this perspective it is clear that for Kuhn, most scientific innovations are simply 
additions to, or relatively minor modification of existing paradigms which later become 
incorporated into scientific tradition for use by later generations of scientists.
However, a second much more radical kind of innovation can occur when one paradigm 
is replaced by another, this kind of intellectual transition can only take place by means of 
open rebellion and revolutionary transformation of the existing order. Such revolts are 
usually brought about by a loss of confidence in the existing paradigm which can no longer 
be reconciled with the cognitive hopes guiding normal science. Nonetheless, from such 
failures new rules do evolve, from which emerge the latest paradigm destined to become 
the next accepted orthodoxy in the field. Since such paradigms are regarded by Kuhn as 
being incommensurable, there is no rational 'scientific' basis for the change from one 
paradigm to another, rather revolution takes place within the social structure of the 
scientific community, or as Lakatos (1970:178) says, "In Kuhn's view scientific revolution 
is irrational, a matter for mob psychology". This is important, because as Hagstrom 
(1965) points out, science can be viewed as an exchange system in which gifts of 
information are exchanged for peer recognition. Therefore, says Mulkay (1991), the 
status and recognition of a scientist are dependent upon the new paradigm. A  new 
paradigm thus offers work and opportunity as well as possible career enhancement, 
professional standing and recognition. In such circumstances the social control of the
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scientific community is ensured by the demands and confines of the new paradigm.
imre Lakatos
Lakatos' theory was formulated in an attempt to develop and improve upon Popper's 
account of falsification, while at the same time disassociating his own theory from what he 
believed to be Kuhn's socio-psychological approach.
Lakatos identified three aims for his model, first, to distinguish scientific from the non- 
scientific; second, to evaluate competing scientific research programmes; thirdly, to explain 
scientific change.
Deriving his work from the history of science, he represents this as a structured organic 
whole made up of sequences of theories welded together into a continuous scientific 
research programme. The purpose of the programme is to offer scientists guidance on 
which methodological principle to avoid abandoning (the negative heuristic), and which to 
pursue, thereby developing an increasingly sophisticated model (the positive heuristic). 
Underlying his theory is what he calls the 'hard core' (centre) of the programme which is 
made up of background information consisting of a number of theoretical assertions and 
assumptions.
Once established, the 'hard core' is sacrosanct and must be defended by a 'protective belt' 
made up of 'auxiliary hypotheses', the purpose of which is to be tested, refined or rejected. 
Thus in any piece of research, various auxiliary hypotheses will be added to, or rejected
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from the research programme to accommodate new anomalies. Therefore, Lakatos was 
not against the use of ad hoc hypotheses5, provided it contributed to the development and 
growth of the research.
In the opinion of Lakatos therefore, a scientist is free to make the best adjustments or 
modification to a theory he can by abandoning or removing assumptions or simply by 
ignoring unacceptable evidence. The most important thing is whether such intervention will 
lead to progressing the development of the research programme. Conflict between 
competing research theories thus stimulates scientific progress.
Because of the structural basis of Lakatos' work, he argues that there is no instant way of 
assessing the merits or otherwise of scientific research and any attempt to do this, is an 
example of utopian ideology. Lakatos goes on to condemn 'justifications' who want 
scientific theories to be proven, 'probabilists' who expect to instantly confirm a theory, and 
'falsificationists' who immediately expect elimination on the basis of instant results.
Paul Feyerabend
For Feyerabend, there is no such thing as scientific method, it is he suggests, just one 
tradition among many. Science is therefore not 'privileged' in terms of method or results. 
Feyerabend, in his book Against Method, goes on to challenge any notion that there is a
5 It is customary to assume that ad hoc hypotheses 
go beyond the available evidence, and further, that 
it must go beyond the evidence to be of value.
Ad hoc hypotheses may be used to save a theory and 
may include any new idea which the scientist considers 
necessary for the progress of the research.
84
system of rules which guide scientists in the business of theory choice. In the opinion of
Feyerabend, any attempt to adopt such rules or methodology would in fact impede
scientific progress. Referring to history in support of his proposition, Feyerbend
(1984:23) points out:
The idea of a method that contains firm, unchanging, and absolutely binding 
principles for conducting the business of science meets considerably difficulty when 
confronted with the results of historical research. We find then, that there is not a 
single rule, however plausible, and however grounded in epistemoiogy, that is not 
violated at some time or other.
For Feyerbend, methodology rests on social convention within the scientific community, 
rather than on any process of rational procedure.
Perhaps Newton-Smith (1981:1-2) summarized the situation when he wrote:
The scientific community sees itself as the very paradigm of institutionalized
rationality. It is taken to be in possession of something, the scientific method, which
generates a "logic of Justification". For Feyerabend, Kuhn and others, not only does
scientific practice not live up to the image the community projects, it could not do
so. For that image, it is said embodies untenable assumptions
concerning the objectivity of truth, the role of evidence and the invariance of
meanings.
A t a time when the unforseen and unpredicted effects of technological and scientific 
advances are being realised, those responsible are being targeted at both the scientific and 
legal level. Public recognition that the practice of science is a process formulated on the 
basis of a false ideology, has brought into question the reliability, accountability and 
trustworthiness of the practice of science, resulting on occasion, in a disillusioned society 
re-examining the application of science based technologies. Increasingly aware of the 
fragility of scientific ideology, the public are demanding action to reduce what Bauer
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(1969:18 ) has referred to, as the "unintended, unanticipated or undesirable" second order 
consequence. Therefore says Woolgar (1988:11), not only are the politics and impact 
of science under question, but also the validity of "the internal workings of science".
When applying this theoretical analysis to a complex toxic tort case like Reay and Hope 
v BNFL, it becomes apparent how divided scientific opinion remains, and as will be shown 
later on in the thesis, how integral at foundational level, scientific ambiguity and uncertainty 
are. The deconstruction of scientific knowledge helps us in two ways, first, to appreciate 
the basis upon which to challenge the cognitive authority of science, and secondly, with the 
aid of this cognizance, to recognize the limitations of the practice of science. 
Epistemologically, this is not only important to our understanding of the nature of scientific 
inquiry, but also, scientific controversy. According to Wynne (1989:23), in a world 
where scientific claims and counter claims abound, the shifting and ever changing body of 
negotiated knowledge means that "science like life in general involves creating adequate 
conclusions from inadequate premises".
While social sciences, philosophy and history have done much to challenge the universality 
and construction of scientific knowledge, there still exists, an underlying assumption that 
scientific ideology offers a pure knowledge form; as Smith (1980:70) says, "many people 
both inside and outside the scientific community assume that the practice of science is 
equivalent to being rational. It is assumed that is, that if one wishes to know what is the 
case, then one must pursue a scientific procedure".
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Moving on, and intrinsically linked to the scientific knowledge debate, is the issue of causal 
relations. In the next two sections therefore, attention will focus on the problems of 
establishing causation, from both a scientific and legal perspective.
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2 .2  SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION AND THE PROBLEMS OF CAUSATION
Moving on from the philosophical and theoretical concerns that surround the foundation 
and construction of scientific knowledge, this section will concentrate on the problems of 
causal relations, in particular the scientific basis of causality and the difficulty this poses for 
the toxic tort case.
David Hume in A Treatise of Human Nature 1739 formulated what is regarded as the
classic analysis of causation in which he argued (among other things) that a cause was an
object precedent and contiguous to another. In an Abstract of that work, he wrote:
Here is a billiard ball lying on the table, and another ball moving towards it with 
rapidity. They strike; the ball which was formally at rest now acquires a motion. 
This is as perfect an instance of the relations of cause and effect as any which we 
know either by sensation or reflection. Let us therefore examine it. It is evident 
that the two balls touched one another before the motion was communicated, and 
that there is no interval betwixt the shock and motion. Contiguity in time and place 
is therefore a requisite circumstance to the operation of all causes. It is evident, 
likewise, that the motion which was the cause is prior to the motion which was the 
effect. Priority in time is, therefore, another requisite circumstance in every cause. 
But this is not all. Let us try any other balls of the same kind in a like situation, and 
we shall always find that the impulse of the one produces motion in the other. Here 
therefore, is a third circumstance, viz., that of constant conjunction betwixt the 
cause and the effect. Every object like the cause produces always some object like 
the effect" (Hume "An Abstract of A  Treaties of Human Nature" 1955:186-187)
Since the time of Hume the standard view of causality rests on the notion that there are 
"two or more distinct events that bear some sort of cause effect relation to one another" 
(Salmon 1984:137). Thus in everyday life we refer to situations in which one event 
(cause) is linked to another event (effect) by means of a causal process. While, as 
discussed in 2 (1 ), deconstructionists may question the existence of causal laws (by 
acknowledging that nothing in nature is constant and everything is in a perpetual state of
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flux), scientists nevertheless hold that some relationships do remain constant and that, 
depending on the "objects, events, conditions or other things at a given time" (Bohm 
1984:2), causal laws (while not absolute) can and do exist.
In order to identify the existence of causal laws, certain well defined methods of scientific 
research have been established. As discussed in the previous section, in ideal circumstances 
they include the recognition of regular association of condition or events, the making of a 
workable hypotheses, the predicting of future effects, and the testing by observation or 
experiment of the hypotheses under question. However, not all hypotheses can be tested 
by controlled experimentation and where this is the case, identification of causal laws 
maybe be based on the possibility of some causal connection. According to Bohm 
(1984:12), "as long as these possibilities exist, progress can always be made in any science 
towards obtaining a progressively better understanding of the causal laws that apply in the 
field under investigation". For this reason the theory of probability (as applied by 
epidemiological and statistical research) aims to provide the objectivity needed when 
making approximate predictions in areas of uncertainty and also, helps establish whether 
there is a chance or causal connection.
In addition to causal laws therefore, laws of chance also contribute to the establishment of 
a particular theory surrounding a particular event, and in some situations, chance (as a 
consequence of some independent variable) may well provide an alternative explanation. 
Thus causal laws are only one part of the process. "The central problem in science, as in 
everyday life, is to differentiate between real causal effects and the spurious ones that are
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due to confounding variables" (Dunbar 1995:15).
Currently, two distinct sets of guidelines (which have emerged over the years) assist the 
scientist (the Henle-Koch-Evans postulates) and the epidemiologist (Bradford Hill Criteria) 
in their quest to establish causal relations.
The Henle-Koch-Evans Postulates
The first set of criteria, the Henle-Koch-Evans (HKE) postulates6 rest on ten factors, 
satisfaction of which say Foster, Bernstein and Huber (1993:7-8) provide compelling 
evidence of causation:
1. The disease is significantly more prevalent in those exposed to the hypothesized 
cause than in exposed controls.
2. Exposure is more frequent among those with the disease than in controls without the 
disease.
3. Prospective studies show a significantly higher incidence of disease in those exposed 
than in those not exposed.
4. Disease should follow exposure after an incubation period that tracks a log-normal 
curve.
5. Responses follow exposure along a logical biologic gradient from mild to severe.
6. Exposure triggers a measurable response (e.g. antibodies, cancer cells), with a high 
probability after exposure, or increases the number of responses if already present 
before exposure. This response pattern occurs infrequently or never in persons not 
exposed.
6 HKE postulates were first proposed by Robert 
Koch (1843-1910) a bacteriologist and Nobel Prize 
winner. Some of these postulated were considered 
as early as 1840 by Koch's mentor Henle. They 
were later restated in 1976 by Evans, and are now 
referred to as the HKE postulates.
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7. Experimental reproduction of the disease, in volunteers or laboratory experiments, 
or by controlled regulation of natural exposure, occurs more frequently in exposed 
animals or humans than those not exposed.
8. Elimination of the suspected agent (e.g. polluted water, removal of tar from 
cigarettes) decreases the incidence of the disease.
9. Modification of the host's response on exposure should decrease or eliminate the 
disease.
10. All of the relationships and findings should make scientific sense.
Notwithstanding the methodological usefulness of the HKE postulates, they nonetheless 
represent an 'ideal', a gold standard which often prove elusive if not impossible to achieve. 
Frequently, scientific evidence of causal relations is inconsistent and contradictory, yielding 
ambiguous results and divergent scientific opinion.
Because of the uncertainty of establishing the exact causal mechanism for cancer, three 
predominant theories have emerged. These include: the virus theory7, pollutant theory8 
and psychosocial theory9. Other important factors in the development of cancer have also
7 Viral infection may result in the virus DNA 
(deoxyribonucleic acid) taking over the function 
of normal healthy cells, which in turn may lead to 
cell changes and the start of cancer. Cervical cancer 
in particular has been linked to viral theory.
The research evidence relied on for this is 
based only on animal experimentation.
8 This second theory suggests a statistical relationship 
between certain types of cancer and environmental 
pollution, including poisons, chemicals, radiation, 
(cigarettes would also come under this category).
There is says Rowe (1992:21) no empirical evidence to 
support this theory in relation to humans - "we only 
have unverified theoretical models".
9 This third category relates strong emotion such as 
stress, tension, anxiety, negative attitudes to people 
who may become (as a consequence) cancer prone 
(Bahnson 1969, Redd fit Jacobson 1988).
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been identified as falling into three categories: nature, nurture and luck. "Nature 
relates to a person's genetic make-up at conception...Nurture relates to what people do or 
have done to them (in the womb, in childhood or in adult life)...Luck takes care of the 
remaining differences in outcome that both observation and theory lead us to expect" (Doll 
and Peto 1990:1203-1204).
Currently, no one mechanism has been identified as having dominance over another, 
nonetheless, in much the same way that John Snow established the causal relationship 
between cholera and sewage in water (by recognising that control of the harmful outcome 
did not necessarily depend on precise identification of the mechanism of harm), scientists 
have continued to reduce the incidence of cancer. For example the claim that "smoking 
causes lung cancer" is not based on any identified causal mechanism, despite this, 
progressive increases in the risk of lung cancer can now be avoided by people giving up 
cigarette smoking. In similar vein, circumstantial evidence based on research carried out 
in the chemical industry led to reduction of the incidence of bladder cancer, once the 
manufacture and use of 2-naphthyIamine was stopped.
Because of the recognition of causal uncertainty, a variety of laboratory methods have 
been, and continue to be, developed in an attempt to identify which particular chemicals/ 
pollutant/factors are likely to cause disease. According to Doll and Peto (1990) however, 
the most favoured laboratory method are animal studies which have the advantage of 
providing information about toxic substances without exposing human subjects to harm.
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In addition, because animal studies are more easily controlled than epidemiological studies, 
they also allow scientists to vary conditions of exposure at will.
The most direct approach in such experiments are "long term tests" where the chemical/ 
pollutants under investigation are given in high doses for a substantial part of the life span 
of the animal and "short term tests" which although similar, may only take days/weeks to 
complete as opposed to years.
Because no scientist fully understands the causal process involving toxins as either initiators 
or promoters of humans cancers, there are difficulties in quantifying or prioritising human 
risk of exposure based on laboratory data. While human experiments (skeletal/cataract/in 
vitro) offer direct evidence, extrapolation from animal studies to humans is fraught with 
difficulties. Such hypothesis and methodological difficulties that do exist however, become 
all the more apparent when transferred to an adversarial setting in which a toxic tort litigant 
seeks to prove that exposure to a particular pollutant resulted in a specific disease, birth 
defect or mortality. Often in such cases the plaintiffs rely on numerous animal studies in 
an attempt to show some sort of correlation between exposure and disease. For the results 
of these studies to be probative however, the assumption must be made:
1. that if a substance is toxic in various species of animal it must also be toxic in 
human beings;
and
2. that one can extrapolate from the higher and more toxic doses given to animals 
to the lower levels of exposure in humans being.
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Unfortunately says Berger (1994:78), "while scientists are willing to make these
assumptions, and animal studies are routinely used in risk assessment, a number of courts
have rejected this evidence to prove causation on the grounds that the underlying premises
cannot be confirmed". After ail, while "quantitative extrapolations from animals to humans
may be giving us approximate correct assessments of human risk. Conversely they
may suggest risks that are widely misleading in one or another direction" (Doll and Peto
1990:1216); a view supported by Higginson (1982:122) when he concluded:
Today few experienced experimental oncologists would make any attempt to
extrapolate mathematically the degree of human risk from animals Exact
estimates as to the number of cases of cancer that might be expected to occur in 
man based on a single experiment are silly and simply ignore biological realities. 
The fact that no better methods exist does not make these statements any better or 
more valuable.
Identifying the different causes of cancer is further complicated by the additional factor that 
"some agents interact with others to produce effects that are much greater than the sum 
of the separate effects of the same two agents" (Doll and Peto 1990:1219). That 
synergism plays an important role in the development of cancer is not in doubt, what it 
means for research is that it is often impossible to maintain any categorical certainty in 
relation to the causes of cancer, and for this reason information that would allow a direct 
quantitative attribution of risk is also lacking and incomplete.
Epidemiological Research
In contrast to laboratory work, epidemiology concentrates on observations of the pattern 
of disease rather than on studies of particular toxins. Therefore, "epidemiology is 
concerned with the incidence of disease in populations and does not address the question
of the cause of an individual's disease [thus] epidemiology addresses whether an agent
can cause a disease, not whether an agent did cause a plaintiffs disease" (Bailey et al. 
1994:167).
Historically, epidemiology has played a significant part in cancer research by pinpointing 
risks associated with exposure to "combustion products of coal, sunlight, X-rays, asbestos 
and many chemical agents" (Doll and Peto 1990:1217). Unfortunately however, unless 
epidemiologists study reasonably large groups of people who have been subject to large 
doses of exposure over many years without effect, they cannot guarantee that those 
exposed to moderate levels will not also suffer some material effects. Other disadvantages 
in respect of epidemiological observation are:
1. Observation data may be open to misinterpretation.
2. The observation is limited to the conditions that actually occur at the time
of the study.
3. Epidemiological research may not be able to detect the effect of a
carcinogen until it has been used over many years.
On the positive side, epidemiologists study the impact of toxins on people directly (rather 
than animals) and try to determine what are the main causes of disease by looking at overall 
population trends (past and present). Further, epidemiologists have the advantage of being 
able to make use of their colleagues' laboratory work (which when used in conjunction 
with, or in combination with their own research may offer greater insight in terms of causal 
analysis then relying on laboratory studies or epidemiology alone).
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Austin Bradford Hill in his classic work Principles of Medical Statistics10, laid down what has 
become known as the Bradford Hill Criteria. The Bradford Hill Criteria represent the 
second set of guidelines. Relied on by epidemiologists in helping to ascertain the reliability 
of evidence as regards cause and effect, confirmation will depend upon a low probability 
of a chance finding, and the absence of confounding factors and flaws in methodology. If 
there is a finding in relation to chance of five per cent or less the conclusion reached by the 
study will usually be unassailable. If the study is designed to show a relative risk of disease 
consequent on exposure, then, provided that the lower confidence level is greater than a 
relative risk of 111, the study can be taken prima facie to show a causative link between the 
disease studied and the exposure of interest.
The Bradford Hill Criteria
Bradford Hill identified the following factors for consideration of a cause and effect 
relationship.
1. The strength of association (between exposure and disease) found by the study.
2. The consistency of association when compared with other studies. Is the finding 
confirmed by different persons, in different places, circumstances and times?
3. The specificity of the association with regard to groups, sites and types of disease.
4. The temporal relationship with regard to cause and effect. Which is the cart and 
which is the horse?
10 In a celebrated lecture of 1965, Sir Bradford Hill 
proposed nine criteria to assist epidemiologists and 
others identify whether a reported association is 
causal or spurious. In 1971 he published his book 
Principles of Medical Statistics.
11 A  relative risk of 1, or close to 1, implies that 
exposure is only one factor of many contributing 
to the development of the disease.
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5. The biological gradient in relation to the dose-response relationship. Is there a dose 
response relationship?
6. The biological plausibility of a causal link.
7. Coherence of evidence and the compatibility of a postulated cause with known facts.
8. Experimental evidence involved in the study.
9. Analogy (if available) to confirm findings.
To these nine points he added:
10. Animal experimentation. Extrapolation from animal to man must be done with 
caution.
Bradford Hill (1 9 9 1 :2 77) was however careful to point out that:
Clearly none of these nine viewpoints can bring indisputable evidence for or against 
a cause-and-effect hypothesis and equally none can be required as a sine qua non. 
What they can do, with greater or less strength, is to help us to answer the
fundamental question - is there any other way of explaining the set of facts before
us, is there any other answer more likely than cause and effect?
Although it is not the purpose of an epidemiological study to establish or disprove specific 
causation, it does help to assess whether there is an association between a risk factor and 
an effect and whether the association occurs more frequently than would be expected by 
chance. If it does so, then the strength of the association may be assessed by statistical 
methods and the results be used as evidence either on their own, or as part of other 
relevant evidence in deciding the issue of causation.
Despite the problematic nature of causation with regard to applied science and 
epidemiological studies, personal injury claims still depend on establishing whether or not, 
on the balance of probabilities the substance emanating from a particular source
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caused the illness, injury or condition. Therefore, it rests with the plaintiff to prove the 
existence of a causal link and to establish that the defendant's action was a material cause 
of the plaintiffs condition.
Moving on from the problems of scientific causation, the next section will concentrate on 
causation in the law, in particular, the tort system's capacity to deal effectively with 
personal injury cases, where the burden of proof of causation relies on scientific explanation 
and the preponderance of evidence rule.
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2.3 CAUSATION IN THE LAW
When David Hume formulated his opinion that ali reasoning concerning matter of fact 
seemed to be founded on the relation of cause and effect, he released the scientist from 
the historical constraints of metaphysical speculation, and in so doing, offered him an 
alternative to the notion of some unknown, unexplainable force or power. In effect say 
Hart and Honore' (1985:11) Hume told the scientist that "there was nothing in these 
notions, or in the idea of cause itself, over and above the generalizations and iaws which 
it was his [the scientist's] business to discover".
Recently, challenges to the philosophical and procedural framework of science have 
furthered our understanding of the difficulties underlying the epistemology of science, the 
construction of scientific knowledge and causality in science. Moving on from issues 
relating to scientific ideology, the final section of this chapter will concentrate on causation 
in the law.
Generally supportive of Oliver Wendell Holmes' (1920) view that the law should derive 
its theory and legislative justification from science, law has increasingly relied upon 
scientific methodology for support of its claim to legal rationality (Smith and Wynne 
1989). Today, reservations about the limits of rationalization and the problems this poses 
for science-law interaction, raises questions not only about the validity of scientific and 
legal analysis, but also law's deconstruction of scientific information. As Sales and Simon 
(1993:235) say, often:
Scholars may have different theoretical and methodological orientations, existing
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research may not provide definitive answers, the same data can be interpreted in 
a variety of ways, the appropriateness of one sampling technique may be disputed, 
the appropriateness of the statistics may be open to question, and so forth.
The purpose of investigating causation in the law is say Hart and Honore'( 1985:3), to 
"permit the clear formulation of constantly recurrent factors which count, though not 
conclusively, for and against decisions". A t a time when no causal assertion in science is 
certain, and the intrinsic fragility of scientific knowledge is open to question, an 
understanding of the legal framework within which the traditional basis of causation resides 
seems all the more important.
In their monograph, Causation and Law (1985:10-11), Hart and Honore' acknowledge 
that the lawyer is primarily concerned "to make causal statements about particulars, to 
establish that on some particular occasion some particular occurrence was the effect or 
consequence of some other particular occurrence". Therefore, the lawyer is not interested 
in discovering connections, only in applying what are already accepted generalizations to 
particular cases. It is the role of science to construct theories, the lawyer's to establish 
particular events as causes. Thus lawyers when attempting to identify a causal connection 
question whether something "should be said to be the cause of something else, or only its 
'occasion', 'a mere condition', or 'part of the circumstances' in which the cause 
operated" (Ibid). Causal questions therefore affect many different areas of law including 
criminal law, contract law and tort in helping to determine the existence and extent of 
liability or omission of harm.
Concentrating on personal injury claims, the issue of causation is perhaps one of the
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greatest hurdles to overcome. In such claims, the defendant's negligence must be shown 
to have caused loss or damage12, the establishment of which13 (with proof of 
causation) will affirm the required link. More recently however, this traditional approach 
to causation, particularly with regard to toxic tort claims has become the subject of much 
criticism.
Traditionally, it has been customary over many years for the questions of causation to be 
considered in two stages. The first, the "but for" stage is concerned with whether loss 
would have occurred "but for" the relevant act or omission of the defendant. If the 
plaintiff is able to show on the balance of probabilities14 that he would not have suffered 
the harm in question then factual causation may be proven. In the second stage, the 
court makes an assessment of whether the link between the conduct and the ensuing loss 
was sufficiently direct, proximate, foreseeable or alternatively remote, and whether as a 
consequence some subsequent event broke the chain of causation.
The separation of these two stages is however only figurative. As Honore' (1983:67) has 
said, they "are not taken literally. They do not refer to what is far or near in space and 
time. They are simply a shorthand used to denote all those considerations, causal or
12 The loss or damage forms the 'gist of negligence'
Stapleton, J. (1988) 104 LQR 213.
13 The only exception to this requirement is in strict 
liability, industrial injury and war injury cases.
14 This test dates back to 1571. Newis v Laik (1571)
Plowd 403. According to Howarth (1995:95), the 
balance of probability of standard of proof requires 
the court to be indifferent between pro-plaintiff 
mistakes and pro-defendant mistakes, but it does not 
tell it to be indifferent about making mistakes in the 
first place.
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other, which may make the connection between tortfeasor and the damage legally 
sufficient". Other factors relating to policy and personal responsibility have also been 
highlighted by Hart and Honore' as underlying many of the judgments of courts and of 
equal significance.
Markesinis and Deakin (1994) in their consideration of the problems of causation look 
to the burden of proof15 required and ask whether the defendant may be liable, in the 
absence of conclusive proof, under the "but for test"16. By raising this question they 
draw attention to the problems facing a plaintiff trying to establish the necessary causal 
link in medical, industrial and environmental personal injury cases, and also (by 
implication) the tort system's capacity to deal effectively with "mass exposure cases"17 
(Rosenberg 1984:855) or "toxic torts"18 (Day 1992:2). As Rosenberg rightly says, 
under either negligence or stria liability "mass exposure claimants, like ail other tort 
plaintiffs, must establish the existence of a but-for, cause-in-fact relationship - a causal
15 The burden of proof generally falls on the plaintiff.
If the court cannot decide between the plaintiffs and 
the defendant's account of events. The defendant will 
win the case. Described in 1942 by Viscount Maugham as 
"an ancient rule founded on considerations of good sense 
[the rule] should not be departed from without good 
reason" ]. Constantine Steamship Line v Imperial 
Smelting Coip. Ltd [1942] AC 154, 174.
16 Barnett v Chelsea and Kensington Hospital Management 
Committee [1969] 1 QB 428.
17 Re: Northern DisL of Cal. "Daikon Shield" IUD Prods.
Liab. Litig., 526 F. Supp. 887 (N.D. Cal 1981) vacated,
693 F. 2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert, denied 103 S. Ct 817  
(1983). Re: "Agent Orange" Product Liab. Litig., 565 F Supp. 
1263. (E.N.D.Y. 1983). Re: "Three Mile Island" Litig.,
557F. Supp. 96 (M.D. PA 1982).
18 Eckensley v Binnie (unreported, CA 18 Feb. 1988,
Lexis). Meriin v British Nuclear Fuels Pic [1993]
All ER711.
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connection - between the defendant's tortious conduct and the loss for which recovery 
is sought" (Ibid). Unfortunately for the plaintiffs however, as discussed in 2 (2 ), often 
identification of the exclusive toxic agent and/or the determining nature of the victim's 
disease, proves elusive.
For while the toxic tort defendant may admit to polluting the environment, the plaintiff, 
relying on the traditional tort approach may fail to establish causation. Firstly, the 
defendants may argue that the causal mechanism is unknown. Second, the defendants may 
suggest that the plaintiff would have contracted the disease (regardless of exposure) 
anyway. Thirdly, the defendants may contest on the basis of 'unassessibility' of 
contribution of risk19, and fourthly, the defendants may suggest cumulative causation20. 
In mass tort cases there are also additional problems of multiple defendants21.
Recently, in recognition of these problems, there have been a number of proposals put 
forward to resolve this situation including: reversal of proof in favour of the plaintiff22, 
res ipsa loquitur, liability in proportion to major accountability, and the abandonment of 
the traditional approach to causation.
19 See McGhee v National Coal Board 1 WLR 1.
20 See Wilsher v Essex Health Authority [ 1988] 2 WLR 557,
21 See Sindell v Abbott Labs 26 Cal 3d 588, 607 P 2d 
924, 163 Cal Rptr 132 (1980). Each drug company in 
this case argued that the chances are it did not 
manufacture the drugs responsible for the personal 
injury.
22 In 1978 the Royal Commission on Civil Liability 
and Compensation for Personal Injury considered 
this issue (Pearson Report, vol 1 p.285).
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One case perhaps more than any other, has however focused attention on the limitations 
of the traditional approach to causation, while at the same time opening a window of 
opportunity in favour of the plaintiff. In Hotson v. East Berkshire Area Health 
Authority23 the plaintiff was unable to establish, on the balance of probabilities, that the 
defendants' failure to treat him promptly, in breach of duty, would have reduced the 
injuries he sustained as a consequence of falling from a tree. The trial judge, Simon Brown 
J, found that there had always been a 75 per cent chance that the injuries would have 
resulted in his current disabilities anyway, but due to the defendants' carelessness, this had 
become a 100 per cent certainty. Therefore, even if the plaintiff failed to show that 
1 but-for" the defendant's negligence he would be injury free, he could at least establish 
that he had lost a 25 per cent chance of avoiding his eventual permanent damage. The 
claim in Hotson was whether this could found a claim for damages. The trial judge24 and 
the Court of Appeal25 held that it could.
On appeal to the House of Lords26 however, their Lordships in Hotson, reaffirmed the 
need to meet the 'but for' test, yet failed, in the opinion of some (Stapleton 1988; Scott 
1992; Reece 1996), to properly consider or evaluate the alternative basis upon which 
the action was brought - loss of chance of avoiding outcome.
As a consequence of this, a number of academics (Stapleton 1988; Hill 1991; Scott
23 [1987] 2 AH ER 909 (hereafter the case will be 
referred to as Hotson).
24 [1985] 3 All ER 167.
25 [1987] 1 AH ER 210
26 [1987] AC 75, [1987] 2 AH ER 909.
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1992; Howarth 1995; Reece 1996) have sought further clarification on this issue. For 
while other legal systems appear to embrace loss of a chance doctrines27, in England the 
idea has not been well received. Whereas loss of a chance is still recognised in contract 
law28, in tort, says Howarth (1996:99), "although the question is still technically open, 
the door is rapidly closing".
According to Reece (1996:205), the theoretical base underlying this problem relates to 
the legal system's acceptance of scientific "universal determinism" dating back to the 
eighteenth century. While science has now started to question the legitimacy of this 
outdated theoretical perspective however29, the assumptions underlying scientific 
determinism still remain deeply rooted and entrenched in respect of causation in the law. 
The burden and standard of proof, says Reece, were never intended for an indeterministic 
world.
In her article30, Reece therefore adopts a philosophical analysis to elucidate her position, 
and thereby assist the reader to appreciate the difference between cases based on a
27 In the US a number of jurisdictions have developed 
such doctrines. See Henskovits v Group Health 664 P 
2nd 474 (Walsh 1983); Deburkaite v Louvar 393 NW  2d
131 (Iowa 1986); Falcon v Memorial Hospital 462 NW 2d 
44 (Mich 1990). In France also the doctrine is well 
established see P. Malaurie and L. Aynes Cours De 
Droit Civil: Les Obligations Paris: Editions Cujas, 
1994:135-136).
28 Chaplin v Hicks [1911] 2 KB 786.
29 Please refer to 2(1).
30 Helen Reece (1996) Losses of Chances in the Law;
59 MLR 188.
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deterministic (clear causation) foundation, and cases founded on a quasi deterministic (loss 
of chance) basis. In attempting to grapple with this issue, Reece, in considering quasi 
deterministic (ioss of chance) cases, states that the traditional rules cannot be applied. 
The burden and standard of proof she says, are irrelevant when we are faced with a 
random event because neither side can prove or disprove causation on the balance of 
probabilities. For example, when confronted with a pollutant which is responsible for a 
random 10 per cent of cancers, it makes no sense "to ask whether it is more likely than 
not that the pollutant caused the plaintiff's cancer. The most that we can ever hope to 
know in this case is that there is a 10 per cent chance that the pollutant caused the 
cancer" (Reece 1996:205).
Linked to this philosophical position is the issue of what constitutes the 'gist of negligence'. 
Stapleton (198831) looks at the question of what has in the past (loss or damage) and 
may in the future (Ioss of chance) be regraded as the essential and minimum requirements 
of actionable damage in the tort of negligence. In the second part of her analysis, 
Stapleton then goes on to consider the relationship between the reformulated damage 
(loss of chance of avoiding injury) and causation. She argues that such a departure would 
not violate the traditional approach and that the damage suffered by the plaintiff would 
still have to be 'more likely than not' caused by the defendant's breach.
Moving on, Stapleton goes on to consider possible wider applications of Hotson with 
regard to latent damage. Here, Stapleton is concerned with accelerated claims formulated 
in terms of loss of chance of avoiding outcome before onset of disease. This would mean
31 Stapleton, J. 'Gist of Negligence' (1988) Part 1.
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that observable manifestations of physical injury would not be necessary for a claim of 
negligence.
When analysing the injustice of the 'all or nothing' balance of probability test, Stapleton 
points out the unfairness to the plaintiff (who is unable to establish a causal connection 
between the defendants fault and the outcome) and indirectly, the failure of the law to 
protect the public through deterrence of present or future negligent activity on the part 
of the defendant.
Further says Stapleton, there are advantages to the loss of chance approach, including a 
more accurate valuation of the impact of the defendant's conduct (as the plaintiff would 
only recover a proportion of the cost to him of the full outcome). This is because each 
claim will have to address the exact nature of the interest which the defendant's fault has 
destroyed (which means the defendant only paying in proportion to the risk of his 
activity). Scott (1992) in supporting this proportionate approach recognises that statistics 
have long been utilized by the courts32 and from a medical perspective, concurs with 
Stapleton's view that the implementation of the Ioss of chance doctrine would ensure 
justice to both parties.
Hill (1991) in criticising the loss of chance doctrine, considers the work of Stapleton and 
reflects on the House of Lords decision in Hotson, in particular their Lordships' failure to 
clarify the position with regard to this matter. In Hill's judgment, it should be for
32 In terms of valuation of interest. To establish causation 
in the absence of better evidence. Contributory negligence.
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Parliament to decide whether traditional rules are to be dispensed with and also, whether 
causal questions should be bypassed in favour of compensation for statistical chance.
In particular, Hill is critical of the fact that no distinction has been made between 
'statistical' and 'personal' chance. A  statistical chance can only be an assessment based 
on collected data of non-individual cases. A  personal chance would be a chance that is 
peculiar to the individual and would therefore take account of that particular person's 
future circumstances and capacity to deal with a disease. It is Hill's view that loss of 
chance can only ever be realized in terms of 'personal chance' involving future 
hypothetical questions. Statistical chance, based on past fact, will not suffice. As far as 
Hill is concerned, the loss of chance doctrine is too radical and incorporates a fundamental 
change of policy which involves a new principle of recovery. As a consequence, Hill 
proposes the application of a policy orientated approach to the decision making process 
and thereby:
in cases involving merely lost statistical chances, [where] the courts cannot 
determine which plaintiffs, if any, have suffered a personal loss. If, as a matter of 
policy, it is felt that the plaintiff ought to receive some financial help from the 
defendant as he might have suffered some personal loss - the plaintiff is 'innocent' 
whilst the defendant has been negligent and this is a way of being sure that 
everyone who has suffered a personal Ioss is compensated - then it should be 
recognised that policy, not logic, underlies the decision (Hill 1991:518).
For the present however, their Lordships in Hotson appear to have deliberately left open 
the question of whether 'loss of chance' may in the future form the gist of an action in 
negligence/personal injury claims. Possibly, this disregard was intentional in deference to
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the decision of the House of Lords in McGhee v. National Coal Board33 (discussed 
below) and in the knowledge that Wilsher v. Essex Area Health Authority34 was shortly 
to be considered by their Lordships. Whatever the reason for their Lordships7 lack of 
clarification, some academics (Stapleton 1988; Hill 1991) consider this was a missed 
opportunity which has resulted in continued uncertainty.
In McGhee35, the plaintiff was employed at a brick kiln where he contracted dermatitis. 
There was no doubt that industrial dermatitis was caused by the brick dust and that as a 
consequence of this work, dust adhered to the plaintiffs skin resulting in the condition. 
Although no breach of duty by the defendant employers was established in respect of 
working conditions, the employers were held liable for failing to provide adequate washing 
facilities which resulted in the plaintiff having to bicycle home after work with his body 
still caked in brick dust. The question therefore was, whether the failure to provide 
showers caused or materially contributed to the dermatitis. The evidence did not show 
how the dermatitis began, but was in the opinion of their Lordships36 sufficient to justify 
a conclusion that the defendants failure to provide washing facilities made a material 
contribution to the onset of the dermatitis, although it may not have been the sole cause.
33 [1972] 3 AH ER 1008, [1973] 1 WLR 1, HL (hereafter 
the case will be referred to as McGhee).
34 [1987] QB 730, [1986] 3 AH ER 801, CA (hereafter, 
the case will be referred to as Wilsher).
35 [1972] 3 AH ER 1008, [1973] 1 WLR 1, HL.
36 See per Lord Reid [ 1973] 1 WLR at 5, per Lord 
Wilberforce at 6, 7, per Lord Simon at 8, per Lord 
Salmon at 12.
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What made this case remarkable however, was perhaps more to do with the passages in
some of their Lordships' speeches than the decision itself. Lord Wilberforce's speech in
particular has become the focus of much attention:
...it is a sound principle that where a person has, by breach of duty of care, 
created a risk, and injury occurs within the area of that risk, the loss should be 
bome by him unless he shows that it had some other cause. Secondly, from an 
evidential point of view, one may ask, why should a man who is able to show that 
his employer should have taken certain precautions, because without them there 
is a risk, or an added risk, of injury or disease, and who in fact sustains exactly that 
injury or disease, have to assume the burden of proving more: namely that it was 
the addition to the risk, caused by the breach of duty, which caused or materially 
contributed to the injury? In many cases of which the present is typical, this is 
impossible to prove, just because honest medical opinion cannot segregate the 
causes of an illness between compound causes37.
Therefore, when considering the 'loss of chance' question in Hotson, Lord Mackay
referred to McGhee, and the controversial proposition that where the defendants' failure
had materially increased the risk for the plaintiff, then it was proper to treat such a
material risk as equivalent to a material decrease in the chance of the plaintiff avoiding a
particular outcome, at least, until McGhee had the opportunity to be reconsidered.
Accordingly, Lord Mackay said that it would be:
unwise to do more than say that unless and until this House departs from the 
decision McGhee, your Lordships cannot affirm the proposition that in no 
circumstances can evidence of Ioss of chance resulting from breach of duty of care 
found a successful claim in damages38.
Commenting on the implications of this evidential gap for the plaintiff, Lord Wilberforce's 
speech (cited in Hotson) went on to say that "if one asks which of the parties, the 
workman or the employers, should suffer from this inherent evidential difficulty, the 
answer as a matter of policy or justice should be that it is the creator of the risk who, ex
37 [1972] 3 All ER 1008 at 1012. 1 WLR 1 at 6.
38 Hotson [1987] AC 75 at 916.
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hypothesi, must be taken to have foreseen the possibility of damage, who should bear its 
consequences"39.
More recently, in Wilsher, the House of Lords reaffirmed the strict application of the "but 
for test" (where the onus of proving causation on the balance of probabilities lies with the 
plaintiff being able to prove the existence of a causal link which in court is taken to mean 
more than 50 per cent probability). Therefore, mere proof that the defendants' breach 
increased the risk of injury is not sufficient. Where damage may have been caused by one 
or more of a number of factors, it is now necessary to prove affirmatively that at least one 
factor for which the defendant is liable made a material contribution to that injury.
In this case, the plaintiff, a premature baby who had suffered from most of the 
background afflictions that beset a premature baby, claimed damages in respect of 
retrolental fibroplasia (RLF), an incurable condition of the retina. In the plaintiff's case, 
this condition had resulted in total blindness in one eye and severely impaired vision in the 
other. The plaintiff argued that the defendants' fault had materially increased the risk of 
the outcome (a point disputed by the defendants). Accordingly, the plaintiff argued on 
the basis of McGhee, that if he could prove the defendants' negligence had increased the 
risk of the outcome, he had sufficiently established causation and the burden of proof 
would therefore shift to the defendant.
Lord Bridge, with whom other members of the House unanimously agreed, rejected the 
argument that McGhee had laid down some sort of esoteric principle of causation and
39 McGhee v National Coal Board [ 1973] 1 WLR 1 at 6.
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burden of proof. Thus the law as a consequence of Wilsher, now stands where it always 
has with the onus of proof on a balance of probabilities lying on the plaintiff, and that 
onus satisfied only if the plaintiff proves that the defendant's breach of duty made a 
material contribution to their injury.
What Hotson and McGhee/Wilsher all have in common is that under traditional rules the
plaintiff would fail to establish on the balance of probabilities the necessary causal
connection to allow for recovery. Hotson, in attempting to reformulate these orthodox
rules offered their Lordships the opportunity of considering loss of chance as an alternative
doctrine in respect of cumulative and multiple causation claims, or where the existence
or establishment of a causal connection proved to be elusive. Increasingly in mass
exposure and/or toxic claims, there is a reliance on complex scientific expert evidence
where conflict of scientific opinion is divided over the specific causal agent. As Rosenberg
(1984:851-852) says:
Accidents in the course of the production, distribution, marketing, consumption, 
and disposal of toxic agents can have catastrophic consequences. Even a single 
instance of product defect, carelessness, or risk-taking may increase for thousands 
or even millions of people of one or more generations the dangers of contracting 
cancer or some other insidious disease. Ultimately, after a latency period that 
usually spans two or more decades, this disease risk will materialize and cause the 
disability or death of a significant portion of the exposed population.
The tort system's capacity to deal effectively with cases of this kind have been frustrated 
by the burden of proof of causation and the all or nothing approach of the "but-for" test 
where, under either negligence or strict liability, causation must be established on the 
balance of probabilities. Unfortunately, for mass exposure and/or toxic tort claimants, 
the generic character of the pollutant and its latency period often remain undetermined, 
as a consequence, the toxic agent is generally found not to exceed the background risk.
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Another problem facing the plaintiff (discussed in the previous section) is the determining 
nature of the victim's disease. Rarely is one agent ever the exclusive source of a particular 
disease, and often, nature, nurture and environment all play their part in producing a 
synergistic effect. Therefore, while epidemiological studies may provide probabilities in 
respect of the incidence of disease, background risk and cumulative risk, because of our 
limited knowledge of the aetiology of disease, it is impossible to be more precise in 
relation to the exact casual mechanism involved. So although some employees have 
succeeded in identifying a particular toxin as the causative agent, these tend to be in cases 
where there are also rare pathological conditions40. Most third party claims remain 
conspicuous by their absence or fail on the basis of causation.
In modem industrial society where radioactive emissions or chemical discharges can have 
profound human and environmental consequences, the traditional view of the personal 
injury claim, perceived as it is, in purely individualistic terms (Chayes 1976), must be 
challenged. Any non-utilitarian view says Rosenberg (1988) is a misconception of the 
social function of the tort system and negates the collective interest that now exists in 
mass exposure or toxic tort cases. Today, deterrence, precaution and accountability are 
public issue concerns. For this reason, Reece (1996) and Stapleton (1988) among 
others, recognize that the conventional approach to causality, whether at theoretical or 
practical level, needs to be confronted. Loss of chance offers a real opportunity for 
claimants, and in so doing, encourages the development of a deterrent/optimal care
40 Biadder cancer among workers in the rubber industry 
exposed to beta-naphthylamine has hinged upon 
judicial assessment of contradictory epidemiological 
evidence. See Cassidy v Dunlop Rubber Co. Ltd (1971)
11 KIR 311; Wright v Dunlop Rubber Co. Ltd (1972)
13 KIR 255.
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culture, while at the same time ensuring that the defendants' are only liable in proportion 
to their tortious conduct and the plaintiff's injury41.
Currently under traditional rules therefore, the issue of causation continues to be the 
football kicked around from one side to the other. What is being attempted is the 
resolution of uncertainties and what tilts the balance of probabilities in favour of the 
plaintiff or the defendant depends less on scientific truth, and more on the legal system's 
acceptance of a discredited deterministic philosophy which has its foundation in scientific 
ideology.
Having considered a few of the problems underlying the epistemology and construction 
of scientific knowledge, and discussed some of the issues with regard to scientific and legal 
causation, the next chapter will concentrate on expert evidence. In particular, the role 
of the scientist as expert witness. This is particularly important from a legal perspective 
for as Sales and Simon (1993:232) correctly point out, "scientifically compromised 
judgments presented in legal proceedings can be used by lawyers and judges to look to 
prior appellate [and first instance] decisions to support their conclusion about the validity 
of scientific testimony". Potentially therefore, any scientific opinion may gain legal 
acceptance, and by so doing take on precedential value in future cases.
41 Presently, where the balance of probability exceeds 
51 % the defendant may find himself liable not only for 
the excess risk but also for the background risk.
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3.1 THE EXPERT WITNESS
In the same way that notions of causation extend beyond narrow epistemological and 
disciplinary boundaries, scientific expert evidence goes beyond the realms of legal 
procedure to encompass scientific uncertainty and the dynamics of science/law interaction.
Although expert evidence has long been integral to the legal process, where says 
Schwarzer (1994:1), people "qualified by skill, knowledge, education or experience have 
been permitted to testify to help the trier of fact understand the evidence or determine 
a fact in issue", it is only with the advent of the toxic tort that cases coming before the 
courts have involved such complexity and scientific uncertainty. Notwithstanding that 
"courts are institutions established for the resolution of disputes, not arbiters of scientific 
truth" (Herman 1990:15), nonetheless as Freckelton (1987:174) points out, "law will 
always have difficulties in dealing with complex scientific evidence and new scientific 
techniques on the fringes of acceptance within the scientific community".
Indeed the problem this unfamiliar and often multifarious testimony poses for the judicial
system has led some authorities to question the courts' competency to make reasoned
decisions in light of such expert evidence. Recently, the Carnegie Commission on Science,
Technology, and Government concluded that:
The courts' ability to handle complex science-rich cases has recently been called 
into question, with widespread allegations that the judicial system is increasingly 
unable to manage and adjudicate science and technology issues. Critics have 
objected that judges cannot make appropriate decisions because they lack the 
technical training, that jurors do not comprehend the complexity of the evidence 
they are supposed to analyze, and that the expert witnesses on whom the system 
relies are mercenaries whose biased testimony frequently produces erroneous and 
inconsistent determinations. If these claims go unanswered, or are not dealt with, 
confidence in the judiciary will be undetermined as the public becomes convinced
115
that the courts as now constituted are incapable of correctiy resolving some of the 
most pressing legal issues of our day1.
In view of these concerns, the focus of this chapter will be on scientific expert evidence. 
In order to put the various issues into perspective however, 3(1) has been divided into 
two parts, the first discusses the role of the expert witness generally, the second, identifies 
relevant legislation and considers rules governing expert evidence, including, draft Civil 
Procedure Rules (1998), and proposals for an Experts' Protocol (1998)2. Moving on, 
Sec 3(2) examines issues related to scientific expert evidence specifically.
Incorporated throughout this chapter are the results of empirical research (carried out for 
the purposes of this thesis) from members of The Academy of Experts who, over the 
years, have become involved in complex litigation of a toxic tort or medical research 
nature3. The Questionnaire was delivered to Michael Cohen4, Chairman of The
1 Carnegie Commission (1993) Final Report.
2 The draft Experts Protocol is a document generated 
by the Association of British Insurers and Law 
Society in consultation with The Lord Chancellor's 
Office.
3 In addition to incorporating the results of the 
research throughout Chapter 3, I have included 
some of the data in Chapter 5. Part of the 
questionnaire was concerned with expert opinion 
of the judiciary. Please see Chapter 5 for 
further information.
4 Michael Cohen LLB FI BA FCIarb QDR FAE Barrister.
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Academy of Experts5 in May, 1997. Mr. Cohen kindly agreed to distribute the 
questionnaire to 160 of his membership6 involved in scientific or medical 
experimentation.
The Expert Witness
Wigmore (1940) suggests putting the date of modem law expert evidence (as expressed 
in the dicta of Lord Mansfield in Carter v Boehm7, and the decision of Foikes v Chadd8) 
as around the end of the eighteenth century. Concurring with this view, Jones 
(1994:58-59) agrees, "Foikes v Chadd was simply a formal admission of what was in fact 
already the day to day practice"; it thus legitimized the expert status of "a special sort of 
witness", and by so doing made expert evidence the exception to the opinion rule.
5 The Academy of Experts is based at Gray's Inn 
London. The current President is The Rt Hon 
The Lord Howe of Aberavon CH QC.
Vice Presidents: Daniel R. Fung QC.HH Judge Esyr 
Lewis QC. Anthony Scrivener QC. HE Judge Stephen 
Schwebel. Sir Donald Harrison MD MS FRCS FRCOphth 
(Hon) FRACS FRCSE FCM(SA) FACS FRCSI FRSM. 
Rodger Pannone MAE. Sir Francis McWilliams 
GBE BSc(Eng) F.Eng DCL.Prof. Pierre Lalive Lie. 
jur Lic.Litt(Geneva) Ph.D (Cantab).
6 In total 160 questionnaires consisting of 34 
questions were sent out to The Academy of Experts 
members. The response rate was 62% representing 
99 replies, of which 7 (3%), were incorrectly 
completed, leaving 92 replies. Out of the 92 
responses, 43 of the members (47% ), chose to put 
additional comments on the back page of the 
questionnaire. All those taking part were 
involved in scientific and/or medical research
at senior levels. Please refer to Appendix 1 
for a copy of questionnaire and results.
7 (1766) 3 Burr, 1905.
8 (1782) 3 Doug. 157.
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With regard to the role of an expert witness, Lord President Cooper expressed the view, 
this was to:
..furnish the judge or jury with the necessary scientific criteria for testing the 
accuracy of their conclusions, so as to enable the judge or jury to form their own 
independent judgment by the application of these criteria to the facts proved in 
evidence9.
Despite such assertions however, historically there has always been ambivalence and
judicial concern over the role of the expert witness. In 1873 the Master of the Rolls, Sir
George Jessel observed:
In matters of opinion I very much distrust expert evidence  An expert is not
like an ordinary witness, who hopes to get his expenses, but he is employed and 
paid in the sense of gain, being employed by the person who calls him.
He goes to say:
Undoubtedly there is a natural bias to do something serviceable for those who 
employ you and adequately remunerate you. It is very natural, and it is so 
effectual that we constantly see persons, instead of considering themselves 
witnesses, rather consider themselves as paid agents of the person who employs 
them10.
More recently, Cresswell J. said of an expert:
An expert witness should provide independent assistance to the Court by way 
of objective unbiased opinion in relation to matters within his expertise...
An expert witness in the High Court should never assume the role of advocate11
9 Davie v Edinburgh Corporation [1953] SC 34 at 40.
10 Lord Abinger v Ashton (1873) 17 LR Eq. 358 at 374.
11 National justice Compania Naviera SA v Prudential 
Assurance Co. Ltd "The Ikarian Reefer" [ 1993] 2 
Lloyd's Rep. 68 at 81.
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Today the importance of the expert witness cannot be under estimated, according to 
Freckelton (1987:3) "the influence of the expert is far-reaching and reminiscent of that 
of the mystics and village sages of former times". He goes on to say, that the courts 
willingess to embrace 'specialist expertise', 'latest scientific developments', and 'scientific 
claims' has resulted in a reliance and a dependency on the expert.
The challenge expert evidence poses for an already over burdened civil justice system are, 
as Lord Woolf acknowledges, problematic. In his Interim Report, Access to Justice12, 
Lord Woolf observed that the expert witness was a prominent area of concern throughout 
the inquiry, and that as a professional body experts appeared to be one of the main areas 
of contention within the legal system. While acknowledging that criticism differed, 
depending on the type of proceedings under consideration, the general consensus was 
that:
The need to engage experts was a source of excessive expense, delay and in some 
cases, increased complexity through the excessive or inappropriate use of experts. 
Concern was also expressed as to their failure to maintain their independence from 
the party by whom they had been instructed13
Further, there was a recognition that such problems had increased, particularly over the
last decade.
In attempting to identify what factors underlie these difficulties, Lord Woolf began by 
outlining what he considered to be the function and role of the expert witness. In his 
opinion this was to:
12 Access to Justice (1995) Interim Report to the 
Lord Chancellor on the Civil Justice System in 
England and Wales.
13 Access to Justice (1995:181).
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(a) assist a party to establish the facts and to assess the merits of a case and with its 
preparation;
(b) give to the court, as evidence, their expert opinion where opinion evidence apart from 
that of an expert would not be strictly admissible;
(c) give factual evidence on a subject, where because of their expertise, their evidence will 
have greater weight than that of an unqualified witness.
(d) conduct inquiries on behalf of the court and report to the court as to their findings; 
and
(e) sit as assessors with judges to assist the court to understand the technical evidence 
which the court has to consider14
When considering the difference between an expert witness and "a good expert witness", 
Smith (1989:69) identifies communication skills and expertise as two of the more 
important criteria. However, Smith goes on to say "technical expertise in itself is certainly 
not sufficient for legal purposes which, whether in a written reporter in oral testimony, 
require clarity and simplicity of expression, firmness with modesty, and an ability obviously 
more important with a jury - to couch technical statements in lay terms".
Other qualities identified by Reynolds and King (1992:26) which befit 'a good expert 
witness' include: "an analytical mind, objective judgment, recognition of the merits in 
alternative approaches, concise reporting, an interest in researching, patience, tact, 
the ability to negotiate, coolness under pressure, placidness, an ability not to be easily 
antagonized, realism, convincing credibility, relevant experience, thorough technical 
knowledge".
14 Woolf, op cit. 181.
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Therefore, what constitutes a "good expert witness" has evolved over many years as a 
result of: lawyers' experience, judicial observation and input, and an informal network of 
colleagues and recommendations from 'other' experts. Combined, all these factors have 
contributed to a perceived legal wisdom of what makes an expert 'a good witness'. 
Today, as Jones (1994:140) says, "lawyers' lists make it clear that they prefer people 
who are good experts and good witnesses".
Another factor in the evaluation of a "good expert witness" is the degree to which the
lawyer can influence the expert witness in the course of his testimony. Often this will
depend upon an element of witness subordination, as Smith and Wynne (1989:4) say:
..it is important to note that the legal process, and not the expert, defines the 
factual question which is relevant for the expert to answer. A  'good' expert 
therefore is someone who can subordinate his or her technical view of the relevant 
question".
Bennett and Feldman (1981:124) also highlight co-operation as an important factor, "the 
willingness of the witness to co-operate and his or her ability to respond to cues in the line 
of questioning".
Therefore says Green (1989:117) "experts who appear in court are at the end of a 
highly selective process", a selection process that involves "expert shopping" (Sales and 
Simon 1993:234) and has changed surprisingly little since 1877, when Sir George Jessel 
remarked that:
A  man may go, and does sometimes, to half-dozen experts. I have known it in 
cases of valuation within my own experience at the Bar. He takes their honest 
opinions, he finds three in favour and three against him; he says to the three in 
favour, will you be kind enough to give evidence?
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And he pays the three against him their fees and leaves them alone; the other side 
does the same. It may not be three out of six, it may be three out of fifty. I was 
told in one case, where a person wanted a certain thing done, that they went to 
sixty-eight people before they found one15.
In addition to the selection of experts, and questions over renumeration, Freckelton
(1987:124) highlights the potential bias of expert witnesses:
Experts do not come into the court room as disinterested observers. They are 
generally sought out by one or other side in legal proceedings, requested to make 
a report to the legal representatives, paid for that and, if the report coincides with 
the arguments which the lawyers wish to put forward in the case, asked to testify. 
Experts are no more altruistic than lawyers. They expect remuneration and they 
receive it. O f necessity, this affects the relationship between the expert and the 
side for which he or she appears. There are all manner of pressures, albeit often 
subtle ones, that propel the expert in the direction of making findings which are 
acceptable to the side for which he or she initially prepares the report and then is 
asked to appear.
This concern with impartiality is also identified by Lord Woolf, in particular, he highlights 
the importance of expert witnesses being seen to be independent, as well as being free 
from the influence of partisan considerations. According to Lord Woolf (1995:182), 
many of the experts simply become an "effective weapon in the parties' arsenal of 
tactics", as a result, more often than not, there is:
(a) a polarisation of issues and unwillingness to concede issues from the start;
(b) insufficient observance of the confines of expert evidence and expansion into the 
realms of rival submissions; and
(c) insufficient willingness to strip out, agree or concede all but the essential issues 
following exchange of reports (Ibid).
In their submission to Lord Woolf, the Academy of Experts voiced their concerns over 
witness independence, highlighting two particular areas. Firstly, the "meeting of experts"
15 Thom v Worthing Skating Rink Co. (1877) 6 Ch. D. 415.
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where experts are frequently instructed by lawyers not to agree to anything, or 
alternatively, only to agree subject to lawyers' approval. Secondly, the "exchange of 
experts' reports" where concealment appears to be the main requirement.
Lamenting the lack of witness independence, the Editor of the legal journal Counsel has
been particularly scathing of expert testimony:
Expert witnesses used to be genuinely independent experts. Men of outstanding 
eminence in their field. Today they are in practice hired guns; there is a new 
breed of litigation hangers on, whose main expertise is to draft reports which will 
conceal anything that might be to the disadvantage of their clients16.
Notwithstanding the legitimacy of such views, it is important to remember that lawyers'
bias in favour of their clients is "neither illegal nor immoral" (Sales Simon 1993:234).
As Saks (1993:5) says:
The advocate's duty is to advance the most persuasive evidence and arguments on 
behalf of a client that can be done without perpetrating a fraud on the court. 
Presenting "biased" arguments and evidence in this endeavour not only is 
permitted, it generally is ethically required. This is part of what it means to be an 
advocate.
Therefore, while it is not permitted for lawyers to deliberately mislead the court they are 
not required to present the whole truth. As Sales and Simon (1993:234) remind us, 
"truth is supposed to emerge from the adversarial process, with each side presenting the 
strongest, biased case for their client".
Unfortunately, say Smith and Wynne (1989:30), this reliance on the adversarial process
16 Editorial Counsel (1994).
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to expose "which side of an expert disagreement is introducing covert, extraneous bias 
(including values and opinions) or incompetence" is itself now under scrutiny17. In 
addition to allegations of "artificial polarization" and concern over partisanship and 
remuneration, there is also the danger says Freckelton (1987:133) "that the expert can 
be manipulated into presenting a distorted account of evidence"; particularly since, as 
Jones (1994:13-14) points out, "the dynamics of advocacy are not so much concerned 
with the deconstruction of the other side's case as with destroying it altogether".
Presently any evaluation of an expert witness depends on his ability to persuade the court
of the soundness of his opinion which according to Stuart Smith LJ:
..involves an examination of the reasons given for his opinions and the extent to 
which they are supported by the evidence. The Judge also has to decide what 
weight to attach to a witness's opinion by examining the internal consistency and 
logic of his evidence; the care with which he has considered the subject and 
presented his evidence; his precision and accuracy of thought as demonstrated by 
his answers; how he responds to searching and informed cross-examination and in 
particular the extent to which a witness faces up to and accepts the logic of a 
proposition put in cross-examination or is prepared to concede points that are seen 
to be correct; the extent to which a witness has conceived an opinion and is 
reluctant to re-examine it in the light of later evidence, or demonstrates a flexibility 
of mind which may involve changing or modifying opinions previously held; 
whether or not a witness is biased or lacks independence18.
Thus, failure to live up to these expectations may find the expert's credibility as a witness
challenged. One of the ways of achieving this is to attempt to destroy the experts'
plausibility and believability. Witnesses may be portrayed as "evasive, unclear, rarely able
to say anything without beating about the bush, and consistently not addressing the
17 See Chapter 13 p. 138 of Lord Woolfs 
Final Report on Access to Justice.
18 Loveday v Renton [1990] 1 Med LR 177 at 125 per 
Stuart Smith LJ.
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question" (Nyhart 8C Carrow, 1983:230). In addition, witnesses who appear uncertain, 
flustered or confused under cross-examination may "run the risk of being perceived as 
unprepared, careless, unprofessional or lacking in thoroughness" (Freckelton 1987:135). 
In the opinion of Jones (1994:149), some witnesses appear "too short winded, others 
are too opinionated, antagonistic, and chronic qualifiers"; if the expert is to be credible 
he must be none of these. Further, as expert testimony becomes increasingly relied upon, 
the quality of the testimony, and the skill of the witness are inevitably subject to harsher 
scrutiny and criticism by judiciary and lay public aiike.
Linked to the notion of the 'credible witness' is the question of professional competence, 
which all too often, may be deliberately undermined by Counsel asking questions beyond 
the specialism of the witness, on occasion, leading to witness ridicule. Interestingly, of 
those members of the Academy of Experts who successfully completed the 
questionnaire19, just over half (55% ), found themselves being asked to give evidence in 
areas they considered beyond their specialism. A  further 51 % of the experts stated that 
their competency had been challenged, and over a quarter of these (26% ), said they have 
been subjected to witness ridicule.
As a consequence, many experts "regard the adversarial system with distaste" (Smith 
1989:71) as it appears to be a system that enables "barristers to win cases rather than 
uncover the truth" (Ibid). In addition, while many experts support the notion of expert
19 Please refer to Footnote 6.
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neutrality and consider themselves to be objective throughout proceedings, often, says 
Green (1989:121), "they are not seen in this way by others", instead they are portrayed 
as experts lacking professional integrity. Thus the Academy study found that a relatively 
high number (20% ), of Academy of Expert members had their impartiality challenged 
under oath.
The inevitable result of such experiences is that many experts (in their submissions to the 
Woolf inquiry) drew attention to the difficulties and tensions which arise from the 
exigencies of litigation and expressed an unwillingness to appear as expert witnesses in 
future cases. Confirming a high level of negativity, the completed Academy questionnaire 
identified unrealistic deadlines and trial adjournment or delay, as particularly relevant in 
affecting the 'feel good' factor of the expert witness experience:
Questions Yes
Are there unrealistic deadlines imposed on you? 52%
Have you ever incurred personal expenses as a consequence of 
trial alteration/adjournment or delay? 59%
Have you ever incurred any inconvenience as a consequence of 
trial alteration/adjournment or delay? 83%
Compounding the problem further, and acknowledged by the Academy of Experts as of 
additional concern, is the issue of professional negligence. The expert still owes a duty of 
care as a witness to his client to carry out his investigations with reasonable skill. If an 
expert is deemed to breach this duty of care he may well find himself liable for any losses
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incurred as a consequence of his negligence20.
Moving on to the 'Additional Comment' section of the questionnaire, 47%  of the
Academy of Expert members chose to make supplementary remarks related to their own
experience. These comments are important for two reasons: first, because so many of the
expert members chose to take advantage of the space provided to express their opinions;
second, because many of the comments (in addition to reinforcing the views outlined in
the main body of the questionnaire) also concur with the findings of Lord Woolf. In his
Final Report (1997:143), Lord Woolf said:
Contributions to the Inquiry from experts themselves suggest that there is a degree 
of uncertainty among them as to their duties, and a perceived conflict between 
their professional responsibilities and the demands of the client who is paying their 
fee. Experts would welcome some formal recognition of their role as advisors to 
the court rather than advocates of the parties.
On the basis of the following comments21, Lord Woolf's assessment would seems to be
correct:
"My main gripe is that solicitors (the vast majority) do not keep me in the picture with 
what is going on in the case and leave requests to the last minute".
"Unrealistic deadlines are invariably the fault of the solicitor who has been careless with 
the case".
20 While it is very difficult to prove that the loss 
is due to the expert's negligence, the possibility 
is one recognized by the Academy of Experts who 
recommend that all expert witnesses take out 
professional insurance to cover both compensation 
and legal fees.
21 This selection of 'Additional Comments' provides 
a good overview of many of the opinions expressed 
by the Academy of Expert members. For a full 
breakdown of comments, please see the Research 
Results presented in Appendix 1.
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"Main problem is solicitors' poor communication skills and tendency to work at arms 
length by means of hastily dictated and sometimes convoluted letters. Few appreciate the 
fact that their work would be greatly eased if they brought experts in as quasi team 
members".
"The most negative aspect of being an expert witness is trying to receive payment - 
despite having an agreed timescale".
"Most lawyers use the expert merely as a 'tool' and do not accord sufficient respect or 
acknowledgement of years of experience and special training. Many lawyers devalue the 
'expert system' by favouring amenable or prejudiced experts who approach a case not 
openly, but from a skewed 'frame of reference', this fans the adversarial flames and adds 
costs and time".
"Few lawyers have the courtesy to inform experts that a case has been settled and the file 
may be closed. Too many lawyers treat experts in an arrogant way".
Moving on, the following comments were particularly critical of 'the system', and again
appear to concur with the conclusions of Lord Woolf:
"In my field of personal injury litigation, there are some cases where it is necessary to 
delay settlement (final) for several years on account of the nature of the disability. But 
I believe that liability should be established as soon as possible to facilitate interim 
payments, based on professionally assessed needs".
"I believe the majority of cases take unnecessarily long to settle and that the emotional 
distress caused to the plaintiff and relatives is disproportionate to the financial gains. If 
at all possible the adversarial element and the number of experts should be reduced".
"The system of not knowing if or not you will be going to court until the very last minute 
is infuriating - surely someone can invest in a better system"
"I feel it would save a lot of time and effort (not to mention stress) if agreement could 
be reached in advance over which aspects of an expert's testimony were accepted and 
which were in contention. This would enable the experts to direct their time and efforts 
accordingly. Maybe a court appointed expert could adjudicate on such matters. I find it 
frustrating that well considered reports are sometimes not reviewed in sufficient depth 
prior to the start of proceedings".
"I have had solicitors asking me to alter my reports to present their clients in a more 
favourable light - asking to prepare a biased report".
Rules of Expert Evidence
Currently, in addition to the statutory provision as to the general admissibility of expert
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evidence (Sec 3(1) of the Civil Evidence Act 19721Z), there are also special provisions 
with regard to codes of procedure regulating expert evidence. The most important, Order 
38 of the Rules of the Supreme Court (R.S.C) 196523.
As well as admissibility and procedural restrictions however, the courts also exercise 
control over the way expert evidence is given. According to Jones (1994:96) "the need 
to structure expert evidence stemmed from the real possibility that the expert would usurp 
the judicial role". Although there is no overall academic agreement on the classification 
of these rules, a certain consensus of opinion has emerged (Freckelton 1987; Robertson 
and Vignaux 1995). These include rules relating to qualifications24, areas of 
expertise25,
22 Please refer to Appendix 2.
23 R.S.C (Amendment) 1987 (S.I. 1987
No. 1423). Please see Appendix 3.
24 With regard to qualification, it appears 
that expert witnesses must possess some 
specialized knowledge, skills, training
or experience sufficient to enable them 
of offer information and opinion not 
generally available to members of the 
public (R v Silverlock [1894] 2 QB at
769 and 771). Sec. 4(1) Qvil Evidence
Act 1972 suggests that expertise must 
derive from knowledge and experience.
25 According to Cross and Tapper (1995:557) 
areas of expertise have included "medical 
and scientific questions, the meaning of 
technical terms, questions of commercial 
practice or market value, the provision of
a foreign system of law and the identity of 
a person's handwriting. These areas are in 
constant flux". Hodgkinson (1990:133) has 
suggested that the matter is, "at root, one 
of probative value".
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hearsay26, the common knowledge rule27, the basis rules28, and the ultimate issue
26 The rule against hearsay evidence is one 
of the oldest and most complex in English 
law. For the application of the hearsay 
rule to written assertions see Myers v DPF 
[1965] AC 1001. For oral assertions see
R v Turner [ 1975] QB 834. For conduct see 
Li Shu-Iing v R [1988] AC 270. in addition,
Part 1 of The Qvil Evidence A rt 1968 governs 
the admissibility of hearsay statements. The 
Civil Evidence A rt 1972 and Rules 37 sc 38 of 
the Supreme Court Practice do not accord any 
special relevance to the fart upon which the 
expert's opinion is based, whether they be 
hearsay or matter outside the expert's general 
professional knowledge and experience.
27 According to Freckelton (1987) there are two 
approaches to common knowledge. The 'strict' 
exclusionary approach which propounds the view 
that the mere existence of an area of 'common 
knowledge' precludes any expert evidence on 
the topic, and the 'liberal' view, based on
a 'need for assistance' concept in which 
the function of expert evidence is to render 
assistance, as and when required.
28 The Basis rule is founded on the notion that 
expert opinions are excluded from evidence if 
their basis either is not admitted, or is not 
admissible in evidence. Murphy (1992) highlights 
the highly problematic nature of this rule, in 
particular the fart that an expert bases his 
opinion on many matters derived from his general 
knowledge; training and education; and professional 
experience. Much of the evidence available to
the expert would clearly be based on experience 
and research that would, as a result of this rule 
potentially be inadmissible. The decision in 
English Exporters (London) Ltd v EldonwaD Ltd 
[ 1973] Ch 415 clearly shows that the expert cannot, 
by using underlying fart as the basis of his opinion, 
make those facts evidence in the case. This view 
was supported by R v Abadom [1983] 1 WLR 126.
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rule29.
In addition to having an understanding of the general principles of evidence however, all 
experts, say Reynolds and King (1992:120), also require "a working knowledge of the 
different categories and classifications of evidence so as to be able to distinguish which 
type of evidence is to be used". In their typology, Reynolds and King identify eight areas 
of evidence including: direct evidence30, best evidence31, real evidence32, conclusive 
evidence33, extrinsic evidence34, indirect evidence35, documentary evidence36, and
29 Historically it has been the rule at common 
law that no witness may give evidence on the 
ultimate issue of a case (R v Wright [1821] 
Russ. St Ry. 456). The ultimate issue rule 
has now been abandoned in England. In civil 
cases its abolition was recommended by Sec. 3 
Gvil Evidence Act 1972.
30 Direct evidence is the actual evidence of
a fart. The evidence must be something the 
expert evidence personally experienced.
31 This is the 'best' evidence that can be obtained 
to establish the basic facts from investigation, 
and, to give an opinion based on those facts.
32 The real evidence is the object itself which 
is the subject matter of the dispute.
33 Conclusive evidence is the most convincing 
evidence which is decisive in providing a 
fart of issue.
34 Extrinsic evidence usually consists of oral 
evidence given in conjunction with written 
documentation (drawn from a source outside 
the documents) to explain the point in issue.
35 Indirect evidence may be either hearsay or 
circumstantial.
36 Documentary evidence is governed by Section 4( 1) 
of the Civil Evidence A rt 1968, and Rule 3 of 
Order 38 R.S.C.
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prima facie evidence37 (Ibid).
Moving on to the issue of judicial discretion to exclude evidence in civil proceedings, 
it would appear says Murphy (1992:24) that "no well defined exclusionary discretion can 
be demonstrated in respect of civil cases". Further says Tapper (1995:215), there is also 
an absence of "English cases asserting discretion to exclude pursuant to the fair trial 
categorisation". Despite this state of affairs, consideration has nevertheless been given to 
cases where evidence has been unlawfully obtained38, and in cases where information has 
been withheld from the court39.
Notwithstanding this ambiguity, Murphy (1992) nonetheless believes that some 
exclusionary discretion exists. Citing section 18(5) of the Civil Evidence Act 196840 
as support for his view. This states:
Nothing in this Act shall prejudice:-
(a) any power of the court in any legal proceedings, to exclude evidence (whether 
by preventing questions from being put or otherwise) at its discretion.
Atiyah (1980:1249) similarly observes:
Rules of procedure and evidence tend increasingly to be subject to discretion rather
37 This is evidence which will establish whether 
or not there is a case to answer.
38 Ibrahim v R [1914] AC 599 at 610, [1915-15] All ER 
Rep 874 at 178.
ITC Film Distributors v Video Exchange Ltd [ 1982] CH 431.
HeffiweD v Piggott-Sims [1980] FSR 356 at 357.
39 D v NSPCC [1978] AC 171 at 239.
40 Reaffirmed by S.5(3) of the Qvil 
Evidence Act 1972 which refers to "civil" 
rather than "legal" proceedings as in the 
earlier Act.
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than fixed rule; and even where there are rules they tend increasingly to be of a 
prima facie nature, rules liable to be displaced where the court feel they may work 
injustice.
As far as the expert is concerned, says Freckelton (1987:248), there are "many 
circumstances in which professionals can find themselves in an embarrassing and awkward 
situation when asked as expert witnesses to disclose what has been said to them on the 
understanding that it would remain private and secret". He goes on to say that quite 
often, "disclosure can involve a conflict between the profession's code of ethics and the 
demands of the court system to have as much of the recent available evidence before it 
as possible". In addition, compliance with the order of the court could (at least in theory) 
result in sanctions and/or reprimands from ethical bodies together with loss of face among 
colleagues. In particularly sensitive cases this could endanger a relationship of trust that 
has been established or result in the withdrawal of research funding.
In sum, the position of the law appears to be that judicial discretion may exclude relevant 
evidence on grounds of public policy41, vital interests of the state42, and in certain 
cases where other (less serious) interests of the state may be challenged43.
41 Hennessy v Wright (1888) 21 QBD 509.
D v  NSPCC [1978] AC 171.
R v Chief Constable of West Midlands, ex 
p. Wiley [1995] 1 AC 274.
42 Duncan v CammeD Laird SC Co. Ltd [ 1942] AC 624; 
1942 1 All ER 587.
Rogers v Secretary of State for the Home Office 
Department [1973] AC 388.
43 Alfred Crompton Amusement Machines Ltd v Customs 
and Excise Commrs. [1974] AC 405.
Conway v Rimmer [ 1968] AC 910.
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Recent Developments
As a consequence of Lord Woolf's recommendations, Sec 1 (1) of the Civil Procedures 
Act 1997 identifies certain 'rules and procedures', while Sec 2(1) St (2) outlines the 
composition of the Rules Committee, currently engaged in the preparation of the 'Draft 
Civil Procedure Rules', including those relating to expert evidence44.
In addition to the Draft Civil Procedure Rules however, another proposal, a 'Draft
Protocol of Best Practice in the Instruction and Use of Experts', is currently being
formulated. This involves the Association of British Insurers, the Law Society and the
Lord Chancellor's Department. The aim of the protocol is to help those who instruct and
make use of expert evidence to do so:
...more effectively and efficiently. It is also intended to facilitate better 
communication and dealings between the expert and instructing party and more 
widely between opposing parties to a dispute45.
Having reviewed some of the wider issues with regard to the role of the expert witness, 
the next section concentrates exclusively on 'Scientific Expert Evidence', highlighting 
particular concerns with regard to this area of expertise.
44 Access to Justice: Civil Procedure 
Rule Committee. Draft Civil Procedure 
Rules. July, 1988. Part 32 'Experts 
and Assessors' has been included in 
Appendix 4.
45 Draft Protocol of Best Practice in the 
Instruction and Use of Experts. 
Introduction. Please see Appendix 5. 
for further details of these proposals.
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3.2 SCIENTIFIC EXPERT EVIDENCE
Moving on from some of the more general issues associated with the expert witness, this 
section will concentrate on scientific expert evidence, in particular, problems associated 
with the validity of scientific knowledge including: poor methodology, novel or new areas 
of scientific research, and misrepresented or fraudulent scientific claims.
Having read so far, it seems clear that scientific knowledge, based as it is on observations 
within a philosophical and procedural framework, experiences difficulties in dealing with 
cause and effect relationships. Therefore, the problem for the plaintiff (who depends 
upon the testimony of the scientific expert witness) is often radically different views of the 
hazard involved and divergent medical opinion of the impact of the toxin on human 
health. Fuelled by an adversarial process which seems to magnify these differences, the 
parties try to persuade the court to favour their interpretation. Thus the reality, says 
Oddie (1991:18) is that "Trial processes do not purport to be enquiries into the truth"; 
rather they are enquiries into whether a particular view of the matter (reconstructed for 
legal purposes) can be established or not.
Therefore, while the aim of an adversarial system may be to achieve just results, in fact,
as Lord Woolf (1996:138) points out:
AH too often it [the adversarial system] is used by one party or the other to 
achieve something which is inconsistent with justice by taking advantage of the 
other side's lack of resources or ignorance of relevant fact or opinions. Expert 
evidence is one of the principal weapons used by litigators who adopt this 
approach.
Although Lord Woolf in his Final Report, did not designate toxic torts as a 'special
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area46', there nonetheless exists some overlap with two designated 'specialist
jurisdictions' (Medical Negligence and Multi-Party claims) in relation to scientific evidence.
O f particular concern to Lord Woolf were problems related to partisanship and inequality
of resources. As far as partisanship is concerned, Lord Woolf reiterated the findings of
his Interim Report when he said:
There is wide agreement that the expert's role should be that of an independent 
advisor to the court, and that lack of objectivity can be a serious problem47.
In challenging inequality of resources, Lord Woolf pointed out that:
One of the fundamental principles of my approach to civil justice is that there 
should, so far as possible, be a level playing field between litigants of unequal 
financial or other resources. A  particular problem arises when one party, often the 
defendants or potential defendant, has an easily available source of expertise to 
which the other part does not have access48.
When applying either partisanship or inequality of resources to toxic torts often 
(as in the Reay and Hope case) plaintiffs are faced with a 'David and Goliath' situation 
in which, 'in-house experts' and huge corporate resources ensure an unfair playing field 
from the start.
Having touched on a couple of the wider problems (partisianship and inequality of 
resources) with regard to scientific expert evidence, this section will move on to more 
specific concerns with regard to: qualifications; scientific methodology; new areas of
46 Lord Woolf identified: Medical Negligence; 
Housing; Multi Party Actions; The Crown Office 
List; Specialist Jurisdictions.
47 Final Report (1996:143).
48 Final Report (1996:146).
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science and scientific fraudulent claims.
Qualifications
From discussion in Sec 3(1), it is clear that an expert is a person who has knowledge not 
ordinarily possessed by the lay person. Historically therefore, the courts have permitted 
the expert to testify, where it is decided that specialized knowledge is relevant to a 
particular issue. In order to adduce the professional standing and reputation of the expert 
witness, it is customary for the expert, having taken the oath, to provide evidence on his 
own behalf, of his experience, professional achievements and qualifications for admissibility 
purposes.
The establishment of qualified experts, particularly in toxic tort cases, where causation is 
the issue, allows the court to attribute weight to the witnesses' opinion in areas of 
scientific uncertainty. Documented academic attainment therefore permits the court to 
assume the expert has sufficient understanding of his specialism to ascertain whether data 
or conclusions are valid, and further, that the data and/or conclusions can be applied to 
the facts of the case. As Marino and Marino (1995:9-10) say, "No expert should be 
permitted to testify regarding causality if the expert lacks academic attainment and actual 
experience of the appropriate type, and few experts should be permitted to testify if they 
possess only one such qualification".
When applying the expert's knowledge to a particular case, Marino and Marino (Ibid) go 
on to propose the utilisation of a basic framework which they suggest should be based on 
the following questions:
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1. Does the expert's academic background indicate training in scientific methods and 
processes for inferring causality?
2. Has the witness demonstrated a familiarity with the scientific studies that embody 
the current scientific knowledge regarding the effects on living organisms produced 
by the toxin of interest?
Determining answers to these question will help the court decide firstly, whether the
experts has sufficient understanding of the scientific principles involved in the toxin under
consideration, and second, whether the expert can make relative evaluations in disciplinary
areas overlapping their specific expertise, be it dosimetry, epidemiology or laboratory
studies49.
Methodological Problems (Applied Science and Epidemiology)
Because of the uncertainty over scientific knowledge discussed in C h .2 (l), and the 
problems of causation discussed in Ch.2(2), Gower (1997:18) believes we should not 
assume scientific experiments to be simple events, with clear beginning or endings. In his 
view, natural sciences are subject to "human interventions in a world of numerous 
conflicting influences and forces [which] have their origins in earlier related investigations 
and their termination in later explorations". Therefore:
It is not surprising that the data produced in laboratories are sometimes unreliable, 
often contradictory, and always ambiguous. Experimental enquiries do have a life
49 Often epidemiology and laboratory studies 
are conducted on the same toxin of interest. 
Therefore, geneticists and epidemiologists 
may rely on each others work to provide 
additional support for their own hypothesis. 
Statistics are also common to both areas, 
consequently, dose assessment and risk 
analysis may also be incorporated for 
evaluative purposes.
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of their own, independent of any theories or hypotheses to which they may be 
relevant.
In similar vein, although epidemiological studies are useful because they focus on human 
health effects, nonetheless says Jasanoff (1995:120), they too often fall short of providing 
the level of proof required to establish causation:
 methodological defects render such studies unreliable or difficult to
interpret. A  common failing in epidemiological research is that studies are 
conducted on small population groups and hence may fail to detect a real, though 
infrequent correlation between exposure and illness.
Jasanoff goes on to say:
Epidemiological studies may be inconclusive even if they show a statistically 
significant correlation between exposure and disease because of a failure to account 
for possible "confounding factors", that is, factors other than the alleged toxic 
exposure that could also have produced the observed effects.
Novel Areas of Scientific Expertise
Moving onto less established areas of science, the issue to be confronted is the basis upon 
which the courts allow new, novel50 or controversial expert evidence. In two unreported 
cases51, the Court of Appeal, while reaching no firm conclusions on the scientific validity 
of the evidence, admitted the testimony on the basis that the jury might find it of probative 
value.
50 Novel refers to innovative or new evidence 
that is not established or necessarily 
accepted by the academic mainstream.
51 Rv McCrossen, unreported, 10th July 1991 CA 
Trans. No. 90 /1256/Y2.
R v Mitchell, unreported, 26 March 1993 CA 
Trans. No. 82 /2419/E2.
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Acknowledging the difficulties of this area, Hodgkingson (1990:133-134), has suggested
the following approach with regard to the admissibility of new areas of scientific expertise:
i) The matter is, at root, one of probative value. Expert evidence is only 
admissible if the evidence of the particular expert is significantly probative of issues 
which the triers of fact would, left with the established facts and their own 
knowledge, be unable to determine because they are outside human experience.
ii) The courts acknowledge a process over time by which particular scientific 
techniques become accepted, initially within the scientific community, and then by 
the courts. The two do not run hand in hand, both because the courts are not 
primarily a forum for the accreditation of the experimental sciences and because 
the legal process, entailing as it does a process of evidential proof makes additional 
demands upon a scientific discipline.
iii) A  discipline need not be accepted or rejected for evidential purposes. It may 
have a limited use in the court process, either because of its nature, or because of 
its limitations as compared with conventional evidential methods.
iv) A  scientific technique may be treated as admissible, but only subject to specific 
warnings to lay triers of fact as to the need for clearly understood and forensically 
unambiguous results.
v) The courts may admit expert evidence in a field which is of doubtful 
susceptibility to expertise, if its findings can be put before the court in such a way 
that the court can itself analyze each element in the reasoning or calculation 
process.
vi) The court will not generally compromise established evidential principles, which 
are themselves a safeguard of the reliability of the expert evidence to which they 
apply.
Until recently, other common law jurisdictions (for example the United States),
introduced additional admissibility standards which exceeded the basic relevance
requirement. The most established of these being the 'US Frye Test' which, as a
consequence of this case, resulted in a 'general acceptance standard' which stated:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the 
experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this 
twilight zone the evidential forces of the principle must be recognised, and while 
courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well- 
recognised scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is
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made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the 
particular field in which it belongs52.
The effect of Frye v United States was the potential rejection of any scientific evidence 
which was not sufficiently established, and had not gained general peer acceptance within 
the scientific community. The Frye test has therefore been the subject of much debate in 
the US, and other common law jurisdictions, and was not resolved until the 1993 case, 
Daubert v Menrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc53.
In Daubert v Merrell Dow Phamaceuticals Inc., the US Supreme Court took the view that 
Frye had been superseded by the US Federal Rules of Evidence. Rule 702 (which the 
court applied) was that novel evidence may be given if it will "assist the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue". The result of this decision was 
to abolish any admissibility standard and return to basic principles of relevance and 
probative value. In addition, the Supreme Court identified some important factors which 
they proposed for consideration on the scientific validity and relevance of any new 
scientific evidence. These include:
1. Whether the theory or technique can be, or has been tested.
2. Whether the technique has been published or subjected to peer review.
3. Whether actual or potential error rates have been considered.
4. Whether the technique is widely accepted within the relevant scientific community.
52 Fiye v United States (1923) 293 Fed. Rep. 1013 at 1014.
53 Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc (1993)
113 S Ct 2786.
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Therefore, the importance of evidential rules in coping with areas of scientific uncertainty
cannot be under estimated. As Clark (1981:81-83) reminds us:
The data [scientific data] are always insufficient to dictate unambiguous 
conclusions...The debate therefore shifts from a preoccupation with the facts and 
their proof. It turns instead to the careful development of rules for the 
admissibility of legitimate evidence, and for the form of legitimate argument. Such
rules are known to be fallible  but fallibility is accepted as an inevitable
consequence of our lack of omniscience. On the other hand, careful attention to 
developing mutually agreed-upon rules of evidence can create that essential 
willingness to proceed in the face of fallibility.... Perhaps most important formal 
rules of evidence constitute formal hypotheses on how we can best cope with the 
unknown.
While scientific ambiguity, and/or human fallibility may be accepted as an inevitable part 
of the scientific process, invalid or unreliable expert evidence nonetheless has serious 
implications for law.
This is particularly true of what Huber refers to, as 'junk science'. In the opinion of 
Huber (1991a:2), "Junk Science is the mirror image of real science, with much of the 
same form but none of the same substance". Huber (1 9 9 la :3), warns other common 
law jurisdictions to be wary of following the example of United States, "the legal 
establishment has adjusted rules of evidence accordingly, so that almost any self-styled 
scientist, no matter how strange or iconoclastic his views, will be welcome to testify in 
court. The same scientific questions are litigated again and again, in one courtroom after 
the next, so that error is almost inevitable".
What constitutes "good science" is however open to debate. According to Huber 
(1991 a:215), it is to the lawyer's advantage to "maintain that science is unreliable, and 
to assert that nothing is really known for sure, and that no one outside the courtroom is
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to be trusted". For Huber, good science is defined not by credentials but by consensus.
Frauduient Scientific Evidence
Moving onto scientific misrepresentation/deception, in this instance, the issue is of 
concern not only to unwitting colleagues and the rest of the scientific community, but also 
to the legal system's reliance on expert witnesses, who may in good faith, refer to 
inaccurate/fraudulent data.
In this country the recent example of Dr. Malcolm Pearce, a senior consultant at St. 
George's Hospital in London shows the potential for such falsification of data54. In this 
case, three leading scientific journals including the British Medical loumai. the Lancet, and 
the British loumai of Obstetrics and Gynaecology, all published fraudulent papers by 
Pearce (one of which had been 'rubber stamped' and co-authored by Professor 
Chamberlain, President of the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists). In 
evidence, Professor Chamberlain stated that the paper had been peer reviewed twice 
(medically and statistically); it never occurred to him that the paper was based on 
fraudulent claims. According to Lock (1995:1547-48) "the time has come for Britain 
to abandon its lax approach to scientific fraud", as well as the amateurism that permits 
publication of fraudulent research.
The difficulty of defining exactly what constitutes deception, fraud, misconduct or
54 Dr. Malcolm Pearce was investigated and disciplined 
on the basis of alleged falsification of data on 
his research of a potential treatment for ectopic 
pregnancy.
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unconscious behaviour is the subject of much national and international scientific debate.
Related to this debate are issues of self-regulation, governmental intervention and judicial
consideration. According to Grayson (1995:75), the United States is the only country
that appears to be willing to confront this issue:
Even the most cursory giance at the literature of scientific deception reveals a 
glaring discrepancy between the United States and the rest of the world. Although 
the American scientific community has demonstrated many of the characteristics 
of scientific conservatism, and has perhaps been forced to confront misconduct by 
the threat of legislative action, it has shown itself considerably more willing to 
admit that a problem exists than its counterparts elsewhere in the world. It has 
discussed the issues exhaustively, developed institutional procedures for 
investigating and disciplining misconduct, devised guidelines on ethical conduct, 
and addressed the educational needs of young scientists. Much of this has 
happened in the public domain, with the newspaper press playing a significant role. 
Elsewhere there is almost complete silence.
Savan (1988) believes that because research publication is so closely associated with an 
increase in salary, promotion, the achievement of academic tenure and research funding, 
the aspiring, as well as the established scientist is now under an intolerable pressure to 
publish, with research papers becoming an end, rather than a means. According to 
Grayson (1995:35), "scientists no longer publish predominantly to disseminate new 
knowledge - this function is increasingly carried out by informal means, either 
electronically or through face-to-face contacts at conferences - but to boost their 
curriculum vitae or the research ratings of their departments".
Thus internal dynamics and problems of the scientific academic world may indirectly 
impinge on the credibility of the expert witness. As Pugh and Day (1995:91) suggest
"the lawyer should therefore not accept anything at face value Scientists, although
in some ways quite scrupulous when it comes to drafting a report, can also be quite naive 
when it comes to accepting other people's work. The training of the lawyer to have an
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enquiring mind and not to accept things at their face value is a real asset".
The problem that scientific evidence poses for the legal system has led to a realization that 
the legal community needs to become more sophisticated about the limitations of scientific 
knowledge, and correspondingly, scientific expert evidence. Perhaps, given the complexity 
of the matter, and the fact as Carson (1992:17) points out, the issues involved are so 
fundamental ie: "the nature of science, comparative methodologies, assessing degrees of 
expertise", it is not surprising there are problems.
In a toxic tort case, the plaintiff must establish that exposure to a toxin is sufficient (in the 
circumstances) to bring about the plaintiff's disease. According to Marino and Marino 
(1994:43), if the expert can demonstrate, on the basis of scientific research, and the 
evidence presented, that:
1. the plaintiff's disease can be caused by the toxin;
2. the doses of the toxic agent used in scientific studies involving the agent were 
comparable to the dose the plaintiff actually received; and
3. the plaintiff was exposed at levels substantially in excess of those experienced 
by ordinary members of the public.
then, in these ideal circumstances, the necessary conditions have been met. However, this 
assumes that the plaintiff has only been exposed to one risk factor, the toxic agent, for 
which the defendants are liable. In most situations however, other factors (as discussed 
in Chapter Two) play their role in contributing to the question of apportionment of cause.
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Moving on to Chapter Four, it is clear that many of the concerns raised in this chapter 
with regard to the expert witness and scientific expert evidence unfolded during the Reay 
and Hope trial. Throughout the lawsuit, notions of the expert as a hired gun; lack of 
witness impartiality; claims of poor methodology; allegations of fraud, incompetence and 
bias emerged. Further, notwithstanding the novel and complex nature of the scientific 
evidence, and the public health importance of the issues under consideration, there was 
an unwillingness to embrace new ideas; thus scientific dogma55 and the legal system's 
acceptance of scientific 'universal determinism'56 prevailed. Other factors identified by 
Lord Woolf in his Final Report (1996), in particular, polarisation of issues and inequality 
of finances/resources vis-a-vis plaintiffs/defendants were also apparent from the start of 
Reay and Hope proceedings.
Because of the numerous expert witnesses that took part in the trial, Chapter Four begins 
by providing a brief synopsis of the case (4 .1), before moving on to a more detailed 
examination of the experts and scientific expert evidence. Scientific areas relevant to the 
Reay and Hope case include: Occupational Dosimetry (4.2); Environmental Dosimetry 
(4.3); Epidemiology (4 .4); and Genetics (4 .5).
55 Please refer to Chapter 2( 1).
56 Please refer to Chapter 2 (3 ).
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4.1 SYNOPSIS ■ REAY AND HOPE v BRITISH NUCLEAR FUELS PLC
Having laid the foundations of the case in Chapter One by providing the reader with a 
brief history and examination of the public health concerns that surround the Sellafield 
Plant, Chapter Two moved on to an exploration of science and consideration of the 
construction of scientific knowledge before tackling the thorny problem of scientific and 
legal causation - all issues which at root are fundamental to our understanding of the 
difficulties that so often best a toxic tort or multi-action claim where science and law 
interact and where, as Chapter Three illustrated expert evidence is increasingly relied upon 
to provide a beacon of light through the quagmire of scientific uncertainty.
Expanding on the research in these previous chapters, this part of the thesis will provide 
an analysis of Reay v. British Nuclear Fuels pic; Hope v. British Nuclear Fuels pic. 
Underlying this analysis is the proposition that rationalization on the basis of precise 
empirical questions, premised on the supposition that causal relations are only ever one 
dimensional is no longer tenable. This proposition challenges not only the neutrality and 
impartiality of the facts presented as objective, but equally the objectivity and application 
of the rule of law in attempting to resolve the issues appertaining to those facts. Beginning 
with a synopsis of the case therefore, the following sections of this chapter will provide 
an in depth and detailed account of the substantive evidence that led the presiding judge 
to his ultimate conclusion.
The trial of the cases of Elizabeth Reay and Vivien Hope, commenced in October 1992 
and concluded at the end of June 1993 (with Judgment being given in October 1993)
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was one of the most interesting trials in English civil law. The trial lasted short of one 
hundred days and included the evidence of some thirty one expert witnesses (out of a 
possible seventy experts who produced reports1). The trial broke new ground on two 
fronts; it was the first time in this country that a personal injury claim had tested the 
concept of genetic damage from radiation, and the only time in a civil trial that a judge 
(in this case Mr. Justice French) had been allocated a barrister (Mr. Philip Nicol-Gent) 
to act as a full-time judicial assistant. Further, this trial was one of the first to endorse a 
satellite video link for examination of expert witnesses pursuant to Order 38, Rule 3.
The basis of the action of Elizabeth Reay against the defendants British Nuclear Fuels pic 
(BNFL) was a claim for damages under the Fatal Accidents Acts and Law Reform 
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934 in respect of trauma consequent on conception, 
birth and death of her daughter Dorothy2 from leukaemia. The second plaintiff, Vivien
1 According to Martyn Day (who was also the Plaintiffs'
Solicitor in Reay and Hope) there were a total of forty five 
expert witnesses who gave evidence (Pugh and Day 1995:111). 
Relying on the transcript of the trial however, only
thirty one experts appeared in court to give oral evidence. 
Excluded from these figures are Professor Gardner who died in 
1993; Professor Nomura who was ill; Dr. Inskip who made a 
signed declaration under oath. Other experts included 
Dr. B. Lambert (Advisor) and Professor Ehling who submitted 
evidence under the Civil Evidence Act.
2 Dorothy Reay was bom on 8th October 1961 and died 
of 'early B-cell acute lymphoblastic leukaemia 5'
(All) on 2nd September 1962. Leukaemia is a form 
of cancer of the blood or haemopietic system.
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Jane Hope3 claimed damages against BNFL for past and future suffering and disability 
consequent upon her lymphoma.
The core issues before the court were whether the plaintiffs could prove that the cause 
or a material contributory cause of firstly, Dorothy Reay's death from leukaemia, and 
secondly, Vivien Hope's NHL was ionising radiation emitted by the activities carried out 
at Sellafield in Cumbria by the Defendants and their predecessors (the United Kingdom 
Atomic Energy Authority [UKAEA]). By reason of statutory provision the Plaintiffs did 
not need to prove negligence. It was common ground that section 5(3) of the Atomic 
Energy Authority Act 1954, imposed upon the defendants (as successors to the UKAEA) 
a statutory liability attaching from 1st August 19544. The fundamental issue therefore 
was causation.
The plaintiffs based their case on paternal preconception irradiation (PPI); in particular, 
the work of Professor M . Gardner, Head of the Medical Research Council Environmental 
Epidemiological Unit, University of Southampton5 who suggested that the raised
3 Vivien Jane Hope was bom on the 10th May 1965 
and was diagnosed in June 1988 (at the age of
23 years) of having non-Hodgkins lymphoma (NHL)
Burkitt's lymphoma. Lymphoma is also a form of 
cancer of the blood or haemopietic system.
4 As discussed in the Introduction (p. 5), Section 5(3) 
imposed a statutory liability to ensure that no ionising 
radiation from anything on any premise occupied by the 
defendants, or from any waste discharged (in whatever form) 
on or from any premises occupied by them causes any hurt 
to any person or any damage to any property, whether he 
or it is on any such premises or elsewhere.
5 Referred to in Chapter 1(3).
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incidence of leukaemia and (to a lesser extent) non-Hodgkin's lymphoma among children 
near Sellafield was associated with paternal recorded dose of whole body penetrating 
radiation during employment at the Sellafield Plant before conception6. The fathers of 
both Dorothy Reay and Vivien Hope worked for many years at the nuclear plant and both 
families lived in the vicinity. They alleged that their fathers' exposure to ionising radiation 
resulted in mutation in the spermatagonia which as a consequence, caused a pre­
disposition to leukaemia and/or NHL in the next generation.
A t the outset of the trial it was made clear by Counsel for the plaintiffs that these cases 
had nothing to do with current debate or concern surrounding the issue of nuclear power 
and that the events highlighted during the trial took place several decades before (Day 1, 
p.3). A t the time the plaintiffs' claim, there were ineffective and defective procedures 
and practices in place which resulted in the exposure of workers and residents close to the 
plant to unacceptably high doses of radiation.
The dispute between the parties therefore centred on four main areas: occupational dose 
(4 .2), environmental dose (4.3); the epidemiology (4.4) and the genetics (4 .5).
4.2 The Occupational Dose
The doses of ionising radiation received by George Reay and David Hope in the course 
of their employment with BNFL were clearly fundamental for both the defendants and
6 For a wider discussion of Professor Gardner's 
findings in the context of other research into 
childhood cancer and nuclear installations, 
please refer back to Chapter 1(3).
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plaintiffs. As far as the plaintiffs were concerned the importance of the total paternal 
radiation dose lay firstly in their wish to show the doses were sufficient to cause male 
parental gonad damage, and secondly, to demonstrate there was some correlation between 
the total radiation dose received by both fathers and the incidence of the two diseases as 
regards wider epidemiological support.
The defendants by contrast hoped to prove that firstly, the doses received by the fathers 
were insufficient to cause the alleged damage, and secondly, that the alleged correlation 
between the radiation dose and incidence of disease did not exist.
Clearly the problem of establishing total occupational paternal radiation dose 30-40 years 
after the event would prove complex. In the end the figures agreed upon with regard to 
photon dose, neutron dose, the internal dose assessment and the totals of those 
assessments over an entire period of employment in respect of the plaintiffs, as well as an 
evaluation of Reay and Hope's preconception exposure period of six months, three 
months and two months, were only agreed after much discussion and compromise 
between the parties7 and only then, after a total re-examination of the figures which was 
required as a consequence of inaccurate information provided by BNFL to Professor 
Gardner8.
7 See Ch.4(2) for a wider discussion and analysis 
of this issue.
8 Further discussion on the reasons behind BNFL 
supplying inaccurate information to Professor 
Gardner will be discussed in 4(2 ).
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The final figures9 agreed upon by the plaintiffs and defendants were presented to the 
Court on the fifth day of the trial by Dr. Rex Strong (Head of Environmental and 
Personnel Protection at the Sellafield site of BNFL). Although Dr. Lambert and Dr. 
Dennis agreed the figures on behalf of the plaintiffs, they were fully aware of the 
reservations expressed by Dr. Strong that the dose figures:
...are intended to be used by epidemiologists in this litigation who have a technical 
appreciation of the scientific limitation of the data and who are prepared to accept 
them in this light as being indicative rather than definitive10
Therefore, it was accepted by both parties that the dose figures only represented the 'best 
possible estimates' and were not clear cut or conclusive in their application to the 
epidemiological and genetic evidence.
4.3 The Environmental Dose
This factor relates to the environmental dose11 received by Vivien Hope and Dorothy 
Reay and their families, as well as other residents of Seascale. The importance of 
environmental dose is again linked to the Gardner study, where excesses of leukaemia and 
NHL were found in the vicinity of the Seascale village which is situated two miles from the 
Sellafield plant.
9 The final figures will be discussed in greater 
detail in the following section.
10 Dr. Rex Strong cited by Mr. Justice French 
Judgment p. 19.
11 Not to be confused with background radiation naturally 
present in the atmosphere.
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The plaintiffs submitted that in addition to the occupational doses already referred to, the 
defendants were also responsible for emissions of radiation from the Sellafield plant. The 
effect of this extra exposure was to provide a 'second hit' opportunity in respect of the 
emerging cancers which, as a multifactorial disease often requires two events or 'hits' 
before the condition is fully realised. The plaintiffs maintained that this other element 
could have acted somatically on the foetus in utero or on the child after birth, 
contributing to the development of cancer. This is irrespective of whether the initiating 
cause was PPI or some other unknown factor. The plaintiffs however elected to call no 
evidence on this issue, relying instead on the cross examination of the witnesses called on 
behalf of the defendants.
In contrast to the plaintiffs, the defendants called three witnesses. The first Dr. S.R. 
Jones, was at the time employed by BNFL as Head of Environmental Studies at the 
Sellafield site12. Dr. Jones produced a mathematical model known as the Sellafield 
Environmental Assessment Model (SEAM). The aim of this model was to calculate the 
doses to the various members of the two families of concentrations of different 
radionuclides in the environment. The second witness was Dr. R.J. Dickinson who was 
employed by BNFL as Business Planning and Technical Appraisal Manager of the Magnox 
Division. The purpose of calling Dr. Dickinson was to confirm various aspects of 
authorization procedures in respect of the BNFL discharges. The third witness was Dr. 
J.W. Stather employed by the National Radiological Protection Board (NRPB) as Assistant
12 Dr. S.R. Jones later became Director of Environmental 
Research at the Westlakes Research Institute and 
Corporate Advisor to BNFL. He is also a visiting 
professor at Liverpool University.
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Director of the Environmental Measurements Department and the Non-ionising Radiation 
Department who, following the screening of the Yorkshire Television Programme 
"Windscale - the Nuclear Laundry"13 was given responsibility by the NRPB for 
quantifying the dose assessment and radiation risk to children and young persons at 
Seascale and also for preparing a report for the Black Advisory group on the topic. His 
report to the Court was mainly to reiterate the findings he had made earlier and apply 
them to the Reay and Hope families.
4.4 The Epidemiology
The epidemiological evidence, in particular the study carried out by Professor Gardner and 
his team provided the foundation for the plaintiffs7 case. As already discussed, Professor 
Gardners 1990 study centred around an excess of leukaemia, NHL and other cancers in 
west Cumbria and in the neighbourhood of the Sellafield plant. The Gardner team 
examined cases occurring in young people bom in the area and diagnosed there between 
1950-1985 under the age of 25. An account of that study together with its findings 
were published in two papers in the British Medical loumai (BMJ)14.
13 See Ch. 1 for further details on this programme.
14 Gardner, N .j. et al. British Medical Journal 300, 
423-429 (1990). The first paper was headed "Results 
of case control study of leukaemia and lymphoma 
among young people near Sellafield nuclear plant in 
west Cumbria". The second paper was headed "Methods 
and basic data of case-control study of leukaemia
and lymphomas among young people near Sellafield 
nuclear plant in west Cumbria".
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Since its publication the Gardner report has been reworked by others15 than Professor 
Gardner on no less than three occasions. Despite these changes however the Gardner 
report (with subsequent amendments) still remains central to the case16.
The plaintiffs maintained that the Gardner Study demonstrated a significant association 
between the excess of leukaemias around Sellafield and PPI; that the data on which 
Gardner based his findings when re-analyzed continued to support that association; and 
that when the Bradford-Hill criteria (discussed in Chapter Two) are applied to the 
association, causation is proved on the balance of probabilities.
The defendants made it clear in their submission that it was for the plaintiffs to establish 
on the balance of probabilities that ionising radiation resulting from the operation of BNFL 
(or its predecessors - UKAEA17) at Sellafield was the cause, or a material contributory 
cause of the plaintiffs' diseases, it was not enough therefore to show that ionising radiation 
'enhanced the risks' of those diseases. The defendants18 went on to identify what they
15 In particular Dr. Stephen Evans, Royal London 
Hospital who took over the work when Professor 
Gardner became ill and sadly died of lung cancer 
in January 1993.
16 Witnesses called in respect of the plaintiffs include
Dr. Stephen Evans (who recalculated the Gardner Study); 
Dr. K.J.Kopecky; Dr. E. Alberman; Professor D.C. Thomas; 
Professor D.A. Savitz; Professor N.E. Day.
17 See Chapter 1(1) for more information on the history and 
background of Sellafield.
18 Witnesses called on behalf of the defendants include:
Dr. K. Macrae; Dr. R. Wakeford; Professor G. Howe; 
Professor A.C. Upton; Professor W.J. SchuII;
Professor B. Macmahon; Professor Sir Richard Doll.
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regarded as methodological shortcomings in the Gardner Study. Included in their 
criticisms were: the small number of cancer cases involved in the study; the limited 
geographical location of the study; the concentration on the Seascale cases19; the 
inclusion of one particular case (the Bristol case) which they maintain should not have 
been included20; the inability of Gardner to explain the Seascale leukaemia and 
lymphoma excesses; the failure of the study to satisfy the Bradford Hill criteria. In their 
evidence the defendants relied on a number of epidemiological studies21 discussed in 
greater detail in Chapter 4(4).
4.5 The Genetics
The plaintiffs maintained that although it was not necessary in law for them to prove 
either that the Gardner hypothesis was biologically possible or plausible (as their case 
relied on the epidemiological evidence and should therefore only be displaced by a clear 
demonstration that the cause and effect they claimed was impossible), the plaintiffs were 
nonetheless able to call experts to identify a probable biological mechanism whereby a 
plausible biological pathway could be identified, and where as a consequence radiation 
emitted by, or from the Sellafield Plant, could have caused or materially contributed to
19 The issue of sub-group analyses (concentrating 
on those cases bom and diagnosed in Seascale 
rather than examining all the cases diagnosed
in west Cumbria) proved particularly contentious 
later on in the trial. For farther discussion on 
this aspect please refer to 4 (4 ).
20 See Chapter 4(3 ) for a wider discussion of this issue.
21 These will be considered in greater detail in 
Ch.4(4). O f particular importance are: Urquhart,
(1991); Kinlen, (1991), (1993); Roman, (1993);
Craft, (1993); Draper, (1993); Parker/Wakeford 
(1993).
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one or both of the diseases. Therefore, in the opinion of the plaintiffs, irradiation of 
paternal gonads couid cause a transferable mutation in the germ line which resulted in a 
predisposition to cancer (leukaemia and NHL) in the children. The only remaining issue 
was whether the numbers involved in the Seascale excess couid also be explained by this 
predisposition.
In support of their case the plaintiffs began by calling Professor M.F. Greaves, Director 
of the Leukaemia Research Fund Centre at the Institute of Cancer Research. Professor 
Greaves supported the proposition that there was a plausible biological mechanism based 
on paternal irradiation and viruses which could explain the Seascale excess22.
Developing their case further the plaintiffs then moved on to research data from mouse 
experiments and in particular, the work of Professor Nomura (Chairman of the 
Department of Radiation Biology, Osaka University, Japan). One of the central findings 
of Professor Nomura's work was an excess of tumours found in the offspring of mice that 
had been subjected to specific doses of ionising radiation23. Professor Nomura, although 
able to provide two written reports to the court, was unable to attend the trial due to ill 
health24. In order to overcome this problem the defendants did suggest the setting up
22 The plaintiffs also called Professor J.C. Neil 
as further support.
23 Nomura, T. "Quantitative Studies on Mutagenesis, 
Teratogenesis and Carcinogenesis in Mice" (1984) 
pp.27-34, JEMS, Mishima.
24 Professor Nomura's evidence was therefore subject 
to a Civil Evidence Act Notice, allowable in 
circumstances where there are good reasons for 
non-attendance.
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of a video link between London and Osaka, thereby enabling Professor Nomura to defend 
his studies in person25. However, in the event, given the circumstances and length of 
time anticipated for Professor Nomura's evidence, a London/Japan video link was not 
considered appropriate or realistic by the plaintiffs.
In addition, the plaintiffs relied on the evidence of Dr. Roger Cox (Head of the 
Biomedical Effects Department at the NRPB and Consultant to the United Nations 
Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation) who put forward three possible 
novel and speculative mechanisms26. Underlying Dr. Cox's evidence was the belief that 
the Gardner hypothesis could not be explained on the basis of conventional genetics, a 
view shared by Professor D.H. Wright, Chair of Pathology, Southampton; Professor M. 
Meuth, Chair of Radiology and Head of Section of Experimental Oncology, University of 
Utah; and Dr. J. Thacker, Head of DNA Repair and Mutagenesis Group at the Medical 
Research Council's Radiology Unit. These experts called on behalf of the plaintiffs, all 
agreed that too little was known about the mutation rates of complex illnesses such as 
cancer. It was therefore unacceptable to simply reject unconventional genetic data or 
conversely rely on conventional genetic data.
The defendants while not assuming any burden of proof, were keen to demonstrate the
25 Having already made an order for examination of
a witness in Canada via a video link pursuant to order 
38 rule 3 which proved unnecessary, Mr. Justice French 
further agreed to support a video link from London to 
Japan.
26 These include "transposons", telomere-like repeats" 
and "fragile sites", also "genomic imprinting".
See Ch. 4(5) for more detail and explanation on 
this aspect of the case.
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implausibility of the existence of a biological pathway whereby PPI could predispose the 
next generation to leukaemia and/or NHL. In submitting their evidence the defendants 
relied on three main areas of supportive research which included: the A-bomb studies, a 
rejection of the mouse data, and the absence of a heritable component in leukaemia. 
Important to the defendants' case was the evidence of Professor EJ. Hall; Dr. P Selby; 
Professor A.B. Dickinson; Professor J.V. Neel27; and Professor H.J. Evans; all renowned 
experts in their own area of genetics.
However of particular significance to the defendants (at this point of the trial) was the 
evidence of the mouse geneticist - Dr. P. Selby, on the work of Professor Nomura. 
Throughout his evidence which took two full days in chief, Dr. Selby alleged anomalies, 
inaccuracies and inconsistencies in the research of Professor Nomura resulting in his 
conclusion that the work could not be taken at face value and could not be relied on.
Having provided a brief synopsis of the case, the following sections will concentrate on an 
analysis of the expert evidence with regard to occupational and environmental dosimetry 
4(2) and (3); epidemiology (4.4); and genetics 4(5). A t the core of this chapter, as 
with previous ones, are the underlying concerns relating to epistemology; scientific 
uncertainty; scientific causation and causation in the law.
27 Professor J.V. Neel gave evidence on the A-bomb 
studies (Day 55 and 56) and on the mouse data 
(Day 83).
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4 .2  OCCUPATIONAL DOSIMETRY
Moving on from the synopsis of the case, this section is concerned with occupational 
dosimetry28 and in particular, whether the doses received by Reay and Hope were 
sufficient to cause male parental gonad damage. Intrinsic to this litigation therefore is not 
only the problem of establishing Reay and Hope's annual occupational dose so many years 
after the event, but also, the accuracy, reliability and foundation upon which such figures 
are based.
The purpose of measuring occupational dose is twofold, first it enables an individual who 
has been exposed to acute/chronic high doses of radiation to be withdrawn from a task 
or area. Second, it facilitates 'safe' occupational levels of radiation to be identified 
thereby ensuring employee dose recording and monitoring are kept within national and 
international guidelines. As a consequence, a worker's estimated life time exposure can 
be evaluated to ensure he does not exceed recommended safety levels.
In order to ascertain the occupational dose absorbed by George Reay and David Hope we 
are concerned with an exposure period of some fourteen years (beginning forty one years 
ago, and ending twenty seven years later). During this time Reay and Hope were 
employed as fitters at the Sellafield Plant, their duties involved the routine maintenance
28 Occupational dosimetry comprises of 'external doses' 
from gamma and neutron radiation which can be measured 
by dose badges and other equipment, as well as 
'internal doses' from alpha radionuclides via ingestion 
or inhalation pathways which rely on urine or faecal 
analysis. Both external and internal occupational doses 
have to be taken into account in any assessment of total 
occupational radiation dose.
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and machinery. Both men worked on the piles (chimneys)29, as well as in the 
d decanning areas30 and both were exposed to high doses of radioactivity 
Day 1, p.6).
easuring the external occupational dose of workers employed at the Sellafield 
i defendants relied on the use of film badges. Film badges were used because 
in the form of electromagnetic waves31 will blacken or cloud over a 
phic film, and through means of calibration (measuring the level of radioactivity 
tensity of clouding) the amount of radiation can then be assessed. Further, it is 
ible applying this method, and using the same badge, to cover part of the film
29 George Reay in particular worked on the pile roof.
His job involved assisting in the removal of any burst 
cartridges (identified by the control room monitoring 
equipment detecting the release of radioactive gasses 
in the piles). During the removal of the necessary 
manhole covers and plugs (the biological shield to the 
core), Reay would find himself straddled at the top of 
a vertical void which would be streaming radioactive 
rays (neutrons and particles) before being lowered into 
the identified channel itself to specifically locate 
and dislodge the burst/leaking cartridge.
30 Once dislodged the fuel cartridges would end up
in the two pile ponds for approximately sixty to one 
hundred days 'cooling7 before being decanned (the 
decanning bay was at the side of the ponds). The 
purpose of the decanning machine was to remove the 
aluminium cartridge cases from the uranium containing 
all the plutonium and other fission product. The fuel 
thereafter was despatched in sealed coffins to the 
separation plant. David Hope in particular spent 75%  
of his time in the ponds between 1956 until 1959. After 
promotion in 1959, 95%  of his time was spent in the pond 
area. The ponds and the decanning bays were highly 
radioactive. Hope would often find himself wading into 
the water in the decanning section of the ponds and 
therefore subject to high doses of radiation.
31 That is gamma and X-rays (photons), and particles 
such as beta particles or neutrons.
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with a filter and in so doing, differentiate between different types of radiation.
Although the basic design of the film badge did not alter in this period32, 1960 did see 
a change in the photographic film (from Ilford PM to Kodak RM) and filters (from 
lead/aluminium to tin/cadmium). It was as a consequence of these changes in the 1960s 
that what became known as "The Howells Factor" became identified by the plaintiffs' 
solicitors.
While going through the discovery documents, the plaintiffs' solicitors came across a 
report by Mr. Huw Howells, Head of Health and Safety at the Sellafield plant during the 
1950s and 1960s. From the documents it was apparent that the managers of the plant 
were concerned by the disparity in recording as between the old Ilford film and newly 
introduced Kodak film and asked Mr. Howells to investigate. As a consequence of Mr. 
Howells' research it became clear that not only had the Ilford film been under-recording, 
in some instances by as much as 50 to 100 per cent, but also, the Kodak film in use at 
the time was possibly under-recording by up to 30 per cent33.
Mr. Howells made a number of recommendations, the first related to the historic
32 The film badge consisted of a 0.015 inch thick 
tin plate holder within which was wrapped 
photographic film. The holder had two open 
windows at the front and one similar window at the 
back corresponding with one of the two at the front 
Inside in the unexposed area there were one or
two filters.
33 Two years after the Howells Report in 1962,
a further report - the McKinnon Report concluded 
that the gamma recording on the Kodak RM film 
may have been actually over-recording. This was 
disputed at the time and the matter lay unresolved.
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inaccuracy of workers' dose. He suggested that past employee records should not be 
altered, instead a note should be added to the employees' current records "giving a clear 
indication that the doses had been measured with the old Ilford film, and that a correction 
factor should be added to the Kodak badges in the future" (Hytner, Day 1, p. 16). In 
respect of the possible under-recording of the Kodak film in use from 1960, Mr. Howells 
recommended investigations to find a suitable new filter. He pointed out that "the film 
badge is the prime arbiter of radiation control and while the accuracy of this is in doubt 
long-term exposure control is uncertain so that there is an urgency to exert considerable 
effort in solving this technical problem" (Ibid).
When going through the records of the late George Reay and David Hope it became clear 
to the plaintiffs' solicitors that the Dosimetry Service at Sellafield had only inserted their 
annual dosage; no amendment had ever been made to take account of the 'Howells 
Factor'. This meant that not only were the men exposed to far higher doses of radiation 
than was initially realised, but also, the whole basis of Gardner was now under question 
as the Gardner team had based their original research on inaccurate dose figures as 
supplied by BNFL. Because of this, the case fathers'34 exposure levels were found to be 
higher than the control group, necessitating an entire re-working of the Gardner Study.
34 Vivien Hope was not included in the original
Gardner Study because she was bom and brought up 
until the age of six in Drigg, two miles south of 
Seascale and therefore did not satisfy the criteria 
of being bom and diagnosed in Seascale. Further, 
she was not diagnosed until 1988. The study period 
only went up to 1984.
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Another problem identified by the plaintiffs' solicitors at this time related to the 
placement of employee film badges. Often, in addition to chest badges, certain workers 
were also issued with 'special' badges worn elsewhere35. O f significance to the plaintiffs' 
solicitors were the dose badges worn on the waist by Reay and Hope. Clearly waist 
badges could give a far more accurate reading in relation to the gonads and potential pre­
conception dose than chest badges, this was another factor for consideration in the re- 
anaiysis.
As a consequence of these findings, Mr. Hytner QC in his opening statement on behalf 
of the plaintiffs, accused the defendants of having what he termed a 'cavalier approach'. 
Taking the issue further Mr. Hytner went on to say that:
...throughout this case, not only in relation to this [occupational dosimetry], but 
also in relation to other doses and other discharges, the Defendants do not appear 
to have taken with as much seriousness as befitted them the accuracy of the 
information they were passing on to others about dose.
My Lord, they knew from their own safety expert that they had been under­
recording doses, in the case of neutrons not recording them at all, and yet they 
gave inaccurate figures to Professor Gardner and they did not inform their 
workforce.
My Lord, this is the first example of many we shall be coming to in the case where 
it can be shown that the Defendants either did not know what they were doing, 
where co-ordination in relation to discharges and exposure were inadequate, and 
they were somewhat cavalier in their approach to the accuracy of the information 
they gave others. (Day 1, p. 17-18)
Although this assertion was both challenged and denied by Mr. Rokison QC on behalf of
the defendants, it was nonetheless accepted that the occupational dosimetry figures were
unreliable and inaccurate. Consequently a re-assessment of workers' occupational dose,
35 In particular hand or waist.
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in addition to a re-analysis of the Gardner Study was required.
The plaintiffs' solicitors having realised the enormity of the task ahead of them as well as 
the significance of their findings, contacted the NRPB (as an independent advisory body) 
to discuss the implications of this discovery, as well as request help with the occupational 
dose re-assessment. In response, Mr. G. Webb, Secretary of the NRPB contacted the 
plaintiffs' solicitors informing them that as two of their officers had already been instructed 
by BNFL (on the environmental dosimetry side of the case), the Board decided it would 
be inappropriate for another one of their officers to represent the plaintiffs' side. As far 
as the plaintiffs' solicitors were concerned this rejection confirmed their suspicions that the 
NRPB were not independent from BNFL, and that on this occasion, they were working 
against the public interest. NRPB's refusal was therefore viewed by the plaintiffs' solicitors 
as deliberately obstructive.
After further negotiation and discussion with the plaintiffs' solicitors the NRPB although 
still refusing to help directly, did finally recommend a retired expert named Dr. John 
Dennis who, prior to retirement had been a former employee of the NRPB. Despite this 
concession however the issue of the neutrality of the NRPB as an independent public body 
appeared open to question, particularly in light of evidence36 given to the House of 
Commons Select Committee on Radioactive Waste where the NRPB identified their public 
role as one where:
36 Webb, G .A.M . Hill, M.D. O'Riordan, M. Smith,
H.and Shaw, K. "Radioactive Effluents and Solid 
Wastes: A  Summary of NRPB Work on Standards, 
Assessments and Research" March 1985 pp. 197-219.
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(i) it provides guidance on the radiological protection standards to be applied;
(ii) it performs assessments and predictive calculations, using mathematical modeis of the 
potential risks to people;
(iii) it carries out research into environmental transfer processes and radiation dosimetry;
(iv) it provides advice to Government Departments, the nuclear industry, and other 
organisations, on radiological protection (Webb et ai; 1985:198).
Aware of the implications and inequity of this situation, Mr. Hytner QC on behalf of the 
plaintiffs sought to elucidate the inherently problematic nature of NRPB's position when 
he said:
The NRPB is a body independent of Government and industry, though lacking 
statutory powers similar to those of the Health and Safety Executive. Whilst it 
might be unjustifiably hurtful to suggest, using the language now in vogue in 
commercial circles, they are in bed with the defendants, it is the plaintiffs' case that 
partial explanations for some of the events with which we shall be dealing may be 
found in the fact that they are at least very close friends. Certainly NRPB have 
shown little enthusiasm to assist the plaintiffs in the fields of dosimetry in this 
litigation (Hytner: Day 1, p.22)
In the event and despite the issue of NRPB's neutrality and BNFL's public accountability, 
agreement was reached37. After two further exchange of expert reports, re-assessment 
of the external occupational doses were finalised by Day 4, and presented to the court on 
Day 5 by Dr. Rex Strong on behalf of the defendants38, having been agreed by Dr. John
37 The agreement consisted of an increase from the 
original 117 cases and controls that appeared in 
the Gardner Study to a total of 159 individuals
(an additional 41 workers including Reay and Hope).
38 Those involved in the reassessment on behalf
of the defendants included Dr. R. Strong (BNFL);
Mr. Harvey (Freelance Consultant); Dr. Avery and 
Mr. Gibson (UKAEA). The statement dated 5th November 
1992 contained four tables. Table 1 set out the photon 
dose assessment; table 2 the neutron dose; table 3 
the internal dose assessment and table 4 the totals 
of those assessments.
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Dennis and Dr. Barry Lambert on behalf of the plaintiffs.
Taking account of overall occupational exposure, the plaintiffs assessed the actual total 
pre-conception doses as:
Reay - 709 mSv Hope - 294  mSv
These figures contrast sharply with the defendants' original figures of:
Reay - 384 mSv Hope - 160 mSv
or the defendants' amended figures of:
Reay - 639  mSv Hope - 246  mSv
(Hytner, Day 1 ,p. 19).
Although Dr. Strong made it clear that the amended figures could only be regarded as 
joint 'best estimates' of the doses received and should therefore not be treated as 
definitive, there is no doubt that potential health effects39 of exposure rates of between 
600-700 mSv (0.5 to 1.5 sievert) could cause: longterm, possible benign or malignant 
tumours; premature ageing; shortened lifespan; genetic damage; or, in the case of 
exposure levels of between 200-300 mSv (0.1 to 0.5 sieverts) premature ageing; genetic 
effects; and some risks of tumours (Bertell, 1985:42-43).
In addition to external occupational exposure, working at the plant also subjected 
employees such as Reay and Hope to the inhalation of radioactive particles in the air or 
through ingestion. Unfortunately, the 1950s and 1960s saw little monitoring of this
39 See Chapter 1 (2) for a wider discussion of the 
potential health effects of ionising radiation.
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internal occupational exposure40, it is for this reason that the plaintiffs, for the purposes 
of this issue alone, were willing to proceed on the basis of the defendants' alpha figures 
of between 0  and 1 mSv for Reay, and 0.85 for Hope.
Throughout this first part of the case the plaintiffs hoped to prove that the contribution 
of occupational exposure in relation to the total paternal doses was (a) sufficient to 
damage male parental gonads and (b) there was some correlation as between the dose 
amount and the incidence of the two diseases.
In their Opening therefore, the plaintiffs set out the history of the dose debate and the 
importance of the discovery process in highlighting the defendants' complacency and 
cavalier approach as regards their employees, government departments and the public. 
In particular, their failure to keep accurate records; inform their workforce of correct 
exposure levels; respond to recommendations from their own Health and Safety Advisor; 
provide accurate dosimetry figures to Professor Gardner.
In addition, Mr. Hytner pointed out that the defendants had been on terms which were 
too friendly with NRPB for each to fulfil their distinct and independent role with the result 
that there had been a failure to protect certain sections of the population, or inform them 
as to the full extent of their exposure levels. In the opinion of the plaintiffs therefore, the 
defendants' evidence should be treated with caution and suspicion.
40 Post 1960s the traditional method for assessing 
the internal occupational dose would be through the 
monitoring of alpha of fission products in workers 
faeces or urine.
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The defendants by contrast hoped to establish that the contribution of the occupational 
dose as regards the total paternal dose was (a) insufficient to cause the alleged damage to 
the gonads and further (b) that there was no correlation as between the amount of dose 
and the incidents of the two diseases.
In their Opening, Mr. Rokison QC on behalf of the defendants emphatically denied the 
plaintiffs' allegation of adopting a cavalier approach and made it clear that this assertion 
was resented by BNFL. In defending their position in respect of inadequate record 
keeping, Mr. Rokison said that "there had been the most exhaustive examination in the 
course of the discovery process and otherwise to seek out relevant records. It is perhaps 
not surprising that some potentially relevant records or other documents have not been 
located" (RokisomDay 2, p.4).
On the issue of the 'Howells Factor', Dr. R. Strong on behalf of the defendants agreed 
under cross examination by Mr. Hytner QC that occupational doses in respect of 78 
workers had gone up41, and of that number 15 had gone up by more than 50 per cent, 
six by more than 100 per cent (Strong: Day 5,pp.5-6). Dr. Strong also agreed that had 
it not been for the discovery process in this litigation the historical information in respect 
of the 'Howells Factor7 would not have come to his attention (Day 5, p.7). In 
challenging Mr. Hytner's cross examination of the defendants' witness on this matter, Mr. 
Rokison pointed out that occupational figures had now been agreed by the two parties and 
that bringing up this issue after agreement was simply perpetuating the prejudice already
41 The dose of 15 workers also went down in relation 
to external doses.
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exhibited in Mr. Hytner's Opening Statement, a view not wholly shared by Mr. Justice 
French who when asked to rule on this matter said, "the fact that cross-examination goes 
in some way to prejudice is no grounds for excluding it" (Day 5, p .l 1).
With regard to NRPB's relationship with BNFL, Dr. Stather on behalf of the defendants 
emphasised that the NRPB were an independent advisory body which despite having close 
working contact with individuals in BNFL, jealously guarded their independence (Stather: 
Day 7, p .73). Nonetheless, Dr. Stather did admit that as NRPB did not have expertise 
on discharges from nuclear sites, they had to rely on the operator to provide them with 
information (Day 7, p. 74).
It is clear that a number of concerns relating to the trial process emerge from this part of 
the case. The first concerns the reliability and accuracy of the dose figures. Although 
Mr. Rokison on behalf of the defendants pointed out that a lot of work had been done 
in relation to the Reay and Hope cases in order to try and get the doses as precise as 
possible, it was acknowledged by both the plaintiffs and defendants that the occupational 
doses were subject to random error and therefore a degree of uncertainty. There were 
in total three separate analyses of dose. First there were the doses used by the Gardner 
team. Second there was a reassessment of doses done by Dr. Dennis as a consequence of 
the 'Howells Factor'. Third there was a re-analysis of the doses by Professor Stephen 
Evans and Professor Howe which formed the bases of the agreed statement presented to 
the court by Dr. Rex Strong on behalf of the defendants, as agreed by plaintiff experts, 
Dr. Dennis and Dr. Lambert.
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Notwithstanding the uncertainty and unreliability of the figures, and the recognition by 
plaintiffs' Counsel that the occupational dose provided "the bedrock on which both sides' 
cases rested" (Hytner: Day 1, p.84), it is significant, as Mr. Rokison pointed out on 
behalf of the defendants, that the plaintiffs' experts made a number of concessions with 
regard to this issue (Day 2, p.6D). Possibly the reason behind these concessions can be 
explained by the second concern, inequality of resources, for while defendant experts had 
access to specialised manpower and unlimited resources, enabling analyses of enormous 
quantities of information relevant to the case, as well as having access to powerful 
computer software, such resources were clearly not available to the plaintiffs. (A situation 
recognized by Lord Woolf in his Final Report (1996:146) in which he acknowledged the 
importance of a level playing field between litigants to ensure a 'just' result).
In addition to the 'David and Goliath' component, an added resource pressure could also
be found in the 'public purse factor'. Both plaintiffs and defendants were aware of the
extra costs in money and time of delay, as Mr. Justice French said in his judgment:
By far the largest element in computing the total paternal radiation dose received 
by individuals is the occupational dose ie that received while at work at the 
Sellafield plant. Had the occupational doses remained in contention it would 
have occupied the court for many weeks, even months42
Mr. Justice French, commending the occupational dose agreement, went on to say that
with eminent good sense, the parties' settlement rendered any type of forensic exercise
in respect of occupational dosimetry unnecessary.
42 Judgment p. 17.
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Linked to the other issues, and of particular importance to the plaintiffs, is the third 
problem of securing the services of independent expert witnesses43. This proves difficult 
where corporations like BNFL and "close friends" like the NRPB have in-house experts 
that dominate the field under investigation making any independent expert opinion very 
difficult to obtain. On this issue, the plaintiffs' experts were few as a consequence of the 
stance adopted by the NRPB with the result that, upon reaching agreement with the 
defendants, the plaintiffs called no witnesses on their own account. This is despite Dr. 
Strong, on behalf of the defendants, playing down BNFL's responsibility over the 'Howells 
Factor7 and denying any suggestion that BNFL were cavalier in their approach.
A  final concern which emanated from the discovery process was the realisation that the 
plaintiffs' solicitors were possibly the only people who had actually studied BNFL's 
documents in any depth. The NRPB and other regulatory bodies, it seemed, accepted 
BNFL's historic dose assessments without challenge. This aspect perhaps more than any 
other highlights the public importance of toxic tort cases and again brings into question 
the traditional view of the tort of negligence, perceived as it is in purely individualistic 
terms, reiterating the point raised by Rosenberg (1984 )44, that any non-utilitarian view 
of toxic tort claims is a misconception of the social function of the tort system and negates 
the collective interest that now exists in such litigation.
Having reviewed the issues in respect of occupational dosimetry, the next section will
43 Refer to Chapter 3 for a wider discussion on 
this issue.
44 Please refer to Chapter 2 (3 ).
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move on to consider environmental dosimetry and the impact this has had on workers and 
local population around the Sellafield plant.
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4.3 ENVIRONMENTAL DOSIMETRY
In addition to the occupational doses which were the subject of agreement between the 
parties, it was also necessary for the Court to hear evidence and submissions on the 
subject of environmental doses emitted by and from the Sellafield plant in respect of the 
plaintiffs, their families, and the local population as a consequence of the defendants7 
activities45. According to Mr. Hytner QC on behalf of the plaintiffs, it should be 
emphasised that not only were the Gardner excesses associated with paternal occupational 
dose, they were also heavily concentrated in the village of Seascaie, two miles from the 
plant (Day 1, p. 19).
Therefore the plaintiffs asserted (a) that environmental dose enhances the PPI received by 
way of occupational irradiation (b) that environmental dose augments the natural 
background radiation level providing a 7second hit7 opportunity for cancer which, as a 
multifactorial disease may require one or two 7hits7 before emerging and expressing itself. 
So, regardless of whether the initiating 7first hit7 was PPI, or, some other unknown cause, 
environmental radioactive discharges emitted from the Sellafield plant could, in 
combination with natural background radiation levels, act somatically on the foetus in 
utero or on the child after it is bom to cause/promote cancer at a later stage.
While the plaintiffs were not suggesting that environmental dose was enough on its own 
to cause the leukaemia and NHL of Dorothy Reay and Vivien Hope, they were proposing
45 Environmental dose emitted from the Sellafield Plant 
is not to be confused with background radiation 
naturally present in the atmosphere for which the 
Defendants are not responsible.
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a possible synergism, that is an inter-reaction with either occupational dose or some other 
factor. Thus despite the uncertainty over dose figures and the fact, as Mr. Hytner 
acknowledged, that it was impossible to gauge with any accuracy the extent of the 
Sellafield radioactive emissions over the years46, it was nonetheless probable that the 
estimated environmental doses were considerably higher than those calculated by the 
defendants. Mr. Hytner went on to make it clear "that any uncertainty in relation to 
environmental dose rebounds to the disadvantage of the defendants, at whose door in any 
event blame for the uncertainty lies" (Day l,p .21 ).
In his introduction to this part of the case, Mr. Hytner began by briefly outlining the 
historic roles of various bodies (the NRPB; the ICRP; the Black Committee; COMARE). 
However, of particular concern to the plaintiffs at this stage of proceedings were events 
ensuing the Yorkshire Television programme of 1983 and the setting up of the Black 
Committee of the same year.
As discussed in Chapter 1(3), the Black Committee were asked to consider exposure of 
children through the atmospheric discharges from the Sellafield piles and the great pipe 
into the Irish Sea. In order to complete this research, the Black Committee turned to the 
NRPB to carry out analyses of the radiation doses received by the Seascale children. 
Having accepted the defendants' estimates of the atmospheric discharges, the NRPB 
produced document R171 based on the information supplied from BNFL. This stated
46 Specifically the relevant period up to 1962 in 
the case of Dorothy Reay and, 1988 in the case of 
Vivien Hope.
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that the maximum dose to the children would be 5 mSv representing only 10 per cent 
of the doses they received from background radiation levels.
Therefore, while confirming the existence of an excess of childhood leukaemia in the 
village of Seascale, the report concluded that the 'best estimate' of the average radiation 
dose did not support the view that radiation from Sellafield was responsible for the 
observed excess of leukaemia. However, the Black Committee did recommend further 
research on this issue47 and, in addition, the setting up of COMARE48 to measure 
doses actually received by members of the public in west Cumbria and the relevant areas.
Two years after the publication of the Black Committee Report of 1984, COMARE 
reconsidered the Sellafield discharges of the 1950s, this time taking account of the 
allegations made by Dr. Derek Jakeman. Dr. Jakeman (who was abroad during the 
process of the Black inquiry) had, prior to his position with UKAEA, been employed as 
a scientist actively researching into radioactive emissions at the Sellafield plant during the 
1950s.
Upon returning to the UK and having read the findings of the Black Committee Report 
and NRPB document R171, Dr. Jakeman challenged the low levels of radioactive 
emissions cited in both reports. O f particular concern were the underestimated uranium
47 Culminating in the Gardner Study.
48 COMARE was established in 1985. See 
Chapter 1(3) for more information on 
this development.
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oxide levels49 of 440 grams which formed part of the calculation of radiation dose 
received by people living in the local community as well as statistical errors in assessing the 
release from environmental monitoring data50.
In an attempt to draw attention to this matter, Dr. Jakeman wrote to BNFL, the NRPB
and the British Medical Journal, pointing out that:
The release....was substantial, consisting of thousands of millions of highly 
radioactive particles (Jakeman 1986:760).
Dr. Jakeman went to say that despite large numbers of the radioactive particles being 
found in the gardens and homes of local residents in 1955, no attempt was made to trace 
the full extent of the radioactivity, or the impact on the foodchain until July 1957.
As a consequence of Dr. Jakeman's protestations, the 440 grams were increased by a 
factor of 45 over that in the NRPB R171 report to 20  kilograms51. Thus in a further 
report in 1986 (the R171 Addendum), the NRPB concluded that the 1950s overall 
discharge dose figures should be increased by ten per cent. Observations made by 
COMARE in consideration of the R171 Addendum said that:
49 In order to identify particles of uranium oxide 
it is necessary to ascertain the levels of Ceasium
137 and Strontium 90, two isotopes produced during 
the changing of uranium to plutonium, as well as 
levels of plutonium around the local environment.
50 This methodological flaw became known as "The 
jakeman Factor", it includes: chemical analysis; 
measurement; interpretation of migrating and 
leaching (dissolving) of radioactive particles.
51 This figure was a compromise between the 
figure of 12 kilograms put forward by or on 
behalf of the defendants, and 30 kilograms 
put forward by Dr. Jakeman.
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The way in which some of these data came to light is unsatisfactory and 
undermines our confidence in the adequacy and completeness of the available data. 
Although we accept that every reasonable effort has been made to ensure 
completeness of the information now available to us, we feel the monitoring 
programme and record keeping for the 1950s were such that we cannot be certain 
that ail releases have been recognised (Day 1, p.23).
In support of this view and by way of illustration, the plaintiffs cited iodine, plutonium and 
argon 41 as examples where uncertainty over discharges still remain52.
Iodine was highlighted because it only has a half life of eight days before being 
concentrated in the human thyroid. As a consequence no data exists on discharges of this 
period.
Plutonium53 was specifically identified as during this time vast quantities of plutonium 
were released through the B204 stacks at the separation plant into the environment. 
Under cross-examination by Mr. Hytner on behalf of the plaintiffs, Professor S.R. Jones, 
an employee of BNFL and currently Director of Environmental Research at the Westlakes 
Research Institute54 confirmed the fact that the B204 stacks had come on stream in 
1952 and that in the twelve years prior to 1964 no specific monitoring of plutonium
52 Other examples include polonium, caesium 
and strontium. The plaintiffs demonstrated 
identifiable flaws in the defendants methods 
of collecting and evaluating data (Hytner:
Day 1,p.30).
53 Plutonium is dangerous if inhaled or ingested 
either directly or through the food chain.
Measuring the amount of plutonium at ground level 
also offers an indirect method of assessing the 
amount of uranium oxide in the atmosphere. In 
addition further external exposure comes from 
gamma radiation and other radionuclides.
54 Westlakes Research Institute is funded by BNFL.
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levels had ever been undertaken (Day 6 p.27F). As a consequence said Mr. Hytner, "we 
do not know the years when it was discharged, so who was breathing it in, who was 
ingesting it, nor do we know the wind conditions which may have caused it to be 
resuspended and when, so that it would be again inhaled or ingested by the population" 
(Day 11 p.21E). In the event BNFL accepted that the level of plutonium released by 
Sellafield was twenty times more than had previously been accepted by the company55.
A  third example of discharge uncertainty relates to Argon 41 which, although having a 
relatively short radioactive half life of 1.8 hours, can nonetheless be inhaled. Argon 41 
was emitted between 1951 and 1957 without any monitoring and it was only with the 
publication of the R171 Addendum that the estimated Argon 41 figures, which appeared 
in the original R171 Report were revised and, as a consequence increased by 70 per cent. 
(Day 6, p.24H).
Underlying the problem of incomplete and inadequate data, Mr. Hytner was also keen to 
demonstrate the possibility that the defendants may have missed or failed to identify other 
unaccounted for radioactive discharges or releases. Referring to disclosure, and the fact 
that BNFL had agreed to supply all documentation by September 1991, Mr. Hytner 
pointed out that had it not been for Leigh Day Solicitors' Court Order for further
55 As late as 1985, a paper by Professor Popplewell, 
'Plutonium in Autopsy Tissues in Great Britain' to 
the NRPB found up to a six-fold increase in plutonium 
"body burden" in local inhabitants around Seascale.
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discovery in 19 9 2 s6, discrepancies in the plutonium and other release figures would not 
have come to light at all. As far as the plaintiffs were concerned, this was a further 
example57 of an occasion where discovery produced monitoring information which 
neither the defendants nor any other agency seemed aware of.
Another inconsistency that showed itself as a consequence of information supplied by 
BNFL related to historic discharge figures in respect of BNFL's 'discharge authorization 
application'. Plaintiffs' solicitors discovered that the historic figures that appeared in the 
Government application, did not correlate with the historic discharge figures produced for 
the Court by Professor Jones on behalf of BNFL. Dr. Dickinson, an employee responsible 
for authorization applications on behalf of the defendants was obliged to concede that 
certain factors had not been taken into account, and that this omission would make the 
emission figures for 1977-1987 appear four times lower than in fact they had been 
(Hytner Day 7, 64C).
Throughout this part of the case the plaintiffs made the tactical decision not to call any 
expert witnesses on their own behalf and instead to rely on the defendants' experts to 
highlight the fact that BNFL "never see their mistakes, they never apologise, they self 
justify" (Hytner: Day 11, p. ID ). In their submission on environmental dose, Mr. Hytner
56 The was the eighth Affidavit issued by Leigh 
Day Solicitors. The Affidavit set out their 
concerns with regard to the historic plutonium 
releases and specifically requested details in 
relation to B204, the plutonium separation plant.
57 "The Howells Factor" identified in the 
previous section with regard to occupational 
dosimetry provided another such example.
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on behalf of the plaintiffs, emphasized that BNFL made persistent errors due to 
complacency, over confidence and defensiveness (Day 1 l,p .lO B), that the public and 
public bodies58 had been misled (Day ll,p .2 2 F ), and that this careless (Day 11, 
p.73G) and cavalier approach in respect of unaccounted for emissions, as well as the 
extent of those emissions, would not have come to light had it not been for the 
documents disclosed on discovery.
As far as the defendants were concerned they called three expert witnesses, Professor S.R. 
Jones, Dr. R.J. Dickinson and Dr. J.W. Stather. Both Professor Jones and Dr. Dickinson 
were employed by BNFL, while Dr. Stather was employed by the NRPB.
Professor S.R. Jones, the defendants' primary witness at this point of the triai, produced 
a report dealing with radiation, dosimetry, natural radiation, discharges, radionuclides in 
the environment and environmental monitoring. In addition the report consisted of a 
description and evaluation of a mathematical model (the Sellafield Environmental 
Assessment Model [SEAM]), which Professor Jones had constructed in order to calculate 
the concentrations of a number of different radionuclides in the environment and also, the 
pathway of exposure as a result of discharges from the Sellafield plant to both the 
atmosphere and the sea. In total the work took four years to complete and was regarded 
by Professor Jones as thorough and comprehensive. Under examination by Mr. Rokison 
QC on behalf of the defendants, Professor Jones said:
I am very confident that what is in here [SEAM Model Report] is certainly the best
58 Public bodies such as the NRPB and HMIP.
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assessment that has yet been made of the historic discharges from the Sellafield site 
and, if you like, the history of radionuclide concentrations in the environment" 
(Day 6,p.3D).
This view however was not accepted by the plaintiffs who were keen to stress the 
unreliability of BNFL's past estimates in relation to radionuclide emissions and (as a 
consequence of BNFL's history) question the accuracy of Professor Jones' SEAM 
conclusions. Further, as pointed out in the plaintiffs' earlier submission, the NRPB, who 
supported the SEAM document, were in no position to independently assess the reliability 
of the original discharge figures supplied by BNFL, leaving unresolved many questions with 
regard to the composition and mathematical basis of the estimated emission figures.
Moving on, Professor Jones went on to say that he considered the model to be a cautious 
assessment of the discharge figures and had therefore overestimated rather than under 
estimated the dose figures involved. The aim of SEAM therefore was to put together the 
total data on emissions, environmental monitoring and internal monitoring in order to 
determine the doses in respect of the various members of the two families. In the opinion 
of the defendants, the exposure levels were small and constituted only a fraction of the 
amount that each member of the families would have received from background radiation.
The second witness called on environmental dosimetry was Dr. Dickinson. Dr. Dickinson 
was employed by the defendants in a planning and technical appraisal capacity and was 
therefore involved in the discharge authorization applications on behalf of BNFL. The 
purpose of calling Dr. Dickinson was threefold. First to refute any suggestions that BNFL 
had attempted to mislead NRPB, HMIP or the public at large. Second to refute any 
allegation that inaccurate information had been deliberately supplied to NRPB or HMIP.
182
Third to explain the discrepancy between Professor Jones' historic discharges figures, and 
the figures presented to the authorising department on behalf of BNFL59.
The third witness cailed on this issue was Dr. Stather of the NRPB. Dr. Stather had been 
involved in the preparation of NRPB Report R171 on the dose assessments of children 
and young persons at Seascale for the Black advisory group. The purpose of calling Dr. 
Stather was to quantify the doses received by the relevant members of the Reay and Hope 
families and assess whether the radioactive material released into the environment was 
sufficient to augment the alleged PPI received by way of occupational radiation and/or 
sufficient to augment the background radiation level.
In addition, Dr. Stather was called by the defendants to confirm that the NRPB were an
independent advisory body which despite having close working relationships with
individuals at BNFL remained autonomous. Although confirming the existence of a
professional relationship, Dr. Stather was willing to concede that the NRPB were wholly
reliant on BNFL for discharge figures of radioactive emissions and that:
... we [NRPB] are not an organisation that can validate information on discharges 
that would be given to us by an operator. A  regulator might be able to do that 
but we cannot do that. We do not have the expertise (Stather: Day 8, p. 84D).
Therefore, as far as the defendants were concerned the plaintiffs' case on environmental 
dosimetry could be broken down to three components. "First, they point to possible
59 This inconsistency was reluctantly conceded by
Dr. Dickinson, who admitted that 'an ordinary reader'
(a member of the public) reading the application, 
could well have misinterpreted the figures as being 
four times lower than in fart they were.
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incompleteness of records, particularly for the eariy years. Second, they point to errors 
made by BNFL or their predecessors in the past. Thirdly, they rely upon what they call 
the attitude and approach of BNFL" (Rokison: Day 1 l,p .36D ).
On the first point Mr. Rokison on behalf of the defendants identified two possible reasons 
to account for incompleteness of records:
a) that monitoring in the early years was not as comprehensive as later years;
b) that extraordinary discharges went unnoticed or unrecorded.
In consideration of the early days of monitoring, M r Rokison acknowledged that this was 
an area which had become more comprehensive, thorough and regular as time had moved 
on (Day 11p.36G). With regard to point b) and the possibility of unrecorded or 
unnoticed discharges, Mr. Rokison stated that "so far as extraordinary discharges are 
concerned, there is no reason to believe that ail significant incidents were not recorded" 
(Day 11, p.37D).
On the second point concerning the alleged past errors made by BNFL and their 
predecessors, Mr. Rokison suggested that any such mistakes in the early days of operation 
of the Sellafield plant were perhaps to be expected, it was he said "not surprising that over 
a period of 40 years there may have been errors" (Day 11, p.37G).
With regard to the third point which dealt with the general attitude and approach of 
BNFL, Mr. Rokison, in his submission on environmental dosimetry dismissed this aspect 
as wholly irrelevant to the case (Day 1 l,p .39F). Mr. Rokison went on to say, that it was 
not surprising that out of thousands and thousands of documents the plaintiffs were able
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to show "that someone at BNFL, in the past, may have been complacent or over­
confident or defensive or over-sensitive, so what?" (Day 11,p.40A). Relying on the 
evidence of Professor Jones and Dr. Stather, Mr. Rokison pointed to the professionalism 
of the defendants' two experts as illustration of the competence that also exists in the 
nuclear industry.
As with the occupational dose, environmental dosimetry has raised a number of concerns. 
A t root and fundamental to this part of the case is the question of monitoring and 
quantification of dose received by the relevant members of the Reay and Hope families 
as a result of the radioactive material released into the environment from the Sellafield 
plant. That is to say doses:
1. to Dorothy Reay's red bone marrow (a) from conception to birth and (b) from 
birth to date of diagnosis;
2. to Elizabeth Reay's ovaries down to Dorothy's conception;
3. to George Reay's testes down to the conception of Dorothy;
4. to Vivien Hope's lymphatic tissue (a) while in utero (b) from birth to 1988 
(when her NHL was diagnosed);
5. to Monica Hope's ovaries down to Vivien's conception;
6. to David Hope's testes down to Vivien's conception60.
As far as the defendants were concerned, Professor Jones' SEAM model produced the 
best assessment yet made of historic discharges from the Sellafield site which confirmed 
the exposure levels as being small, and constituting only a fraction of the amount of 
radioactive exposure that each member of the families would have received from
60 Reay and Hope Judgment p. 29-30.
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background radiation.
In respect of the plaintiffs Mr. Hytner maintained that:
1. The defendants had in the past been widely wrong in estimating their own emissions 
of radionuclides;
2. As with occupational dosimetry, the defendants' relationship with the NRPB was too 
friendly with the result that the NRPB were failing to fulfil their public function as a 
distinct and separate body. Further, NRPB were not in a position to independently 
validate BNFL's environmental discharge figures61.
3. The defendants' cavalier approach to their duties resulted in a failure to inform the 
NRPB and the public of the ftill extent of the emissions;
4. As a consequence of these factors, the defendants' evidence on emissions should be 
treated with caution and indeed with suspicion.
Underlying the environmental dosimetry part of the case are many of the problems 
highlighted in the previous section. In particular, inequality of resources, lack of 
independent expertise, problems of public body regulation and accountability. In addition 
however, this section of the trial also reveals a tendency in the rhetoric and practice of law 
to treat the expert (in particular Professor S.R. Jones) as autonomous from the 
institutional setting (BNFL) of which he is a part62, thereby confusing the credibility of 
the witness (as a representative of BNFL) with the credibility of the institution.
In the next section attention will focus on the epidemiological evidence and in particular,
61 According to Dr. Stather the NRPB were 
not a regulator and therefore did not have 
the expertise to validate BNFL's figures.
62 This issue will be considered further in
Chapter 5(2) (analysis of the Reay and Hope 
Judgment).
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the study carried out by Professor Gardner and his team which provided the foundation 
for the plaintiffs' case.
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4.4  THE EPIDEMIOLOGICAL EVIDENCE
The Gardner study generated as a consequence of the observed excess of childhood 
leukaemia and iymphoma near the Sellafield nuclear plant was based on two hypotheses. 
First, that there was some causal connection between the childhood cancer excess and the 
geographical area, second that the increased rates of leukaemia and NHL were associated 
with some aspect of the Sellafield site.
To recapitulate, Gardner identified 97 cases of people aged under 25 years, bom in west 
Cumbria Health Authority and diagnosed there between 1950-1985 as having leukaemia 
(52); non-Hodgkin's lymphoma (22) and Hodgkins disease (23) compared with 1001 
controls matched for sex and date of birth taken from the same birth registers as the cases. 
Gardner used two groups of controls: area controls and local controls63. The area 
controls were 8 controls for every case drawn from west Cumbria. The local controls 
were 8 controls per case drawn from the same parish in which the mother was resident 
at birth64.
Professor Gardner's epidemiological evidence was published in two concurrent papers in 
1990. The first described the methodology and basic data of the case control study. The
63 The aim of having area and local controls is 
to reduce the chance of bias.
64 The reason for using 8 controls per case is
to improve information about background factors 
which may prove relevant Ideally it would of 
course be better to increase the number of cases, 
rather than the number of controls. Due to childhood 
leukaemia still being a relatively rare disease 
however the number of cases is limited.
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second paper concluded that there was indeed a significant excess of leukaemias and NHL
in the vicinity of Sellafield, and further that:
The raised incidence of ieukaemia particularly, and non-Hodgkin's lymphoma 
among children near Sellafield was associated with paternal employment and 
recorded external dose of whole body penetrating radiation during work at the 
plant before conception. The association can explain statistically the observed 
geographical excess. This result suggests an effect of ionising radiation on fathers 
that may be leukaemogenic in their offspring, though other, less likely, explanations 
are possible. There are important potential implications for radiobiology and for 
protection of radiation workers and their children (Gardner 1990a:423).
This was the first time since the Yorkshire Television Programme of 198365 that a
correlation between exposure and disease had been confirmed. Prior to this, and
throughout the 1980s, studies on the incidence of cancer around Cumbria and around
nuclear installations had been undertaken and were progressing66, however Gardner was
the only study that had borne out COMARE's tentative hypothesis in their first report67
that paternal preconception exposure might contribute to the childhood cancer excess.
In order to assess the validity of Professor Gardner's study, plaintiffs and defendants relied 
on the criteria devised by Professor Bradford Hill in 1965. Although I have referred to 
the nine points earlier on in the thesis68, it is perhaps worth recapitulating on the detail
65 For wider discussion of the Yorkshire 
Television Programme see C h.l.
66 Particularly: Tiplady (1981; 1983), Alderson et al 
(1984); Cook-Mozaffari (1984); Craft St Birch (1983); 
Urquhart, Palmer and Cutler (1984); Palmer (1984); 
Gardner sc Winter (1984a); For further, more detailed 
information please refer to Ch.l (3 ).
67 COMARE (1986) 'The implications of the new 
data on the releases from Sellafield in the 1950s 
for the conclusions of the Report on the Incidence 
of a Possible Increased Incidence of Cancer in west 
Cumbria'.
68 Please refer back to Ch.2(2).
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of the Bradford Hill Criteria, particularly since they played such a significant and ultimately 
decisive role in Counsels' Opening; Closing Submission; and Mr. Justice French's ruling 
of the epidemiological evidence.
In summary, the Bradford Hill criteria considers the following as indicative of cause and 
effect:
1. Strength of association.
2. Biological gradient (dose-response relationship).
3. Temporal Relationships (does response follow dose).
4. Consistency with similar studies.
5. Biological plausibility (existence of a biological mechanism).
6. Coherence (compatibility of a case with the known facts).
7. Experimental evidence (relevant laboratory experiments).
8. Analogy (the production of similar results).
9. Specificity (alleged link between the disease and exposure of interest).
Before moving on to an evaluation of the more important parts of the epidemiological 
evidence however, this section will start by providing a necessarily detailed overview of 
the witnesses and issues involved. The importance of understanding the epidemiological 
evidence cannot be over stated. First, a descriptive account helps to provide a foundation 
upon which analysis can take place and second, such a framework prepares the reader for 
discussion of the rationale behind French J's ultimate decision.
In the first instance and having exchanged experts' reports69, it appears initially there 
were only two concerns raised by the defendants in respect of Professor Gardner's 
methodology. The first related to the appropriateness of combining leukaemia and NHL
69 Dr. Peter Smith, London School of Hygiene was 
the first expert commissioned by the defendants 
to assess the intrinsic and extrinsic validity of 
Gardner's 1990 report.
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cases and controls70; the second concerned the number of hypotheses tested by 
Professor Gardner and the possibility that one of the hypotheses might appear statistically 
significant purely as a result of the random effect of chance.
In respect of the first point, the plaintiffs acknowledged that by themselves the NHL cases 
and controls were too small to be statistically significant. On the other hand, non­
inclusion of the NHL cases and controls would result in the association between pre­
conception exposure to radiation and leukaemia showing a stronger significance. As Mr. 
Hytner on behalf of the plaintiffs pointed out in his Opening, "it would therefore be 
surprising if this were to loom large as an issue in the case, as the Defendants, if they were 
to do so, would simply be trading a lessened certainty of cause and effect in the case of 
Vivien Hope71 for an increased certainty in the case of Dorothy Reay72 (Day 1, p.53).
On the second point, the plaintiffs accepted the general principle that where a number 
of hypotheses are chosen for a study there is a greater risk that one will appear statistically 
significant as a result of chance73. However, the plaintiffs rejected the notion that such
70 The plaintiffs contended that leukaemia and NHL 
were one disease. The defendants contended that they 
were essentially different diseases of the haemopoietic 
system; the one originating from the bone marrow
the other deriving from the lymphoid cells. Professor 
Greaves testified for the plaintiffs, Professor Catovsky 
for the defendants.
71 Vivien Hope was diagnosed as suffering from 
non-Hodgkin's lymphoma in 1988.
72 Dorothy Reay died of leukaemia in 1962 aged 
ten months.
73 Where there are multiple hypotheses the study may 
becomes one of 'hypothesis generation' rather than 
'hypothesis testing' which could undermine the results.
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a mechanism was operating as regards the Gardner Study.
Notwithstanding the four aims of the study:
(1) to examine maternal exposure to medical X-rays and to infectious disease during 
pregnancy;
(2) to examine the geographical distribution at birth and in particular proximity to 
Sellafield;
(3) to examine habits that might have enhanced exposure to radionuclides released from 
Sellafield (for example, eating seafood, playing on the beach);
(4) to examine parental occupation especially employment at Sellafield and occupational 
radiation dose. (Hytner Day 1, p.55).
M r Hytner pointed out there were only two hypotheses tested by Gardner: "first that the 
raised rates of leukaemia within the area were due to a high frequency of known causes 
of childhood leukaemia and lymphoma; and second, that the raised rates were associated
with some aspect of the Sellafield plant  Consequently, there was no "multiplicity"
of hypotheses as suggested" (Day 1, p.54).
Moving on to the second exchange of reports, it emerged as a consequence of the 
discovery process that BNFL had supplied inaccurate dosimetry data to Professor Gardner, 
necessitating an entire re-working of the Gardner Study74. Unfortunately for the 
plaintiffs however, Professor Gardner had by this time become seriously ill75 and was not 
in a position to undertake this exercise himself.
74 Please refer to 4(2) for wider discussion of this 
issue.
75 Professor Gardner died of lung cancer in 
January 1993.
Therefore, in light of Professor Gardner's illness and the fact that responsibility for the 
inaccurate information lay firmly with BNFL, the plaintiffs approached the defendants, 
hoping to agree as facts the raw data used by the Gardner team and contained in the 
study. Upon receiving the defendants' refusal to this proposal, the plaintiffs had no 
choice but to obtain Gardner's raw data from the Medical Research Council (MRC) at 
Southampton University and effectively re-run the study.
For the re-working of the Gardner Study, the plaintiffs' solicitors contracted Stephen 
Evans, Professor of Medical Statistics at London Hospital Medical College, University of 
London. Professor Evans produced a total of four reports, the first report involved a 
discussion of other studies. The second and third reports conducted a re-analysis of the 
data which Professor Gardner had used to produce his published work, in part reanalysed 
as a consequence of the revised doses. The fourth report commented on recent 
epidemiological studies that had come to prominence over the last year.
Before calling Professor Evans on the thirteenth day of the trial, a dictated statement dated 
13th November 1992, served under the Civil Evidence Act was read out on behalf of 
Professor Gardner76 dealing with a further three criticisms identified in the interim by Dr. 
Macrae on behalf of the defendants. The first issue concerned the misclassification of 21 
cases and controls, representing 2.45 per cent of the total. This Professor Gardner dealt 
with by pointing out that the original information supplied by BNFL to the MRC unit was
76 Professor Gardner was by this stage too 
ill to appear in court.
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incomplete and/or inaccurate in respect of eighteen fathers77, the other three 
misclassified fathers were the result of incomplete data necessitating further tracing 
information78.
The second point raised by Dr. Macrae related to the exclusion of leukaemia and 
lymphoma cases bom outside west Cumbria. On this point, Professor Gardner confirmed 
that while the aim of the original study had been to include all children diagnosed with 
leukaemia and lymphoma in and around the west Cumbrian area, the results of the 
Seascale Birth and Schools Cohort Study reported in 1987 showed clearly that the risk 
appeared to be confined to children bom and diagnosed in west Cumbria. Accordingly, 
these cases were highlighted as of primary interest and published analysis focused on this 
area.
The third issue concerned the inclusion of what became known as the 'Bristol' Case. This 
case, said Dr. Macrae should not have been included in the analysis. Further, had this case 
been excluded, the statistical significance revealed in the study would not have appeared. 
In response, Professor Gardner pointed out that the aim of the case control study was 
only to include those cases diagnosed while resident in west Cumbria. In this instance the 
deceased had moved to Bristol University for a short period of time, having lived all his
77 O f these eighteen fathers, sixteen did not 
appear in the original workforce data supplied
by BNFL. The remaining two did appear in the data, 
but one was without initials, the other had a 
different surname spelling and date of birth than 
the information contained in Gardner's own files.
78 The requirement of further tracing information 
is not uncommon. Most epidemiological studies 
have a few cases like this.
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life in Seascale. Further he had registered his permanent address as being in west Cumbria 
and the same address appeared on his death certificate. As to whether exclusion of the 
Bristol case would affect the statistical significance of the study, Professor Gardner stated:
Although the relative risks for the highest dose categories are consequently 
lowered, the majority in fact remain statistically significant with 95%  confidence 
intervals79.... Our interpretation of the results would hardly change from 
that published (Day 13, p. 11D)80.
The Plaintiffs7 Expert Witnesses
Having read out the statement by Professor Gardner, Mr. Langstaff proceeded, on behalf 
of the plaintiffs to call Professor Evans to the witness box. In total Professor Evans spent 
almost two weeks giving evidence, during which time he not only reaffirmed the Gardner 
results but also strengthened them, particularly in relation to the dose - response 
relationship; the higher the exposure dose, the greater the risk ofthe offspring getting 
leukaemia. Professor Evans was also able to show that any possibility ofthe dose response 
relationship being simply a matter of chance had reduced from the 3-4% found by 
Gardner to 2-3%  as a consequence of the revised dose figures.
When examined on the rigour of Professor Gardner's methodology, Professor Evans 
observed:
79 95%  confidence interval is established by the 
exclusion of chance to a 95 per cent extent.
This means a 95%  certainty or 5 per cent (or 
less) if chance is considered.
80 In the event, after a third re-analysis of Gardner, 
Professor Howe on behalf of the defendants confirmed 
Professor Gardner's view that exclusion of the Bristol 
case would have no impact on the original findings.
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The description of the methods of the study is one of the most extensive I have 
read in the scientific literature and has not to date been the subject of any major 
criticism in the scientific press (Day 13, p.49A).
I consider that Professor Gardner has done as good a job as possible with the 
available material and I do not believe that there are any serious subjective biases 
in the occupational data derived from BNFL (Day 13, p.66E).
Although asked to comment on a range of studies, one theory which Professor Evans was 
examined and cross examined on later acquired particular importance for the defendants.
The 'Kinlen Hypothesis'81 was based on a total of four studies82 which looked at the 
relationship between clusters and viruses. According to this theory, children develop what 
Professor Kinlen has referred to as 'herd immunity'. This immunity protects families 
against certain viruses providing they remain within their own native environment. 
However, once they move to a new area, particularly a new town or village the defence 
of the herd immunity breaks down, leading to a greater likelihood of a predisposition to 
viral induced diseases. There are three elements to the Kinlen Hypothesis:
1. that influxes of population into rural and isolated areas are conducive to 
epidemics of certain infections;
2. that Sellafield and Dounreay are extreme examples of isolation and population 
influx;
3. that some unidentified virus (or viruses or other source of infection) can cause 
leukaemia and may well have caused the Seascale cluster without any causal 
contribution from Sellafield83.
81 The Kinlen hypothesis is referred to in 
Chapter 1(3).
82 Kinlen, (1988); Kinlen, Hudson and Stiller (1991), 
Kinlen (1993); Kinlen, Dickson and Stiller (1995).
83 judgment p. 13.
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In response to this hypothesis Professor Evans expressed the view that had leukaemias and
lymphomas been due to a virus he would have expected:
....to have found clusterings in space and time to be rather common. If we apply 
those sort of methodologies to other diseases that we know have a viral cause, we 
find that clusters are identified all over the place and we find that same sort of 
patterning even with such simple viruses as food poisoning (Day 14, p.55E).
Therefore Professor Evans rejected the Kinlen hypothesis as the primary or sole
explanation for the excess84. In his conclusion, Professor Evans went on to say:
The re-analysis confirms the overall conclusions of Gardner in regard to the
case The most complete data with the agreed dose levels now shows firm
evidence from both local and area controls that paternal radiation exposure is 
associated with childhood leukaemia (Day 14, p.68D).
Following Professor Evans' first appearance85 in the witness box, the plaintiffs called two 
American experts, Scott Davis, Associate Professor, Department Epidemiology at the 
University of Washington, and Kenneth Kopecky, a biostatistician atjhe Fred Hutchinson 
Cancer Research Centre and Associate Professor in the University of Washington School 
of Public Health and Community Medicine.
Professor Scott Davis had since the 1980s focused his research on two principal areas of 
activity; first, the effects of radiation and second, the aetiology of leukaemia and 
lymphomas as a consequence of exposure. A t the time of the trial Professor Davis' three 
research projects included: investigating the health effects of radioactive atmospheric
84 The plaintiffs had not rejected the possibility 
that viruses in combination with preconception 
irradiation could be responsible for the excess.
85 Professor Evans was called to the witness box 
twice.
discharges from Hanford nuclear facility; leukaemia excesses as a consequence of the 
Chernobyl accident, and analysis of clusters linked to Hodgkin's disease.
Professor Davis was commissioned to prepare three reports on behalf of the plaintiffs, his 
aim, to review and evaluate from an epidemiological perspective the "body of knowledge 
concerning a possible link between radiation exposure from nuclear power plants and the 
development of childhood leukaemia" (Day 19, p.4B).
The thrust of Professor Davis' evidence was that a number of studies, looking at the excess
of cancers around nuclear power plants, gave strength to the view that the Seascale excess
had not been caused by chance and further, that there was sufficient backing from other
case-control studies to support Gardner. In his final assessment of the various studies86,
Professor Davis observed:
As a group, the case-control studies reporting no association appear to be based 
on much poorer quality exposure information than those reporting an association 
(Day 20, p.63E).
In his concluding remarks, Professor Davis stated that he could find "no convincing 
evidence to refute the findings of Gardner" (Day 20, p.63G).
Moving on to the next witness, the plaintiffs called Dr. K.J. Kopecky87. Dr. Kopecky
86 Studies included: Stewart/Keale (1970); Shu (1988); 
McKinney and Alexander (1991); Buckley 1989; Urquhart 
(1991); McLaughlin (1993); Roman II (1993); Kinlen 1993.
87 As a biostatistician Dr.Kopecky was concerned 
with the statistical side of the review, whereas 
Professor Davis was concerned with the 
epidemiological aspects.
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prepared three reports for the purposes of litigation in which he focused on the "statistical 
aspects of published reports concerning studies in humans ofthe effect of preconceptional 
irradiation of parents, and particularly the extent to which the currently available literature 
either supports or refutes the findings of Gardner" (Day 24,p.4Q ).
In his overview of the published material, Dr. Kopecky was ofthe opinion that "taking this 
body of work as a whole.... the evidence [was] strongly suggestive of a link between 
preconception radiation exposure and childhood leukaemia" (Day 25, p.4F).
As regards the question of methodology, Dr. Kopecky informed Mr. Read on behalf of
the plaintiffs that in his view:
...the methodology in the Gardner Study was of a very high calibre. I would say 
compared to other studies that I have read over the years in the epidemiological 
literature it ranks in the highest category in terms of^the quality of the 
methodology. I think the authors are particularly to be applauded, at least 
from my point of view as a scientist, for having gone to such great lengths in a 
separate paper to lay out the methodology (Day 25, p .l 5A).
In addition to the array of epidemiological evidence that Professor Davis and Dr. Kopecky
were asked to consider, one study of particular significance merits further comment. The
aim of the A-bomb Study88 led by Professor Neel and Professor SchuII (both of whom
were expert witnesses for the defendants) was to follow-up surviving Hiroshima and
Nagasaki victims and their offspring in order to evaluate the effect of ionising radiation,
somatically and genetically. The A-bomb Study is regarded as the largest cohort study of
its kind ever conducted, it is generally recognised as being well executed and state of the
art, developing as it has over time. Nonetheless, despite the general acceptance of the
88 Some of the problems of the A-bomb Study
were identified in Chapter 1(2).
199
A-bomb study, there are a number of anomalies which Mr. Hytner on behalf of the
plaintiffs was keen to highlight, particularly in view of its contradiction of the Gardner
findings. In his Opening Mr. Hytner pointed out that:
Although the defendants rely heavily on the A-bomb data as not only being 
intrinsically reliable but also as being applicable to and setting apart the Gardner 
findings, it transpires that Profs. Neel and Schull themselves were not blind to the 
problems arising from what appeared to be bizarre results showing, as they did, a 
series of effects lower among those exposed to the blasts than among the 
unexposed cohort.
Since it was recognised, as a matter of common sense and science, that this could 
not be so, the results were conveniently interpreted to make them correspond with 
the known reality of radiation effects - known that is, at the time (Hytner: Day 1,
p. 61).
As far as Professor Davis and Dr. Kopecky were concerned, it was their shared view that 
whilst the A-bomb study results were incompatible with the Gardner study, the 
circumstances surrounding the A-bomb exposures were so different to those surrounding 
the exposure at Sellafield89, that it should not be taken as being capable of contradicting 
the Gardner findings.
The next expert called to the witness box on behalf of the plaintiffs was Professor E. 
Alberman, a Clinical Epidemiologist with the Wolfson Institute of Preventive Medicine. 
Professor Alberman had also sat on COMARE III in 1988. The purpose of calling 
Professor Alberman was to deal with three assertions made by Professor Neel in relation 
to his A-bomb research:
a) that 'there is an irreconcilable conflict' between the Gardner hypothesis and the 
studies on the A-bomb survivors (Day 29 , p.8F);
89 In particular, acute v chronic irradiation,
difference in dose levels, difference in population 
groups, difference in intemal/extemal radiation 
exposure.
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b) that the doses to the workers at Sellafield were far too low to bring about 
the observed cancer excesses in their children (Day 30, p. 1C);
c) that it is acceptable to combine stillbirths, neonatal deaths and congenital 
malformations into a single endpoint - 'untoward pregnancy outcomes' for the 
purpose of deriving a genetic doubling dose90 (Day 30, p.2D).
In concluding her evidence Professor Alberman said:
In summary I must stand by my view that the evidence from the Japanese Atomic 
Bomb data does not provide convincing proof that exposure to low dose ionising 
radiation will not cause genetic damage (Day 30, p.17D).
In the opinion of Professor Alberman the findings of the A-Bomb data needed to be 
questioned more vigorously; there were she said, too many discrepancies which had been 
ignored for too long. Although not qualified to comment on genetic contradictions, her 
own conclusions as an epidemiologist in the international and national infant mortality 
field, highlighted the inconsistencies that existed between her own work and those of the 
A-bomb research.
Following Professor Alberman, Duncan Campbell Thomas91, American Professor at USC 
School of Medicine, Los Angelos, California took the stand. Professor Thomas' principal 
areas of research included statistical methods in epidemiology; radiation carcinogenesis; 
cancer epidemiology; occupational and environmental health; genetic epidemiology. In 
total Professor Thomas was commissioned to prepare four reports with the aim of 
providing:
90 This is the dose of ionising radiation which
will produce the same number of genetic effects 
of a specified type as would result from 
'spontaneous7 mutations in each generation.
91 Professor Thomas7 academic training included 
mathematics, biostatistics and epidemiology.
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 quantitative estimates ofthe probability that the diseases of....Dorothy Reay
and Vivien Hope, were caused by their fathers' occupational radiation exposures 
at Sellafield...based on exposure-response data derived from the Gardner study 
(Day 32, p.4F)
When considering the methodology and practice of epidemiologists in general, Professor 
Thomas observed:
In practice, conclusions about causality...are never based just on the study data but 
on its concordance with the world literature, biological plausibility, freedom from 
bias, and numerous other considerations. In other words, epidemiologists 
behave more like 'Bayesian' statisticians (Day 32, p.30D).
In recognising this practice, Professor Thomas was acknowledging the fact that an 
epidemiologist, like a Bayesian statistician92, approaches his study in light of prior 
information and expectations. Adopting the Bayesian method therefore, an 
epidemiologist could assess the probability of the hypothesis first, and then move on to 
analysis of the data.
As far as the Gardner study was concerned a causal connection between paternal 
preconception irradiation and leukaemia was not established until the research data was 
revealed. Although not advocating the use of the Bayesian formula in any quantitative 
way, Professor Thomas did suggest that combining the 'probability causation'(PC) 
estimates and the frequentist approach93, could help to provide further information on
92 See Ch. 5(3) for wider discussion of 
Bayes' Theorem.
93 The frequentists simply look at the data itself.
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whether there is an association at all94. However, in assessing the magnitude of any
association using this combined method, Professor Thomas did point out:
PC estimates are inherently uncertain and there is no clearly accepted basis for 
allowing this uncertainty in reaching such judgments (Day 33, p.47A).
In considering the method and approach adopted by the Gardner study, Professor Thomas
said "in general, the Gardner study appears to have been very well done" (Day 32,
p .l 5A). He went on to say:
In my view Gardner chose the most efficient design to achieve results 
(Day 32, p. 16F).
When examined by Mr. Langstaff on behalf of the plaintiffs, as to his opinion ofthe study,
Professor Thomas said:
In my opinion, the Gardner case-control study provides the most solid evidence 
on which to resolve the litigations concerning the childhood cancer cases in the 
vicinity of Sellafield (Day 32, p .l9D ).
In conclusion, Professor Thomas was of the view that the strength of the association as 
between paternal irradiation and the Seascale leukaemia excess was unlikely to be 
accounted for by chance. Thus preconception exposure acting in synergy with 
environmental radiation and/or viruses was the most probable explanation. Therefore, on 
the balance of probabilities he felt that the cases under consideration were cases where 
preconception irradiation had played a causative part. However, Professor Thomas went 
on to say that if the Gardner study had been a study in the absence of any other prior
94 The defendants were keen to suggest that because 
the Gardner Study was the first study to come up with 
such a positive link, it must mean that the prior 
hypothesis was of very limited strength and therefore 
the paternal exposure results could not be taken as 
being causal without further support from other studies.
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study considering preconception irradiation and its effects, he would not necessarily have 
come to this conclusion.
The next witness called by the plaintiff, was David Savitz, Department of Epidemiology, 
American Professor at North Carolina School of Public Health. For the purposes of 
litigation Professor Savitz prepared two reports dealing with an evaluation of "a number 
of studies relating to a sizable body of epidemiological research on preconceptional 
paternal exposure to chemical exposures in relation to childhood cancers" (Day 36, 
p.4C). The aim of Professor Savitz report was to interpret the data contained in the 
studies and in so doing provide a context for a broader array of research findings into 
which the Gardner study may or may not fit.
As a researcher primarily concerned with occupational and environmental epidemiology,
Professor Savitz was able to confirm the usefulness of these studies in helping to determine
the Gardner hypothesis by pointing out:
Like ali studies the Gardner study is not out there in isolation. There are other 
studies that I reviewed giving some sense of the underlying information base, the 
underlying information about whether environmental agents that the father is 
exposed to may in fact affect the health of his offspring (Day 36, p.4G).
In order to put Gardner into a wider context, Professor Savitz looked at the analogous 
situation of the chemical exposure of other workers, and the levels of leukaemias and 
additional cancers that affected their offspring. The intention of calling Professor Savitz 
was to show that evidence from non-radiation exposure, including some of Professor Savitz 
own research findings, supported the conclusions of Gardner. Thus if paternal germline 
damage could result from chemical exposure, it could also happen to workers exposed to
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ionising radiation. Professor Savitz was able to confirm therefore that a sizable number 
of studies (at least ten) examining paternal employment and childhood cancer added 
support to the possible link between paternal preconception exposure and childhood 
cancer (Day 36, p. 24).
The final, and arguably the leading expert witness called by the plaintiffs on the
epidemiological side ofthe case was N.E. Day, Professorof Public Health at the University
of Cambridge. Professor Day's main area of interest included epidemiological
methodology, statistics and cancer research. Professor Day prepared three reports on
behalf of the plaintiffs. In his first report, Professor Day expressed the opinion that, on
the balance of probabilities, a preconception radiation dose contributed substantially to
the development of Dorothy Reay and Vivien Hope's malignancies. When asked by Mr.
Langstaff whether he had modified his opinion as a consequence of additional information
received since the completion of the first report, Professor Day replied:
There has been a considerable amount of information which has become available 
which, on the whole, has tended to increase the strength of my belief that 
preconception irradiation played a part in producing the cluster and causing those 
haematological malignancies that were observed around Seascale (Day 40, p.3F).
In his second report, Professor Day looked at the strength of the association under the
Bradford Hill Criteria, observing that:
There is a great deal of support for the Gardner hypothesis from the geographical 
studies, the other case control studies, the Draper study95, the animal
95 Draper et a!. (1993) 'Cancer in Cumbria and 
in the vicinity of the Sellafield nuclear 
installations 1963-90 BM1 306:89-94.
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experiments of Nomura96 and others and the analogous findings in other 
industries. The only negative evidence that truly stands out is that from the A- 
bomb data. It does not seem to me, for the reasons described above, that these 
data are strong enough to nullify not only all the supporting evidence but also the 
dose response relationship in Gardner's report, in a way that can only promote 
chance as the most likely explanation. Taking the evidence as a whole, there are 
considerable grounds for concluding that the observed association between 
preconception exposure to radiation and childhood cancer (Day 40, p.29B).
In his third report, Professor Day expressed his opinion as regards causation. Under cross- 
examination by Mr. Rokison on behalf of the defendants, Professor Day stated his belief 
that synergism in the form of environmental radiation and/or viruses could have interacted 
with paternal preconception irradiation and in so doing produced a causal effect. 
Professor Day went on to confirm his belief that the strength of the relationship for the 
Seascale cases (as between paternal irradiation and the level of leukaemias) was so great 
that it was unlikely to be accounted for by chance, and was therefore likely to be a cause 
or causes of the excess.
In his summary of the plaintiffs' interim submission of the epidemiological evidence Mr. 
Justice French said:
The plaintiffs start their submission by saying that the Gardner Study demonstrates 
a significant association between the excess of leukaemias around Sellafield and PPI; 
that the data on which Gardner based his findings when reanalysed with additional 
data continue to support that association; and that when the Bradford Hill criteria 
are applied to the association causation is proved on the balance of probabilities. 
It is now unchallenged, they say, that there is indeed an excess of leukaemias and 
NHLs in Seascale though an issue remains how far the excess may spread, and to 
what degree, beyond Seascale. O f the presence of a 6-8 fold excess in Seascale 
there is no realistic doubt. The Gardner study is methodologically sound; there is
96 See Nomura, I (1990) 'O f mice and men' 
Nature 345:671 and Nomura, T. 'Parental 
exposure to X-rays and chemicals induces 
heritable tumours and anomalies in mice'. 
Nature (1982) 296:575-7.
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no bias which affects the results and accordingly the P value can be interpreted as 
face value as excluding a chance association except by a freak97.
The plaintiffs concluded their submission on epidemiology as follows:
The Gardner report and its updated version remains centre stage. The defendants' 
own analysis confirms the high excess relative risk of leukaemia and NHL's in 
Seascale which is most unlikely to be explained by chance. The association with 
a high occupational dose has been unchallenged.
In the plaintiffs' opinion therefore:
...the challenge to the 'appropriateness' of the biological gradient has failed to 
erode the undoubted evidence of a suitable dose response indicative of causation. 
The result is that any explanation other than PPI has to explain that response; and 
the defendants' witnesses have failed to come up with a credible alternative 
explanation98.
The Defendants' Expert Witnesses
As soon as Professor N . Day had completed his evidence on behalf of the plaintiffs, the 
defendants went straight into their evidence commencing with Dr. K.D. Macrae, Reader 
in Medical Statistics, Charing Cross and Westminster Medical School.
Dr. Macrae produced three reports based on his analysis of the Gardner Study. The first 
report looked at epidemiology and causation, the second considered leukaemia types and 
sub-types in the context of the Bradford Hill criteria, the third report dealt with other 
issues related to leukaemias.
Mr. Spencer QC on behalf of the defendants began his examination of Dr. Macrae by 
considering more general topics related to data bias; the concept of significance; multiple
97 Judgment p.57-58.
98 Judgment p .80-81.
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hypotheses; what constitutes a true experiment; the appropriateness of relying on the 
Bradford Hill criteria; study designs in epidemiology.
Moving on to the Gardner Study specifically, Dr. Macrae was asked his view of a number
of selected studies both inside and outside the UK which in the opinion ofthe defendants
did not support the Gardner hypotheses. Dealing with the non UK studies first, Dr.
Macrae confirmed his conclusions that:
..there is little, if any, supporting evidence from the systematic studies" 
conducted outside Britain for a raised risk of childhood leukaemia and NHL around 
nuclear sites (Day 45, p.7D).
Having received additional information on studies post-Gardner, and having considered
UK and other studies together, Dr. Macrae was then asked by Mr. Spencer, his opinion
on the validity of the Gardner hypothesis as regards cause and effect. In response Dr.
Macrae commented:
I start by being sceptical as to whether the Gardner Study itself has really 
established an association between pre-conception irradiation and childhood 
leukaemia or indeed NHL even more so. Because ofthe problems with the study 
I doubt the conclusions of the association in the study (Day 45, p.65C).
An area of particular concern to Dr. Macrae was the inclusion ofthe 'Bristol' case already 
discussed100, and the exclusion, of what became known as the Edinburgh case101.
99 Including: Hill and Laplanche (1990) France;
Jablon et al. (1991) US; Michaelis et al. (1992) 
West Germany.
100 To recapitulate, this case concerned a young man 
who had resided in Seascale for most of his life. 
Upon taking up the offer of a place at Bristol 
University two months before he died, the deceased 
continued to register his permanent address as west 
Cumbria. Later the same address appeared on the 
death certificate. Gardner on the basis of this 
information concluded he was a resident of Seascale.
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This second case was excluded from the Gardner study on the basis of failing to meet 
Gardner's methodological requirements of residency. Both cases, in the opinion of Dr. 
Macrae, cast doubt on the reliability of the study. Interestingly though, despite Dr. 
Macrae's criticism of Gardner, he seemed unable to make up his mind over the exclusion 
of the Edinburgh case. Under cross examination by Mr. Langstaff on Day 4 5 102 of the 
trial, Dr. Macrae said he would not have included the case, on Day 4 6 103 of the trial 
however, he said he would have included the case.
Earlier, when examined by defendants counsel as to whether criticism, particularly over 
the Bristol case, was not simply nitpicking (Day 45, p.31A), Dr. Macrae defended his 
opinion vigorously, castigating the fundamental bias of Professor Gardner's work, causing 
Mr. Justice French to ask whether Dr. Macrae was suggesting some sort of methodological 
malpractice on the part of Professor Gardner (Day 45, p. 32F).
Later, under cross examination on this same issue, Mr. Langstaff pointed out to Dr.
101 This case concerned an Edinburgh student who was excluded 
from the Gardner Study because she was registered with
a GP in Dorset for six years, and then registered in 
Edinburgh for three years prior to diagnosis. In total 
there was nine years non-registration in west Cumbria, 
therefore, she was regarded as non resident on the basis 
of the methodological criteria laid down by Gardner.
102 Transcript: Day 45, p. 35D-E.
103 Transcript: Day 46, p. 19C.
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Macrae that two defendant experts, Professor Howe and Professor Doll104 confirmed 
the study to be free from major potential bias, and that further, on re-analysis of the 
Gardner Study by Professor Howe, exclusion of the Bristol case was found to have no 
significant impact on the original findings. Notwithstanding this virtual professorial 
consensus at this time, Dr. Macrae remained dogmatic in his condemnation of Gardner's 
methodology.
The next witness called by the defendants was Dr. Richard Wakeford, Principal Research 
Scientist at British Nuclear Fuels. For the purposes of the case, Dr. Wakeford prepared 
three statements in which he identified his main area of interest as childhood leukaemia 
clusters around nuclear installations in the UK and overseas. Appertaining to these 
statements, Dr. Wakeford also submitted a draft copy of a new research project 
provisionally known as the Parker paper (later referred to as the Wakeford/Parker 
Study105) which allegedly demonstrated, in support of the defendants, that the Gardner 
hypothesis could not explain the childhood cancer excess observed in Seascale.
104 Professor Doll confirmed the study to be 
free from major potential bias in his first 
report. Later in his second report Professor 
Doll did discuss the Bristol case, but still 
concluded that there was no substantial bias in 
the Gardner Study. Later, when Professor Doll 
was testifying however, he totally changed his 
position. See p.228-230 of this chapter for 
further details.
105 This authors of the study are Parker, Craft,
Smith, Dickinson and Wakeford (1993). For the 
convenience of the trial the study was referred
to simply as the Wakeford/Parker study. In order 
to avoid any possible confusion I have continued 
to use the Wakeford/Parker abbreviation hereafter.
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When examined on the funding status of the research106, Dr. Wakeford, an employee 
and witness on behalf of the defendants, stated that the principal funding had come from 
the UK Co-ordinating Committee on Cancer Research (UKCC). However, clarifying the 
situation, Dr. Wakeford went on to concede that UKCC were in fact financed by the 
nuclear industry, including BNFL, the UK Atomic Energy Authority and the Central 
Electricity Generating Board who together provided a total of £3 million for distribution 
of projects under the auspices of UKCC. As a project satisfying the criteria laid down by 
the UKCC, the Wakeford/Parker study qualified for research funding.
Moving on to the findings of the paper, Dr. Wakeford confirmed that this latest study 
showed:
... that the suggestion that the paternal preconceptional doses of children bom in 
Seascale are sufficient to explain the excess of childhood leukaemia cases in the 
village is incompatible with the absence of any indication of a similar excess in the 
much greater number of children with such doses bom outside Seascale (Day 47, 
p. 20F).
In our opinion, said Dr. Wakeford:
It is concluded that it is unlikely that the excess of childhood leukaemia in Seascale 
is due to paternal preconceptional radiation exposure and this must cast doubt on 
the direct causal interpretation of the statistical association between paternal 
preconceptional radiation exposure and childhood leukaemia reported by Gardner 
et al.
The Seascale childhood leukaemia cluster remains an enigma (Day 47, p. 20G-H).
106 Determining the funding status of research 
is important in assessing the neutrality and 
objectivity of the work.
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Although Dr. Wakeford was essentially testifying on the findings of the new 
Wakeford/Parker study, it was open to the plaintiffs to cross examine Dr. Wakeford on 
other aspects of the case. Under cross examination by Mr. Langstaff, Dr. Wakeford 
conceded a number of points including: the excess of leukaemia and NHL was unlikely to 
be a chance phenomenon (Day 47, p.48A); it was not inappropriate to group together 
leukaemias and NHL (Day 47, p. 48B); the inclusion of the Bristol case on the basis of 
the death certificate address (as defined in Gardner's methodology paper) was 
appropriate.
When asked to provide a causal explanation for the Seascale excess, Dr. Wakeford 
proposed the idea of an occupational confounder107, suggesting instead, that the excess 
might be due to the affected children being resident longer in Seascale and therefore more 
exposed to population mix and viral infection. Challenging this view as implausible, Mr. 
Langstaff on behalf of the plaintiffs, pointed out, that the 'case children' (whose fathers 
had high doses) were not employed at Sellafield, on average, any longer than the control 
group. Acknowledging this, Dr. Wakeford confirmed that he was only postulating a 
confounding factor as a possible explanation.
The next witness called by the defendants was Professor G. Howe, Director,
107 Confounding factors are factors which have 
an apparent causal relevance where none exists.
In this situation high occupational paternal dose 
could be irrelevant. What is relevant is that the 
fathers worked at the plant longer, and therefore 
exposed the case children to a greater number of 
viruses.
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Epidemiological Unit, National Cancer Institute, Canada, and also Professor in the 
Department of Preventive Medicine and Biostatistics, University of Toronto. For the 
purposes of the case, Professor Howe prepared four reports underlying the question of
"whether there was at least a 50% probability that Dorothy Reay's leukaemia had a causal
*
link with PPI, and a similar question in relation to Vivien Hope's NHL" (Day 49, p. 8A).
Among other areas, incorporated into the four reports were issues of dose, causality, the 
role of chance, the Bradford Hill criteria, and comparisons with other studies. In 
concluding his report Professor Howe said:
Thus, overall, the epidemiological evidence does not satisfy three important criteria 
of causality, namely strength of association, consistency, and overall 
existence of a dose-response relationship. I conclude that there is far from adequate 
support from the epidemiologic data for a causal association between paternal 
preconception radiation exposure and risk of leukaemia in offspring 
(Day 49, p. 7C).
In respect of NHL, Professor Howe concluded:
....there is no support from the epidemiologic data for a causal relationship 
between paternal preconception radiation exposure and increased risk of NHL 
(Day 49, p. 7F).
Interestingly in reaching his conclusions, Professor Howe not only dismissed the 
significance of Gardner's P values, but also challenged the weight of P values altogether. 
According to Professor Howe, epidemiologists place too much emphasis on the 
significance of P values, with the result, that a P value of a 5 per cent chance or less (or 
conversely a 95 per cent certainty) can lead to an incorrect interpretation of the figures 
as an indicator of causal association. In the opinion of Professor Howe, calculating a P 
value is only the first step on the way to determining causation. Referring to the Bradford 
Hill criteria as a more useful model for assessing adequate proof in terms of: consistency,
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overall strength of association and overall existence of a dose response relationship,
Professor Howe, applying the criteria to the Gardner Study stated that:
 the probability of a causal association existing between paternal exposure and
leukaemia risk is substantially less than 50 per cent (Day 49, p.42E)
When pressed on the exact percentage108, Professor Howe seemed reluctant to quantify
this in numeric terms as in his view it was:
extremely difficult to place a specific number on one's beliefs because clearly this 
is a subjective process and we have to take account of evidence from a number of 
disciplines and from a number of studies, therefore we tend to use qualitative 
words to describe our beliefs (Day 49, p.43A).
Later, in challenging Professor Howe on this issue, Mr. Hytner, in his submission on behalf
of the plaintiffs pointed out that:
 Professor Howe's results show prima facie an association between PPI and the
Seascale excess to a very strong statistical significant degree (Day 89, p .l7E ).
Mr. Hytner went on to suggest that Professor Howe's refusal to accept the significance of
Gardner's P values, and his own calculations of those P values109, brought into question
the whole significance of P values as an indicator of causal association, one is left with a
situation said Mr. Hytner, where "the P value is meaningless" (Day 89, p .!8A ).
Moving on to the issue of combining leukaemia and NHL, Professor Howe said that he
108 Professor Howe, although uncomfortable in 
putting forward a figure, suggested verbally, 
numerical values of between zero and 20%  as 
the probable causal association existing 
between PPI and paternal exposure.
109 Professor Howe initially accepted the 
findings of his own analysis of Gardner's 
P-values of a cause and effect association as a 
'reasonable conclusion to come to'. Later, there 
was a 'change of tack' and Professor Howe refused 
to accept the significance of Gardner's P-values 
on the basis that the study was testing multiple 
hypotheses (Day 89, p.17E-F).
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personally would have preferred to have conducted separate analyses, however, as a non­
expert in the aetiologies of these diseases, he did not wish to be drawn into a debate on 
this issue (Day 50, p.56F).
As regards the Bristol case, Professor Howe agreed that although the inclusion ofthe case 
was largely insignificant to the results, he nonetheless felt that as a matter of principle this 
case should not have been included. Later under cross-examination by Mr. Langstaff on 
behalf of the plaintiffs, it was pointed out to Professor Howe that the death certificate 
certified residence in Seascale at the time of death and that accordingly it was appropriate 
for the Gardner team to have included the Bristol case. In response, Professor Howe 
stated that his knowledge was "based upon published papers which are not terribly 
adequate in this context" and that he would therefore prefer not to comment (Day 50, 
p. 36BJ.
Although as an epidemiologist Professor Howe was a highly respected expert witness, he 
nonetheless came across as being rather biased in his evidence against radiation, informing 
the court that despite prima facie evidence to the contrary, he unlike other experts in his 
field, immediately considered chemicals and not radiation to be the front runner in 
response to the 1983 screening ofthe Yorkshire Television programme Windscale - The 
Nuclear Laundry (Day 50, p. 14B).
Later, having also rejected synergism as a plausible explanation, Professor Howe was asked 
to provide some alternative solution for the excess. In response Professor Howe said:
I cannot pretend that I can sit here and glibly explain it at all. I cannot. There are
questions. There are difficulties (Day 51, p. 66D).
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In the event Professor Howe came to the conclusion that the Seascale excess was due to 
a chance phenomenon110, with an unknown Factor X (possibly socio-economic) 
contributing to the Seascale excess.
Following Professor Howe, Professor W.J. Schull was called to give evidence. Professor 
SchuII along with Professor J. Neel (who also gave evidence on behalf of the defendants), 
are regarded as the two leading researchers in respect of the atomic bomb data. Both 
scientists went into the devastated Japanese towns after the bombings and both helped 
initiate research in to whether genetic damage had occurred to first generation offspring.
Professor Schull at the time of the trial was Director and Ashbel Smith Professor of 
Academic Medicine in the Graduate School of Biomedical Sciences, University of Texas. 
In addition, Professor Schull also held the Chair of Human Genetics in the School of 
Public Health and was Acting Director of the Medical Genetic Centre at the same School 
of Biomedical Sciences.
Although a geneticist, Professor Schull was called by the defendants to produce three 
reports concerned with epidemiology. In the first report, Professor Schull was asked to 
"consider specifically the cases of the two Plaintiffs, Vivien Hope and Dorothy Reay, and 
to focus on the findings on leukaemia and NHL from the bi-national studies of the 
survivors of the atomic bombings of the two towns" (Day 53, p.4D). In the second 
report, Professor Schull was concerned with the "adequacy of the Japanese data to
110 Professor Howe was the only epidemiologist 
who came to this conclusion.
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identify risk commensurate with that reported to be seen in the west Cumbrian study" 
(Day 53, p.58G-H). In the third report, Professor Schull, referring to his two earlier 
reports, concluded his evidence by offering his opinion on the statistical power of the 
Gardner Study in comparison with other epidemiological studies.
As far as the defendants were concerned, the A-bomb data represented the largest and 
most comprehensive epidemiological prospective cohort study ever conducted in relation 
to the effects of ionising radiation (both somatic and genetic) on a surviving population 
and their offspring. Professor Schull made it clear that most, if not all of what is known 
about biological consequences of human exposure to ionising radiation resulted from the 
atomic bomb studies, and that further, current legislation across the world stems from the 
experience of the A-bomb survivors (Day 53, p. 6A ). In addition, the results of the 
studies have been closely scrutinised over a period of many years with international and 
national agencies assessing radiation risks and setting recommended limits of exposure on 
the basis of the research.
In the opinion of Professor Schull, the results of the Gardner study were statistically
inconsistent with the results of the A-bomb studies, in particular the study of the first
generation offspring. In concluding his evidence, Professor Schull said:
Present scientific evidence provides no firm basis for assuming that preconception 
exposure to ionising radiation will increase an individual's risk of leukaemia or 
lymphoma, and there are many reasons to believe that it would not. However, 
even if it is assumed that preconception exposure entails some risk, there are no 
specific dose-related estimates that can be used to project the chance of 
occurrence of either leukaemia or lymphoma. Indeed, the experience of children 
conceived by the survivors of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 
where the doses are better known, the sample size is much larger, and the 
surveillance has been more comprehensive, given risk estimates that do not differ 
significantly from zero. Under these circumstances it is my opinion that no
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meaningful estimate can be made (Day 53, p. 58B-C).
Under cross examination by Mr. Hytner, Professor Schuil was questioned on a number of 
areas which in the opinion of the plaintiffs highlighted shortcomings in the A-bomb studies 
including: loss of cases in the early period in the immediate aftermath of the bombings; 
disparity in lung cancer rates as between the exposed and non-exposed; problems of 
Down's syndrome frequency relative to exposure dose; the negative regression slope for 
leukaemia; the non-statistically significant increase in untoward pregnancy outcomes; 
differences in leukaemia and chromosome abnormalities rates as between Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki; apparent discrepancies between the A-bomb research and the Oxford 
Survey111 in relation to in utero leukaemias; more malformations in the low dose group 
than the high dose group; inconsistent figures in respect of stillbirths and infant mortality 
rates as between the two cities; and inaccurate absorbed dose figures and risk estimates.
Before moving onto the defendants' challenge of these issues however, it is important to 
consider the evidence of Professor Neel. Professor Neel112 (also acknowledged as one of 
the leading experts in this area) like Professor Schull was involved in initiating research into 
the effects of exposure to ionising radiation as a consequence of the dropping of the
’ 11 This showed a relationship between maternal 
X-rays and subsequent leukaemia in children.
112 In addition to being a respected geneticist,
Professor Neel also acted as consultant to the 
Radiation Effects Foundation, where as a young man 
in March 1947, he accepted the post of Acting Director 
of Field Studies under the earlier named Atomic Bomb 
Casualty Commission (ABCC). Prior to this, Professor 
Neel had been a commissioned officer assigned to the 
Medical Corps of the Manhattan Project.
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Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombs. Because of the joint collaboration of their 
research work, much of the evidence in respect of the somatic effects identified by 
Professor Schull and the genetic effects identified by Professor Neel were, for the purposes 
of the epidemiological section of the case, considered together.
Professor Neel, like Professor SchuII's, prepared three reports for the court. Outlined in 
the first report were six general propositions113 concerned with the genetic effects of 
ionising radiation. Included in the second report, were issues relating to the data 
collection in Hiroshima and Nagasaki during the past 40 years on the children of the 
survivors of the atomic bombings. In the third report, Professor Neel drew comparisons 
between the A-bomb data and the Sellafield data.
Corresponding to Professor SchuII's examination, Professor Neel was also questioned on 
the shortcomings of the A-bomb data. In addition to the methodological weaknesses of 
the research, other factors relating to the applicability of the A-bomb data to the Sellafield 
situation were also highlighted by Mr. Hytner under cross examination. In particular, Mr. 
Hytner focused his attention on four concerns. Firstly, the problem of comparing chronic 
radiation (Sellafield), as against acute radiation (the A-bomb victims). Secondly, the 
existence of possible differences in susceptibility as between the Japanese population and 
those of England and Wales. Thirdly, whether the A-bomb survivors were subject to 
comparable environmental radiation exposure, which in the case of Sellafield, provided
113 These include: universality of effect;
the scattergun nature of radiation damage and 
the teratogenic effects; the mathematics of 
radiation response; the dose rate effect; 
sensitivity to radiation; The calculation of the 
doubling dose.
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a second hit opportunity in promoting possible somatic and genetic Ieukaemogenic effects. 
Fourthly, whether there was any absence of viruses in Japan, present in Seascale, that 
could explain the inconsistency in the A-bomb/Gardner results. Also, Mr Hytner was 
keen to know why Professor Schull and Professor Neel had not addressed the issue of 
synergism in any of their written reports.
The defendants countered the plaintiffs' allegation of shortcomings in the A-bomb studies 
by submitting that the court should accept the reliability and thoroughness of the A-bomb 
research in comparison with other smaller studies examined throughout the trial. Moving 
on, the defendants maintained that the plaintiffs had not seriously challenged or damaged 
the international standing of the research, and that the plaintiffs' attempts to marginalise 
the A-bomb conclusions, in the end came down to two points. First, the loss of cases in 
the immediate aftermath of the bombings, and second, the fact that Japanese radiation 
doses had been acute whereas those at Sellafield were chronic. In respect of the first 
point, the defendants relied on the evidence of Professor Neel and Professor Schull to 
show there was absolutely no reason to believe there was any substantial loss of cases in 
the immediate aftermath of the bombings, although Professor Schull was willing to
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concede that some cases could have been lost114 in the ensuing years before 1948115 
(Day 89, p.48E).
On the second point, the defendants cited the opinion of Professor Neel and Schull, as 
well as producing statistics from various regulatory bodies to support their belief that acute 
radiation is more effective than chronic radiation. However, despite this evidence, there 
remains a general lack of consensus on this issue, leading French J. to conclude that 
chronic somatic irradiation was not more effective than acute radiation.
The other two matters raised by the plaintiffs and acknowledged by Mr. Justice French 
in his Judgement, concerned firstly, possible differences in susceptibility as between the 
Japanese populations and those of west Cumbria, and secondly, whether the A-bomb 
survivors were subject to comparable environmental radiation exposure and therefore, 
open to the possibility of a "second hit" opportunity as identified by the plaintiffs.
With regard to the first issue the defendants relied on the evidence of Professor Upton 
who had produced the international risk estimates on behalf of the ICRP. In the opinion
114 Lost in the sense of mis-diagnosis, death on impact 
or non-diagnosis of leukaemia. In addition, there 
were in the opinion of the plaintiffs, unknown numbers 
of abortions because of the shame those exposed to the 
bombings suffered. The 'hibakusha' (bombed people) were 
stigmatised as likely to produce ill, deformed or dying 
offspring. Many denied being in Hiroshima or Nagasaki
at the time of the bombings or concealed abortions, 
miscarriages or stillbirths to avoid such labelling.
115 Official monitoring of the A-bomb survivors did not 
start until five years after the bombings. Prior to 
this only informal, therefore unreliable data was 
kept by the various bodies.
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of Professor Upton, there was remarkable similarity, rather than difference between ethnic 
groups in respect of the carcinogenic effects of radiation observed in exposed populations. 
Notwithstanding the defendants' position on ethnicity, Professor Neel was willing to 
concede under cross examination by Mr. Hytner, the need for caution when extrapolating 
from one population group to another.
As far as the other factor was concerned, the defendants pointed out, there was no excess 
of leukaemia found in the offspring of survivors of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings, 
suggesting, not an absence of possible 'second hit' opportunity factors, but instead, a clear 
demonstration that leukaemia in offspring was not measurably increased by the irradiation 
of parents.
When considering the absence of viruses in Japan that may be present in Seascale, the 
defendants maintained there was no evidence to suppose the existence, or conversely the 
non-existence of viruses in one place and not the other. The only virus actually identified 
by the plaintiffs, HTLV-1, is as widespread in western Japan as it is in Britain and was 
probably present in Hiroshima and Nagasaki at the time of the bombings. In conclusion 
say the defendants, any notion of interaction between PPI and viruses is simply speculation 
on the part of the plaintiffs.
In opposing this view the plaintiffs point to four areas of dissention in respect of the A- 
bomb evidence. Firstly, the numerous methodological problems that have now come to 
light as a consequence of the trial. Secondly, the uniqueness of the Sellafield situation and 
the Gardner Study. Thirdly, the dissimilar circumstances of the exposed populations in
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respect of: radiation, dosimetry, data collection, ethnicity, culture, and socio-economic 
factors. Fourthly, the unwillingness of Professor Neel and Professor Schull to even 
consider the issue of synergism in their written reports. In conclusion say the plaintiffs, 
the A-bomb study offers no answer to the plaintiffs' case.
The next witness called on behalf of the defendants, was Professor A.C. Upton, who until 
his recent retirement in 1992, was Chairman of the Department of Environmental 
Medicine at New York University. In addition to holding this academic position however, 
Professor Upton was also Rear Admiral in the United States Public Health Service and 
Director of the National Cancer Institute. Further, Professor Upton served on the ICRP 
and was until recently, Chairman of the National Academy of Sciences-National Research 
Council, Advisory Committee on the Biological Effects of Ionising Radiation (BIER V ).
For the purposes of the trial, Professor Upton prepared two reports. The first was 
concerned with:
 the extent to which the acute lymphatic leukaemia in the case of Dorothy Reay
and the non-Hodgkin's lymphoma in the case of Vivien Jane Hope can be 
scientifically attributed to ionising radiation released from the Sellafield site (Day 
57, p. 4G).
The second report considered the probability of causation and the way in which this 
concept has been used in relation to calculating the somatic risks from radiation.
In reaching his conclusions on the types and relative risks of leukaemia and lymphomas as 
a consequence of irradiation, Professor Upton looked at a number of studies adopting a 
variety of dose-response models. Included in his report were examples of research using
223
projection models; multiplicative models and linear-quadratic dose response models as a
means of assessing risk and causation in relation to the two plaintiffs. In respect of
Dorothy Reay, Professor Upton said:
 the radiation from Sellafield discharges can be considered negligible in terms of
Dorothy Reay's overall risk of leukaemia (Day 57, p. 15F-G).
As regards the second plaintiff, Professor Upton stated:
 there was no firm evidence on which to implicate radiation as a causal factor
and therefore there is no basis scientifically for attributing Vivien Hope's lymphoma 
to radiation received from the Sellafield discharges (Day 57, p .l5 H ).
In the opinion of Professor Upton, there was no association between the development of
leukaemia or lymphoma as a consequence of heritable genetic damage and pre-conception
irradiation. In his closing paragraph, Professor Upton concluded:
Whether the cancer in either of the two cases might be in any way attributable to 
paternal occupational irradiation is entirely conjectural at present. Without 
confirmatory epidemiological and experimental data, the hypothesis proposed by 
Gardner et al (1990) must remain highly questionable (Day 57, p. 19A).
Under cross examination by Mr. Read on behalf of the plaintiffs, Professor Upton 
confirmed his background to have originated in the field of pathology rather than 
epidemiology or statistics. Challenged on his reliance of two studies116 in respect of his 
risk estimates for somatic leukaemia, Professor Upton confirmed the relatively sparse 
nature of supporting evidence in this field, and the fact that given the uncertain nature of 
existing dose-response models, particularly as regards very low levels of ionising radiation, 
there may be a need for departure from the standard risk models.
When examined on the two main studies for gauging somatic risk, Mr. Read pointed out
116 The A-bomb Life Span Study and the Ankylosing 
Spondylitis Study. Please refer to Ch.l (2).
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that there was an elevated risk for lymphomas in the case of the ankylosing spondylitis 
study and accordingly, an increased relative risk in respect of non-Hodgkin's lymphoma. 
As far as leukaemia was concerned, Professor Upton confirmed "a dramatic consistency, 
strong effects with a variety of studies" (Day 57, p. 27F).
Mr. Read then tackled Professor Upton on a number of studies117 which he referred to 
in his report as providing backing for his opinion that the Gardner hypothesis was unlikely 
to be valid. Pointing to the various methodological problems that existed in relation to 
studies, Mr. Read highlighted the fact that none of these studies actually contradicted the 
findings of Gardner, they simply failed to support the research.
When asked by Mr. Read to explain the reason for the Seascale excess, Professor Upton 
admitted that it remained something of a conundrum. Referringjto a constellation of 
causes, Professor Upton suggested parental smoking as one possible contributor to the 
Seilafield excess.
Following Professor Upton, the defendants called Brian MacMahon, Henry Pickering 
Walcott Professor of Epidemiology, Emeritus at the Harvard School of Public Health. 
Prior to Professor MacMahon giving evidence however, Mr. Rokison pointed out that 
unlike other expert witnesses, Professor MacMahon, due to ill health had been unable to 
keep up with recent developments in the case, as a consequence it was his intention to
117 Including: McLauglin (1993); Cosgrove (1993);
jablon (1991); McKinney (1991); Yoshimoto (1990); 
Hill and Laplanche (1990).
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limit his questioning, as far as possible, to clarifying matters with regard to Professor 
Macmahon's submitted reports.
For the purposes of the trial Professor MacMahon prepared three reports concerned with 
the topic of: epidemiology; relevant studies in relation to leukaemia and NHL; and 
clustering of childhood cancer around nuclear facilities.
In conclusion Professor MacMahon confirmed his opinion that:
None of the reported individual clusters of childhood leukaemia and or lymphoma 
around nuclear facilities holds up convincingly as a biologically meaningful cluster; 
with the possible exception of the cluster in Seascale, all appear to result from 
artificial boundary manipulation and/or chance. None, including that at Seascale, 
can be convincingly linked to the facility. The cases at Seascale are of unknown 
origin. The idea that these cases result from exposure to radioactive discharges 
from Sellafield is not consistent with current knowledge of the relationship 
between radiation exposure and leukaemia risk (Black, 1984; COMARE, 1986) 
(Day 58, p. 28B-C).
Although Professor Macmahon, author of the seminal text on epidemiology was seen by 
the defendants as a key witness - the American equivalent of Professor Sir Richard Doll, 
he was by this stage still convalescing, and therefore, unable to completely come to terms 
with evidence post-Howe.
The final witness called on behalf of the defendants was Professor Sir Richard Doll, 
Emeritus Professor at Oxford University, Consultant in Epidemiology to the NRPB and 
Honourary Member of the Imperial Cancer Research Fund. Professor Doll is regarded as 
one of the most eminent authorities in epidemiological research and was responsible, along 
with Sir Bradford Hill for identifying the correlation between smoking and lung cancer.
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For the purposes of the trial Professor Doll prepared five reports concerned with the 
principles, methodology, and interpretation of epidemiology. In particular, Professor Doll 
looked at causal relationships, leukaemias and occupational hazards, before considering the 
excess of childhood leukaemias around nuclear power stations specifically. In his 
evaluation of Gardner, Professor Doll considered, and analyzed a number of studies118.
Upon examination by Mr. Rokison QC on behalf of the defendants, Professor Doll
confirmed his opinion that:
In the light of all the evidence the idea that occupational exposure to ionising 
radiation was the cause of the increased incidence of leukaemia in the children of 
Sellafield workers cannot be sustained (Day 60, p.42H).
In relation to the individual cases, Professor Doll said of Vivien Hope:
None of her past history provides any reason to think her cancer was attributable 
in any way to the operation of the nuclear plant in Sellafield. First there is nothing 
to suggest that residents of Cumbria experienced any greater risk of developing any 
type of cancer than people resident elsewhere in Britain, unless they were bom in 
Seascale (Day 60 p.48C).
As far as Dorothy Reay was concerned, Professor Doll said:
An increased incidence of acute leukaemia has been observed in children bom in 
Seascale between 1955 and 1986, but there is no evidence of an increased risk 
in infants bom elsewhere in Cumbria and birth in Whitehaven per se provides no 
reason to link the development of the disease with the operation of the Sellafield 
plant (Day 60, p. 49E).
Although confirming his earlier opinion that the Gardner Report was a properly conducted 
study (Day 61, p.lOD), Professor Doll did, nonetheless identify three major flaws with
1,8 Including: Darby (1987); Cook-Mozaffari (1987);
Shu (1988); Yoshimoto (1988); Buckley (1989); Mole 
(1990); Draper (1991); Urquhart (1991); Michaelis
(1992); McLaughlin (1993); Roman II (1993); Kinlen
(1993).
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regard to Gardner's methodology. The first concerned the number of hypotheses tested 
by Gardner, which, in the opinion of Professor Doll amounted to several. The second, 
concerned Gardner's lack of recognition as regards sub-group analysis in the presentation 
of his results, the third related to the inclusion of the Bristol case discussed earlier on in 
the trial.
With regard to the first point, Mr. Hytner QC on behalf of the plaintiffs, asked Professor 
Doll whether the number of hypotheses were particularly important as a criticism of 
Gardner. Replying, Professor Doll explained, the number of hypotheses were only 
significant in relation to the interpretation of the P value. While not crucial therefore, he 
did regard it as something that needed to be bome in mind when considering whether the 
results were a chance finding or not.
Moving on to the second point, Professor Doll made it clear that he thought his criticism
regarding sub-group analyses to be a far more serious flaw in the study. Under earlier
examination by Mr. Rokison on behalf of the defendants, Professor Doll had stated:
What I lay more store on really is the concentration on cases bom in and 
diagnosed in Seascale rather than an examination of all the Seascale cluster and 
although there is no way of proving this, and indeed I think Dr. Inskip has denied 
it, it does seem to me that there is a possibility that this report was focused on the 
particular small group on which it was focused because of the findings as they were 
doing the study. To me a more natural study would have been one that took in 
all the cases that were reported in the Seascale cluster (Day 60, p. 29H -30A)
At this stage of the proceedings, the defendants' counsel did not seek clarification of the 
implication behind Professor Doll's allegation, relying instead on Mr. Rokison to point out 
to Professor Doll:
To be fair, and you may be aware of that, this was in a sense only regarded
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as the first stage of the study and I think the intention remains to complete 
the study by looking at all cases that were diagnosed in west Cumbria as 
recommended by Black (Day 60, p.30 A-B).
Under cross examination by Mr. Hytner however, clarification of Professor Doll's words
was sought. Having confirmed that Professor Doll was referring to the case-control study,
Mr. Hytner went to ask:
What you are suggesting there is that as they were doing the case control study, 
because of the findings in that study and the findings that were coming out of the 
study they began to focus on the Seascale births because they thought that would 
produce the more significant result. Is that your suggestion? (Day 61, p .l2H -  
13A).
In an attempt to avoid any misunderstanding Mr. Hytner reiterated his question:
Again, so that there can be absolutely no doubt and to avoid any 
misunderstanding, this is not a suggestion really but it is an allegation of fact. Your 
allegation or suggestion or imputation is not that they exercised judgement in some 
way which you disagree with but that factually they made this decision to focus on 
births in west Cumbria after they knew the details of dose?_
(Day 61, p,14D).
Repeating the question for a third time, Mr. Hytner said:
Sir Richard, the allegation which you say has been denied by Hazel Inskip was not 
simply that they focused on births and diagnosis in west Cumbria because that has 
not only been admitted, if you like to use the word, but asserted positively and 
explained by Professor Gardner and Dr. Inskip. What is said which she denied, and 
that which you have said again in the witness box today, is that they focused on 
births and diagnosis in west Cumbria as a result of the information that was coming 
to them from the case-control study, including dose? (Day 61, p. 14E-F).
The allegation that Professor Doll appeared to be making related to Professor Gardner's 
decision to concentrate solely on those bom and diagnosed with leukaemias and 
lymphomas in Seascale, west Cumbria, as against all those bom with cancer in Cumbria 
as a whole. Gardner had stated in his study that he had taken this decision as a 
consequence of his research in 1987, which showed that those bom in the area were at
229
particular risk. Professor Doll seemed to be suggesting that the Gardner team had 
knowledge of additional information and dose data before making the decision to 
concentrate solely on those bom and diagnosed in west Cumbria, the implication being 
that Gardner had deliberately set the parameters of his own study to ensure that the 
results were as strong as possible. In other words, the Gardner Study, five years work, 
was meaningless. Professor Gardner had not only misrepresented but also manipulated 
his own results.
This attempt by Professor Doll to discredit the professional reputation and standing of 
Professor Gardner, particularly in light of his recent early death from lung cancer, seemed 
to the plaintiffs quite extraordinary. Professor Gardner was after all one of the country's 
most highly regarded and respected epidemiologists, he was viewed by his colleagues and 
other epidemiologists as a man of honesty and integrity and was the first epidemiologist 
in this country to be awarded the prestigious Bradford Hill medal, given posthumously by 
the Royal Statistical Society for Professor Gardner's "outstanding contributions to the 
application of medical statistics, especially in the study of occupational and environmental 
hazards, and for the excellence of his expository writing on the use of statistics in medical 
research" (The Royal Statistical Society 1994:5).
To avoid any misunderstanding of the serious nature of this allegation therefore, Mr 
Hytner again asked Professor Doll whether he fully appreciated the factual criticism he was 
making of Professor Gardner. It was at this point of the trial however, that Professor Doll's 
allegation was to prove all the more revealing in light of further cross examination by Mr.
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Hytner with regard to Professor Gardner's statement119.
This statement, dated 13th November 1992 was taken under oath at Professor Gardner's
home, at a time, when he was terminally ill. The statement, required by the plaintiffs had
been made in response to similar, earlier criticisms, identified by Dr. Macrae on behalf of
the defendants120. O f particular importance to Professor Doll's allegation, was the
second point raised by Professor Gardner, this concerned the exclusion of leukaemia and
lymphomas cases bom outside west Cumbria, the statement stated:
The case-control study was planned during the mid 1980s with the aim of 
including all children diagnosed with leukaemia or lymphoma in west Cumbria. 
The results of the Seascale birth and schools cohort studies reported in 1987  
showed that the risk appeared to be confined to children bom there and so these 
cases were of primary interest. The published analysis, therefore, focused on those 
both bom and diagnosed in west Cumbria. It has always been the intention to 
present findings for the six cases of leukaemia and eight cases of lymphoma bom 
elsewhere. These cases, however, are more relevant to the assessment of such 
factors as X-rays or mother's age than to the Sellafield geographical and 
occupational environment before birth or at a young age (Day 13, p.9E-G).
In addition to Professor Gardner's statement, Dr. Inskip had also prepared a confirmatory
declaration which asserted:
Although not included in the first analysis, it is still the intention to examine those 
cases bom outside west Cumbria. The main reason for excluding them from the 
published paper was that the risk appeared to be confined to those bom in the area 
(Day 13, p. 7E).
119 This statement was given under the terms of
the Civil Evidence Act as a consequence of Professor 
Gardner's illness. The statement was made under oath 
to Mr. L.L. Blake, Treasury Solicitor.
120 For a wider discussion of Professor Macrae's 
criticisms and Professor Gardner's response 
(dictated statement served under the Civil 
Evidence Act), see p. 193-195 of this section.
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When asked by Mr. Hytner whether Professor Doll appreciated that the factual criticism 
he was making had been denied by both Professor Gardner and Dr. Inskip, Professor Doll 
admitted he had not in fact read Professor Gardner's statement, although, he did confirm 
seeing the statement by Dr. Inskip. The plaintiffs' legal team, astonished by this 
revelation, referred Professor Doll to the relevant section in his bundle of documents. 
Professor Doll was then asked by Mr. Hytner if he wanted time to read Professor 
Gardner's entire statement in order to put the matter in context. Agreeing to this 
suggestion, Mr. Justice French adjourned the hearing for twenty minutes to allow Professor 
Doll time to read Professor Gardner's statement.
Upon returning to the witness box, Mr. Hytner asked Professor Doll whether he wished 
to maintain or withdraw his criticism of Professor Gardner. Professor Doll confirmed his 
wish to maintain his position.
In order to avoid any possible misunderstanding, and also, to clarify Professor Doll's 
position with regard to this allegation, Mr. Hytner cited two examples of separate 
situations:
Situation No. 1.
The epidemiological group decide, without knowledge of exposure risks or doses, to 
concentrate on cases bom in and diagnosed in west Cumbria. They do a study on that 
group and publish the findings of that study.
Situation No. 2.
...they do the same thing but, before making the switch, they know the dose records and 
exposure risks of the cases (Day 61,p.22D).
Mr Hytner then asked Professor Doll which situation applied to Professor Gardner.
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Confirming there would be no criticism in respect of the methodological approach 
adopted in situation one, Professor Doll cited situation two as the most relevant with 
regard to Professor Gardner.
Alluding to earlier observations Professor Doll had made of the Gardner study121, Mr.
Hytner referred Professor Doll to relevant passages in his correspondence with Dr. Berry:
I have at last found time to study Martin Gardner's articles with the attention they 
deserve - and, frankly, I found them very good (Day 61, p. 2 7 D)
Later in the correspondence and, notwithstanding initial concerns expressed by Professor
Doll over multiple hypotheses and weakness of conclusions, Mr. Hytner pointed out that
Professor Doll had decided that these concerns:
 turned out to be irrelevant in respect of the major finding
(Day 61, p. 27D-E).
In conclusion, Professor Doll stated:
In summary, I have no methodological reasons for doubting the validity of the 
radiation findings. They are, however, both statistically weak because of the small 
numbers and biologically surprising. I assess the results as good grounds for 
formulating a hypothesis that has to be tested by other data (Day 61, p.27H).
When asked by Mr. Hytner how he reconciled this view of the Gardner study, with the
hardened one he now adopted, Professor Doll replied, that his view had only hardened
on the basis of further information.
A t times, throughout his cross examination with Mr. Hytner, Professor Doll appeared to 
become confused and uncertain of exactly what he was saying. Perhaps, because of
121 These observations were made in a letter to 
Dr. Berry.
233
Professor Sir Richard Doll's international standing and reputation, the allegation made 
against his colleague seems all the more serious. Not only did Professor Doll make the 
allegation in the first place, but he compounded the accusation by initially not reading, 
and then, rejecting Professor Gardner's statement, given under oath, weeks before his 
death. Intentional or not, this attack was made in the knowledge that Professor Gardner 
could not personally refute the allegation, and also, that any charge of this nature would 
impact heavily on Professor Gardner's professional integrity and competence. 
Interestingly, prior to Professor Gardner's death, Professor Doll had a period of two years 
in which he could have challenged him on his findings, it seems surprising therefore that 
such an accusation could have been made, so soon after Professor Gardner's death, in 
open court.
Colleagues working with Professor Gardner were in no doubt that the written statement, 
read on Professor Gardner's behalf, did not have the weight or impact of a personal court 
appearance. Nonetheless, despite this view, associates felt duty bound not to ally 
themselves with one side or the other. Appearing in court on behalf of the plaintiffs 
could not only compromise MRC's neutrality and independence, it could also put at risk 
future research funding. In considering the ethical and moral conflict facing 
epidemiologists, and the authors of the Gardner study in particular, Nilstun and Inskip 
believe:
 that to have maintained independence in this particular case was ethically
justified. However, if not only the Plaintiffs, but also the workers at nuclear plants 
would have benefited substantially, our analysis would lead us to the conclusion 
that the epidemiologists should have served as expert witnesses (Nilstun and Inskip 
1996:127).
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In addition to the attack on Professor Gardner however, it should not be forgotten that 
Professor Doll also cast aspersions on the honesty and integrity of Dr Inskip herself. In 
rejecting her confirmatory statement, Professor Doll was by implication suggesting that Dr. 
Inskip had deliberately misled the Court, an opinion he later qualified and finally retracted.
In his Closing Submission on behalf of the plaintiffs. Mr. Hytner said that this episode had
been a painful one, he went on to say that:
Our case is that Professor Doll never really intended to make this allegation at all. 
Our case is that it was a statement he made under examination-in-chief, that it was 
a rash comment, that he said it at a time during evidence when he himself was 
confessed to being confused during the course of his evidence. Your Lordship will 
remember that he also made a suggestion against Dr. Inskip, which he retracted - 
he plainly didn't intend to make it. Indeed it was odd if your Lordship is 
considering the whole of the circumstances of how this statement came to be 
made. My Lord, we recall Mr. Rokison in re-examination, when he brought 
Professor Doll back to the comment on Dr. Inskip, saying, "Well you brought it on 
yourself," which seemed to suggest that it was something he had said which was 
contrary to something else he had said.
My Lord, what we then say is that when brought face to face with what he had 
said, he was, like so many witnesses in the witness box, under pressure, reluctant 
to admit he had made a mistake (Day 89, p.26B-D).
Summarized below are eight of Bradford Hill's criteria identified by Mr. Justice French 
in his ruling, as representative of the plaintiffs' and defendants' epidemiological evidence:
(i) STRENGTH OF ASSOCIATION
Plaintiffs
The Gardner study demonstrates a significant association between the excess of leukaemias 
around Sellafield and PPI; the data on which Gardner based his findings when re-analyzed 
with additional data continue to support that association (Judgement, p. 3 IF).
The strength of association is therefore established.
235
Defendants
The Defendants submit that as a consequence of adjustments needed for multiple 
hypotheses and second, the sub-group analysis identified by Professor Doll, the criterion 
of strength of association could not be regarded as having been satisfied.
(ii) CONSISTENCY
Plaintiffs
The Plaintiffs identified two areas of consistency, the first, the operation of a genetic 
element in leukaemia, the second, consistency with other studies. On the first point, both 
Professor Schull and Professor Doll on behalf of the defendants conceded the existence 
of a genetic component in certain leukaemias. On the second point, the Plaintiffs, while 
acknowledging the variety of opinion as regards consistency for Gardner, highlighted the 
unique nature of the Gardner Study, in particular, an unusually extensive high socio­
economic group in the population; considerable rural isolation, and high atmospheric 
discharges of radioactive material from Sellafield. In the opinion of the Plaintiffs there was 
no study, at the present time that could compare with Gardner. Citing studies 
(McLaughlin (Ontario 1992), Parker/Wakeford (west Cumbria 1993), Roman II 1993) 
in support of the Gardner hypothesis, they state that the A-bomb study is not sufficiently 
reliable nor the conditions sufficiently similar for the data to be applied to Sellafield.
Defendants
The Defendants contend that all the evidence points to the conclusion that this criterion 
was satisfied neither in relation to the Gardner hypothesis of causal association between 
PPI and leukaemia/NHL, nor in relation to the hypothesis of synergism or interaction 
between PPI and some unidentified further "factor X"
(Judgment, p.43E-F).
(Hi) EXISTENCE OF A  DOSE/RESPONSE RELATIONSHIP 
(Biological Gradient)
Plaintiffs
The strength of association is established. The 'point estimate' of the risk is indicative of 
a true causal relationship. If the dose repones and PPI are not the cause of the excess 
then, whatever the cause, it must mimic the dose-response relationship. This 
consideration makes anything other than an occupational exposure closely related to dose 
very unlikely.
Defendants
On the latest analysis carried out with reference to the agreed figures, there is no 
biological gradient or relevant dose response relationship apparent whether one has regard 
to the total or to the six month doses. On the contrary, any positive association is limited 
to the few cases in the highest dose category with no evidence of any increase relative risk 
in relation to total doses of less than 100 mSv (Judgment, p.46F-H).
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(iv) ANALOGY
Plaintiffs
While not of crucial importance, Analogy does provide supporting evidence for the 
Gardner hypothesis. Professor Savitz dealt with relevant research on chemicals and the 
key features of his evidence lay in identifying trends, confirmed by recent studies, that 
certain forms of paternal exposure to occupational factors (in particular chemical 
exposures) may cause cancers including leukaemias in offspring.
Defendants
Nobody has placed very much reliance on Analogy. Dr. Savitz himself introduced 
reservations as to what analogous studies actually showed. No study shows a clear 
association (Rokison, Closing Submission, Day 87, p.60G).
(v) SPECIFICITY
Plaintiffs
Though this criterion is of little assistance because it cannot be proven categorically that 
radiation causes a specific disease, research on the incidence of NHL and a variety of 
leukaemias does support the Gardner hypothesis that the scattergun effect of radiation can 
produce a variety of leukaemias somatically. Data for Seascale reflects this variety of 
leukaemias.
Defendants
The Defendants maintain that the Plaintiffs' case in relation to specificity is odd. On the 
one hand, the plaintiffs recognise the criterion to be of little assistance, on the other, 
instead of complying with the demands of Specificity and attempting to identify specific 
diseases caused by radiation, the Plaintiffs reverse the requirement for specificity and 
counter with the scattergun effect of radiation. In so doing the plaintiffs are 
acknowledging that specificity cannot be established.
(vi) TEMPORAL ASSOCIATION
Plaintiffs
The Plaintiffs submit that there can be no dispute that this requirement is satisfied, since 
exposure preceded disease.
Defendants
Temporal association is generally taken to mean simply that the postulated cause must 
precede the postulated event which it causes and that is a necessary prerequisite and 
everybody agrees that is satisfied (Rokison, Closing Submission, Day 87, p.61E).
(yii) EXPERIMENT
Plaintiffs
Not relevant to this case.
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Defendants
It was not suggested that there was any experimental or semi-experimental data which had 
any relevance to the Gardner hypothesis or to the plaintiffs' synergy theory.
(vm) BIOLOGICAL PLAUSIBILITY
Plaintiffs
The Plaintiffs submit that the evidence received from the epidemiologists (before hearing 
the genetic evidence) to be unanimous, namely that far from being implausible, the 
germline mechanism for radiation-induced leukaemia had been demonstrated 
(Judgment, p.34B).
Defendants
The Defendants do not contend that the Gardner hypothesis, with or without the alleged 
synergism or interaction with an unidentified factor X, is biologically impossible in the 
sense that a germline mutation may, in a rare case lead to the development of leukaemias 
in offspring. They do, however, contend that it is completely implausible as an 
explanation of the Seascale cluster, in that the relative risk is quantitatively quite out of 
line with human experience and is inconsistent with the results of the A-bomb data 
(Judgment, p.47D-F).
The final section of Chapter Four is concerned with genetics and the mechanism that 
explains how a mutation can be transferred to the next generation, and also, how it can 
do so at sufficient frequency to account for the Seascale excess.
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4.5 The Genetics
Although the plaintiffs' case remained one of epidemiology, they nonetheless called 
experts to demonstrate the plausibility of a biological mechanism which could firstly, 
explain how the mutation could be transferred through the paternal germline and 
secondly, account for the scale of the Seascale excess.
In their interim submission on this subject, the plaintiffs contend that where, as with the 
Gardner study, the epidemiology is strong, the evidence could only be displaced by a clear 
demonstration that the causal relationship which they assert is untenable. As knowledge 
of the causes of cancer are still far from complete, plausibility of a genetic component is, 
say the plaintiffs, quite impossible to disprove. While not suggesting any formal shift of 
the burden of proof, the plaintiffs submit that ultimately the defendants will have to 
concede to the existence of a biological mechanism. Therefore as Mr. Justice French 
pointed out122, what effectively separates the two parties has less to do with the 
plausibility of a biological mechanism and more to do with whether the biological 
mechanism could explain the excess of leukaemia and lymphomas around the Sellafield 
plant.
Prior to calling the first witness on the sixty third day of the trial however, Mr. Hytner 
drew the court's attention to some procedural matters that had arisen in the interim. O f 
particular concern at this stage of the proceedings was the attendance of Professor T. 
Nomura on behalf of the plaintiffs.
122 judgment p. 126.
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Professor Nomura, Chairman of the Department of Radiation Biology, Faculty of 
Medicine, Osaka University, japan, had over a period of thirty years, focused his research 
almost exclusively on in-utero and transgeneration carcinogenesis, teratogenesis and 
mutagenesis.
Professor Nomura's research concentrated on analysing the genetic impact of exposure 
to various mutagens and carcinogens, including radiation in the offspring of mice. In 
reaching his conclusion that parental exposure to ionising radiation could significantly 
increase the incidence of tumours in offspring, he believed his work clearly demonstrated 
the plausibility of a genetic mechanism which could predispose children to cancer as a 
result off radiation-induced mutations in their fathers' germ cells.
Acknowledging that such effects had not been detected in the offspring of atomic bomb 
survivors, Professor Nomura suggested three possible causes for the apparent discrepancy 
which he identified as: "different germ cell susceptibility to leukaemia-causing mutations 
in Japanese and English people; different germ cell stages exposed in the two populations; 
and different postnatal tumour promoting environments" (Nomura, 1990:671). 
Believing his work could reconcile the differences between the A-bomb and Sellafield 
population studies, Professor Nomura stated his view that the Gardner study demonstrated 
in humans, what his experiments had shown in mice. Thus, the Gardner study accorded 
with his own findings that it was possible for leukaemia and other cancers to be induced 
genetically by the irradiation of the fathers' sperm/spermatogonia123.
123 Male seeds and immature male germ cells.
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As far as Professor Nomura's testimony was concerned however, Mr. Hytner identified 
two problems that had arisen in respect of Professor Nomura's attendance at court. 
Firstly, he had received notification (confirmed by fax on Day 63) that as a Government 
employee, Professor Nomura was not permitted to take time off work to give evidence. 
Secondly, acknowledging receipt of a subsequent fax, Mr. Hytner drew the court's 
attention to a medical certificate indicating that Professor Nomura was unwell and 
therefore unable to travel. According to the certificate, recovery was not expected for 
several months.
In view of Professor Nomura's non-attendance at court, Mr. Hytner proposed submitting 
his testimony under the Civil Evidence Act124. Aware that Professor Nomura's 
evidence would carry far less weight than if he was able to attend in person, Mr. Hytner 
declared his intention of relying on other witnesses, called on behalf of the plaintiffs, to 
comment on Professor Nomura's findings.
The Plaintiffs' Expert Witnesses
The first witness called by the plaintiffs was Professor M.F. Greaves, Director of the 
Leukaemia Research Fund Centre at the Institute of Cancer Research. For the purposes 
of the litigation, Professor Greaves prepared four reports concerned with: the nature of 
leukaemias and NHLs and the mutations involved in them; the inheritance of leukaemias 
and NHLs; the aetiology of leukaemia and NHL; and the aetiology of the diseases of the
124 Professor Nomura's evidence was formally 
submitted to the court on 4th May 1993 
(Day 75 of the trial), when Dr. Cox (NRPB) 
was giving evidence on behalf of the 
plaintiffs (Day 75, p.5E-F).
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two Plaintiffs.
Throughout his examination by Mr. Hytner, Professor Greaves maintained his opinion as 
a biologist, that the pathological division between leukaemia and NHL was blurred; a 
situation which occurs where there is considerable overlap between two categories of 
blood cell cancers. Further, recent work carried out by Professor Greaves and others in 
the 1980s, purported the now accepted view, that lymphomas can in fact evolve into 
leukaemias, thus supporting Professor Greaves' opinion that they can be part of the same 
disease.
Moving on to the mutations that are involved in leukaemias and NHLs, Professor Greaves 
corroborated the consensus view that disorders arise from a single cell and therefore result 
in monoclonal125 diseases. When considering the gene mutation^ involved in cancer, 
Professor Greaves explained that gene mutations may be the result of complete or partial 
deletion of a gene, extra copies of a gene, rearrangement of genes or other mechanisms 
leading to gene mutations.
With regard to the inheritance of leukaemia and NHL, Professor Greaves affirmed his
125 Monoclonal means that only the daughter cell of the 
mutated cell is defective. The daughter cells 
of other stem cells remain directly unaffected by 
the mutation, although indirectly the normal 
functioning of other cells may be upset. In contrast 
to monoclonal diseases are multiclonal diseases such 
as parasitic and bacterial infections where multiple 
cells are affected.
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belief that both leukaemia and NHL could arise somatically and be inherited. Citing 
examples such as Bloom's Syndrome126; Ataxia Telangiectasia127; Duncan's 
Syndrome128 and Li Fraumeni Syndrome129, Professor Greaves suggested that Li 
Fraumeni syndrome provided the clearest example of a mutant gene that could both 
predispose and give rise to leukaemia in the offspring of those inheriting the mutation. 
Referring to studies130 that observed a familial pattern of inheritance, Professor Greaves 
agreed with Mr. Hytner that a number of those reports identified two possible 
interpretations of the evidence as being: "inheritance and/or some common exposure 
within a household" (Greaves Day 63, 35B).
Following on from inheritance, Mr. Hytner asked Professor Greaves about gene-mouse 
experimentation, in particular whether genes that had been implanted into a mouse (a
126 Bloom's syndrome is thought to be caused by 
a mutated gene which results in a defect
in the protein that connects DNA.
127 Ataxia telangiectasia is thought to be caused by 
a mutated gene (as yet unknown), that is linked 
to a protein function in the embryo.
128 Duncan's syndrome is caused by a defect in the immune 
system which has the effect of predisposing the person 
to variety of tumours including lymphomas.
129 Li Fraumeni Syndrome is a familial syndrome
in which a number of cancers appear at increased 
frequency. The particular gene involved is 
the p53 gene. The loss or deletion of this 
tumour suppressor gene or anti-oncogene may 
give rise to leukaemia or other cancers as 
its function is to control dividing and growth.
130 Studies include: Nomura (1986); Draper (1989); 
Narod et al. (1991); Yoshimoto et al. (1991); 
Kaye et al. (1991); Felix (1992).
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transgenic mouse) would, once inserted into the germline as a dominant oncogene131 
(in this case one involving human leukaemia) result in offspring becoming susceptible to 
leukaemia and lymphoma. In response, Professor Greaves affirmed that "those mice bom 
of that fertilised egg and their subsequent offspring can be very susceptible to leukaemia 
and lymphoma" (Greaves: Day 63, p. 35E). Professor Greaves went on to say that both 
dominant oncogenes and suppressor anti-oncogenes had been successfully used in such 
experiments.
When asked whether he had conducted any such experiments himself, Professor Greaves 
confirmed that he had been involved in one set of experiments with one particular gene 
in transgenesis, and that there were perhaps ten to twenty laboratories worldwide involved 
in similar research.
Before moving on to the aetiology of leukaemias and NHLs, Mr. Hytner wondered 
whether Professor Greaves had reached any firm conclusions about the Seascale excess 
prior to the publication of the Gardner study. Responding that he had suggested (not 
concluded) in a letter to the Lancet Medical Journal that "paternal mutations should be 
considered as an important possible contributor" to the leukaemia excess (Greaves: Day 
63, p.38C-D), Professor Greaves agreed that prior to publication of the Gardner study, 
he had recognised the plausibility of a biological mechanism.
In respect of the aetiology of leukaemias and NHLs, Professor Greaves acknowledged
131 A  dominant oncogene is a gene which encourages 
dividing activity and leads to uncontrolled 
growth.
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various suggested causes of the two diseases including: radiation, the HTLV-1 and 
EBV132 viruses, chemicals, socio-economic factors, drugs and electro-magnetic fields. 
In the opinion of Professor Greaves, the virus theory, in particular the Kinlen 
hypothesis133 that childhood leukaemia may be due to an abnormal and/or rare 
response to a common infection had some validity. However, Professor Greaves made 
it clear that he parted company with Professor Kinlen over the particular virus responsible. 
According to Professor Greaves, it could be any one of a number of viruses, known or 
unknown, or it could be bacteria. Further, he did not accept that viruses working on their 
own could account for the level of the excess found at Sellafield.
With regard to the relevance of socio-economic factors, again Professor Kinlen and 
Professor Greaves arrived at different, although not dissimilar conclusions on the basis of 
their research. In contrast to Professor Kinlen's United Kingdom located studies which 
looked at the operation of a viral mechanism in high socio-economic rural communities, 
Professor Greaves investigated different ethnic and geographical communities across the 
world. On the basis of his observations he concluded, that with socio-economic 
development, there was an elevated risk of childhood leukaemia, and the risk was an 
increased risk of the order of a ten-fold increase. Linked to infection and patterns of 
exposure to viruses therefore, were environmental factors related to: hygiene, smaller
132 The Epstein Barr (EBV) virus has been particularly 
associated with part of the causal mechanism (along with 
malaria as a crucial co-factor) in Burkitt's lymphoma in 
Africa. More recently EBV has also been implicated with 
non-Hodgkin's lymphoma.
133 See Ch.4(4) for a wider discussion of the Kinlen 
hypothesis.
245
family size, occupancy of houses and lower population density impacting with other 
factors.
Moving on to the aetiology of leukaemias in relation to synergy between radiation and 
viruses, Professor Greaves said he endorsed what most biologists would have predicted, 
synergy is a powerful factor in both human and animal cancer. Referring to the work of 
Dr. Bems in Holland, Professor Greaves explained that Dr. Berns had carried out 
synergistic experiments with inherited genes and other agents (chemicals, viruses) to 
establish whether this combination would produce a greatly increased rate of leukaemia 
and lymphoma. As a consequence of such experimentation, synergy between inherited 
genes/chemicals and inherited genes/viruses translated into a 20-fold increase.
Asked to explain the apparent absence of any observed synergistic effects in Japan 
between the A-bomb and other factors such as viruses, Professor Greaves said that in 
contrast to the defendants' experts (Professor Schull and Professor Kinlen), he had no 
knowledge of the prevalence of the HTLV-1 virus134 in Japan prior to 1961. In any 
event, he rejected any notion that there was one definitive virus responsible for childhood 
leukaemia, or the view that all viruses acted in the same way. Whatever the underlying 
reason, it was Professor Greaves' conviction that a vital component of synergy was 
missing.
134 Professor Greaves also argued that only a small
number of people who are infected with HTLV-1 actually 
develop the disease. The Japanese estimate suggest 
one in one thousand. Therefore only a small number 
of cases of leukaemia due to HTLV-1 virus would 
be evident over the subsequent 50 years in Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki.
246
Citing the findings of the Gardner study and the conclusions of the Parker/Wakeford study 
in support of his opinion that some additional factor, other than paternal mutations was 
present at Seascale, Professor Greaves provided two specific examples of synergy - the 
papilloma virus and bracken135 in relation to animals, and environmental radiation in 
relation to humans.
Acknowledging the fact that evidence had already been given in respect of environmental 
radiation being associated with, and/or causing a percentage of childhood leukaemias, 
Professor Greaves declared that although he preferred the virus option, he had no quarrel 
with the view that synergy combined with PPI could in principle account for the 
Seascale excess.
Following Professor Greaves, the plaintiffs called Professor D.H. Wright, Chair of 
Pathology at Southampton Hospital. For the purposes of the court, Professor Wright 
prepared two reports in which he considered the heterogeneity of leukaemia sub-types and 
known causes of leukaemia and NHL.
In respect of the first point, Professor Wright stated that in his opinion both leukaemia and 
NHL were derived from immature cells of the lymphoid system, and therefore had 
common aetiologies. Referring to his experience as a clinician and pathologist, Professor 
Wright agreed there were certain lymphomas and leukaemias where the dividing line was
135 'Papilloma bovine virus' and 'bracken fern' are 
the subject of a study carried by Dr. Ruth jarrett 
which brought together biological and epidemiological 
studies to show that a combination of exposures to 
bracken and the virus accounted for the high 
frequency of cancer in cattle.
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so narrow as to be almost indistinguishable. Elaborating on the similarity, Professor Wright 
cited the example of a patient who enters one door of a hospital and has a lymph node 
biopsy done and is diagnosed with a lymphoma. The following day, the same patient 
enters the identical hospital by another door, and has a blood count and marrow 
examination done, on the second occasion, the patient is diagnosed with leukaemia.
With regard to the causes of leukaemia, Professor Wright said he concurred with the view 
of Professor Greaves and others, that inherited gene line mutation could give rise to 
different types of cancer. However, Professor Wright also pointed out, in the case of an 
inherited gene mutation which was present in every living cell, that the resulting disease, 
be it leukaemia or lymphoma was dependent upon the nature of the co-factor (whether 
it be viruses, PPI, or chemicals) as well as the number of hits (first, second, third) acting 
in synergy with the mutation.
The next witness called by the plaintiffs was Professor J.C. Neil, Chair of Veterinary 
Pathology, University of Glasgow. Professor Neil had since 1974 been involved in the 
study of retroviruses136 and was widely regarded in the field of virology.
According to Professor Neil, it was possible for cancer-inducing viruses to invade the 
nucleus of the cell in two ways. In the first instance, the virus could integrate into the 
host D N A 137 directly with the result that the gene may become inactivated and/or
136 A  retroviruses is a subdivision of viruses.
137 The nucleus of every cell contain a molecule of acid, 
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA).
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damaged, impairing or abolishing its function. Alternatively, a virus could indirectly affect 
the DNA by altering the expression of a cellular gene by virtue of the information which 
the vims brought in. Therefore without integrating into the DNA directly, the vims 
could replicate the DNA and affect the proliferation of the ceil. Also, again indirectly, 
the vims could affect other cells which do not contain the vims, causing them too to 
proliferate.
Under examination by Mr. Hytner, Professor Neil affirmed the existence of a wide 
diversity of viral agents known to be associated with cancers in animal and man. Professor 
Neil confirmed that by far the largest, most diverse, and best known group were 
retrovimses, which had been implicated with cancers, particularly leukaemia since 1908.
As far as vimses/retrovimses are concerned they may be endogenous138 or 
exogenous139, the latter being regarded as unstable and potentially cancer-inducing. 
When asked by Mr. Hytner which explicit vimses had been implicated in human 
populations, Professor Neil cited EBV (an exogenous vims), HTLV-1 and H IV 140 (two
138 An endogenous virus/retrovirus is one that is inherited 
in the germiine. According to Professor Neil they are 
regarded as very stable elements in DNA and are not 
thought to be harmful or cause any known diseases.
139 Exogenous viruses/retroviruses have an external 
origin and are implicated in the spread of 
infections involved with cancer.
140 B cell lymphomas are relatively common in AIDS 
patients so it would appear that HIV may directly 
promote tumours. Indirectly however, because the 
viral genome is not generally found in the tumour ceil, 
this suggests one of two possibilities. The first 
mechanism said Professor Neil, is through impairment 
of the host's immune system. The second, by the virus 
affecting the B cells and causing them to proliferate.
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exogenous retroviruses). However, he also said that in his opinion, it was unlikely that 
these were the only viruses/retroviruses implicated in human cancer.
Developing this point further Professor Neil went on to say:
The acceleration phenomenon appears to depend on the capacity of the virus to 
activate cellular genes which act synergistically with the inherited oncogene to 
reveal the fully malignant phenotype (Day 69, p.20B).
Notwithstanding the fact that human viruses are efficient carcinogens in their own right, 
they nonetheless all require co-factors141, acting in synergy in order to be effective, to 
date, there have been no human cases142 of a virus operating on its own.
Later, when asked under cross-examination about the relevance of co-factors in relation 
to leukaemia and NHL, Professor Neil reiterated the conclusions of his report, that in his 
judgment:
 it is quite conceivable that a virus could interact with preconception paternal
exposure to radiation to induce leukaemia and lymphomas of diverse types (Day 
70, p.32H).
Following Professor Neil, the plaintiffs called another three genetic experts143 to
141 Such as chemicals, drugs, irradiation, socio­
economic factors.
142 Professor Neil did express the view that a 
feline leukaemia virus might be able to act on 
its own in respect of cats. However, this is
a particularly potent virus which often results 
in the death of the host.
143 Professor Meuth; Dr. Thacker; Dr. Cox.
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demonstrate to the court firstly, how little is actually known about the mutation rates of 
complex illnesses such as cancer. Secondly, to identify various mechanisms recently 
implicated in the onset of tumours. Thirdly to show how problematic it is to rely on 
conventional genetics when analysing the plausibility of the Gardner hypothesis.
The first expert, Professor M . Meuth, Chair of Radiology, Head of Experimental 
Oncology, University of Utah, described his area of interest as genome instability and 
oncology, specifically, the role of unstable regions of DN A 144 in cancer. Professor 
Meuth's primary aim therefore, was to understand the "chromosomal rearrangements 
between mutations that occur particularly in tumour cells and ultimately to define the 
mechanism underlying their formation" (Day 71, p.4A).
Agreeing with Mr. Hytner that his interest in the genetic effects of radiation developed 
as a consequence of the now widely accepted view of the seriously disruptive effects of 
radiation on chromosome structure, Professor Meuth confirmed:
These research interests have led me and my collaborators to make comprehensive
144 These are sequences of DNA which have a high 
frequency of breakage and are prone to re­
arrange or change their orientation. These 
may include structures such a 'telomores' (TLRs are 
ends of chromosomes), or, 'fragile sites' known as 
transposons (of which there are large numbers in the 
genomes of all mammalian cells). Because of 
their chromosomal locations damage is more 
likely.
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analyses of the molecular basis of spontaneous145 and radiation induced 
mutations in model cell culture systems (ie experimental systems using animal cells) 
(Meuth Day 71, p. 7F).
Having established Professor Meuth's main area of interest, Mr. Hytner proceeded to 
question Professor Meuth on the estimated number of 'radiation induced' mutations that 
occur. Commenting that it was difficult to provide exact numbers, Professor Meuth did 
confirm that 'some' mutations were believed to be due to environmental radiation, while 
others were known to result from deamination146 (chemical processes).
Moving on to experimentation, Professor Meuth affirmed his belief that radiation does 
increase mutations. Referring to his experiments with hamster cells in which he compared 
the frequency of mutations induced by gamma radiation with those that occur 
spontaneously147, Professor Meuth said he discovered significant differences between 
the spontaneous and radiation induced mutations. One particularly unusual type of 
mutation, discovered after irradiation, was the multiple mutations found in localised 
regions of the affected gene which could, as a consequence of a defective repair 
mechanism lead to "double strand breaks in the DNA, and subsequently either to the
145 Spontaneous has two meanings in this context.
Firstly, as something which occurs within the cell 
without any outside influences. Secondly, as something 
that occurs due to causes. Recently the term 'spontaneous 
mutation' has been used where environmental agents have 
impacted on cellular processes and cellular metabolism, 
altering the basis of the DNA structure with the result, 
that there is a change in the nucleotide sequence.
146 A  chemical process which involves the removal 
of one more amino groups from a molecule.
147 In respect of Professor Meuth's research,
'spontaneous' means no known selective damaging 
agent was applied to the cells.
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formation of deletions or more complex type rearrangement of DNA" (Meuth Day 71, 
p.14G). In particular, these double strand breaks could also lead to the rearrangement 
and inactivation of adjacent genes.
Professor Meuth went on to propose two explanations for multiple mutations as a 
consequence of ionising radiation. Firstly, a mutator gene which had the effect of 
increasing the rate of mutations throughout the genome. Secondly, a defective DNA  
repair mechanism, which as a result of exposure may become 'error prone'.
Questioned by Mr. Hytner as to whether there was any human experimental support for 
the hamster cell experiments, Professor Meuth said that while further experimentation was 
under way, the work of Dr. J. B. Little at Harvard Medical School, was able to provide 
further evidence for 'inducible mutator genes' resulting from irradiation. Asked by Mr. 
Justice French to confirm that "these are genes which produce non-targeted (random) 
mutations throughout the genome in irradiated cells many generations after the original 
exposure" (Day 71, p. 18H), Professor Meuth confirmed this to be correct. Clarifying this 
point further, Professor Meuth explained, if such mutator genes occurred in the germline, 
it could produce sperm with mutations over many months and over many cell generations.
Confirming his work involved relatively small numbers, and presently only dealt with acute 
as opposed to chronic radiation, Professor Meuth reiterated his observation that on the 
basis of his research:
A  recurrent feature of many Iymphoproliferative disorder is the presence of non- 
random chromosomal rearrangements (i.e. chromosomal rearrangements which are 
consistently of a certain type). There is good evidence that at least some of these
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rearrangements may be the result of aberrant joining of unlinked DNA fragments 
(e.g. fragments which have arisen as a result of radiation-induced breaks in the 
DNA) (MeuthrDay 71, p.25F).
In summarizing his position Professor Meuth said:
i) Ionising radiation significantly increases the frequency of complex rearrangements in 
somatic cells. These have not been detected among spontaneous mutants. Insofar as some 
of these complex rearrangements involve small regions of DNA, it is perfectly possible that 
they are capable of being inherited.
ii) Recent work suggests that inducible responses, that is the mutator genes, could directly 
increase the level of DNA instability for prolonged period. The induction of such mutator 
genes in spermatogonial stem cells could lead to the accumulations of mutations in mature 
sperm long after exposure. Mutator genes would also have significant effects on somatic 
cells.
iii) There is clear evidence of an interrelationship between the pathways involved in 
processing of antibodies and the repair of radiation-induced damage. This increases the 
risk of non-random rearrangements in somatic cells (B and T cell lineages) leading to 
activation of oncogenes (initiation of cancer) (Meuth: Day 71, p.27H-28E).
The next witness called by the Plaintiffs was Dr. John Thacker, Head of the DNA Repair 
and Mutagenesis Group at the Medical Research Council's Radiobiology Unit. For the 
purposes of the court Dr. Thacker prepared two reports concerned with the apparent 
discrepancy between the 'genetic risk estimates' calculated from the A-bomb survivors and 
the mouse data, in comparison with the 'risk estimates' implied by the Gardner 
study148. In his assessment, Dr. Thacker addressed two main points. Firstly, the dose 
effect in respect of acute v chronic irradiation. Secondly, the variation in the 
radiosensitivity of certain genes. Acknowledging that scientists did not understand the 
the full genetic and biological consequences of radiation exposure and that further analysis
148 The 'genetic risk estimates' derived from the 
atomic bomb and mouse data imply that the doses 
received by the fathers in the Gardner study were 
insufficient to account for the leukaemia excess.
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of radiation-induced mutations in the human genome was needed, Dr. Thacker stated:
Two of the mainstays of current radiation risk estimates for genetic effects are the 
human atomic bomb data and the experimental mouse gene mutation frequencies. 
I believe that the above analyses show that neither of these data sets can be used 
straightforwardly to predict the outcome of specific mutagenic or carcinogenic 
effects of radiation; to do this we need specific information on both the genes (and 
chromosomal regions) involved and the relative effectiveness of the doses and dose 
rates experienced (Day 73, p. 31B).
 we will not understand the potential mutagenic and carcinogenic consequences
of radiation exposure until we have thoroughly analyzed radiation induced 
mutation at representative sites in the human genome (Day 73, p. 37D).
Referring to the inadequacy of the mouse data in respect of the 'specific locus test'149 
to detect mutations, and the 'indirect doubling dose method'150 to assess risk, Dr. 
Thacker confirmed that it was very difficult to extrapolate risk estimates from mice to men.
149 A  system of murine (mouse) experiments to 
detect recessive (double chromosome) 
mutations in offspring. Originally pioneered by 
Professor Russell (1954), he identified seven 
specific loci (genes) which when mutated, gave 
rise to six specific 'coat' variations and one 
'short ear7 variation from the norm. When the 
'test' mouse was subsequently mated with a 
'normal' parent who was also irradiated, the 
consequences were observed in the offspring 
and the 'normal' (now irradiated) parent.
Later the 'specific locus test' was extended to 
dominant (single chromosome) skeletal and 
cataract mutations.
150 The data from the experiments with mice
can be used to estimate radiation induced genetic 
risk in humans. The 'indirect doubling dose method' 
is doubling the amount of radiation it would 
take to double the spontaneous mutation frequency. 
This is done by observing mutation rates in future 
generations and then working backwards to estimate 
risk in first generations.
An alternative is 'the direct method' of risk 
assessment pioneered by Professor Ehling and 
developed by Dr. Selby, which makes an estimate 
of human damage in the first generation based 
on experimental damage in the first generation 
directly.
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Under cross examination by Mr. Rokison on behalf of the defendants, Dr. Thacker 
provided a number of reasons for his opinion on this matter including:
1. There is no proof that the sensitivity of the human and mouse genome is equal.
2. The 'specific locus experiments' preclude analysis of more than a few genes.
3. There are no large scale studies of mice.
4. The genetic endpoint in respect of mice 'coat colour' and ' short ears' are 
not the same as the endpoint of leukaemia and lymphomas cited in the Gardner 
study.
5. More recent studies at a molecular level show that radiation induces a much 
higher frequency of complex rearrangements.
6. The atomic bomb and mouse data are based on 'acute' high doses not 'chronic' 
low doses of radiation.
Following Dr. Thacker, the plaintiffs called Dr. Roger Cox, Head of the Biomedical Effects 
Department, National Radiological Protection Board. For the purposes of the court Dr. 
Cox prepared three reports concerned with the "possible germline mechanisms that can 
influence the appearance of cancer in human families and populations [when placed in the 
context of] possible associations between paternal radiation exposure at Sellafield and the 
increased leukaemia incidence in the offspring of exposed workers" (Day 73, p .lH -2A ).
Confirming that there was now unambiguous evidence from clinical, epidemiological, 
cytogenetic151, and molecular studies within human population, that individuals and 
families carry mutations in germ cells which could predispose them to the development 
of cancer152, Dr. Cox went on to explain that the same genes may also give rise to non-
151 Study of chromosomes.
152 Transgeneration carcinogenesis.
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inheritable (sporadically) arising tumours.
Moving on to the work and competence of Professor Nomura, Dr. Cox confirmed that 
in his judgment Professor Nomura was a competent worker. Asked by Mr. Hytner 
whether he had any concerns over Professor Nomura's recent research, Dr. Cox admitted 
to having a number of reservations with regard to the design of the study.
Under cross examination by Mr. Rokison, Mr. justice French intervened to ask Dr. Cox 
his opinion of the international standing of Professor Nomura. In response Dr. Cox 
replied:
He is a well recognised mouse geneticist, my Lord. Certainly this is a contentious 
area and there is a good deal of dispute amongst the mouse geneticists and people 
like me, if you like, who are somewhat on the edge of it but interested in cancer. 
I would say that I would regard him as competent. This is a study that has caused 
problems. On the other hand the study that Professor Nomura did which I am not 
so familiar with, which was with congenital malformations, also raised a great deal 
of contention at the time it was published but was then subsequently repeated by 
others, notably Dr. Lyon at the Radiobiology Unit. I would have the same 
problem really commenting on the standing of many people. He is a well 
recognised worker (Day 75, p.49F-H).
Dr. Cox confirmed that as yet there had been no attempt to replicate Professor Nomura's 
studies, reiterating the point that "it is not that people had tried to do it and failed. As 
far as I am aware nobody has actually repeated his study" (Day 75, p. 50C).
When asked by Mr. Hytner his opinion of the Gardner hypothesis in conjunction with the
findings of Professor Nomura, Dr. Cox replied:
The Sellafield findings are, in part, qualitatively supported by the data from 
Nomura's mouse studies but neither study can be easily reconciled with current 
views on germ cell mutagenesis...To different degrees both studies demand a
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radiation mutagenesis mechanism that generates high frequency germ cell events 
relatively specific to tumourgenesis, ie certain tumour associated genes of DNA  
sequences are preferentially damaged. Further to this, in order to explain the 
absence of such mutations in Japanese children whose parents received higher 
doses than the Sellafield fathers it is also necessary to postulate the existence of 
genetic factors of ethnic origin and/or the involvement of unconventional genetic 
mechanisms that might have unusual properties with regard to dose and dose-rate 
effects (Day 75, p.9C-D).
Dr. Cox went on to say however, that despite the limited knowledge on the mechanisms
involved and their relationships to Ieukaemutagenesis, it was not possible to preclude any
strictly scientific judgment "on the specific probability of a causal relationship between
doses to the fathers and leukaemia in their offspring. I suggest such a causal relationship
should not be excluded on mechanistic grounds" (Day 75, p.29B).
The final witness due to be called on behalf of the plaintiffs was Professor U.H. 
Ehling153 who along with others in his field, is acknowledged as one of the main figures 
in mouse genetics. Prior to the trial, Professor Ehling had written a review article setting 
out all the uncertainties as regards mouse genetics. In the build up to the exchange of 
reports in June 1992, having originally agreed to submit a report, Professor Ehling instead 
submitted his article as evidence. Shortly before Professor Ehling was due to appear in 
court however, the defendants decided to agree the article and not challenge Professor 
Ehling's evidence, negating any need therefore for the plaintiffs to call him as a
153 Professor Ehling developed the 'direct7 method 
of risk assessment which was later developed by 
Dr. Selby. This method, in contrast to the 'indirect 
doubling dose7 method, does not double the spontaneous 
dose rate in order to assess risk in respect of the 
mutation rate in offspring.
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witness154. As a consequence Professor Ehling's evidence was submitted under the Civil 
Evidence Act.
From the unchallenged evidence155 of Professor Ehling, Mr. Justice French gleaned the 
following information156:
a) There is no proof that the radiosensitivity of the human and mouse genome is 
equal.
b) There is no proof that the genes selected in these [mouse] experiments are 
representative of the whole mouse genome.
c) It is meaningless to determine an average mutation rate for all genes.
d) Extrapolation from mouse to man should be based on the same endpoints.
e) The skeletal method is less reliable than the cataract157.
f) An integral component of the 'direct method' is the incidence of multifactorial 
disease.
Having completed their evidence in respect of the genetics part of the case, the plaintiffs 
concluded in respect of:
154 Professor Ehling did assist the Plaintiffs' legal 
team later on the trial however (when Dr. Selby 
was challenging the competence of Professor 
Nomura).
155 Although originally agreeing not to challenge 
Professor Ehling's evidence and allowing it 
stand on its own, the defendants later disagreed 
with the plaintiffs interpretation of the review 
article and challenged it in their Closing 
Submission. A point highlighted by Mr. Hytner 
in his Closing Submission on behalf of the 
plaintiffs (Day 89, p. 61E-F).
156 Judgment p. 132.
157 His Lordship is refering to the 'specific 
locus test'. See Footnote 149 for more 
information on this.
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Dorothy Reay:
She was part of the Seascale excess.
Her father, George Reay's dose was extremely high and in light of Dorothy's 
age at onset, the most likely explanation for her leukaemia was her father's PPI.
There is no evidence of interaction or synergism with other factors.
The second hit would have occurred as a consequence of a 'spontaneous 
mutation'.
Vivien Hope:
Although deemed by the defendants 'not to be part of the Seascale excess', she 
should for all practical purposes of the litigation be included: her father 
was exposed to high doses of radiation and therefore subject to PPI; Vivien was 
bom only a few miles away from Seascale; she lived at Seascale from the age of 
six (until her lymphoma was diagnosed at 23); she worked at Sellafield.
A  plausible explanation in Vivien Hope's case is that she inherited a predisposition 
to virally induced Burkitt's lymphoma; when exposed later in life to the virus she 
therefore contracted NHL. In addition, a further hit (second or third) was 
environmental radiation from Sellafield to which she had been exposed for 23 
years.
The Defendants' Expert Witnesses
In order to counter the plaintiffs' claim of a plausible biological mechanism which could 
firstly, account for paternal germline mutation and secondly, explain the frequency of the 
Seascale excess, the defendants' experts concentrated on the following areas:
1. The plausibility of a biological mechanism in respect of paternal germline 
mutation and the Seascale excess.
2. The heritability of leukaemia and NHL.
3. The level of radiation exposure received by the parents.
The first witness called by the defendants was Professor E.J. Hall, Chair in Radiation
Oncology and Radiology, Columbia University. For the purposes of the litigation
Professor Hall prepared three reports concerned with:
...what is known about the interaction of ionising radiation with biological material, 
and the radiobiological principles that have emerged concerning the effects of 
radiation quality and radiation dose-rate. The purpose of this report
 to arrive at a comment on the feasibility of the Gardner hypothesis, namely
that paternal exposure to radiation over a period of time may lead to leukaemia 
or lymphoma in the offspring (HalhDay 77, p.6H-7A).
In reaching his conclusion that the Gardner hypothesis was highly unlikely, Professor
Hall stated his opinion that there was insufficient knowledge about radiation induced
cancer or leukaemia inherited through the germline. Any information that does exist in
relation to biological dose rates or mutation rates are based on the A-bomb data which
contradicted the Gardner findings. According to Professor Hall, the hypothesis inherent
in the Gardner report "namely that leukaemia may be induced in offspring by paternal
irradiation by being transmitted via the germ cells represents a mechanism unknown to
conventional radiation biology" (Day 77 ,p. 25A-B). Further said Professor Hall, if
radiation induced mutations were to be propagated through the paternal germline, a
whole range of other genetic defects would be expected:
Leukaemia alone, in the absence of a whole spectrum of other malignancies and 
mutations leading to structural deformation, is difficult to imagine 
(Day 77, p.27D).
Albeit, as Professor Hall explained, the A-bomb data itself did not reveal any radiation 
induced tumours not seen before.
When asked by Mr. Rokison on behalf of the defendants, whether paternal preconception
irradiation offered a plausible explanation for the Seascale excess from a genetic
perspective, Professor Hall agreed it was theoretically plausible:
I think one has to say that it is theoretically plausible because, on the one hand, 
we know that radiation induces mutations, and, on the other hand, we know that 
leukaemia has some familial trait, though weak, and those two things put together, 
I think it would not be fair or reasonable to not concede it was theoretically 
plausible (Day 77, p.39D-E).
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Under cross examination by Mr. Hytner on behalf of the plaintiffs, Professor Hall was 
asked to confirm his input (along with others) into the BIER V  Report, in particular 
Chapter Three, 'The Mechanisms of Cancer' which stated:
1. The effects of radiation and chemical carcinogens which lead to cancer are dose 
dependent and generally irreversible.
2. The carcinogenic process is dependent on cell proliferation.
3. The changes that initiate carcinogenesis in a cell are passed on to daughter cells.
4. The subsequent events in carcinogenesis can be profoundly influenced by various 
non-carcinogenic factors.
5. Tumours tend to become increasingly malignant with time through the stepwise 
outgrowth of progressively more malignant subpopulation of tumour cells.
6. A  synergistic interaction between the initiating effects of radiation (or
various chemicals) and specific promoting agents is now known to occur in many 
different organs and cell systems (Day 77, p. 58D-G).
Confirming that he had considerable input into this chapter, Professor Hall acknowledged
that an initiating event, such as a mutation, could pass through the germline and upon
exposure to a second event, express itself in a particular endpoint. Professor Hall also
agreed with Mr. Hytner, that it was important not to be unduly sceptical about scientific
thesis that had the support of other experimental data.
The next witness called by the Defendants was Dr. Paul Selby, Senior Research Scientist 
in the Biology Division of Oak Ridge National Laboratory158, Tennessee. For the 
purposes of the court Dr. Selby prepared two reports which firstly, provided a detailed 
synopsis of his experience159 and research interests, and secondly, considered the
158 Oak Ridge National Laboratory is an outgrowth 
of the Manhattan Project which developed as
a consequence of World War II.
159 Dr. Selby worked with Professor Russell 
who developed the original 'specific locus 
test', and later with Professor Ehling who 
pioneered the direct method of risk assessment.
Dr. Selby went on to develop the work of Professor 
Ehling.
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Gardner hypothesis and the work of Professor Nomura.
In respect of the work of Professor Gardner, Dr. Selby concluded:
It thus appears that Gardner's hypothesis has no biological plausibility and simply 
resulted from a correlation, based on small numbers, that gave a significant result 
when, in reality no real difference existed. In view of the profound implications 
of the Gardner hypothesis to the uses of nuclear energy, and even to the uses of 
diagnostic and therapeutic radiation (especially when that hypothesis is extended 
to the view that 10 mSv has a serious heritable genetic effect), it is unfortunate 
that the authors did not give more attention to assessing the plausibility of the 
hypothesis before alarming the public (Day 78, p. 50E-F).
Although not an epidemiologist, Dr. Selby went onto say:
...it is extraordinarily unlikely that the acute leukaemia in the Reay child or the 
non-Hodgkin's lymphoma in the Hope child had any relationship at all to the 
preconception radiation exposure of their parents. Had the radiation exposure of 
either or both their parents been responsible for these kinds of diseases, there 
should have been an epidemic of all kinds of genetic disorder in the communities 
where the fathers lived who worked at Sellafield. Such epidemics should also be 
apparent throughout the world around all nuclear plants.. (Day 78, p.53G).
With regard to work of Professor Nomura, Dr. Selby was less circumspect, resorting to 
adverbs like "falsely" and adjectives like "preposterous", "misleading" and "amazing". 
Indeed so serious were the allegations in respect of Professor Nomura's professional 
integrity and competence160, Mr Hytner intervened during Mr. Spencer's examination 
of Dr. Selby, to draw his Lordship's attention to the fact that Dr. Selby's criticisms went 
far beyond those identified in his reports.
In light of Dr. Selby's condemnation of Professor Nomura's methodology and
160 A t one point in his second report, Dr. Selby
suggested that Professor Nomura did not know the 
difference between spermatogonia and spermatozoa.
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interpretation of results, Mr. Spencer suggested to his Lordship, a 'reading day' the
following Monday161, to give the plaintiffs' legal team extra time to consult with
Professor Nomura. In rejecting this suggestion Mr. Hytner said:
My Lord, I am not accustomed to walking into an elephant trap, particularly when 
it is signposted and uncovered. The situation is very simple, as my learned friend 
knows. We have had, I won't say sprung on us, that is pejorative, we have been 
confronted today with highly detailed evidence which has not appeared in any of 
Dr. Selby's reports. (Day 79, p.97A-B)
Reminding his Lordship of the two affidavits and one medical report relating to Professor
Nomura's non-attendance, Mr. Hytner went to say:
My Lord the situation is that the original reports were obtained with some 
difficulty. It entailed two solicitors, one with scientific qualifications, flying to 
Japan and having an all day interview with Professor Nomura, when copious notes 
were taken. My Lord, he asked for the report to be written, or a draft to be 
written from those notes for him to correct. My Lord the draft was sent to him; 
he corrected it. My Lord, we anticipate that if any attempt was made now to send 
the whole of two days' transcripts, or certainly a full day's transcript by fax, to 
Professor Nomura over the weekend it would entail, as your Lordship now 
appreciates, Professor Nomura waltzing from report to report on his own, through 
the transcript, trying to work out precisely what it was that is being said against 
him. It then entails him writing copious instructions.
My Lord, if that were done by Monday I hope your Lordship appreciates that in 
the time I would have to consider the instructions any cross-examination of mine 
would be a floundering one. My Lord, it would then give the Defendants the 
opportunity to say, "Well Dr. Selby was cross-examined and his evidence stood 
up". M y Lord I do not propose to fall into that trap (Day 79, p97.D-F).
Over the weekend contact was finally made with Professor Nomura, resulting in over forty
pages of faxed material (Day 82, p.lE-F). In the event however, and despite the
assistance of Professor Ehling on the Sunday, the task proved too difficult. Time
161 Mr. Spencer suggested on Friday afternoon 
(Day 79), having Monday (Day 80), as the 
'reading day' in order to facilitate the 
plaintiffs' solicitors communication with 
Professor Nomura. The plaintiffs would 
therefore have three days, instead of two, 
to address any criticisms by Dr. Selby.
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limitation, cost and language difficulties led the plaintiffs' legal team to make the tactical 
decision not to challenge Dr. Selby on Professor Nomura's work. Under cross- 
examination on the Monday therefore, Mr. Hytner stayed clear of any reference to the 
serious allegations made by Dr. Selby162.
Instead, throughout his cross-examination, Mr. Hytner concentrated on undermining Dr. 
Selby's self confidence by challenging the many criticisms he made in respect of Professor 
Gardner, other geneticists and public bodies. Mr Hytner pointed out to Dr. Selby that 
many of the witnesses he castigated were in fact "scientists at the top of their professions 
and highly respected in their field" (Day 80, p.10B).
Beginning with Professor Gardner, Mr. Hytner asked Dr Selby how a geneticist could be
so critical of an epidemiologist. Acknowledging that he had not trained as an
epidemiologist, Dr. Selby qualified the statement by informing the court that neither was 
he a novice when it came to statistics, in Dr. Selby's opinion the Gardner results should 
not have been published until the Gardner team had "deeply consulted" with geneticists 
involved with risk. Reminded by Mr. Hytner that this was an epidemiological study set 
up publicly (by a public body) to look into an association between an excess of leukaemias 
and a nuclear installation, Mr. Hytner went on to explain that in common with other 
studies, the findings were published and not suppressed. Perhaps, implied Mr. Hytner, 
Dr. Selby did not give credence to epidemiological studies per se, particularly if they
conflicted with his own opinions on genetic risk.
162 A  point taken up by Mr. Rokison in his 
Closing Submission on behalf of the 
defendants (Day 87 p.13H).
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Moving onto the two divided camps that exist in the world of genetic risk assessment, Mr. 
Hytner referred specifically to the 'direct7 method of calculating risk developed by Dr. 
Selby, and supported by UNSCEAR163, and the 'indirect' doubling dose method of risk 
calculation supported by the BEIR V  Committee164, appointed by the Academy of 
Sciences. Which camp, asked Mr. Hytner should an epidemiologist like Professor Gardner 
support?. Admitting that both methods had problems, and that neither method would 
ever be completely free of assumptions (Day 80, p.24D), Dr. Selby agreed that risk 
estimates were poor if you needed a precise answer.
Mr. Hytner then put a number of questions to Dr. Selby including:
- Do you accept the proposition that mutations are induced by radiation?
- Is radiation effective at causing deletions and rearrangements?
- Can mutations be transmitted through the germline?
- Can large chromosomal changes be passed through the germline?
- Do you agree that there is no proof that the radiosensitivity of the human and mouse 
genomes are equal?
- Is it questionable whether the genes selected in the specific locus and direct experiments 
are representative of the whole mouse genome?
- Is it true that specific locus experiments cannot be used to determine the magnitude of 
damage that would be encountered in the first generation.
- Wherever possible extrapolation from mouse to man should be based on experimental 
results using the same genetic endpoint in mouse and man?
- A  better experimental data base needs to be compiled for the direct estimation of 
genetic risk?
163 United Nations Scientific Committee on the 
Effects of Atomic Radiation.
164 Committee on the Biological Effects of Ionising 
Radiation.
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Suprisingly Dr. Selby's response to all the above questions was affirmative. Therefore 
while not intending to offer any support to the plaintiffs' case, his answers (at the very 
least) revealed certain inconsistencies in his thinking.
Moving on to Professor Nomura, although Mr. Hytner chose not to challenge Dr. Selby 
directly on his opinion of Professor Nomura's integrity and competence, he did point out 
some anomalies in relation to Dr. Selby's attitude to Professor Nomura.
For the purposes of the court Professor Nomura prepared three reports, the first
was sent to Dr Selby for comment in June 1992, the second in September 1992; the
third in December 1992. According to Dr. Selby's testimony, upon receipt of the second
report in September 1992, he was aware of Professor Nomura's incompetence as regards
methodology and interpretation of results and yet, in Februajy 1993 Dr. Selby
participated in the writing of a two papers which treated Professor Nomura's data and
results with due academic regard. In response Dr. Selby said:
Regardless of the state of erosion of my confidence in the work of Professor 
Nomura, my Lord, the results still are in the literature and of interest. They 
remain of interest and I feel that both of the publications, the one that is in press 
and I hope mine will be published, shed important alternative view in regard to 
positions that Professor Nomura has taken. But they do not at all get into the 
question of questioning his competence. They question very strongly his 
interpretation of data. It would be up to others whether or not they would draw 
from that that his competence was in question (Day 80, p.50A-B).
When asked by M r Hytner whether having publicly castigated the reputation of Professor
Nomura in open court, he should not also alert the editors of respective journals to the
incompetence of Professor Nomura's work, Dr Selby said he saw no reason to personally
write to them.
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Finally, M r Hytner asked Dr. Selby why, when Professor Nomura's research had been 
under the spotlight for over twenty years, other scientists had not also condemned his 
findings and further, why numerous eminent scientists had allowed their names to be 
incorporated into his research, thereby endorsing his work. Mr. Hytner went on to point 
out that Professor Nomura had published articles, in many cases, very prestigious journals, 
in other cases reasonably prestigious journals, and that it was unlikely that peer reviewers, 
knowing the controversial nature of his work would be hoodwinked by the data. In 
response, Dr. Selby said firstly, scientists do not like to criticize other scientists. Secondly, 
it was possible that many of the eminent scientists mentioned by Professor Nomura were 
not actually endorsing his work. Thirdly, many peer reviewers do not take their job as 
seriously as they might, agreeing with the hypothesis put forward by Mr. Hytner, that they 
were careless and not as competent as they should be (Day 80, p.57B).
In conclusion said Mr. Hytner "It really does appear to be the case, does it not, Dr. 
Selby, of "Everybody's out of step except Johnny"?.
On the eighty second day of the trial, Mr. Spencer called A.B. Rickinson, Professor of 
Cancer Studies and Head of Cancer Research Campaign Laboratories at the University of 
Birmingham.
Throughout his professional career, Professor Rickinson had worked on the Epstein Barr 
Virus and on the pathogenesis of tumours associated with that condition, in particular 
Burkitt's lymphoma, which he had studied for over twenty years. The aim of Professor 
Rickinson's report was to comment on the diagnosis of Burkitt's lymphoma in respect of
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Vivien Hope.
According to his testimony, lymphoma is a malignancy identifiable through a characteristic 
marker on the surface of the tumour cells. The malignancy derives from a specific set of 
chromosomal translocations which affect the immune system from a very young age 
(childhood). Professor Rickinson believes the translocation to be a somatic event which 
occurs by reason of errors in the normal development process. He considered an inherited 
predisposition to such a translocation to be unlikely. Burkitt's lymphoma, although 
occurring worldwide is most commonly found in equatorial Africa and New Guinea where 
it is the commonest childhood cancer.
Moving on, Professor Rickinson confirmed the predisposing role of malaria for Burkitt's 
lymphoma and also explained how in H IV  patients, one of the common manifestations 
of AIDS, before the onset of other symptoms, is Burkitt's lymphoma. As far as Epstein 
Barr is concerned, as many as fifteen to twenty per cent of cases were found to be virus 
positive165. In the case of Vivien Hope however, neither malaria nor H IV were found 
to be predisposing factors, further she was found to be negative in respect of the Epstein 
Barr virus.
In reaching his conclusion that it was unlikely that radiation damaged the paternal genetic 
information thereby altering the risk for Bukitt's lymphoma in subsequent children, 
Professor Rickinson highlighted the complexity of determining how Burkitt's lymphoma
165 With the Epstein Barr virus, genetic material 
actually exists within the tumour cells.
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arises in EBV immune individuals. Under cross examination by Mr. Hytner, Professor 
Rickinson proffered the view that where there was no EBV virus, another virus, a 
surrogate may be responsible.
Following Professor Rickinson, Mr. Rokison briefly recalled Professor Neel166 who had, 
since his previous appearance in court, produced a fourth report. According to the 
Defendants, this report was required as a consequence of a number of important scientific 
and other developments, in particular the Kinlen findings, and the fact that Professor Neel 
believed that the Plaintiffs' case had changed from one of parental preconception radiation 
alone, to the inclusion of a potential co-factor (Factor X).
Having taken Professor Neel through some areas of his first three reports again, Mr. 
Rokison them moved onto radiation as a co-factor, and the findings of the Kinlen (1993  
Seascale) study which concluded that paternal preconceptional radiation could not explain 
the excess of leukaemia and NHL in the area. Asked to comment on his opinion of these 
findings, Professor Neel confirmed his concurrence with Professor Kinlen's view; he saw 
no reason for introducing radiation as an explanation for the Seascale cluster.
The final witness in the case was Professor HJ. Evans called on behalf of the defendants. 
For the purposes of the court Professor Evans prepared two reports related to his work 
over the past twenty two years with studies looking directly or indirectly (in a supervisory 
capacity) into the effects of radiation and chemical mutagens in inducing chromosome
166 Professor Neel had given evidence earlier 
on in the trial (Day 55).
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damage in blood cells of exposed individuals, occupationally exposed personnel or cancer
patients. In particular, Professor Evans was interested in studies on the blood cells of
patients with leukaemia or lymphoma. In reaching his conclusion that:
...on the basis of the overall evidence I consider it highly unlikely that the recorded 
levels of radiation exposure received by the male parents of Ieukaemic children 
bom to Sellafield workers is in any way responsible for the development of 
leukaemia/lymphoma in offspring (Day 84, p.4D-E).
Professor Evans went on to suggest that instead he considered it:
...highly likely that the observed leukaemias and lymphomas, including those of the 
Reay and Hope families, are as a consequence of somatic mutations arising post- 
natally from natural unknown causes (Day 84, p. 4G).
While some witnesses accepted the existence of a heritable (non-syndrome167) 
component for leukaemia, Professor Evans rejected this view on the basis that firstly, there
167 Professor Evans accepted the mechanism of inheritance 
in respect of known syndromes including: Li Fraumeni; 
Bloom's syndrome; Ataxia telangiectasia; Duncan's 
syndrome.
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were no leukaemia families168. Secondly, on the findings of the Draper study169, and 
thirdly, the fact that no identical twins had been observed with leukaemia170. 
According to Professor Evans, the wealth of evidence on the heritability of leukaemia and 
NHL based on observations of the population, in particular, twins, siblings and other 
relatives, established no reason to believe in the existence of a gene or genes which pass 
through the germline and give rise specifically to leukaemia/NHL.
In their submission on the genetics parts of the case, the defendants maintained that the 
plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate the operation of any preconceptional causal 
mechanism that could explain the Seascale excess. Further, the plaintiffs had been
168 Over the last thirty years, as a consequence of 
improved treatment, a significant number of children 
with leukaemia have survived and gone on to have 
children themselves. Where parents who have had 
leukaemia have children, the question remained 
whether the parent would pass on a predisposition 
to leukaemia through the germline to their offspring.
169 The Draper (January 1993 Cumbria/Seascale) study 
reappraised the possible excess of leukaemia and 
lymphoma around the vicinity of Seascale to determine 
any excess from 1984-1990. Draper confirmed the 
incidence of leukaemia and NHL in young people aged 
0-24 in Seascale to be higher than expected on the 
basis of either national rates or those of the 
surrounding area. However, of the forty children in 
the study with a parent who had leukaemia it would be 
expected that based on the Mendelian principle, at least 
half (20) would inherit the relevant gene. In fart 
children of survivors show no cases among 40 children 
bom to parents who had leukaemia and none to parents 
with NHL. The observation, according to Professor Evans 
is that "you don't see leukaemia in offspring"
(Day 85, p.46).
170 All information indicates that in the few cases
of concordance between identical twins with leukaemia, 
the mutation is not inherited, but is caused by events 
in utero ie: a chromosomal rearrangement in one twin 
which is passed to the other via a shared blood system.
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unable to undermine the results from the A-bomb studies or account for the complete 
absence of a non-syndromic heritable component in leukaemia and NHL.
The Defendants went on to say, that in respect of the two cases before the court, there 
was no justification for suggesting that Dorothy Reay's leukaemia was in any way 
connected causally with her father's occupational PPI. What was more likely, and a factor 
that had not received proper consideration throughout the trial was the association 
between maternal age and the risk of leukaemia. Dorothy Reay's mother was over the age 
of 40 years and therefore, at four times the average risk of having a ieukaemic child.
As to Vivien Hope, it should be remembered said the defendants, that the plaintiffs' case 
was based on the excess relative risk for those bom and diagnosed within Seascale. Vivien 
Hope was bom in Drigg and moved to Seascale aged six, accordingly, she did not qualify 
for inclusion. Again, Vivien Hope suffered from NHL; there had been no positive 
association with NHL and PPI either inside or outside Seascale. Therefore, regardless of 
the plaintiffs' contention that leukaemia and NHL are so similar that they can be 
combined together, leukaemia and NHL have different aetiologies and different ages at 
onset, they are not variations of the same disease and Vivien Hope's NHL is distinct from 
Dorothy Reay's leukaemia.
The fact that the genetic material of the forty-six chromosomes may be damaged by 
radiation was not at issue, what was at issue, and is alleged by the plaintiffs was that a 
predisposition to leukaemia can be transferred through the paternal germline at a 
frequency that can explain the Seascale excess. The genetics evidence was relevant
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therefore not only as part of the Bradford Hill criteria, but also as an issue of causation.
Throughout this part of the trial the plaintiffs found themselves challenging the traditional 
basis of genetics, in particular: the 'non-syndrome' heritable component for leukaemia; 
the reliability of the animal data; and the findings of the A-bomb studies. Further assert 
the plaintiffs, while conventional mutation genetics may suggest the Gardner hypothesis 
to be implausible, recent research has highlighted the lack of scientific consensus over 
genetic mechanisms generally, and specifically, those related to cancer and the role of co­
factors.
Having reviewed the scientific expert evidence in the case a number of issues, identified 
in Chapter Four, arise from the Reay and Hope trial:
AREAS OF SCIENTIFIC UNCERTAINTY THAT EMERGED DURING THE TRIAL
OCCUPATIONAL DOSIMETRY 4(2): the Howells' Factor; the three separate analyses 
of occupational dose (Professor Gardner; Dr. Dennis; Professor S.]. Evans and Professor 
G. Howe).
ENVIRONMENTAL DOSIMETRY 4(3): the Jakeman Factor; the R171 Addendum 
(NRPB); the SEAM Model; anomalies between the historic discharge figures produced for 
the Court by Professor S.R. Jones and those for a discharge authorization application (for 
the same period) produced by Dr. R.J. Dickinson.
EPIDEMIOLOGY 4(4):
Expert Opinion of the Gardner Study
Good Quality Research (Professor S.J. Evans; Professor S. Davis; Dr. K. Kopecky; 
Professor E. Alberman; Professor D.C. Thomas; Professor D. Savits; Professor N.E. Day. 
Methodologically Flawed (Dr. K. D. Macrae; Dr. R. Wakeford; Professor G. Howe; 
Professor W.J. Schull; Professor J. Neel; Professor A. Upton; Professor B. Macmahon; Sir 
R. Doll).
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Expert Opinion of the A-bomb Research
Good Quality Research (Professor W. Schull; Professor J. Neel).
Methodologically Inconsistent (Professor E. Alberman).
Incompatible with the Gardner Research (Professor S. Davis; Dr. K. Kopecky; Professor E. 
Alberman; Professor N.E. Day).
GENETICS 4(5):
Gardner's Study Biologically Plausible (Professor M. Greaves; Professor Meuth; Professor 
D.H. Wright; Professor J. C. Neil).
Gardner's Study Biologically Implausible (Professor E. Hall; Dr. P. Selby; Professor H J. 
Evans).
Rejection of Conventional Genetics to explain the Gardner Research (Professor M. Meuth; 
Dr. John Thacker; Dr. Roger Cox; Professor Ehling).
Synergism (Gardner Hypothesis plus Co-factor) (Professor M . Greaves; Professor D.H. 
Wright; Professor J.C. Neil).
Viruses Responsible for Seascale Excess (Professor R. Rickinson; Professor J. Neel). 
Expert Opinion of the validity of Professor Nomura Research (Dr. Roger Cox).
Expert Opinion of the invalidity of Professor Nomura's Research (Dr. Selby).
ALLEGATIONS OF MANIPULATION OF RESULTS (POSSIBLE FRAUD)
Professor R. Doll suggested Professor M. Gardner had deliberately manipulated his results, 
notwithstanding Professor Gardner's denial, taken under oath, weeks before his death.
ALLEGATIONS OF FALSE STATEMENT
Professor R. Doll accused Dr. H. Inskip of making a false declaration under oath which he 
later retracted.
ALLEGATIONS OF INCOMPETENCE
Dr. P. Selby castigated the reputation and standing of Professor Nomura in the strongest 
possible terms, then proceeded to accuse other colleagues of incompetence.
NOVEL/NEW AREAS OF RESEARCH 
Professor Gardner's research.
Professor Nomura's research.
LACK OF WITNESS NEUTRALITY/HIRED GUNS
Allegations by the plaintiffs that there was a lack of witness independence by the NRPB 
(particularly in respect of the occupational dosimetry evidence).
In-house and other nuclear industry experts were only available to BNFL.
INEQUALITY OF RESOURCES/FINANCES
This was a classic example of a 'David and Goliath' situation in which BNFL Pic had access 
to unlimited resources and funds not available to the two plaintiffs. According to Lord
27 5
SIGNIFICANCE OF DISCOVERY PROCESS
Without disclosure of 'The Howells Factor', the inaccuracy of the occupational dose 
figures would have not have come to light.
Although BNFL agreed to supply all documentation by September 1991, only upon 
further Discovery in 1992 did the discrepancy in plutonium and other discharge figures 
(released into the environment) become apparent.
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5.1 ludicial Decision Making
Moving on from the complex area of expert evidence, the main focus of this chapter is 
judicial decision making, in particular an analysis of the 'discovery' and 'justification' 
process whereby Mr. Justice French reached his ultimate conclusion in favour of the 
defendants that on the balance of probabilities PPI was not a material contributory cause 
of the Seascale excess or, it must follow, the leukaemia of Dorothy Reay or, the NHL of 
Vivien Hope. In the conclusion of his judgment, his Lordship divided the case into two 
parts. The first was concerned with whether the Gardner study established a statistically 
significant association between PPI and the excess of leukaemia found around the Sellafield 
site; the second, whether on the basis of the evidence and the Bradford Hill criteria, the 
association was causal. Incorporated into the analysis is due regard to the observations 
of Day sc Pugh (1995) and Miller (1997) that his Lordship's decision had little to do 
with law or legal reasoning. Developing this point further, I will explore what factors 
appear to have influenced his decision, and whether the Bradford Hill criteria is an 
appropriate foundation upon which to base a judicial judgment.
Before embarking on the case itself however (5.2), I will begin with an examination of the 
components involved in judicial decision making. Implicit in consideration of this matter 
is a rejection of the notion that the 'judicial discovery' process is beyond the realms of 
legal analysis, and with it, any assumption that such exploration should be left to the 
domain of Psychology. Moving on (5.3), discussion will focus on the benefits or not, of 
rationalising judicial decision making through the implementation of applied probabilistic 
reasoning. In order to evaluate current opinion on these issues, primary research is 
presented from High Court Judges (Queen's Bench Division), and once again, members
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of the Academy of Experts.
Contemporary understanding of legal reasoning (Wasserstron 1961; MacCormick 1978; 
Alexy 1989; Bengeotxea 1993; Anderson 1997) is based on the notion that there is a 
distinction between 'how a judge reaches his decision' and 'how a judge justifies his 
decision'. According to this view, legal reasoning1: the independent, logical, rational and 
objective nature of the process is 'judicial justification'. Whereas, the 'discovery' process, 
which explains how a judge reaches his decision2 (the difficult to control, unconscious, 
non-rational, non-Iogical, subjective, value based, intuitive part of decision making) has 
increasingly moved into the domain of Psychology.
While some legal theorists (Twining 1973; Wroblewskl 1992) continue to support the 
need for a more acceptable distinct psychological theory to assist law in determining what 
factors and considerations influence the judicial decision making process, others, in 
particular Anderson (1997), believe that Psychologists have failed to take the mantle 
offered to them. Consequently, there is a growing demand for academic lawyers and legal 
theorists to re-assert control of this knowledge base and in so doing recognise that both 
discovery and justification are a continuation of the same process; it is only through such 
realisation that judgments, particularly in 'hard cases'3 (which arise as a consequence of
1 Positivists define legal reasoning as a rational, 
objective, impartial process based on deductive 
analysis.
2 Supported by the Realist movements in America and 
Scandinavia; particularly popular in the 1960s.
3 See Dworkin's essay 'Hard Cases' which appeared in 
Taking Rights Seriously (1978 ed) Ch.4.
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gaps in the law) can be understood.
According to Peczenik (1989:24) gaps in the law occur where:
1) the established law does not regulate a given case (an insufficiency gap4);
2) the established law regulates the case in a logically inconsistent way 
(an inconsistency gap5);
3) the established law regulates the case in a vague or ambiguous manner 
(an indeterminacy gap6)
4) the established law regulates the case in a morally unacceptable way 
(an axiological gap7)
Implicit in Peczenik's analysis is the belief that, as a consequence of gaps in the law, 
discretion, value judgments and other factors inevitably impact on judicial understanding; 
interpretation of evidence; and decision making; a view supported by others (Kriele 1965; 
Esser 1972; Larenz 1983), including Alexy (1989), who was particularly concerned with 
the legitimacy of judicial discretion when deciding between two competing solutions.
Underlying concerns of judicial decision making lie two opposing theoretical perspectives. 
The first, legal positivism rests on the notion that law is based on a structure of rules which 
determines how law operates, procedures work and decisions are made. Having rules 
thus ensures that the decision making process is predictable, orderly, consistent and non-
4 Insufficient gaps result from the fart that the literal 
text of the statute does not regulate a given case.
5 An inconsistency gap may occur as a consequence of 
logical inconsistency of a legal norm established
as part of legal tradition.
6 Indeterminacy gaps result from vagueness or ambiguity 
of the legal norm.
7 Axiological gaps occur when the established law regulates 
a given case in a morally unacceptable way.
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arbitrary. Constraining the judiciary in this way therefore minimises the potential for 
judicial discretion, and guarantees as Dicey (1939:202) says "the absolute supremacy or 
predominance of regular law as opposed to the influence of arbitrary power, and excludes 
the existence of arbitrariness, or prerogative, or even wide discretionary authority". 
Embracing positivism therefore encompasses legal autonomy and universality.
in the opinion of Sunstein (1996:111-115) therefore, rules:
- minimise the informational and political cost of reaching decisions in particular cases;
- are impersonal and blind; they promote equal treatment and reduce the likelihood of 
bias and arbitrariness;
- serve appropriately to embolden and to constrain decision makers in particular cases;
- promote predicability and planning for private actors, legislators and others;
- increase visibility and accountability;
The second theoretical perspective is based on American, Scandinavian and German 
Realism. The underlying basis of realist philosophy is the subjugation of rules. Rules in 
this context are therefore only one of many elements such as: the judge's idiosyncrasies, 
background, prejudice, political leanings, relationships with counsel, all factors which could 
potentially affect the outcome of a case.
Acknowledging the work of the American Realist movement, Anderson, (1997) reminds 
the reader of the contribution jurists such as Holmes (1841-1935); Frank (1889-1957); 
Gray (1839-1915); Llewellyn (1893-1962) have made to unravelling the judicial 
discovery process. Rejecting the notion that American Realism was simply a 
response/rejection of positivism, Anderson (1997:10) believes that the Realists came 
closest to identifying the actual processes involved: "puzzling; hunching, intuiting; the 
checking and testing of a solution, judging and deciding, and presenting the judgment".
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Anderson goes on to attribute to the movement a credible account of the illusionary and 
mythical nature of formalism.
In contrast to American Realism, the Scandinavian Realists (Hagerstron (1868-1939), 
Olivercrona (1897-1980), Ross (1899-1979) stressed the psychological impact of 
adherence to normative rules and considered the influence such rules had on judicial 
behaviour. Issues identified include: the impact of legal ritualism (Hagerstrom); the 
potential abuse of judicial power (Olivecrona); and the reality of legal prediction (Ross).
In similar vein, the German 'Free Law' (Freirechtslehre) school which developed at the 
the same time as the American and Scandinavian movements also stressed the 
indeterminacy of legal rules and the creativity of the judiciary. O f particular interest to 
the German realists was the importance of acknowledging and responding to the 
developing role of the judge. Although not as widely known as either the American or 
Scandinavian movements, the German school emphasized the need for judicial control and 
restraint, and in so doing, complemented the work of the behaviourist sociological 
orientated American school, and the psychological orientated Scandinavian school.
Notwithstanding the opinion of Cotterrell (1989), that legal realism has been effectively 
marginalised in Britain, he nonetheless acknowledges the valuable service they performed 
in demonstrating the problematic nature of normative legal theory, and in highlighting 
some very real concerns with regard to judicial decision making.
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Some judges, aware of the 'personal element' and discretionary nature involved in the 
judicial making process have publicly voiced their concerns. Cardozo, (1921:9-10) 
arguably one of America's greatest judges observed:
The work of deciding cases goes on every day in hundreds of courts throughout 
the land. Any judge, one might suppose, would find it easy to describe the 
process which he had followed a thousand times and more. Nothing could be 
farther from the truth. Let some intelligent layman ask him to explain: he will not 
go very far before taking refuse in the excuse that the language of craftsmen is 
unintelligible to those untutored in the craft. Such an excuse may cover with a 
semblance of respectability an otherwise ignominious retreat. It will hardly serve 
to still the pricks of curiosity and conscious, in moments of introspection, when 
there is no longer a necessity of putting off with a show of wisdom the uninitiated 
interlocutor, the troublesome problem will recur, and press for a solution. What 
is it I do when I decide a case? To what source of information do I appeal for 
guidance? in what proportions do I permit them to contribute to the result? In 
what proportions ought they to contribute? If a precedent is applicable, when do 
I refuse to follow it? If no precedent is applicable, how do I reach a rule that will 
make a precedent for the future? If I am seeking logical consistency, the symmetry 
of the legal structure, how far shall I seek it? A t what point shall the quest be 
halted by some discrepant custom, by some consideration of the social welfare, by 
my own or the common standards of justice and morals?
Judge Jerome Frank, an American Realist and highly regarded federal judge, also drew 
attention to the multitude of elusive factors that exist and are involved in judicial decision 
making. In Frank's opinion, prejudices, whether they are "racial, religious, political, or 
economic... Unconscious biases..plus or minus reactions to women, or unmarried women, 
or redhaired women or brunettes, or men with deep voices or high pitched voices, or 
fidgety men, or men who wear thick eyeglasses, or those who have pronounced gestures 
or nervous tics - biases of which no one can be aware" (Frank 1949:xiii), all such 'elusive 
factors' may impact on the judge and ultimately affect his decision making.
Concurring with these sentiments, Judge Richard Posner (1990:189) made the following 
observation:
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It is a mistake to take at face value descriptions of judges as engaged always in a 
search for 'the' correct answer, rather than as exercising discretion under the 
influence of personal values and preferences determined by temperament and 
selective life experiences.
In this country, judges such as Lord Radcliffe (1968:212) have written about the 
"inescapable personal element in the judicial decision", while Lord Devlin (1978:511) 
recognised that "the judge who is confident that he has no prejudices at all is almost 
certain to be a bad judge".
Lord Denning also acknowledged the existence of judicial discretion, but tempered his 
view by stressing the importance of policy considerations:
The truth is the that the law is uncertain. It does not cover all the situations which 
may arise. Time and again practitioners are faced with new situations, where the 
decision may go either way. No one can tell what the law is until the courts 
decide it. The judges do every day make law, though it is almost heresy to say so. 
If the truth is recognised then we may hope to escape from the dead hand of the 
past and consciously mould new principles to meet the needs of the present8
Later, Lord Denning M.R., as he was by then, reiterated this point in somewhat bolder 
terms in Dutton v Bognor Regis U.D.C.9 when he observed:
This case is entirely novel........
In previous times, when faced with a new problem, the judges have not openly 
asked themselves the question: what is the best policy for the law to adopt? But 
the question has always been there in the background. It has been concealed 
behind such questions as: Was the defendants under any duty to the plaintiff? 
Was the relationship between them sufficiently proximate? Was the injury direct
8 'The Reform of Equity' in C.]. Hamson
(ed.) Law Reform and Law-Making (1953:31).
9 [1972] 2 W.L.R. 299 at 313.
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or indirect? Was it foreseeable, or not? Was it too remote? and so forth.....
Nowadays we direct ourselves to considerations of policy...
What are the considerations of policy here?
In addition to recognising the realist perspective and policy considerations, Professor 
Griffith reminds us that the judicial role is also political, one of maintaining the status quo:
The principal function of the judiciary is to support the institutions of Government 
as established by law. To expect a judge to advocate radical change is absurd. 
The confusion arises when it is pretended that judges are somehow neutral 
in the conflicts between those who challenge existing institutions and those who 
control those institutions (Griffith (1991:329).
Whatever the reality of decision making, there is no doubt says Sunstein (1996:136) that 
"reason giving is prized in law". Increasingly however, as the decisionmaker becomes less 
constrained by normative rules, certain cases, particularly those involving complex 
scientific expert evidence are demanding alterative models of decision making. In 
particular, models that offer greater insight into judicial discovery and justification 
processes.
In order to understand the reasoning element underlying judicial decisions the remainder 
of this section will concentrate on providing a more in depth analysis of the distinction 
between the 'discovery' and 'justification' process.
The Discovery Process
Included in the realists critique of legal formalism is a rejection of the idea:
284
- that judges use deductive techniques to decide cases;
- that judges' legal opinions are accurate descriptions of how judges reach 
decisions;
- that legal certainty and predictability are ideals that judges should strive to reach 
(Anderson 1996:3).
Thus the notion that "the judge begins with some rule or principle of law as his premise, 
applies this premise to the facts, and arrives at his decision" (Frank 1949:101) constitutes 
nothing more than dogma. Judicial decision making is neither neutral, objective nor 
rational; any view to the contrary, say the realists, simply masks the reality.
According to Anderson (1996:6), five elements can be identified in mainstream Realists
writings including:
1. brooding and puzzling about the facts of a case;
2. achieving a tentative hunch or intuition about what is just in the case;
3. checking or testing the hunch or intuition against both the relevant laws and legal 
principles and against what is considered to be the wise solution in this case and other 
similar cases that may arise in the future;
4. reaching a judgment, decision or solution;
5. presenting or expounding the judgment, decision or solution in the time honoured 
fashion.
Most cases in Frank's opinion however, are reached by a method of backwards reasoning,
"backwards from conclusions tentatively formulated" (Frank 1949:101).
Taking on board the realists' perspective and his own belief that there are no set patterns 
to judgments, Lee (1989:42) considers that the assumed structure, where: "the facts are 
set out, the legal issue is pinpointed, the previous law is explored, any 'policy' arguments 
are summarily treated, the law is applied to the facts, the conclusion is reached and an 
order is made" to be an over simplification. In reality says Lee, "judges might well reach 
a conclusion intuitively and then work backwards to provide a justification. Occasionally,
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in so doing they might change their minds. They will also sometimes respond to drafts 
of their colleagues' judgments. [What is] clear, is that judges sometimes feel the need to 
give their conclusion without simultaneously providing the reasons" (Ibid). Quite often 
therefore, judgments are made which appear remarkably thin on case-law and remarkably 
fulsome in their treatment of facts. Perhaps as Lee (1989:43) suggests, when judges 
attempt to rationalize their hunches, they find previous case-law does not easily support 
their views. Judges therefore become convinced of a result of a case, before having 
worked out, how to justify their conclusion. Reminding the reader that the rationalisation 
for the justification of a judgment, is not the same as the thought processes involved in 
making the decision, Lee's contention is that the judges could formulate their judgment 
to accord more closely with their reasoning processes if they were more open about the 
various factors that influenced their decision making.
Bell also talks about the inadequacy of the deductive model of legal reasoning, and 
explains why many consider decision-making to be nothing more than 'hunching7. 
According to Bell, underlying such criticisms are concerns that the decision maker has too 
much individual power and is effectively unaccountable to the universal audience. After 
all, says Bell (1986:63), "Lawyers' concerns for legal stability, order, and coherence, may 
be shared less by the wider community [the universal audience] which is interested in 
justice in particular cases". Also, the values which are perpetuated by the legal 
community may fail to correspond to the expectations of the wider community. While 
the concept of legal reasoning may not embrace a system of "cadi-justice" therefore, it 
nonetheless attempts to hide the fact "that in easy cases, judges are carrying out particular 
political policies, and in hard cases, they are making value judgments" (Ibid:64).
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According to Tamanaha (1997:182) to function as a judge, "the judge must internalise 
(and therefore accept, though not necessarily consciously) a great deal of the norms 
applicable to the practice of judging". Some of these are expected and encouraged, such 
as a proper judicial disposition in court; following the law; the style of judicial writing; and 
so forth. Other factors involved in the decision making process however, may result in 
cynicism, or a flouting of legal norms. No matter how rigid and uncompromising the 
norms, the potential attitude of the judge cannot be disregarded. Referring to the work 
of Kenneth Vines (1969), Tamanaha concurs with the view that judges may be divided 
into three categories: the law interpreter (who strictly interprets the law); the law maker 
(who believes that law making is an inevitable part of interpreting the law); and the 
pragmatist (who believes that there are elements of both interpretation and law making 
in judicial decisions). According to the findings of the Vines' study, supported by the 
work of Wold (1974), judges have different perceptions of their decision making role and 
are unclear over exactly what processes are involved.
From the above discussion therefore, it would appear that hunching, insights, brooding, 
intuition, puzzling, potential bias and prejudice are all factors contributing to the judicial 
discovery process. In addition says Anderson (1996:2), other influences such as "mood, 
personality, background, education and experience" are just as important.
Moving on to determining the grounds for the weighting of a legal decision, Burton 
(1994:35) presents what he refers to as his "good faith thesis" (how judges should and 
do adjudicate) and his "permissible discretion thesis" (Ibid: 107) (judicial discretion, if 
exercised in good faith is compatible with the legitimacy of adjudication in a constitutional
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democracy). For Burton, the aim of his project is "to develop and defend a practicable 
and attractive ethic of judging in a judicious spirit" (Ibidixvi). In order to do this Burton 
considers both the reasons for the decision, and the reasoning process in judicial decision 
making. Each reason (legai standard or concrete reason for action) is thus weighed and 
compared with other competing reasons. Facts however are not weighed, therefore, for 
the purposes of analysis, consideration of iegal reasons need to be separated from the 
facts. When this has been achieved, ail the relevant reasons in a case must be identified 
and assigned a weight (out of a possible 100 units for instance, weight could be 
distributed 10-30-10-30-20); from the point of allocation, no new reason can be entered 
into the model.
Burton stresses that weighting is a qualitative exercise, therefore the process of assigning 
the appropriate weight is an act of balancing. According to Burton,J'we should conceive 
of the grounds of weight as a ring of relevant reasons impinging on a decision, not a linear 
regress in search of a result-determining foundation " (Ibid:61). With the ebb and flow 
of weights however, there is always the possibility of multiple outcomes. In spite of this 
potential, Burton believes that a judge in good faith will be constrained by both 'action 
threshold' and 'congeries of reason' which will help him to determine the appropriate 
weighting distribution, and in so doing, force an ongoing review of the total.
While assessment and weighting of the various elements is clearly important to decision 
making, it is also true that the precise determinants of the weighting criteria are not 
specified in advance, consequently, there is ambiguity and uncertainty over exactly what 
factors in the totality of the circumstances are attributed with what weight.
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According to Sunstein, while it may be possible for a judge to assign and stipulate some 
weighting in advance, these factors will not be exhaustive, "no predetermined list of 
factors can be exhaustive" (Sunstein 1996:29), therefore, Sustein considers any advance 
weighting criteria difficult to implement as often, weighting of factors can only be 
determined once the context of the controversy has been put into perspective, and the 
dispute has started to unravel.
In addition to problems with regard to the discovery process, the ideal judicial balancing 
act also demands that the judge adopt the role of the umpire or referee. While presiding 
over the contest therefore, the judge should try to be as even handed as possible and 
ensure the contest is fair to both sides. In order to do this "judges have to receive and 
assess information, to calculate according to paradigms that have a high probability of 
giving the right answer, to modify the paradigms when evidence orjeasoning shows that 
the paradigm as previously used sometimes gives the wrong answer" (Schweers Cook sc 
Levi 1990:301). Unfortunately therefore, it appears lawyers (like scientists before them) 
have accepted the premise that they can add to, or modify existing paradigms without 
necessarily questioning the basic assumptions underlying law's foundation. The result for 
law, as for science (Kuhn 1963) - the endorsement of a framework with fundamental 
faults, where any additions or modifications are merely incorporated into the system for 
acceptance by future generations. It is only with a loss of confidence in the paradigm 
therefore, that transformation and overthrow of the existing order can take place.
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“justification
Moving on to the justification process, Perry (1976) and Perelman (1979) have both 
suggested that legal justification involves convincing others of the rightness of one's 
conclusions. In order to do this it is necessary for the judge to provide an explanation 
which is more favourable to his conclusion than against it. Justification may therefore be 
considered as an appeal to reasonabie people "the universal audience" (Olbrechts-Tyteca 
1968:31), as well as an appeal to the "legal audience" [judges, practitioners, 
commentators, teachers, and students of law] (Bell 1986:53). To do this successfully 
however, the judge must also incorporate into his decision making his rationale for not 
supporting the losing party. Counsel may then have the job of translating and explaining 
the judgment (through solicitors) to their respective clients. The ultimate test for 
rationality says Bell (Ibid:60), is "whether, within a framework, an argument is capable 
of providing a justification for a decision according to law".
MacCormick's (1978) explanation of judicial decision making is heavily influenced by the 
realist movement. Acknowledging the distinction between discovery and justification 
(1978:16), MacCormick proceeds to separate the two stages. Drawing an analogy 
between science and law, MacCormick refers to Archimedes' discovery of specific gravity 
as a later justified "flash of insight". Identifying a similar process in legal discovery, 
MacComick seems to be suggesting that judges also experience similar flashes of insight, 
which again have to be justified. Concentrating on the justification process, MacCormick 
believes that the 'discovery' process should be left to the domain of Psychologists. As far 
as the 'justification' process is concerned, MacCormick divides this into two types: first 
order justification (where on the basis of deductive reasoning, decisions are justified if they
290
evolve from a major premise formulating a valid rule of law, and a minor premise 
(consisting of proven facts based on relevant legal procedures and rules of evidence). 
Second order justification entails testing rival universal norms in order to ascertain which 
one is legally valid.
Where in litigation deductive justification is not possible, MacCormick identifies three 
potential problematic areas: relevancy (dissension over which legal rule is relevant); 
interpretation (where the words of a statute are ambiguous); classification (where the 
court has to decide whether the facts fit into the rule). Reasoning in relation to these 
particular problems are however limited by requirements of consistency, coherence and 
consequences10. Only if a ruling satisfies all these requirements will it be regarded as 
legally justified.
In addition to the limitations of consistency, coherence and consequence, judicial decisions 
also have to fulfil a set of general conditions, including: public good, corrective justice, 
common sense and convenience. Therefore, judges should only make rulings on the basis 
of corrective justice, public good, community common sense, if they are authorised by 
analogy (in the form of other case law), or have support from existing legal principles.
Alexy (1989) places his analysis of justification firmly in the context of the wider 
community, in particular, the 'grounds of legitimacy' of judicial decision making in
10 MacCormick regarded reasoning as consequentionalist 
(not utilitarian). Reasoning must however comply 
with legal principles to be justified.
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situations where the decision maker has discretion11. According to Alexy, the 
application of law allows for value judgments in such situations, the question that concerns 
him is whether such value judgments can be rationally justifiable. In contemplating this 
question, Alexy invites the reader to consider whether the decision maker should be 
guided by the "value judgments of the community at large or of a specific group" 
(Ibid: 10), or, should the decision maker have recourse to the "inner evaluative coherence 
of the legal order" (Ibid: 11) or perhaps, appeal to some "objective order of values" 
(Ibid: 12). Ultimately, says Alexy what is required is a model which takes account of 
commonly held values, as well as the results of prior legal discussion. Linked to this model 
is a criteria of correctness which is the means by which evaluation of the legal assertions 
are rationally justified.
According to Peczenik (1989:336-339), certain methods of judicial justification are 
discemabie, they include the following:
1. The 'pseudo justification method':
i) where extremely brief reasons are given for the decision;
ii) or, where the justification for the decision remains unclear.
2. 'The simple subsumption method', where the court presents the decision as a 
logical consequence of a general rule and some facts.
3. 'The fact-stating method', where there are statements concerning 
facts, but neither value judgments nor norms.
4. 'The dialogue method'. Where the court proffers reasons for and against the 
decision (including facts, norms, and often general value judgments).
5. 'The sophisticated subsumption method' (or scientific method), where the court 
proffers reasons for and against the decision, including facts and value judgments -
11 Where legal norms, doctrines or precedents do not 
dictate an obvious answer.
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then modifies these reasons in such a way, that the decision becomes a logical 
conclusion of them.
In order to ensure coherence of judicial decision making however, all decisions have to be 
both extensive and of general application. Peczenik (Ibid:342) justifies this requirement 
on the basis that firstly, "modern society is no longer orientated towards [simply] obeying
judgments The parties rather wish to have immediate access to general and extensive
reasons, answering the question why the court has decided in a certain way".
Secondly, democracy requires that a judge, particularly in a hard case, fulfils his decision 
making function with due regard to both the wording and spirit of the law. In order to 
do this the judge must provide extensive and general justification for his decision. Thirdly, 
"an extensively and generally justified decision directly fulfils the demand of intersubjective
testability In other words, one knows on which grounds one may criticise it [the
decision]. Testability promotes objectivity of the decision, and thus legal certainty". 
Fourthly, "a decision gains a strong position as a precedent, if it is justified in an extensive 
manner, facilitating its criticism and yet not proved wrong. A t the same time, a highly 
general character of the justification makes the precedent widely applicable" ensuring 
uniformity, coherence, predictability and fixity of the law. Finally, an extensive and 
general justification "helps the parties to decide whether to appeal against the decision". 
It also increases their chance of obtaining a change of decision, should such a move be 
justifiable.
Cardozo (1921:162) appreciating the complex nature of judicial decision making, said 
of a judge:
He must balance all his ingredients, his philosophy, his logic, his 
analogies, his history, his customs, his sense of right, and all the 
rest, and adding a little here and taking out there, must determine as
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wisely as he can, which weight shall top the scales.
Comparing the role of the judge to that of a spectator, watching an "unpredictable daily 
drama with an ever changing cast of characters" (Pannick 1987:199), Pannick reminds us 
of the burdensome responsibilities a judge has to discharge. Lee (1989:195) in similar 
vein, sees the reality of judicial law making as existing somewhere between a 'nightmare and 
a noble dream'. Presenting judges as well meaning individuals from similar backgrounds, Lee 
informs the reader that judges disagree over their decision making role, disagree over pre­
existing law, and disagree over the future development of law in a given area.
Today, judges still appear to have different opinions of their decision making role, although
some judges are far more approachable on this topic than others. O f the sixty five Queen's
Bench Division Judges contacted for the purposes of this thesis, 34 per cent responded12.
While some judges were clearly concerned over recent proposals for a more rationalized
and accountable judiciary13 (particularly in cases involving highly controversial scientific
expert evidence), a few had no doubts about the wisdom of Cardozo's balanced approach:
In most general terms, 1 would put myself somewhere between Cardozo and the 
'some academics [who] would like to take this process a stage further' to whom you 
refer. Decision making is an interesting process especially in the judicial field. Is it 
possible to make decisions which are themselves not the product of one's own 
prejudices derived from family, school and working environment? Why does Judge 
A  decide a case one way and Judge B the opposite way? I remain to be convinced 
that there is a mechanistic tool that can remove 'subjective' reasoning processes and 
which would provide a more just conclusion to cases.
12 See Appendix 6 for a copy of the letter 
sent to Judges.
13 Additional evidence on the changing role of judicial decision 
making will be presented from judges and expert witnesses in 
Section 5.3.
294
Other judges had no doubts:
I declare myself to be a Cardozo man. If humans acted rationally, it is scarcely to 
be contemplated that our civilisation would require a system of law. Rationality is 
surely the antithesis of human behaviour in which law has a proper role to fulfil.
The traditional view of a judge's approach to decision making, as expressed by 
Cardozo, remains as true today as it was then.
I do not think I could fault or improve on Cardozo.
Certain judges while not disagreeing with the views of Cardozo, nonetheless felt other 
factors were equally important:
I certainly seek to use my commonsense.
Other members of the judiciary however, were rather more circumspect, reflecting on past 
judicial experience:
....I call to mind the wise words of Lord Mansfield -"Give your judgment but not 
your reasons; the first may be right the second will almost certainly be wrong."
Only one judge, of those commenting on their views of judicial decision making, 
completely dismissed the relevancy of such analysis, when he wrote:
I cannot relate what you say in your letter of the 9th December to the day to day 
realities of work in the courts, and I do not believe that this sort of 'research' has 
any practical value14.
In America, the problem that unfamiliar, often highly complex scientific evidence poses for 
the judiciary has led some US authorities to question the courts' competency to deal 
effectively with cases of this kind15. Disillusionment over the legal system's ability to handle
14 This was the only judge who responded in this manner.
15 The Carnegie Commission on Science 
Technology. Final Report, (1993).
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complex litigation has therefore resulted in many commentators questioning the legitimacy 
of the whole legal process. As Jasanoff (1995:5) points out, these "technically illiterate 
factfinders, who understand neither the substance nor the methods of science, are 
increasingly called upon to discriminate among sophisticated technical arguments", where 
often the perceived credibility and authority of the expert, rather than the substance of the 
evidence, is what informs judicial decision making. Green (1989:107), found that many 
cases in this country were only "resolved when a judge was satisfied that some point was 
scored by one expert over another - and that needn't mean the judge understood the 
point". Therefore the account of science which informs judicial decision making is 
constructed from a model that assumes the scientific detail to be of less significance than 
other more irrelevant issues determined throughout the trial.
Law as a form of ideology therefore encourages public belief in the existence of a judiciary 
which is rational, objective and neutral, on the premise that issues that come before a court 
can be broken down into precise empirical questions which can be answered through 
a process of deductive analysis, based on a system of unilinear causal relations. Legal 
positivism/formalism thus assumes that the traditional approach provides the only rigorous 
and disciplined means of resolving complex scientific disputes. In reality what is taking place 
is a process of judicial redefinition (Horowitz 1977), which artificially fragments and 
distorts the issue under consideration. To put this differently, while judicial processing may 
seek to exclude wider social and political concerns from the decision maker's role, this is 
not possible. Accepting this judicial fiction merely allows 'certain' important and relevant 
facts to be omitted, disregarded or ignored by the judge, and as with the Reay and Hope
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Judgment, tilts the balance significantly in favour of one side. In addition, any attempt to 
reduce complex, often undecided issues of science and technology to the soluble, does not 
address the nature of the problem itself.
Having laid the foundations of judicial decision making, the next section will concentrate 
on the Judgment in the case.
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5.2 The ludgment
In delivering his judgment on the 8th October 1993, Mr. Justice French reminded the 
Court that these actions had arisen as a consequence of two tragedies. The first concerned 
Elizabeth Reay who claimed against the defendants, British Nuclear Fuels pic, damages 
under the Fatal Accidents Acts and Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934 in 
respect of the trauma consequent on the conception, birth and death of her daughter, 
Dorothy from early acute lymphatic leukaemia (All). The second, Vivien Jane Hope, 
claimed damages against the same defendants for past and future suffering and disability 
consequent upon her non-Hodgkin's lymphoma (NHL) diagnosed at the age of 23 years. 
The sole concern of the Court therefore was whether the Plaintiffs could prove that the 
cause or a material contributory cause of Dorothy Reay's death and Vivien Hope's 
lymphoma was ionising radiation emitted by the activities carried on at Sellafield by the 
Defendants or their predecessors.
Informing the Court of the novel feature of this action as regards paternal preconception 
irradiation (PPI), his Lordship proceeded to expound the Plaintiffs' view that PPI was 
responsible for causing a mutation in the spermatagonia which in turn, via paternal sperm, 
caused a predisposition to leukaemia and/or NHL in the next generation. Known as the 
'germline' hypothesis' and derived from the work of its principal author, Professor Martin 
Gardner, the epidemiological study thus provided the foundation for the plaintiffs' case.
Reaffirming there was no question in this action as to whether the defendants or their 
predecessors were negligent, His Lordship reiterated the fact that the effect of the Atomic
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Energy Authority Act 1954 was to impose upon the defendants, as successors to the
United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority statutory liability:
It shall be the duty of the Authority to secure that no ionising radiations from 
anything on any premises occupied by them, or from waste discharged (in whatever 
form) on or from any premises occupied by them, cause any hurt to any person or 
any damage to any property, whether he or it is on any such premises or elsewhere 
(Section 5(3).
It was also common ground that by virtue of the legislation this statutory liability attached 
only from 1 st August 1954.
The dispute between the parties therefore centred on four main issues:
1. The doses of ionising radiation received by George Reay and David Hope in the course 
of their respective employments;
2. The doses of ionising radiation received by members of the two families and others 
from radiation in the environment insofar as such radiation was caused by emissions
from the Sellafield plant.
3. Whether the Gardner Study in its context, can prove, on the balance of probabilities:
a) the existence of a statistical significant association between PPI of fathers 
working at Sellafield and an excess of leukaemia and/or NHL;
b) the establishment of a causal association in the light of all the evidence and in 
particular, when regard is given to the Bradford Hill criteria.
4. Whether there exists a plausible or reasonably possible biological pathway by which 
radiation emitted by, or from the Sellafield plant could have caused or materially 
contributed to the two diseases.
For the purposes of the conclusion of his judgment however, his Lordship divided the case 
into two parts. The first was concerned with whether the Gardner study established a 
statistically significant association between PPI and the excess of leukaemia around the 
Sellafield nuclear plant. The second, whether on the basis of the evidence and the
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Bradford Hill criteria, the association was causal.
The Gardner Study
O f the Defendants' criticisms of the study, his Lordship enumerated:
- the small number of children suffering from leukaemia/NHL;
- prior identification of the leukaemia excess by Yorkshire Television and the Birth and 
School Cohort study;
- Gardner's decision [alleged by Professor Macrae and Professor Doll] to limit the study 
and cases to those born and diagnosed in Seascale after collection of data had begun;
- Gardner's decision to include the 'Bristol' case contrary to the rules of the study;
- insufficient tracing of certain fathers, which although statistically insignificant was 
not corrected until after publication of the Gardner study.
- the fact, in the opinion of the Defendants, the Gardner study had more than one 
hypothesis.
Acknowledging the validity of all these criticisms to a greater or lesser extent, his Lordship 
qualified this assertion by saying:
 that is not to say that the Gardner study is valueless or that no association is
shown between employment at Sellafield of fathers receiving PPI of 100 mSv or 
more or that the authors' claim "this result suggests an effect of ionising 
radiation on fathers that may be Ieukaemogenic in their offspring" is to be 
disregarded16.
The Bradford Hill Criteria
Moving on to the Bradford Hill criteria, described by his Lordship "as an attempt to 
systemize common sense", Mr. Justice French proceeded to apply the epidemiological
16 judgment p. 193-194.
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model for utilisation in his Judgment17.
In respect of:
(i) S tren g th  o f  A ssociation
My conclusion is that though an arithmetically strong prima facie association is shown 
to exist, considerable reserve is necessary before placing reliance on it.
ii) C onsistency
This criterion requires that there be studies demonstrating similar results in comparable
circumstances A  great number of studies were reviewed in the course of the
evidence, none of which, in my judgment, fulfilled the above requirement.
iii) Existence o f  a  dose response relationship
In my judgment, the data, while not inconsistent with a dose response in the form of 
a biological gradient fail short of demonstrating that such a response is present.
iv) A n a lo g y
The parties are in agreement that this criterion is inherently of little importance.....
I conclude that some, though very little, weight can be attributed to this criterion or 
to the evidence by which the plaintiffs seek to prove fulfilment.
v) S p ec ific ity
In my judgment this criterion affords the plaintiffs little assistance.
vi) Tem poral A ssociation
There can be no dispute that PPI preceded the leukaemias in offspring. This essential 
criterion is satisfied.
vii) E xperim en t
There was no suggestion that any human experimental data which bore on the issues 
in this case was known to exist.
viii) B io logical P lausibility
This criterion was considered, first by epidemiology, secondly, in the genetic aspect 
of biology. In addressing this criterion two questions arise: First, have leukaemias 
and/or lymphomas a heritable component apart from syndromes? Secondly, if so can 
the Gardner hypothesis plausibly explain the Seascale excess.
For the purposes of my judgment I am content to assume that there is a heritable 
component for the two diseases but that it is very small.
17 Judgment P. 193-198.
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In my judgment [Plaintiffs' witnesses] do indeed show that a causal relationship 
between PPI and leukaemia in F1 [offspring] should not be excluded on purely 
mechanistic grounds, though clearly, a great deal more research is necessary. What 
they do not do in my judgment, is to show that, in light of current knowledge, the 
Seascale cluster is capable of being explained numerically by the biological mechanism 
which are the subject matter of their research.
From the above commentary, it seems clear the process by which Mr. Justice French 
reached his ultimate conclusion in this case does not appear markedly different in 
approach from that adopted by the scientific community. Particularly relevant as the main 
focus of his judgment, was his Lordship's evaluation and weighting of the scientific 
evidence, which in the opinion of some (Day 1995; Miller 1997) had little to do with 
legal reasoning. Perhaps not surprisingly therefore, a few scientists (Stather 1993; Doll 
1994) have subsequently expressed their approval of Mr. Justice French's conclusion that 
PPI was not a material contributory cause of the Seascale excess. Notwithstanding some 
scientific support for his Lordship's decision, a number of socio-Iegal concerns emerge 
from the Reay and Hope Judgment.
Before embarking on a comprehensive analysis of the judgment however, a few 
observations are necessary in respect of the more unusual aspects of the proceedings. To 
reiterate, this case marked new ground in three ways: it was the first time that a personal 
injury claim had tested the concept of genetic damage from radiation; the only time in a 
civil trial that a judge had been allocated a named judicial assistant; one of the first trials 
in this country to endorse a satellite video link for the examination of expert witnesses. 
Moving on to the proceedings themselves, his Lordship established early in 1992 his 
preference for having the Opening Statements in writing, in advance of the trial, rather 
than given orally by Counsel as was the norm. Further, and again unusually in this regard,
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Mr. Justice French requested written submissions from defendants and plaintiffs outlining 
key issues as each expert concluded his evidence. Interestingly, at a more general level, 
his Lordship seemed to adopt an almost inquisitorial approach throughout the 
proceedings; judicially pro-active, particularly in the early days of the trial, his Lordship 
frequently intervened (during the examination and cross examination of witnesses) to 
accommodate the complexity of the scientific evidence.
Applying a pragmatic approach to his managerial and supervisory role therefore, Mr. 
Justice French identified and stipulated pre-trial procedures that would assist him in the 
effective management of the trial. According to the Manual for Complex Litigation 
(1995:15 18) effective judicial supervision includes:
- A  judge being active in identifying and anticipating potential problems before they arise 
rather than waiting passively for problems to be presented by counsel.
- The judge's involvement not being limited to procedural matters, but also dealing with 
substantive issues as they arise in order to make an informed ruling.
- The judge deciding disputes promptly. Delayed ruling may be costly and 
burdensome for litigants and will often delay other litigation events.
- The judge periodically monitoring the progress of the litigation to ensure 
that schedules are being followed.
- The judge being carefully prepared. Heavy handed case management by an 
unprepared judge may often be counterproductive, while an early display of careful 
preparation set the proper tone and can enhance the judge's credibility and effectiveness 
with counsel.
18 This is a US Manual produced for high ranking judges by 
the Federal judicial Center. A  lower level equivalent 
in England and Wales is The County Court Bench Book, 
published by the judicial Studies Board. There is no 
equivalent to the US Manual published in this country 
for High Court judges and above.
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From the case analysis it would seem that Mr. Justice French complied with the majority 
of these recommendations in that he:
- Prepared his reading of the issues in advance of the trial.
- Attempted to identify and anticipate potential problems with regard to witnesses, 
reports, timetabling.
- Kept pace with the day to day reading of various reports and counsels' written 
submissions.
- Enhanced his own understanding of the issues by being pro-active in seeking greater 
clarification from witnesses.
- Regularly monitored and reviewed timing schedules.
- Paid due regard to Court time and costs, but was never obstructive where an 
adjournment proved necessary.
- Adopted a courteous and respectful manner towards expert witnesses and counsel and 
was never heavy handed in approach.
- Delivered his Judgment as quickly as possible, given the complexity of the case.
Having established that the trial was well managed, and that Mr. Justice French was 
prepared to use his discretion to adapt and modify existing procedural rules to fit the needs 
of the case, the thesis now moves on to consider the reasoning behind the Judgment, and 
in particular, his Lordship's handling of the substantive issues raised, and his decision not 
to apply the same innovative and creative approach to his decision making.
In his introduction, his Lordship emphasised that Reay and Hope was not directly involved 
with current wider concerns surrounding nuclear power and nuclear processes. Events in 
the case he said, had taken place 30 to 40 years ago when methods then in practice had 
long since discontinued. Reminding the court that during the 1940s it was considered
necessary for the United Kingdom to have ready available sources of plutonium in order 
to fulfil the country's requirements for nuclear weapons, his Lordship emphasized that the 
the construction of Sellafield was considered a priority. Referring to the pioneering spirit 
of the late 1940s, and the fact that Pile No. 1 started operating soon after design and 
construction in October 1950, while Pile No. 2 was working by June 1951. Mr. Justice 
French acknowledged these events as a "brilliant technical achievement"19
French, J. then provided a brief description of the Piles, made reference to the 1957 
'Windscale fire', and explained how sources of environmental contamination during the 
working period of the Piles, and for a few years after closure of the Piles, continued at 
Sellafield. Moving on, his Lordship highlighted the reasons for the contamination:
1. The Piles themselves and in particular the output from the Pile stacks carried to 
atmosphere the effluent cooling air together with radioactive gases and particles 
produced during the Pile operation. This inevitably included large quantities of 
radioactive argon derived from the argon gas naturally present in air.
2. The Pile Ponds in which irradiated fuel elements were stored under water 
resulting in corrosion and the consequent release of some of the contents into the 
water. Gas evolution and spray from wind action were thought to be mechanisms 
for the release of radioactive substances to the environment and not only in the 
immediate vicinity of the site.
3. The de-canning shed where operations involved raising the fuel cartridges, 
stripping off the aluminium cans and separating out the irradiated uranium which 
contained plutonium and radioactive by-products. This operation released 
radioactive droplets and gases.
4. The chemical separation and plutonium purification plants in which the uranium 
fuel was subjected to a number of chemical processes resulting in the isolation of 
plutonium, uranium and unwanted radioactive by-products. Most of the 
radioactive products and by-products were stored either on or off site but low level 
liquid wastes were discharged to the atmosphere through a separate stack (the
19 judgment p.5.
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reprocessing stack). Low level solid wastes were stored off-site at Drigg or 
incinerated on site.
5. The fire in Pile No. 1 which lasted two days (in early October 1957) and 
resulted in the (a) uncontrolled release of gases and fine particles to the 
atmosphere, (b) run-off of contaminated water to the Pile Ponds and via the run­
off pipe line to the sea, (c) contamination of areas adjacent to the Pile building and 
areas surrounding the plant to distances of many kilometres20
Although his Lordship did not expound on the working history of George Reay and David 
Hope, it is clear from the transcript that both men were exposed to high doses of 
occupational exposure. As fitters, Reay was involved in the removal/recovery of burst 
cartridges from the core, while Hope was involved in lowering experimental cartridges 
down to the core. Such procedures required the men to lift the roof manhole cover, 
thereby exposing a concrete plug in the biological shield of the core. In order to carry 
out their duties, both men had to straddle the access holes from the pile roof to the roof 
core, with their gonads suffering direct exposure. In addition to this work, both men were 
also employed in the heavily radioactive pond and bay areas. Only later was it realized 
how radioactive the water was.
Despite evidence from the Plaintiffs with regard to a 'cavalier approach' in respect of 
radioactive emissions, his Lordship was keen to play down the significance of any present 
day concerns in relation to Sellafield, asserting21:
 this case is not, at least directly, concerned with the current wider pubic
20 Judgment p.9-10.
21 Judgment p.4-5.
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interest in the merits or demerits, environmental or otherwise of nuclear power and 
nuclear process;
and:
 evidence regarding radiation doses received by Mr. Reay and Mr. Hope before
conception of their respective daughters Dorothy and Vivien and by others may 
have little bearing on conditions at Sellafield or at other plants at the present day".
In choosing to reject many of the wider implications of the Gardner Study for present and 
future workers; their families; and local residents; Mr. Justice French removed any hope 
that Reay and Hope, a test case, could fulfil the goals identified by Rosenberg 
(1984:851), of contributing towards a more 'public law vision of the tort system' where 
"maximizing social welfare and protecting individual entitlement" co-exist. Acknowledging 
Rosenberg's 'utilitarian rights based model' would have allowed the judge to consider 
issues of accountability; pollution deterrence; and in light of such novel scientific evidence, 
adoption of a more precautionary approach, redefined for toxic tort purposes - "prudent 
action in advance of scientific certainty"22 (Attfieid 1994:152). In the event however, 
his Lordship opted for traditionalism and orthodoxy over innnovation.
22 There is, at present, no comprehensive or 
definitive definition of the precautionary 
principle. The Hon. Mrs Justice Smith in her 
Judgment, R v Secretary of State for Trade and 
Industry, ex parte Duddridge and others QBD 
October 3, 1994 acknowledged that over the 
years the 'expression' had been used in a 
number of international declarations, 
conventions and treaties (p.7), and that it 
appeared to be a policy intended to protect 
the environment. However, Mrs justice Smith 
went on to say it "is not intended to apply 
to damage to health caused by environmental 
factors unless those factors are or might in 
themselves be damaging to the environment in 
the long term" p.20.
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There are three main areas that will be examined (all covered in greater depth earlier on 
in the thesis) which provide a framework upon which to evaluate and consider the 
Judgment23, and in so doing integrate the various strands of the research together. The 
headings include:
- Science and Science/Law Interaction
- Causation
- Expert Evidence
(ie: Occupational/Environmental Dosimetry; Epidemiology and Genetics).
Science and Law Interaction
From the case analysis it seems that Mr. Justice French was willing to accept the inter­
disciplinary approach of science and law, and Vanyo's (1974:57) assertion that "they 
both involve rules of some sort; they both involve data or facts of some sort; and they 
both reach conclusions based on analytical reasoning". This is why for many (Sive 1974; 
Smith 1989; Jones 1994) lawyers' perception of science is of a universal, ideal 'pure' 
knowledge form (supremely rational, open-minded, emotionally detached, objective and 
neutral24). As a consequence, say Wynne and Smith (1989), many judicial fact finders 
increasingly rely upon scientific expertise to assist them in their ultimate decision making. 
Although science and law remain separate disciplines, one of the consequence of this 
professional alliance is the potential deconstruction of both areas distinctive knowledge 
base, with "s ;ience as a body of knowledge and law as a body of knowledge becoming 
blurred as the practices of science and law each intrude one upon the other" Jones 
(1994:270).
23 When analysing the Judgment, none of the detail 
that emerged from the transcripts (discussed in 
Ch.4) will be reviewed in any depth.
24 Please refer to Ch.2.
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Simply acknowledging this increasing interaction of science and law however, does not 
confront the main issue - whose account of science informs judicial decision making? As 
Green (1989:113) points out, most "legal institutions are staffed by non-scientists, non­
engineers and non-doctors" yet all too often, lawyers are called upon, and expected to 
resolve, complex scientific questions for which they have little or no training. Despite this 
lack of scientific knowledge, Green goes on to say that most legal professionals do not 
perceive this as a problem, they simply "construct a model of scientific knowledge which 
allows for an account of the science-Iaw interaction in which non specialists understanding 
of specific issues is sufficient for the resolution of all legal problems" (Ibid).
While Mr. Justice French made a serious effort to clarify and comprehend the scientific 
evidence, as well as cope with the complexities of the arguments, his Lordship nonetheless 
accepted without question the interpretive framework upon which science is based, and 
further, proceeded to utilise scientific methodology for his own decision making purposes.
Unlike the courts in the US which have attempted to identify defined boundary lines 
between judging the process (judicially acceptable) and judging the basis of scientific 
knowledge (judicially unacceptable), the English courts have always accepted the 
legitimacy and authority of scientific knowledge. Regarding science as a joint ally in the 
shared project of truth finding, law has assimilated its defintion of scientific methodology 
(rationality, objectivity, neutrality) and utilised it for its own purposes. When Mr. Justice 
French omitted from consideration any wider concerns with regard to the basis of 
scientific evidence, he did so in the belief that certain facts could therefore be fragmented 
and separated for resolution, exclusively by reference to empiricism.
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When comparing legal v scientific standards of proof there are two juxtaposing positions. 
The first that the legal standards of proof need not be as rigorous as the scientific 
standards (Miller 1987); the other, that the standard of proof in the courtroom is more 
rigorous than those exercised by the scientific community (Levin 1987). Under 
traditional tort doctrine, the civil burden of proof requires the plaintiff to establish a 51 
per cent tilt in his favour to succeed on the balance of probabilities. In contrast, the 
epidemiological standard of proof is determined by calculating the statistical significance 
of the P-value, which in this case was identified by Gardner as having a 5 per cent 
probability (95%  certainty) that any association was due to chance. Forming only one 
part of the Bradford Hill criteria therefore, the strength of the association, along with 
consistency, evidence of a dose response relationship, analogy, specificity, temporal 
association, experiment and biological plausibility make up the guidelines laid down by 
Bradford Hill, with the aim of assisting epidemiologists, and in this case Mr. Justice French 
establish causation.
Although it may have been pragmatic for Mr. Justice French to have utilised the Bradford 
Hill criteria, there is no way of knowing the legal reasoning behind his decision. 
Unfortunately, the all important 'judicial discovery process', discussed in 5(1), remains 
an elusive element. Whether the cumulative effect of attempting to combine the balance 
of probabilities, with guidelines laid down by the Bradford Hill criteria, raised the overall 
standard of proof in this case, remains an open question. While probability theory may 
offer a prescriptive way of assessing such judicial uncertainties in the future (a point 
considered in greater detail in the next section), it presupposes a subjective prior 
probability model, and knowledge of judicial calculation of the probability of compound
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events (Manansky 1997). Without more information therefore, it is virtually impossible 
to determine the weighting basis upon which Mr. Justice French reached his conclusion.
From discussion of this part of the Judgment, certain criticisms can be made:
1. The Judge appears to have accepted without question the interpretive 
framework upon which science is based.
2. His Lordship accepted the existence of a methodological alliance between 
science and law which allowed him to blur the boundaries of scientific and legal 
decision making.
3. French, J. applied and utilised a scientifically constructed model to justify his 
decision.
Causation
The issue of causation continues to be a major problem for any toxic tort plaintiff relying 
on the traditional basis of causation. In recognition of this fact, legal academics and 
lawyers are currently in debate over the all or nothing approach of the 'but for' test, the 
'loss of chance' question and where the burden of proof should lie.
Mr. Hytner on behalf of the plaintiffs cited Bonnington Castings Ltd v Wardlow25, and 
McGhee v National Coal Board26 in support of his assertion that, provided the factor 
responsible for the illness made a material contribution to the disease, or materially 
contributed to the risk of the disease and was not de minimis, the defendants were liable. 
The only way the Defendants could escape liability therefore, is if it could be shown that 
PPI was so overwhelmingly trivial post August 1954, as to be of minimal significance, as:
25 [1956] 1 AIIER 615, [1956] AC 613.
26 [1972] 3 All ER 1008, [1973] 1 WLR 1 HL.
311
Prior to 1954 there was no statutory duty and the Minister of Supply, 
succeeded by the Lord President of the Council, was liable for any breach of 
common-Iaw duties (Day 90, p. 28G-H).
Not surprisingly therefore, the plaintiffs rejected the more recent case, Hotson v East 
Berkshire Area Health Authority27 in which the House of Lords reasserted the authority 
of the all or nothing approach of the but for test, whereby an increase in risk was deemed 
insufficient to amount to causation28.
Relying on Bonnington; McGhee and other cases such as Wilsher v Essex Area Health 
Authority29 (which in the opinion of the plaintiffs, upheld that part of the McGhee case 
which equated increase risk with causation) for their Closing Submission, Mr. Hytnerwent 
on to highlight the impossible task of plaintiffs proving, on the balance of probabilities, 
which particular photon or alpha particle may be responsible for which mutation causing 
leukaemia:
My Lord, the interesting thing is this, that photons are continually reaching the 
body from the background radiation for which the Defendants are certainly not 
responsible. How could we possibly prove, even if PPI is a cause of the Seascale 
excess, that Vivien Hope's NHL wasn't initiated or promoted eventually by a 
proton of gamma from outer space, background radiation having nothing to do 
with Sellafield? How do we know that Dorothy Reay was not one of those
27
28
29
[1987] AC 750, [1987] 2 AH ER909 HL.
As discussed in Ch.2(3), despite this ruling, 
the court left open the question of whether 
'loss of chance' might in the future form 
an action in the tort of negligence, Lord 
MacKay in his speech said, "1 consider it 
would be unwise in the present case to lay 
down as a rule that a plaintiff could never 
succeed by proving a loss of chance" Hotson 
v East Beiicshire Area Health Authority [ 1987] 
2 AH ER 909 HL at 477.
[1988] 1 All ER 871, [1988] AC 1074 HL.
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unfortunate infants of whom there clearly are many whose childhood leukaemia is 
indeed caused by background radiation?
If this point is in fact a valid one, no Plaintiff could every prove a case. It would 
be quite impossible because if you don't know which photon or which alpha 
particle caused the damage, caused the mutation, all these millions that are passing 
through the body, it doesn't matter what statistical evidence you produce to show 
likelihood, you have got to prove this one (Day 90, p.39A-D).
Citing Lord Bridge in Wilsher50 in support of his assertion that a judge is therefore
entitled to draw inferences from the evidence, Mr. Hytner continued:
But where the layman is told by the doctors that the longer the brick dust remains 
on the body, the greater the risk of dermatitis, although the doctors cannot 
identify the process of causation scientifically, there seems to be nothing irrational 
in drawing inferences, as a matter of common sense, that the consecutive period 
when brick dust remained on the body, probably contributed cumulatively to the 
causation of dermatitis. I believe that a process of inferential reasoning on these 
general lines underlies the decision of the majority in McGhee's case.
The defendants challenged the plaintiffs' interpretation of McGhee, as well as the 
interpretation which had been placed on McGhee by the Court of Appeal in Wilsher, in 
particular, the majority judgment of Lord Justice Mustill and Lord Justice Glideweli 
expressed by Mustill, L.J. in the following terms:
If it is an established fact that conduct of a particular kind creates a risk that injury 
will be caused to another or increases an existing risk that injury will ensue; and if 
the two parties stand in such a relationship that the one party owes a duty not to 
conduct himself in that way; and if the first party does conduct himself in that way; 
and if the other party does suffer injury of the kind to which the risk is related; 
then the first party is taken to have caused the injury by his breach of duty, even 
though the existence and extent of the contribution made by the breach cannot be 
ascertained31.
30 Ibid at 1088 B.
31 [1988] AC 1074 HL at 771.
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From the viewpoint of the Defendants, any attempt to extract some esoteric principle 
from McGhee was fruitless and misguided; the Court had simply been adopting a 
pragmatic approach to the facts of the case, and on this occasion, the majority concluded 
that it was a legitimate inference of those facts that the defendants' negligence had 
materially contributed to the plaintiff's injury.
Clearly, Mr. Justice French could have raised some of these issues in his judgment and/or 
made reference to the various authorities cited by the plaintiffs and defendants. In 
particular, he could have offered his opinion on judicial inference of inconclusive scientific 
and medical evidence, and referred to the problems of general v specific causation.
The uniqueness of Reay and Hope offered his Lordship the opportunity to contribute to 
the debate on the problems of causation and also, as part of his written judgment, to have 
identified some wider issues underlying this area from a legal perspective. Because he 
chose to present his Judgment solely on the basis of empirical facts and scientific criteria, 
very little law was actually considered. Yet according to MacCormick (1978:103), "legal 
decisions must make sense in the world and they must also make sense in the context of 
the legal system. In our problem cases, they must be based on rulings which make sense 
in the context of the legal system".
Expert Evidence
From discussion of experts witnesses in Ch.3, it would seem, despite statutory and other 
regulatory authority, there remain a number of ambiguities and uncertainties surrounding 
judicial interpretation of expert evidence, including: perceived level of witness
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competence, witness credibility, potential bias of witnesses, court presentation of 
witnesses. In addition however, other factors such as the death of a primary witness, in 
this case, Professor Martin Gardner, and the non-attendance of Professor Nomura, may 
also have impacted on his Lordship's decision making. Commenting on Professor
Nomura's absence, M r Justice French said32 "It was unfortunate that he [Professor
Nomura] was unable to defend his studies in person or even, it would seem, via a satellite 
video link between London and Osaka".
With regard to the experts who did attend the trial, their areas of expertise (already 
broken down for the purposes of the trial and case analysis) remain, Occupational and 
Environmental Dosimetry, Epidemiology and Genetics.
Occupational Dosimetry
In respect of internal and external Occupational Dosimetry, figures were only achieved 
after a compromise between Plaintiffs and Defendants. The agreement, subsequently 
presented to the court, on day five of the trial by Dr. Rex Strong on behalf of BNFL, was 
referred to by his Lordship in his Judgment33:
By far the largest element in computing the total paternal radiation dose received 
by individuals is the occupational dose ie. that received while at work at the 
Sellafield plant. Had the occupational doses remained in contention it would have 
occupied the court for many weeks, even months. It would have involved to a 
very much greater extent than is now necessary an examination of basic nuclear 
physics, of the various types of radiation, of the impact of those types of radiation 
on the human body, and of varying impact of those types of radiation on different 
parts of the body. It would have involved detailed evidence as to the nature of the
32 Judgment p.207.
33 Judgment p. 17.
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operations carried on at Seilafield, the times spent by the workers concerned at 
various locations on the site, the amounts of radiation to which they were subject 
at the various locations, the nature and effectiveness of protective measures taken 
and the effectiveness or otherwise of methods designed to record doses to the 
workers. All this would have been in the context that the majority of the events 
in question took place 30 to 40 years ago.
As matters have turned out however the parties, with eminent good sense, have 
rendered a forensic exercise of the sort outlined unnecessary.
Mr. Justice French went on to say however:
I shall make one further observation regarding Dr. Strong's agreed statement. He 
ends it with an express reservation that the dose figures as agreed "are intended to 
be used by epidemiologists in this litigation, who have a technical appreciation of 
the scientific limitations of the data and who are prepared to accept them in this 
light as being indicative rather than definitive34.
Three factors arise from this part of the trial. Firstly, despite the 'agreement' reached by 
the parties there remains uncertainty over the reliability of the figures. Secondly, most 
of the problems relating to occupational dosimetry35 only emergedas a consequence of 
the discovery process (the Howells factor) and would have remained hidden, had it not 
been for the litigation. Thirdly, the Plaintiffs' made serious allegations against a public 
body (the NRPB), raising serious concerns over their neutrality and relationship with in- 
house experts and affiliated bodies whose expertise dominates the field under investigation; 
particularly significant, given that the plaintiffs called no witnesses on their own behalf 
after settlement of the 'agreement'.
Clearly all these matters are of public concern, and again bring us back to the private v 
public law debate discussed earlier on in the thesis. Had the traditional tort approach
34 judgment p. 19
35 Discussed in Chapter 4(2).
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been questioned, perhaps his Lordship would have been less concerned with when the 
'parties reached an agreement', and rather more, with the serious public health and policy 
issues that emerged as a consequence of the 'agreement'.
Environmental Dosimetry
A  number of issues arise from the environmental dosimetry36 part of the case, not least 
the 'Jakeman factor' which resulted in releases of uranium oxide levels being increased 
from 440 grams to 20  kilograms. Other discharges, including iodine, argon 41, 
polonium, caesium, strontium were also highlighted by the plaintiffs as providing other 
examples where incomplete or inadequate data existed with regard to radioactive 
discharges and releases. Here again, discovery produced information that neither the 
defendants nor any other monitoring agency seemed aware of.
As with occupational dosimetry, the plaintiffs called no witnesses on their own account, 
relying instead on cross examination to highlight the persistent errors, over confidence and 
defensiveness of the defendants, as well as the cavalier approach they adopted towards 
radioactive emissions. The plaintiffs further allege attempts by the Defendants to "rubbish" 
the reputation of Dr. Jakeman (as a result of his whistle-blowing activities) and again made 
reference to the fact that the NRPB were "too friendly" with the NRPB to fulfil its 
independent monitoring role, thereby safeguarding the public interest.
In preparation for, and also to counter such allegations, the Defendants' devised the 
Seilafield Environmental Assessment Model (SEAM) in order to calculate the
36 See Ch. 4(3) for a more detailed discussion of this area.
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concentrations of different radionuclides in the environment. According to Professor 
Jones, SEAM provided one of the most comprehensive mathematical models yet devised 
to assess historic discharges from the Seilafield site.
Mr. Justice French took on board many of the plaintiffs' concerns, when he said:
To these and other arguments advanced by Mr. Hytner I have given careful 
consideration. I can well see that from the plaintiffs' viewpoint there were good 
grounds for initial suspicion in a number of respects. Having heard Professor Jones 
[BNFL] and Dr. Stather [NRPB] I did feel that they displayed a measure of 
defensiveness perhaps, due in part at least, to Mr. Hytner's and Mr. Read's fair but 
searching cross examination. Also, I think it probable that the defendants, like any 
undertaker whose activities may cause pollution, would prefer uncomfortable facts 
to be presented in their most favourable light.
His Lordship went onto say:
....That said, the probity and competence of Professor Jones, and Dr. Stather are 
beyond question. I am satisfied that I can rely on the evidence to the extent that 
they were doing their honest and expert best to put the full picture regarding 
environmental dose before the court. While by no means all emission of 
radionuclides have been accounted for, let alone recorded, I have sufficient 
confidence in Professor Jones' SEAM model and in his evidence37
In the same way that his Lordship concentrated on the 'agreement' rather than the 
substance of the evidence with regard to occupational dosimetry, he appears to have 
repeated the same error of judgment in respect of environmental dosimetry. Professor 
Jones' expertise provided a prime example of a situation in which he, as the scientist was 
distinguished from BNFL as an institution. In his Judgment, Mr. Justice French 
acknowledged that not all emissions had been either accounted for, or recorded, ignoring 
this point further, he went on to say that he nonetheless found the "probity and 
competence" of Professor Jones to be "beyond question". There are clearly two different
37 judgement p.27-28.
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issues here, one dealing with Professor Jones' competence to formulate mathematical 
historic assessment models, the other, the fact that the defendants repeatedly failed to 
account for, or record, emissions of radionuclides released into the environment.
What emerges from analysis of the environmental dosimetry evidence is the ongoing 
uncertainty over discharge figures. Many (Busby 1994; Gould and Gouldman 1990; 
Sutcliffe 1987; Bertell 1986; Stemgiass 1981) believe that the true emission figures (then 
as now) are in fact far higher than appreciated, or admitted to, and that the nuclear 
industry, and BNFL in particular, have a vested interest in being economical with the 
truth. Although Mr. Justice French was aware of these ongoing evidential inconsistencies 
and also, Dr. Stather's concession under cross examination that the NRPB did not, and 
do not, have the expertise to validate discharge figures given to them by BNFL, his 
Lordship appears to have disregarded these factors in favour of his opinion and evaluation 
of Professor Jones' and Dr Stather's court presentation as expert witnesses, rather than 
confront the issues raised. (Coincidentally, referring to the Academy of Expert research, 
judicial reliance on 'presentation' of evidence rather than 'evidential content' was 
identified by 68 per cent of members as an area of major concern38).
Epidemiology
Epidemiological studies are notoriously subject to methodological problems, incomplete 
or unreliable data and are more concerned with general rather than specific causation. 
As a consequence of such scientific uncertainty says Jasanoff (1996:405), judges often 
become adept at the boundary work of decision making, a process which subjectively
38 Please see Ch.5(3) for further information.
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allows them "to demarcate credible witnesses from unreliable ones"; junk science from 
mainstream science (Huber 1991); plausible theories from implausible ones. Whether one 
accepts or rejects the legitimacy of such boundary work, it is important because, as 
Hoffman (1984) observes, scientific and legal approaches to assessing evidence are, and 
should remain, distinct entities.
Unlike Judge Weinstein in the Agent Orange litigation, Mr. Justice French did not ponder 
on jurisprudential and evidential questions surrounding the general, rather than specific 
aims of epidemiology, nor whether weaker evidential standards were more appropriate for 
epidemiological evidence. What Mr. Justice French does appear to have done, is accept 
what Wynne (1989:47) has referred as "the social negotiation of scientific consensus" 
which as Chapter Two illustrated, presumes the existence of a recognized authority of 
scientific knowledge, reinforced by the assumption that courts are capable of determining 
what constitutes legitimate scientific expert opinion. On this occasion however, 
epidemiology did not simply assist the decision maker, it also provided the methodological 
foundation and justification for the judgment.
Acknowledging the role of epidemiological research as providing an assessment of the 
probability:
(a) that there is an association between the exposure of interest and the disease of 
interest;
(b) that the association, if any, is causal;
His Lordship reiterated the fact that in this case, the exposure of interest was ionising
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radiation and the disease of interest was cancer of the blood. Reminding the court that 
Dorothy Reay's cancer was leukaemia while Vivien Hope's cancer was NHL, Mr. Justice 
French proceeded to outline certain considerations:
(i) whether the exposure of interest was causally connected with both forms of cancer;
(ii) whether both forms of cancer should properly be regarded as one disease of 
interest in assessing the probabilities of causation;
(iii) if not, what the probabilities are, applying the same methods of assessment to 
each, that leukaemia on the one hand and NHL on the other hand were casually 
connected with the exposure of interest.
Accepting the epidemiological evidence as providing the foundation of the plaintiffs' case, 
his Lordship went on to conclude that if, on the evidence before him "no reasonably 
possible or plausible route or pathway had been shown by which radiation emitted by the 
defendants could have caused one or both of the diseases, [it] would clearly be a very 
important matter to put in the scales when deciding whether one or both cases were 
proved"39. Where one or several epidemiologists or other scientists find an association, 
or do not find an association, or are able or unable to establish causation, then such a 
finding would, as Mr. Justice French commented "be most helpful to the judge40. 
Despite offering some judicial assistance however, expert epidemiological opinion remains 
divided and contenious, to quote Sales and Simon (1993:235) once again:
...Scholars may have different theoretical and methodological orientations, existing 
research may not provide definitive answers, the same data can be interpreted in 
a variety of ways, the appropriateness of one sampling technique may be disputed, 
the appropriateness of the statistics chosen may be open to question, and so forth.
39 judgment p. 34.
40 judgment p. 35.
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Referring to the common problems of bias and boundary tightening associated with case 
control and cohort studies, his Lordship identified the Bristol case, multiple hypotheses 
and sub-groups analyses as particular methodological weaknesses alleged by the defendants 
in respect of the Gardner study. Mr. Justice French quoted directly from Professor Doll's 
conclusions:
I have previously concluded that the observations of an excess number of cases of 
leukaemia and non-Hodgkin's lymphoma in Seascale was not the result of paternal 
preconceptional irradiation but could most reasonably be explained by a 
combination of chance and the effect of the sort of socio-demographic factors 
described by Kinlen and that the statistical association with paternal preconception 
irradiation found by Gardner et al (1990) was probably due to a combination of 
chance and the post hoc selection of an atypical subgroup of the young people 
who developed leukaemia in West Cumbria for concentrated study. The new 
evidence that has become available supports this conclusion".
His Lordship went on to say:
This is a conclusion which, on the evidence as a whole, seems to me no less 
plausible than the Gardner hypothesis41
Although Mr. Justice French doubted whether any epidemiological study had been subject 
to so lengthy or so rigorous examination as the Gardner study had undergone during the 
trial, and recognised that under similar scrutiny no "epidemiological study would emerged 
unscathed42", his Lordship does not appear to have applied the same rigorous standards 
demanded of the Gardner study to either the A-bomb research43 or the Kinlen 
hypothesis, both of which were severely criticised for methodological inconsistencies and 
unreliable or contradictory conclusions.
41 Judgment p.208-209.
42 Judgment p. 194.
43 The A-bomb studies were equally important to the 
epidemiological and genetics evidence.
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Given his Lordship's disinclination to apply comparative evidential standards, or consider 
important evidential questions that emerged as a consequence of these methodological 
inconsistencies, it is perhaps not surprising that Mr. Justice French also chose to ignore the 
words of Professor Macmahon44, when he said:
Rarely can we be certain that a causal relationship exists, but by assembling 
evidence from any different angles we may build a body of support sufficient to 
convince most reasonable people that it is more prudent to act as though an 
association were causal than to assume that it is not. The point in the 
accumulation of evidence at which this decision is reached depends in considerable 
part on the consequences of the alternative actions to be taken as a result of the 
judgment (Day 58, p .l 1E-F).
In blurring the boundaries of scientific and legal decision making, Mr. Justice French 
demonstrated the inherent difficulties of ruling on conflicting epidemiological evidence. 
The question of "whose knowledge should count as valid, and according to what criteria", 
are identified by Jasanoff (1993:19) as pertinent considerations when addressing the 
reconstruction and redefinition of scientific knowledge within a legal context.
Genetics
In his introduction to the genetics evidence, his Lordship reiterated the fact that the 
plaintiffs' case is:
 that the epidemiological evidence is very strong and could only be displaced
by a demonstration that the cause and effect they assert is impossible45
44 Judgment p.35.
45 Judgment p.l 18.
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Reminding the Court that the Plaintiffs were not suggesting any formal transfer of the 
general burden of proof to the defendants and that this remained with the Plaintiffs, 
his Lordship proceeded to outline the plaintiffs' allegation that qualitatively it had been 
proved that a pre-disposition to leukaemia could be transferred through the paternal 
germline.
The Defendants, again while not assuming any burden of proof, were concerned to 
demonstrate that the existence of any mechanism whereby PPI could pre-dispose to 
leukaemias in offspring was highly implausible.
Outlining the main focus of the genetics evidence as establishing:
 whether there exists a plausible or reasonably possible biological pathway or
mechanism by which radiation emitted by or from the Seilafield plant could have 
caused or materially contributed to one or both of the two disease46.
His Lordship identified two central questions:
a) whether or not irradiation of paternal gonads can cause a predisposition to 
leukaemia and/or NHL in children; and/or:
b) can do so having regard to the doses of radiation received by the fathers in 
these cases.
Explaining the importance of biological plausibility, his Lordship went on to say:
If the alleged causal connection is biologically impossible as regards one or both 
diseases then, no matter what the statistics purport to show, the claim or claims, 
as the case may be, cannot succeed. Equally if the alleged causal connection is 
widely implausible in respect of one or both diseases that must have a bearing 
on the weight to be given to the statistical probabilities of the matter. Conversely, 
if a plausible biological mechanism exists, that helps the plaintiffs' case by fulfilling 
one of the Bradford Hill criteria (Ibid).
46 judgment p.7-8.
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Pointing out the importance of the genetics evidence in helping to establish both biological 
plausibility and the issue of causation, Mr. Justice French identified risk estimates (derived 
from human, animal, and human cell in vitro data) and advances in medical knowledge 
as fundamental in establishing whether leukaemia and or lymphomas have a heritable 
component (apart from syndromes related) and if so, whether the Gardner hypothesis 
could plausibly explain the Seascale excess.
Accepting the consensus of expert opinion that in the main there was a 'small non­
syndrome' heritable component. Mr. Justice French stated:
For the purposes of this Judgment I am content to assume that there is a heritable 
component for the two diseases but that it is very small47
Referring to the inconsistencies that exist between the A-bomb data and the Gardner 
study, his Lordship reminded the Court that both national and international agencies had 
relied on the A-bomb data for purposes of risk assessment and radiological protection 
standards over many years. Commenting that these nuclear agencies would not have 
taken this action if it had been unsafe to do so, his Lordship went onto to say:
In my judgment they [the Plaintiffs] do indeed show that a causal relationship 
between PPI and leukaemias in F1 [off spring] should not be excluded on purely 
mechanistic grounds, though clearly, a great deal more research is necessary. What 
they do not do in my judgment, is to show that, in light of current knowledge the 
Seascale cluster is capable of being explained numerically by the biological 
mechanisms which are the subject of their research48
47 judgment p. 200.
48 judgment p.205.
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Moving on, his Lordship made reference to the novel features of the evidence and the 
Plaintiffs' claim that "in terms of human experience and studies, the Seascale phenomenon 
is probably unique"49. He referred to the work of Professor Meuth who pointed out 
that the scientific community were failing to take account of important genetic factors 
when making risk estimates; Dr. Cox who identified certain unconventional mechanisms 
to explain the biological mechanism; and Dr. Thacker who said "we will not understand 
the potential mutagenic and carcinogenic consequences of radiation exposure until we 
have thoroughly analyzed radiation-induced mutation at representative sites in the human 
genome"50. There is no doubt that, as with that the link between smoking and lung 
cancer, the biological mechanism responsible for PPI remains at the cutting edge of 
scientific research and, in the opinion of his Lordship therefore, "speculative".
In rejecting the opinion of Professor Day with regard to the limitations of the A-bomb 
data in respect of dose assessment; variation of population sensitivity and composition; 
differences in exposure levels; and the fact that synergism was not considered a relevant 
factor for inclusion in the A-bomb data; his Lordship also by implication, rejected the 
evidence of Professor Neil, who illustrated the problems of relying on conventional 
genetics, and Dr. Thacker, who as well as identifying the differences between animal and 
human data outlined above, also drew the Courts' attention to the differences between 
acute v chronic radiation exposure.
49 Judgment p. 206.
50 His Lordship cited Dr Thacker's comments made 
on Day 73, p. 31B of the proceedings.
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Concerned over the non-attendance of Professor Nomura and the Plaintiffs' thwarted 
attempts to make contact, his Lordship appears to have disregarded the observations made 
by Dr. Cox in his evidence, that (as yet) nobody had actually repeated Professor 
Nomura's study (Day 75, p.50C) and further that, Professor Nomura was a well known 
and internationally recognised mouse geneticist (Day 75, p. 49F-H). Relying instead on 
the scathing professional and personal attack made by Dr. Selby, his Lordship said of 
Professor Nomura:
The defendants devoted a great deal of time and expertise on a detailed 
critique of Professor Nomura's studies with a view to demonstrating their 
unreliability. Professor Nomura himself was unable to attend the hearing because 
of illness and the Japanese government's refusal to permit him to leave Japan. He 
did grapple with some of the criticisms in supplementary written reports. A  
sufficient number of unanswered or insufficiently answered criticisms remained, 
however, for me to feel unable to place reliance on Professor Nomura's studies as 
lending support to the Gardner hypothesis. Nor am I impressed by the studies 
on which he relied as supporting his own results51.
Currently, much of the accepted wisdom over genetic research is under review. Genetics 
as a discipline has moved from a letter in the journal Nature by Watson and Crick in April 
1953, to the discovery of the genetic code; it is virtually impossible to predict with any 
certainty what will happen in molecular biology over the next decade. Despite conceding 
to the existence of a 'small' genetic component, his Lordship seemed unable or, unwilling, 
to embrace the developing world of genetics.
In addition to problems of new, novel, or unconventional scientific evidence however, 
many members of the Academy of Experts also expressed concern over judicial
51 Judgment p. 206.
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understanding of traditional scientific evidence. O f those who took part in the Survey52, 
the following views were fairly representative53:
 My main comment would be the apparent lack of understanding of technical
issues by the judge, which impeded clear resolution of often complex problems.
The knowledge of judges varies considerably; some know the subject very well and 
giving evidence is easy, other have no idea about the subject and therefore do not 
understand the complexities of detailed expert evidence
I think that judges may be influenced by a well written report where ethical 
explanations are rendered comprehensible insofar that when he has to recap he will 
refer to the report that he finds easiest to read and is most likely to answer the 
question that it in his mind.
[Regardless of expert evidence] The bias of the judge is still evident in some cases 
to the point that it is visible to all in the court.
“judgment Conclusion
Like the Agent Orange case, Reay 8C Hope was not a traditional tort action, subject to 
qualitative and quantitative difference therefore, alternative approaches to the decision 
making process should have been considered. All toxic tort disputes, by their nature, 
involve complex injuries, time scales and evidence. Consequently, presiding judges, as 
part of their understanding process, need to embrace not only the limits of scientific 
theory and methodology, but also some basic assumptions with regard to tort law. 
Some legal theorists (Rosenberg 1984; Schuck 1987; Reece 1996), while still believing 
that toxic torts remain essentially 'tort disputes', also recognise the unique and distinctive 
character of these claims and the need to have new models to represent them. In
52 Further details of this survey may be found in 
Ch.3.
53 See Ch.3 and Ch.5(3) for further discussion 
of this research
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addition to greater scientific epistemoiogical awareness therefore, judges need to question 
the whole legitimacy of relying on the traditional tort approach to resolve cases of this 
complexity.
In the US, toxic tort development has already resulted in an undermining of the 
traditional basis of tort. As Schuck (1987:12) points out:
1. Tort law and moved from an individualistic grounding toward a more collective 
one.
2. The criteria for evaluating the parties' behaviour has moved from moral 
categories to more functional ones. Evaluations of conduct based on fault, specific 
causation and corrective justice norms have increasingly given way to 
considerations of compensation, deterrence, and administrative efficiency.
3. Today's judge does not simply decide between competing proofs and legal 
theories offered by the parties; he or she is also widely expected to administer large 
scale litigation with an eye to achieving broad social purposes.
The unique features of Reay and Hope fit neatly into this broader paradigm and could 
have provided a basic foundation upon which his Lordship could have built. Instead, Mr. 
Justice French chose to apply a scientific and factual framework upon which to base his 
decision, thereby omitting from consideration any other factors outside the strict, narrow 
parameters defined by him.
From the Judgment analysis therefore a number of factors emerge:
1. Mr. Justice French failed to take advantage of, or alternatively chose not to proceed 
with the wide discretionary powers he had to be innovative. His Lordship was unwilling 
to consider any alternative to the traditional 'individualistically orientated' tort approach.
2. The Judge accepted without question the interpretive framework upon which science 
is based, and allowed his own subjective evaluation of what constituted legitimate scientific 
authority to impact on his decision making.
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3. His Lordship assumed the existence of a close methodological alliance between science 
and law, and in so doing utilised a scientifically constructed model to not only assist, but 
also justify his decision making.
4. Mr. Justice French made no mention of cited authority, and made no attempt to 
grapple with important evidential and jurisprudential questions surrounding toxic torts and 
R eay  a n d  H o p e  in particular. In addition to cited authority, his lordship could have 
expanded on the difficulties of scientific causation v legal causation; traditional standards 
of proof; the preponderance rule; loss of opportunity; public v private law; the dilemma 
of the toxic tort; probability theory and evidential uncertainty54.
Before embarking on any definitive conclusions with regard to this case however, 5(3) will 
consider whether the implementation of some form of applied probabilistic reasoning would 
be a way forward in assisting the judiciary and others, in their understanding of the 
processes involved. Drawing on legal scholarship, and research discussed earlier on in the 
thesis55, this section will evaluate the viability of applied probabilistic theory, in particular 
Bayes1 theorem, to 'hard' cases such as R eay  an d  Hope.
54 Please refer to Chapter 2(3) for further 
discussion on this issue.
55 Queen's Bench Division judiciary. 
Academy of Expert members.
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5.3 THE APPLICATION OF PROBABILITY THEORY TO 1UD1C1AL DECISION
MAKING
Having looked at some of the problems with regard to judicial decision making, and 
considered the Reay and Hope judgment in particular, the thesis will concentrate on 
whether the application of some alternative method of judicial reasoning would be more 
appropriate in cases involving highly complex scientific expert evidence and whether, in 
the final anaylsis, this approach would benefit the toxic tort.
Although generally associated with criminal cases56, Bayes Theorem is seen as a possible 
way forward in assisting lawyers, legal academics and others to confront some of the more 
general problems raised in this chapter with regard to judicial decision making. In addition 
to evaluating current academic thinking on this issue however (Fienberg 1989; Aitken and 
Stoney 1991; Schum 1994; Aitkin 1995; Robertson and Vignaux 1995), this section 
will also incorporate empirical research from the judiciary, and from members of the 
Academy of Experts to assess the viability, and potential benefit of applying probabilistic 
reasoning to the decision making process.
For Holmes writing in the 1890s there was no doubt that a judge of the future should be 
a man of statistics, in his opinion therefore, an ideal system of law should draw its 
theoretical and legislative justifications from scientific methodology. Yet, notwithstanding 
the potential for the realisation of this ideal, there are, and remain, major obstacles to its 
fulfilment. Twenty years ago, Loevinger (1974:15) observed, "few lawyers have even a 
vague impression of the basic principles of statistics, sampling methods, or probability
56 See Footnote 63 (p.339) for case details.
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theory". Twenty years on, Loevinger (1995) is still highlighting the lack of statistical 
training in legal education, and reminding the legal establishment of the radical changes that 
have taken place in the fields of science and technology.
Brennan (1989) too acknowledges this development, but also draws our attention to the 
parallel growth of scientific expert evidence and the toxic tort. Reminding the reader that 
judges are use to thinking about causation in terms of "mechanistic causal chains" (while 
scientists rely on "probabilistic evidence of causation and statistical proof of 
proposition"57), Brennan says it is possible for the judge to misinterpret the hypothesis for 
causal proposition, or alternatively, to reject statistical evidence which may prove/disprove 
a particular hypothesis.
Increasingly, as Reay and Hope shows, judges are called upon to decide cases on the basis 
of highly complex (often contradictory) disparate pieces of scientific evidence where each 
piece of evidence (within its own academic discipline) may adopt a different or contrary 
perspective. For this reason, many academics (Bring and Aitken 1996; Schum 1994; 
Robertson and Vignaux 1995) believe that the application of statistical and probabilistic 
reasoning to the judicial decision making process would not only assist the judiciary (and 
other factfinders) in their understanding of the scientific evidence, but also offer an 
alternative to the top-down decision model (Michon and Pakes 1995) utilised by many 
judges in their decision making.
57 Probabilistic evidence relies on hypothesis 
building and hypotheses testing using 
statistics.
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However, while recognising the potential benefits of an increased use of statistical 
probabilistic reasoning in the courtroom, certain legal scholars such as Bring and Aitken 
(1996:134) claim that "the analytical framework proposed by statisticians does not 
adequately represent the reasoning needed in court" and further says Pakes (1996:148), 
"that judicial decision making is not quite like decision making when betting". Others, in 
particular legal educationalists (Twining 1984; Binder &  Bergman 1984), suggest that law 
schools should simply do more to develop a special awareness of the evaluation of 
evidence, appreciating perhaps, as Jeremy Bentham (1748-18 3 2 )58 and John Henry 
Wigmore (1863-19 4 3 )59 before them, the methodological gap that exists with regard to 
the decision making process, and the fact that "most decisions in court are taken under 
uncertainty" (Bring and Aitken 1996:134) where "conclusive evidence is either in very 
short supply or is quite impossible to obtain" (Schum 1994:1-2).
Although the concept of probability dates back to the gambling days of 1645 (Todhunter 
1865), as early as 1665 the German mathematician, Leibniz, had already proposed a 
probability calculus specifically for legal reasoning. Later in an attempt to utilize 
probabilistic reasoning more fully "clerics, merchants, historians, and others" (Schum 
1994:37) also aspired to apply probability theory to their daily working lives.
Notwithstanding the various unsuccessful attempts by mathematicians (Leibniz 1665;
58 See Bentham j. (1839) 5 Vol. Rationale of Judicial 
Evidence,
59 See Wigmore j.H . (1937) The Science of judicial Proof:
As Given by Logic, Psychology, and General Experience, 
and Illustrated in judicial Trials.
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Condorcet 1785; Wigmore 1937) to systemize legal reasoning into a coherent analytical 
method for drawing inferences from a mass of evidence, the claim suggests Balding (1994) 
that probability theory offers insights crucial to sensible reasoning, particularly about 
scientific evidence, has not gone away.
An eighteenth century clergyman and mathematician, the Reverend Thomas Bayes is 
generally credited with the establishment of a particular approach, which although not 
accepted by the legal establishment, and still regarded as highly controversial, has 
increasingly over the last decade, become a source of academic and judicial debate, as well 
as a major discussion topic at international conferences, and in papers/journals evaluating 
the use of probability reasoning in courts (Schum 1994). Before moving on to Bayes 
Theorem itself however, I will briefly reiterate some of the more important reasons for the 
possible implementation of applied probabilistic reasoning to judicial decision making.
The judicial decision making process particularly in 'hard' cases', without recourse to Bayes' 
theorem or other heuristics, is by its very nature probabilistic, therefore, as has been shown 
in 5(1) and 5(2), open to criticisms of subjective evaluation. Consequently, allegations, 
ill-founded or not, of judicial inconsistencies, judicial bias, judicial incompetence, political 
or public policy considerations overriding public perceptions of equity and justice; all rest 
with the failure of the judiciary to first, explain the reasoning behind their decision making 
(the discovery process) and second, to justify their decision in line with their reasoning, as 
part of that legal process.
Because scientific expert opinion seldom provides a definitive answer, and each item of
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evidence contributes to the 'probability assessment' (judicial hypothesis) in favour of one 
side or the other, the fact that the probity value of the evidence, in addition to some ill 
considered and irrational factors, discussed in 5(1), may also come into play, needs to be 
confronted. These factors it seems may contribute as much to the judge's 
understanding/misunderstanding, interpretation/ misinterpretation of the evidence, as his 
character, education, politics and religious beliefs. Further, judicial perception of the 
scientific witness (whether the expert is seen as credible and/or experienced) depends as 
much on the status of university/institution the expert is associated with as his age, gender, 
ethnic origin, court presentation, confidence and general disposition.
In order to help the judge in his understanding of the scientific evidence, as well as to 
prevent as many of these subjective 'irrational' unquantifiable factors as possible from 
influencing the decision maker, probability theory is seen as a way forward. Not only 
could it assist the fact finder in focusing more fully on the evidence in hand, but also offer 
an opportunity (combining the discovery process and justification) for the judgment to 
become more accessible to other jurists, legal academics and members of the public. For 
the first time, the 'world at large' may be able to understand and systematically follow the 
logic (the 'workings out') behind the conclusion of these scientifically complex cases, and 
in so doing, open the judgment to the type of rigorous scrutiny that is now expected in 
a democratic society where the boundaries of private and public law are becomingly 
increasingly blurred.
Despite the legal establishment's unwillingness to embrace change in this area, there has 
been a growth in the use of statistical information in courts. In part this increase has
335
occurred as a consequence of scientific development (particularly in areas such as forensic 
and genetic evidence). In addition, more technological advances, particularly in 
information technology has also heralded a massive shift in thinking with regard to the use 
and presentation of statistical data in the courtroom.
Today, statistical expertise is no longer confined to those with a degree in statistics. Many 
professionals in medicine, science, and social science receive formal training in statistical 
analysis and methodology as part of their education, and depend on theories of probability 
and applied statistics in the utilisation and presentation of their work. Because of this 
continued growth in the application of statistical methodology, it is not unreasonable to 
propose (from a longer term perspective) the inclusion of statistics as a core component 
within a wider LLB programme, or more immediately, the implementation of statistical 
training for judges, as part of their ongoing educational process.
Moving on to probability theory and Bayes Theorem in particular, it is worth reiterating 
a couple of general points for consideration. Probability say Robertson and Vignaux 
(1995:14) is "a rational measure of the degree of belief in the truth of an assertion based 
on information. The hypothesis, assertion, or premise is itself either true or false.
 Our degree of belief about the truth of the assertion is measured by our assessment
of its probability". Therefore, probability is a quantitative measure60 that allows us to 
assess, on the basis of probability, whether a particular hypothesis is true or false. The
60 Probability takes values between 0-1. A probability 
of 0 = (on the basis of the information) the hypothesis 
is false/impossible. A  probability of 1 = (on the basis 
of the information) the hypothesis is true/possible.
Most assessment of probabilities however, fall 
somewhere between 0-1.
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value of any assessment will of course depend on the quality of the information available. 
If a coin is thrown into the air, it is probable that it will come down heads. It is equally 
probable however, that it will come down tails. There are two possibilities for any 
outcome in this situation - heads/tails. The hypothesis is that it has one chance in two of 
coming down heads. The probability of it coming down heads may be quantified as 
1 t 2 =  0 .5 .
In the Bayesian approach however, probabilities represent subjective degrees of belief, 
rather than objective facts. Bayes' theory therefore starts with the factfinder's subjective 
prior knowledge (perhaps based on pre-trial case reading) which allows the judge to form 
a hypothesis, expressed as quantitative odds in favour of one side. This is known as 'prior 
odds' (assessment without evidence). The odds are obtained by dividing the probability 
that the hypothesis is true by the probability that it is false ie: the judge's hypothesis is 
that the Defendants have a 80%  chance of winning their case, while the plaintiffs have 
only a 20%  chance. Thus:
Prior odds =  Defendants 80%
Plaintiffs 20%
= Prior odds are 4 in favour of Defendants
New pieces of expert evidence (E l, E2, E3, E4) presented to the court however, offer 
the judge the opportunity to revise his prior hypothesis (based on no evidence) and turn 
them into posterior odds (final proposition based on evidence). To do this, the judge
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evaluates the likelihood ratio of the evidence61, assigning to each piece of evidence a 
value (anything from 0  to infinity) which is then multiplied by the prior odds, to give the 
final posterior odds (the final proposition), in favour of one side or the other. Thus:
Prior odds (Defendant/Plaintiff) x LR (E l, E2, E3, E4) =  Posterior odds.
In order to make the likelihood ratio more accessible, Evett (1991) has proposed the 
setting up of a verbal scale62 which allows the factfinder to translate the LR of the 
evidence into words. In the opinion of Redmayne (1997), this approach has certain 
advantages in offering some level of consistency between cases, and also making the 
presentation of complex scientific evidence more comprehensible.
Currently much of the criticism of Bayes' Theorem is based on its application and use in
61 The likelihood ratio (LR) compares one hypothesis 
to another and is defined as the probability of the 
data under the first hypothesis divided by the 
probability of the data under the second hypothesis.
62 'See Evett, 'Interpretation: A  Personal Odyssey' 
in Aitken and Stoney (eds): The Use of Statistics 
in Forensic Science (Ellis Horvsrood: Chichester 1991) 
in which he suggests the following correlation: 
Likelihood ratio Evidence strength
1 - 33 Weak
33 - 100 Fair
1 0 0 -3 3 0  Good
3 3 0 -  1000 Strong
1000+ Very strong
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criminal cases63. Most of this debate however, has been orientated towards jurors 
interpretation of DNA and other forensic evidence, rather than judicial rationalisation of 
scientific evidence. Clearly, while there is some overlap of methodology (regardless of 
whether the case be civil or criminal), this chapter is more concerned with the potential 
impact of Bayes' theorem on the judiciary, and in particular, whether it offers a way 
forward to a more coherent and consistent system of decision making64. Outlined below 
are the views of academics65, Queen's Bench Division Judges, and members of the 
Academy of Experts.
Legal and Socio-legal Theorists
For Allen (1997:255) 'statistical' formalism may reduce the potential for "whim - caprice 
- bias"....and "the influence of the darker side of human decision", it could also offer law 
("which deals with the most profound issues of life"), the opportunity for the decision 
maker to become more predictable and correct. Alternatively says Allen (Ibid), there is 
another strand to legal history which illustrates "the role of judgment in legal affairs, and
63 See R v Deen The Times, 10th Jan 1994; R v Dalby 
(unreported, CA no, 9 4 /2 8 19/W2 (1995); Rv Adams 
[ 1996] 2 Cr App R 467; R v Doheny, R v Adams The 
Times, 14th August 1996; US v Shonubi (Court of 
Appeals): 998 F.2d; 1993 US App; 895 F Supp 460 
1995 US Dist.
64 For a full account of some of the main 
arguments on this issue see 'Bayesianism 
and Judicial Proof Special Issue 
International Journal of Evidence and 
Proof 1997.
65 Although many of the academics referred to in this 
section are lawyers, others included in this debate 
are more socio-legal, with backgrounds in the social 
sciences, in particular, Sociology and Criminology.
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speaks unashamedly of ideas, no matter how ill defined, like justice, equity and fairness. 
These two strands of thought are in a curious relationship. Both strive for very similar 
goals, claiming correct decisions under the rule of law as their primary objective".
In concluding his preliminary inquiry into 'Rationality, algorithms and judicial proof', 
Allen (1997), a Bayesian sceptic, does not deny the potential use of Bayes' theorem as 
an analytical tool. However, in identifying its main problem as 'computational 
complexity', Allen, is particularly concerned with the updating of 'prior probability' (as 
each new piece of evidence emerges) and also with ascertaining the basis upon which the 
LR of the 'evidence reformulation' is founded, tested and validated. Further, he is 
interested in knowing how any new theories (that may emerge during deliberations) are 
incorporated into the overall calculation.
In light of these uncertainties Allen (1997:271) concludes, that problems facing a judge 
at trial are far too complex to be left to Bayesian analysis:
...The law has to decide at the moment in question; it cannot suspend belief while 
a long run of tests is completed. Convergence to the truth based on a series of 
experiments is not feasible for the law. People's rights, obligations and resources 
are conditioned upon the outcome of trials. Society would not function if 
relatively quick answers to legal questions were not forthcoming (Allen 
1997:272).
A  point not lost on McEwan (1996:153) who, in consideration of the application of 
Bayes, and the recognition that decision making inevitably involves some assessment of 
probability, views the prospect of judges "improvising their way through the statistical 
minefield" as something to be avoided. McEwan goes on to point out a common judicial
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objection to statistics enshrined in the notion that "Things happen or they don't, they 
don't probably happen".
Bring (1997:292), like Allen (1997), acknowledges the fact that Bayes' theorem may be 
a helpful analytical tool, but proposes confining its use to legal scholars. Concluding that 
it would "only be of limited use for factfinders in real court cases", he too identifies 
problems of assessment, updating of a prior probability, and errors in decision making. 
Drawing our attention to the possible loss of public confidence in the legal system, and the 
fact that 'the mere appearance of justice' may elude factfinders, Bring believes that 
factfinders have neither the expertise, nor the time to master the intricacies of probability 
theory.
Callen (1997:296) sees the advantage of a formal computational system, but argues that 
such systems cannot accurately represent the complexity of human decision making. 
Agreeing with the views of Ligertswood (1997) and Stein (1997), Callen regards any 
potential application of probability theory (which is dependent on values and judgment) 
as incomplete. From this perspective says Callen, Bayesian analysis rests on impossible fact 
finding assumptions, which it neither acknowledges nor confronts. Bayes' theory therefore 
provides no answer to the question of 'prior odds', and simply leaves the factfinder relying 
on some other means (subjective, and as yet unexplained) to determine the initial 
mathematical level to apply.
Fienberg et al.( 1995:7) too recognises the statistical complexity of probability theory and 
the fact that statistical evidence may obscure certain issues, particularly where "limited
3 4 1
familiarity may lead the judge...to misunderstand statistical evidence". However, in 
contrast to the views of Allen 1997; McEwan 1996; Bring 1997; Callen 1997; Fienberg 
has no problems in declaring the usefulness of probability theory for evidentiary purposes. 
Highlighting the importance of statistical education for factfinders, Fienberg (1997:310) 
reminds the reader that "Probability has served as a language that scientists and others 
have found to be not only helpful but crucial to the advancement of their enterprises".
Carriquiry (1997:299), a Bayesian enthusiast, believes that much of the misunderstanding 
that exists between the Bayesiosceptics and the Bayesian supporters is based on the fact 
that they "seem to be talking past each other, without listening to what the other side is 
saying". In Carriquiry's opinion,"there can be no Bayesian analysis without a healthy dose
of judgment. judgment and probabilistic formulations complement each other, and
both are fundamental components of the process of decision making" (Ibid).
For Friedman (1997), the complexity of Bayes' Theorem is not the issue 'the world is a 
complex place'. The flexibility of the Bayesian approach means it can take into account 
as much complexity as its user can handle. As far as Friedman is concerned, most of the 
computational problems identified by Allen and others may not be as difficult as claimed, 
as in his opinion, pure computational precision is not necessary to make the Bayesian 
system work. In proposing the adoption of the Bayesian approach, particularly for 
analytical purposes, Friedman (1997:289), like Kaye and Balding (1995), believes "that 
probability analysis can help "observers - lawyers, courts and especially scholars - think 
about the probative value of evidence".
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Agreeing with many of the limitations identified by the Bayesiansceptics, Michon believes 
that unless statistical evidence has a significant analytical role in a case, there is no 
substantial reason to make an explicit presentation of probability theory. What is needed 
is "a revision of court procedures, on the basis of research that will take into account the 
cognitive abilities and limitations of factfinders who, after all are human" (Michon 
1997:334).
Kaye (1997:314) in his paper focuses on the 'burden of persuasion' and the 
completeness, generality, and utility of probabilistic theory when applied to civil and 
criminal cases - a dichotomy he finds useful. In Kaye's (Ibid) opinion "The mathematical 
properties of decision rules have little or nothing to do with the hoary debate over law 
versus equity, rules versus principles, or the like". For Kaye, no 'tension between 
algorithms and judgment' arises from dissecting or appraising a legal standard that requires
judgment to apply  [Therefore].... "The mathematics does not diminish the
importance of the judgment, but directs attention to how it should be applied".
Lempert (1997), also a Bayesian enthusiast, considers the positive contribution of the 
Bayesian approach in understanding both evidence and proof. Respecting the normative, 
analytical and logical role of the theorem, Lempert believes that Bayes also provides the 
factfinder with a framework for making sense of statistical evidence.
From the above discussion, it would seem there are two bodies of academic opinion on 
the future role of Bayes' theory as regards judicial decision making. Many 
Bayesiansceptics while not wholly embracing the theorem therefore, nonetheless unite with
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Bayesian enthusiasts in supporting the analytical basis of the Bayesian approach, and the 
contribution it could make to the decision making process. Underlying this debate is a 
recognition of the ongoing concerns with the current system. For Allen therefore 
(1997:343):
Little could be more challenging, and perhaps nothing, within law more important. 
A t the core of a society dedicated to civil peace through the rule of law must be 
found rational decision making. Rational decision making - deliberate, 
disinterested, informed, open-minded - forms the bedrock of a just society.
Moving on to the opinions of the judiciary, Judge Weinstein (who in addition to presiding 
over the Agent Orange66 trial, also presided over Shonubi67), embarked on what 
McEwan (1996:150) has described "an extraordinarily detailed analysis of law and theory 
in order to justify the use of less familiar methods of proof'. Recognising that relying on 
heuristics may lead to the exclusion of other, equally relevant information, Judge
66 Judge Weinstein was responsible for the lengthy 
pre-trial negotiations in the Agent Orange case 
(re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation, 611
F. Supp. (D.N.Y. 1985). O f particular significance was 
his handling of the 350 veterans who had 'opted out7 of 
joining the wider class action covered by the settlement. 
Appraising the evidence himself, he dismissed the plaintiffs' 
epidemiological evidence, as not strong enough to support 
their claims, and also rejected the animal data supplied 
by the plaintiffs as insufficient to establish causation. 
Although some of Judge Weinstein rulings remain highly 
controversial, he is credited with having "judge centred 
vision, presenting a classic instance of occasional 
influence of academic theories on judicial decisions" 
(Schuck 1987:270).
67 US v Shonubi (Court of Appeals): 998 F.2d; 1993 
US App. Referred for sentence: 895 F. Supp 460;
1995 US Dist. In brief, Mr. Shonubi was convicted 
of smuggling heroin to the US. In order to 
determine sentence, the court needed to ascertain 
how much heroin he had smuggled on previous 
occasions.
344
Weinstein made the decision in Shonubi to incorporate Bayes' theorem into his reasoning 
process. Describing it as a "helpful description of appropriate legal fact-finding 
techniques" (Ibid:25), the judge reminded the court that what he, and others (Bell 1996; 
Anderson 1997) had referred to as the judicial hunch "is generally based on evidence and 
experience, albeit with the inferential chain unstated" (Ibid:22). Accepting Holmes' 
(1 8 7 1 :540) notion that "Judges know how to decide a good deal earlier than they know 
why", Judge Weinstein therefore subscribes to the view that, although the judicial 
'hunching' process is not as defined as Bayesian analysis, factfinders intuitively engage in 
ongoing re-evaluation of the LR during the course of the trial.
'judiciary
As far the English judiciary are concerned, of those Queen's Bench Division Judges 
who responded to the survey (34% ), nearly all expressed their confidence in, and their 
support for traditional decision making practice. However, a few judges (a representative 
sample of which are outlined below) did offer their views on the potential application of 
probabilistic reasoning to the decision making process and whether the Bayesian approach 
had any merit, either as an analytical tool or as a basis for decision making.
One judge in his acknowledgment clearly differentiated the dual roles of Bayes'
theorem firstly, as an analytical tool, secondly, as a possible alternative to 'classic judicial
judgment'. In his view:
There are two entirely different versions of probability which come the court's way 
and which are not always distinguished. One is evaluation of stochastic probability 
on the basis of expert evidence - for example, in order to determine whether it is
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epidemiologically likely that a particular effect has been the product of a particular 
event. Here the judge has to absorb often conflicting scientific evaluations in order 
to form his or her own. The exercise is complicated by the fact that not all experts 
are equally candid or dispassionate, and that a few are mere partisans. So part of 
the judicial task is to try to discern the reliable from the unreliable expert - a task 
made even more difficult by the fact that from time to time an expert who is a well- 
known hired gun may in this one case be right, as a stopped clock is right twice a 
day.
The other, the classic judicial judgement, concerns whether an account given to the 
court is more probably than not true. Here life and literature alike demonstrate that 
the objective probability that something would have occurred is a thoroughly 
unreliable guide to whether it did. The improbable, sometimes the inconceivable 
regularly happen. When was the last time you gave or heard an account which 
began: 'You're not going to believe this'?
Sir Ashley Bramall QC once represented a west London landlord called Jankovitch 
who was always litigating against his tenants and who finally believed that he had got 
a cast-iron case for possession against one of them who had quite clearly abandoned 
the letting. A t court, where Bramall represented the landlord, the tenant turned up 
with a hilariously improbable story of (as I dimly recall it now) having got lost on 
the way to a wedding and turned up weeks later on the other side of the country. 
Judge Baxter, an excellent and experienced judge, accepting his story - Like the 
theologian', he said, 'credo quia non possibile'. The capacity to base judgment on 
experience and understanding and not to be tied to mere probabilism is, I think, one 
of the most important judicial functions.
Another judge in consideration of this issue pointed out that "the complexity of expert 
evidence is nothing new. Judges in the last century would have heard evidence on e.g. 
human pathology and engineering construction". Moving on, he questioned whether there 
was really such a distinction between the traditionally accepted view of judicial decision 
making, and applied probabilistic reasoning:
If a Judge is unfamiliar with a particular technique or methodology then it has 
always been the task of the advocates with the expert to enlighten him. They are 
usually, successful. In deciding which evidence they prefer on the balance of 
probabilities they may well be applying "probabilistic reasoning" but if they are not 
one and the same, then I am afraid the law only permits the judges to apply the 
former.
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Certain judges while acknowledging 'on occasion' judicial unfamiliarity with statistical 
information, also recognised the potential pitfalls of judges assuming any such expertise in 
their own right:
I agree that many Judges (but not all) are unfamiliar with methods of statistical
analysis but it would be a bold Judge who used his own expertise, because he
would, in effect, be giving evidence to himself without the parties having an 
opportunity to challenge it.
Further, as one judge pointed out, while applied probabilistic reasoning may:
....be a useful tool... there is no single method which should be regarded 
as a universal touchstone for reaching the correct decision in every case.
In addition to responding to the survey, one member of the judiciary attached an unrevised 
judgment - K eating  v  S h e ffie ld  H ea lth  A uthority  which he had recently delivered. As 
with R eay  a n d  H o p e , the case involved an array of complex scientific and medical expert 
evidence, concerning the alleged medical negligence of a cardiac surgeon. In his reference 
to this case, the judge acknowledged "the conflict in methodology between the judicial 
'balance of probabilities' and assessment based on medical probability".
Agreeing with the proposition that 'the distinction between law and science is becoming 
increasing blurred', the judge accepted that:
 what the medical profession requires for proof of theory may well differ from
the lawyers - especially in the field of civil law where the balance of 
probabilities suffices.
However, he went on to suggest, that applied probabilistic reasoning was not a way forward 
in solving this problem, and further, that legal academics may be lacking sufficient
347
insight of the decision making process to offer a solution:
....Academics have a valuable role to play in challenging the judicial process of 
decision making, but do not have the necessary access to everyday events to enable 
them to make a sound judgment of resolution of factual conflict. Dare a judge to 
say of academics that they [the academics] are 'not in touch'?
Another judge in his reply highlighted the type of attitude that many legal theorists would 
like to see Bayes' Theorem address, when he referred to the comments of Lord Mansfield - 
"Give your judgment but not your reasons"68. He went on to say however:
Additionally by nature I dislike abstractions creeping into the judicial process. When 
I make up my mind, I take a number of different factors into account and use a 
number of different thought processes without stopping too long to try and analyze 
those processes or to christen them at some intellectual font.
Others in the judiciary likened probability theory to nothing more than using one's 
commonsense:
If by applied probabilistic reasoning you mean exercising one's commonsense, we 
are left with a distinction not a difference.
When considering the practicability of moving to a 'statistically based probabilistic
reasoning' process the following judge provided examples to illustrate his point:
An obvious example of a straightforward use of statistical material is actuarial 
evidence. Such evidence is regularly used by Courts in the larger personal injury 
claims. I believe that in South Africa, actuarial evidence in all such cases is required. 
Actuaries are not cheap. They need time to prepare reports. Is it to be suggested 
that ail plaintiffs in all cases, where actuarial evidence would be admissible, should
68 I have already referred to this comment 
in Ch.5(2).
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be required to employ them? O r are we to say that you get a different quality of 
justice depending upon the monetary value of your claim?
Sometimes experts seek to give more evidence than they can competently
do The Court of Appeal considered this in a case called Auty v National Coal
Board in which I was involved. There, Lord Oilver said that the evidence of the 
actuary on this topic was about as reliable as, but less entertaining than, that of an 
astrologer. Therefore, the fact that an expert gives evidence is not always of 
assistance. In our adversarial system, each side will have an expert who will say 
different things. Maybe it is suggested that the Court itself should appoint its own 
expert, or the Judge seek advice from someone, or perhaps the probabilistic experts 
think they should be experts and judges as well?
Commenting on the move to involve judges in more specialised forms of decision making,
one judge wondered who would benefit from such a change:
As it happens I have just completed a case featuring a strong conflict as to the 
propriety of undertaking a novel type of surgery, in its turn depending substantially 
upon a reading of the contemporaneous radiological evidence. Inevitably there was 
some attempt to make me into a pro tern radiologist so as to determine the 
significance of the scans and x-rays. Authority and inclination happily coincided to 
make me focus solely upon a finding as to whether the Defendant surgeon's 
contemporaneous assessment could be justified as falling with the ambit of accepted 
and reasonable clinical practice - did he have a respectable justification for his 
opinion, not whether he was probably right?
 a Judge is expected to be able to assess evidence and apply the law to it, there
his expertise ends however tempting it may be to pontificate on other subjects.
He went on to consider whose interest would be served by the possible implementation of 
such a theorem, and further how decisions could be justified to parties, the public and the 
Court of Appeal?
Concurring with this view there was support for the believe that as far as the decision 
making process is concerned:
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It is no part of a Judge's function to seek to become an expert himself. The judge 
has to decide which expert's conclusions he/she prefers bearing in mind the burden 
and standard of proof.
Adopting a rather different approach one member of the judiciary saw no great distinction 
in the aims and objectives of law and science, and therefore had no problem with statistical 
analysis contributing to the decision making process:
I don't recognise law and science as belonging to different categories. Both are 
quests for the truth, and the law has no choice but to embrace in its quest, all that 
is sound in science, maths and statistics. The difficulty, of course, is to separate 
what is sound from what is dross. But exactly the same difficulty attends the 
receiving of non-expert evidence.
As to applying probabilistic reasoning to the judicial decision making process, the judge in 
question doubted:
....whether its principles ought to be permitted to control the judicial process - 
contribute to it, yes.
Pointing out that judges (and traditional decision making) have always been part of our 
system of justice, another judge seemed particularly wary of change. Recognising the 
difference of opinion amongst experts, particularly with regard to the presentation of 
statistical evidence in court, this judge rejected any proposal which might seek to replace 
current judicial practice with scientists/scientific methodology, as too radical. In his 
opinion, such views were potentially "dangerous":
 as scientists only too often disagree with one another and do not have the
experience of evaluating evidence that judges have.
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In contrast to the majority of legal theorists who found some merit in the application of 
Bayes' theorem for analytical purposes, most judges who took part in this research remain 
staunch supporters of what one respondent referred to as "classic judicial judgment". On 
one level therefore, such sentiment may be seen as offering some support for the 
Bayesiansceptics; on the other, such views may denote a rejection of the whole notion of 
'judicial proof.
Although, there is no definitive account of the elements involved in decision making, most 
judges appear to take comfort in the ambiguous nature of the task entrusted to them. With 
more 'hard' cases coming before the courts however, and the boundaries of public and 
private law under challenge, it remains to be seen, particularly in this new era of openness 
and accountability, how long the judiciary can continue to ignore their critics.
The Academy of Experts
Moving on to members of the Academy of Experts, and the survey discussed in Ch.369, a 
wholly different picture emerges. In contrast to the judges and Bayesiansceptics, the
69 This research forms part of the 'Expert 
Witness Questionnaire' referred to in Ch.3.
To reiterate, the research comprised of a six page 
booklet made up of 34 questions, sent out to 160 
scientific and medical experts - all members 
of 'The Academy of Experts' based in Gray's Inn.
In total there was a 62% repones rate. Of the 99 
returned questionnaires, 7% were incorrectly 
completed = 93 correctly completed. 47% of the 
92 chose to make additional comments on the 
back page of the questionnaire.
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majority of the experts were unanimous in their support for the implementation of applied 
probabilities reasoning to the decision making process70. O f those who responded:
48%  of the experts had experience of judicial misunderstanding of their evidence;
and:
68%  of the experts found in their experience judges relying more on presentation 
of evidence rather than content.
Because of their experience, and the potential for misunderstanding/misinterpretation of
complex scientific evidence:
52%  of the experts thought that judges should adopt applied probabilistic reasoning 
to both their evaluation of the evidence, and to their judgment.
and:
59%  of the experts who responded, wanted judicially appointed scientific advisor/s 
to sit with the judge.
Most experts considered the appointment of a scientific advisor to be a useful addition to 
the judicial process, although only 34% of experts, believed some form of statistical 
training would make any difference to the present situation.
Friedman (1997 :350) in his article 'Towards a (Bayesian) Convergence?' points out that 
the Bayesian approach does not have to be seen in purely in numerification terms. What 
Bayes offers is a set of constraints or guidelines which may be expressed in the following 
statement:
1. All other things being equal, the more probable a proposition appears without 
consideration of a given body of evidence, the more probable it will appear upon 
consideration of that evidence.
70 Questions 2 7 - 3 1  of the Questionnaire.
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2. AH other things being equal, the more probable it appears that a given body of evidence 
would arise given the truth of a proposition, the more probable the proposition
will appear given the body of evidence.
3. AH other things being equal, the less probable it appears that a given body of evidence 
would arise given the falsity of a proposition, the more probable the proposition will appear 
given the body of evidence.
Most legal academics, judges and experts, would not I submit, deny the 'logical validity1 
of any of these propositions. For 'hard1 cases, involving highly complex scientific evidence 
therefore, Bayes offers a way forward, particularly as a framework and analystical model 
in addressing many of the criticisms identified in this chapter.
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6.1 CONCLUSION
The Judgment of Reay and Hope v BNFL in October 1993 marked the end of one of the 
most interesting and complex toxic tort trials in English law. Lasting short of one hundred 
days and including the testimony of thirty one scientific expert witnesses, out of total of 
seventy who produced reports, the trial marked new ground in a number of ways; it was 
the first personal injury claim to test the concept of genetic damage from radiation; the 
only time that a Queen's Bench Division Judge had been allocated a full-time judicial 
assistant; and one of the first trials to endorse a satellite video link for examination of 
expert witnesses pursuant to Order 38, Rule 3. Moving on to judicial management, the 
case was a forerunner in having Counsels' Opening Statements in writing in advance of the 
trial and having written daily submissions from both Plaintiffs and Defendants of key issues 
upon conclusion of oral evidence.
The circumstances that led to the trial relate to events in excess of thirty to forty years 
ago when the fathers of Dorothy Reay and Vivien Hope were employed by the 
Defendants and their predecessors (the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority) as 
fitters for the Seliafield plant. During the time that George Reay and David Hope were 
employed at Seliafield, they were involved in the routine maintenance of plant machinery 
including the piles, pond and decanning areas. Intrinsic to the litigation was whether 
paternal preconception irradiation (resulting in a mutation in the spermatagonia which via 
paternal sperm) caused, or materially contributed to a predisposition to cancer, leading 
to Dorothy Reay's death from leukaemia and Vivien Hope's NHL.
The first Plaintiff, Elizabeth Reay, mother of Dorothy Reay who died when she was 10
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months, based her claim for damages of £150,000 under the now repealed Fatal 
Accidents Act 1976 and also the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934. In 
addition, Elizabeth Reay claimed damages for injury to herself, and on behalf of the estate 
of her late husband, for injury to him. The second Plaintiff, Vivien Hope was bom in 
1965; in 1988 she was diagnosed as suffering from non-Hodgkin's lymphoma. Vivien 
Hope claimed damages of £125,000 for past and future suffering and disability 
consequent upon her lymphoma.
As a consequence of the various statutory provisions dating back to the Atomic Energy 
Act 1946; the Atomic Energy Act 1954; The Nuclear Installations (Licensing and 
Insurance) Act 1958; The Nuclear Installations (Amendment) A rt 1965; the Plaintiffs 
did not need to prove negligence on the part of the Defendants. It was also common 
ground that by virtue of the legislation this statutory liability attached only from 1st 
August 1954. In order to succeed the Plaintiffs had to prove on the balance of 
probabilities that radiation from Seliafield was a material contributory cause of the 
Plaintiffs' diseases. The fundamental issue therefore was causation.
The Plaintiffs based their claim on the work of Professor M. Gardner, who until his death 
in 1993 was Head of the Medical Research Council, Epidemiological Unit, University of 
Southampton. Professor Gardner's epidemiological evidence was published in two 
concurrent papers in 1990. The first described the methodology and basic data of the 
case control study. The second, concluded there was a significant excess of leukaemia and 
NHL in the vicinity of Seliafield, and further that:
The raised incidence of leukaemia particularly, and non-Hodgkin's lymphoma
among children near Seliafield was associated with paternal employment and
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recorded external dose of whole body penetrating radiation during the work at the 
plant before conception. The association can explain statistically the observed 
geographical excess. The result suggests an effect of ionising radiation on fathers 
that may be leukaemogenic in their offspring, though other, less likely, explanations 
are possible. There are important potential implications for radiobiology and for 
protection of radiation workers and their children (Gardner 1990a:423).
Prior to the publication of Professor Gardner's 1990 study, the Yorkshire Television 
Programme 'Windscale the Nuclear Laundry' (1983); the Black Advisory Group Report 
(1984); the establishment in 1985 of the Committee on the Medical Aspects of 
Radiation in the Environment (COMARE), their subsequent reports (1986); (1988); 
(1989); Gardner's (School Cohort) Study 1987; had all confirmed a raised incidence of 
leukaemia around nuclear power plants and an increased risk of leukaemia/NHL in young 
people living near nuclear facilities.
Despite confirmation by the scientific community of an excess of leukaemia/NHL in young 
people around Seliafield, and the fact these excesses proved persistent over time, 
geographical parameters, and age ranges, scientists still remain deeply divided over the 
cause of childhood cancer and its connection with nuclear installations.
The dispute between the parties centred on four main issues:
1. The doses of ionising radiation received by George Reay and David Hope in the course 
of their employment (Occupational Dosimetry).
2. The doses of ionising radiation received by members of the two families and others 
from radiation in the environment (Environmental Dosimetry).
3. Whether the Gardner study, in its context, can prove on the balance of probabilities, 
first that there is an association between PPI of fathers working at Seliafield and leukaemia 
and/or NHL in F1 [offspring], and secondly that such association is causal of the diseases 
(Epidemiology).
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4. Whether there exist a plausible or reasonably possible pathway or mechanism by which 
radiation emitted from the Seliafield plant could have caused or materially contributed to 
one or both of the two diseases (Genetics)1.
In reaching his conclusion, Mr. Justice French declared:
In my Judgment...on the evidence before me, the scales tilt decisively in 
favour of the defendants and that the plaintiffs therefore have failed to 
satisfy me on the balance of probabilities that PPI was a material 
contributory cause of the Seascale excess, or it must follow, of
a) the leukaemia of Dorothy Reay or
b) the NHL of Vivien Hope2
While any toxic tort claim brought in negligence or in breach of statutory duty poses 
problems of causation, Reay and Hope, a particularly complex case, offers a prime 
example of an action in which highly complicated cutting edge science provided the basis 
for litigation. Reay and Hope gave us an insight into a future in which manmade disasters; 
environmental wrongdoing; human distortions of the natural world impact upon our lives. 
Thus as potential victims and future plaintiffs we look to the civil justice system to 
represent and compensate us, and in so doing, expect the law to live up to the principles, 
identified by Lord Woolf (1995) of justice and fairness. Unfortunately for the plaintiff 
however, society still relies on a tort system which according to Rosenberg (1984:854) 
is "too cumbersome, costly and haphazard". For many (Rosenberg 1984; Stapleton 
1988; Hill 1991; Scott 1992; Howarth 1995; Reece 1996) therefore, the tort system's 
capacity to deal effectively with such action is now open to question.
Under traditional tort doctrine recovery depends upon a preponderance of evidence rule 
which imposes upon the plaintiff an 'ail or nothing' burden of proof in excess of 50
1 Judgment p.5-6.
2 Judgment p.209
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percent. The judge for his part has to decide on the balance of probabilities, a conclusive 
presumption in favour of one party or the other. Once described as an "ancient rule 
founded on considerations of good sense”3 the burden of proof is neither rational nor 
equitable in resolving the causal indeterminacy underlying most toxic torts. Like Reay and 
Hope, many such actions rely on evidence at the frontiers of scientific knowledge, in many 
instances therefore the most that can be established is that exposure to a pollutant 
increased the risk to the plaintiff of contracting the disease.
In contrast to the "eclectic array of wrongs" (Parascandola 1997:147) covered by 
'common' tort law, toxic torts are more specialised (hazardous substances; environmental 
pollutants; toxins) and share a number of similar characteristics (multi-science uncertainty; 
mass exposure; multiparty action). As far as personal injuries are concerned, toxic torts 
often involve some form of birth defect; chronic disease or mortality. Perhaps of all 
diseases however cancer is the most common; described by Weinberg (1998:1) as the 
enemy within, he says of the disease:
Cancer wreaks havoc in almost every part of the human body. Tumours strike the 
brain and the gut, muscles and bones. Some grow slowly; others are more 
aggressive and expand quickly. Their presence in human tissues signals chaos and 
a breakdown of normal function. Cancer brings unwelcome change to a biological 
machine that is perfect, marvellously beautiful and complex beyond measure.
A  socio-legal analysis of the Reay and Hope trial thus afforded an opportunity to examine
3 Joseph Constantine Steamship Line v Imperial 
Smelting Corporation Ltd [ 1942] AC 154, 174 
per Viscount Maugham.
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in depth some of the multi-disciplinary issues arising from the litigation4. In addition 
however, evaluation of the case also allowed for two pieces of empirical research involving 
members of the Academy of Experts (quantitative research) and judges from the Queen's 
Bench Division of the High Court (qualitative research). In assessing current opinion on 
expert witnesses; scientific evidence; judicial decision making; and the potential use of 
applied probabilistic reasoning; the thesis was able to draw upon years of courtroom 
experience and in so doing, consider the development of science/law interaction from a 
practical and theoretical perspective.
In considering the complexity of science/law interaction, some academics (Foster, Berstein 
and Huber 1993) believe the legal community, and judges in particular, need to become 
more sophisticated and adept in appraising scientific evidence. Jasanoff (1995:5) while 
concurring with this view, also postulates that legal professionals need to improve their 
understanding of science per se, commenting that judges and lawyers "know on average 
very little about social organisation and processes of science, still less about basic scientific 
concepts such as "statistical significance", and almost nothing about the substantive 
content of particular scientific fields". The effect of this state of affairs is that judges "who 
understand neither the substance not the methods of science, are increasingly called upon 
to discriminate among sophisticated technical arguments" (Ibid). Without adequately 
trained judges, fact and reason thus become prey to the manipulative dynamics of an 
adversarial system in which misunderstanding and misinterpretation rule the day. The 
result is, says Jasanoff:
4 Including philosophy of science; critical legal theory; 
dosimetry; epidemiology; genetics; probability theory.
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Cross examination and the legal rules of evidence operate only as recipes for 
obfuscation (Ibid).
Further, where scientific evidence is new, novel or does not fit into existing paradigms, 
the views of the scientific community differ sharply from those of the legal professionals;
If we [scientists] are forced to a premature opinion on a scientific question, we are 
bound to give the Scottish verdict Not Proven (Ziman 1968:14-15).
In contrast to scientific incertitude however, the law must take a firm position. Within 
legal constraints and the laws of evidence, the law must tease, goad, pressure the witness 
and ultimately decide; no matter how undeveloped the science, no matter how biased the 
testimony.
Issues. Evidence and “judgment
In light of these wider considerations the thesis sought to elicit greater understanding of 
the issues, evidence and judgment in the Reay and Hope case. Starting with epistemology 
and the work of the deconstructionists, it emerged that science is not based on objective 
truth but is qualified and conditional involving socially constructed and culturally 
determined judgments. Therefore, when embarking upon a toxic tort case such as Reay 
and Hope, the cognitive authority of science needs to be challenged. Lawyers, like 
everybody else it seems, must leam to appreciate the limitations of the practice of science; 
as Midgley (1992) points out science does not have a claim on omnicompetence.
Moving on to scientific causal relations it appears, despite well defined methods of 
scientific research, there are questions about the nature and basis of scientific methodology
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which still remain problematic, as Gower (1997:18) says:
We may still be debating important details about how the methods and logic of 
science work. We may even still be debating some issues of principle. But this does 
not in itself show the project is misconceived; it may instead be a project where 
both principles and details are immensely difficult to make explicit.
Currently no scientist or epidemiologist would suggest that the HKE Postulates or the
Bradford Hill criteria represent the definitive guidelines upon which either group base their
claims. Nor would any scientist or epidemiologist necessarily reject Gower's assertion that
the scientific method has no clear beginning or ending:
Experiments are not simple events with clear beginnings and ends; they are human 
interventions in a world of numerous conflicting influences and forces, and have 
their origins in earlier related investigations and their termination in later 
explorations (Ibid).
Science as we now know is in constant state of flux, frequently therefore, scientific evidence 
of causal relations is inconsistent and contradictory, yielding ambiguous results and 
divergent scientific opinion.
As far as causation in the law is concerned, this is probably one of the greatest difficulties 
for the plaintiff to overcome. The but for, cause in fact relationship between the 
tortfeasor's action and plaintiffs loss remains elusive. While Hotson5 offered a window 
of opportunity in respect of loss of chance, the door is closing; scientific determinism 
remains deeply entrenched within legal dogma. As McGhee6/WiIsher7 has now
5 Hotson v East Berkshire AHA [1985] 3 All ER 167,
[1987] AC 75, [1987] 2 All ER 909.
6 McGhee v NCB [1972] 3 AH ER 1008, [1973] 1 WLR 1.
7 Wilsher v Essex Hath Authority [1987] QB 730, [1986]
All ER 801, [1988] 2 WLR 557.
361
established, the law as a consequence of Wilsher stands where it always did with the onus 
of proof on a balance of probabilities lying with the plaintiff, and that onus satisfied only 
if the plaintiff proves that the defendant's breach made a material contribution to their 
injury.
When discussing the role of the expert witness it is clear that the specialist needs to be a 
'good expert' and a 'good expert witness'. Implicit in this requirement are notions of 
witness selection; witness subordination; witness co-operation and remuneration. As far 
as Lord Woolf is concerned: potential bias; polarisation; lack of witness independence; 
expense and delay are all prime concerns. In addition, the credibility of the witness must 
be assured, he must appear unflustered, certain and competent. Moving on to scientific 
expert evidence, it seems that partisanship and inequality of resources are particularly 
associated with the toxic tort. Thus in-house experts, corporate funds and what Lord 
Woolf described as 'an unlevel playing field' are specific concerns for the would be 
plaintiff.
When analysing the testimony in Reay and Hope similar evidential difficulties emerged. 
Particular problems related to discovery; misinformation; partisanship; lack of witness 
independence; and a disregard for new areas of science. In addition, allegations of: poor 
methodology; manipulation of results; false statement and incompetence were also levelled 
by one side or the other.
7 Wilsher v Essex Hath Authority [ 1987] QB 730, [ 1986] 
All ER 801, [1988] 2 WLR 557.
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Interestingly many of the evidential issues that arose in the trial were also identified by 
members of the Academy of Experts. The quantitative research thus provided an 
alternative means of establishing some of the major concerns underlying scientific 
evidence. Other more general areas that stand out for special consideration include: 
challenges to the competency of the witness; unrealistic deadlines; witnesses being asked 
to give evidence beyond their specialism; personal expense/inconvenience as a 
consequence of trial adjoumment/delay.
Moving on to judicial decision making and the Reay and Hope Judgment, it appears that 
rationalisation for justification of a judgment is not the same as the thought processes 
involved in making a decision. Thus if the 'world at large' is to understand how a 
judgment has been reached, a distinction needs to be made between the 'discovery' and 
'justification' process. Peczenik (1989) identifies public accountability; democracy; 
testability and uniformity as primary motivations for such a dichotomy.
From the second piece of empirical research, it emerged that many of the Queen's Bench 
Division judges contacted for the purposes of the thesis, supported Cardozo's view, that 
decision making rests on a balance of ingredients including: philosophy, analogy, 
background and sense of right. However, any belief in a judiciary which is rational, 
objective, neutral and makes decisions on the basis of legal positivism/formalism may as 
the Realist movement suggest, be open to question.
In considering the Judgment of Reay and Hope, it seems Mr. Justice French took 
advantage of the wide discretionary powers he had to adapt his managerial and
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supervisory style to the needs of the case, and yet failed to apply the same innovative and
pragmatic approach to his decision making. In my opinion therefore:
His Lordship did not consider the application of a more utilitarian rights based 
model despite public health and environmental concerns that emerged as a 
consequence of the discovery process. Concentrating on individual rights, Mr 
justice French missed a golden opportunity of challenging traditional tort dogma 
and embracing wider legal concerns that emerged during the trial.
French, j. did not refer to any case law in his judgment and made no contribution 
to the wider debate on toxic torts and the problem of causation. Unlike Judge 
Weinstein in Agent Orange8 he did not ponder on jurisprudential and evidential 
questions underlying traditional tort doctrine.
Mr. Justice French accepted without question the interpretive framework upon 
which science is based and in so doing, assumed the existence of a methodological 
alliance between science and law which allowed him to blur the boundaries of 
scientific and legal decision making. Taking this to its ultimate conclusion, he 
then applied and utilised a scientifically constructed model to justify his decision 
making.
His Lordship rejected all novel or new areas of scientific research and in so doing 
locked himself into existing scientific paradigms.
M r Justice French, on occasion, seemed more Impressed with the presentation of 
evidence, rather than the evidential content.
When attempting to analyze the Reay and Hope Judgment, one is stuck by the lack of 
available information from which a legal evaluation of the ruling can be made. In light of 
increasing allegations of judicial inconsistency, judicial bias, political or policy 
considerations overriding public perception of equity and justice, there is growing demand 
for 'judicial proof' of decision making.
With the development of statistical analysis in the courtroom, Bayes' Theorem, a
8 re 'Agent Orange' 565 F Supp. 1263 (E.N.D.Y 1983).
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quantitative measure that allows the factfinder to assess (on the basis of probability 
theory) whether a particular hypothesis is true or false, has been proposed as a way 
forward. In advocating adoption of the Bayesian approach supporters believe that 
probability analysis can help judges, lawyers and scholars think about the probative value 
of evidence. Offering both a framework for decision making and an analytical tool, 
Judges from the Queen's Bench Division of the High Court were asked their opinion on 
the potential application of probabilistic reasoning to the decision making process, and 
whether the Bayesian approach had any merit. In contrast to the many legal theorists who 
found value in the application of Bayes' Theorem, the majority of judges remained staunch 
supporters of what Mr. Justice Sedley referred to as "classic judicial judgment". Perhaps 
unsurprisingly members of the Academy of Experts concurred with the findings of 
Bayesian enthusiasts in supporting the implementation of applied probabilistic reasoning 
for decision making purposes.
What emerges from the case analysis is how involved, problematic and complex toxic torts 
are. Reay and Hope, a land mark case, was decided at a time when the whole civil justice 
system was under review and when funding for such cases was also under threat. Legal 
aid funded, Reay and Hope is probably one of the last cases of its kind to qualify9.
The Lord Chancellor concurring with the findings of Lord Woolf's Final Report (1996), 
said of the civil justice system:
9 Reay and Hope qualified under the Legal Aid
Act 1988. Between 1991/2 and 1997/8 civil and 
family legal aid expenditure rose from £330m to 
£634m. Legal aid in civil cases is as a consequence 
under review. See Access to Justice Bill 1998 
discussed below (p.367).
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The civil law tends to be accessible only to those who can afford to pay the high 
and unpredictable costs which accompany litigation; or to those who are so poor 
they qualify financially for legal aid. A  large part of the community feels unable 
to turn to the law for assistance or remedies. Part of the problem is that the 
services and remedies sought from the justice system are often disproportionate 
to the issue at stake. A t the moment, too many services and remedies are simply 
too expensive for those who might want to use them10 .
With this view in mind and looking to the future, Lord Irvine of Lairg in Modernising 
Justice went on to identify 'social welfare cases'; 'other cases of fundamental importance' 
(children; protecting people from violence) and 'cases involving a wider public interest' 
(those likely to produce real benefits for a significant number of other people, or which 
raise an important legal issue; and those challenging the actions, or failure to act, of public 
bodies) as having greatest priority11. As far as funding assessment is concerned, he said 
this should aim to consider three questions:
1) Would another type of service be a better way of dealing with the case?
2) Could the applicant fund the case in some other way?
3) Do the merits of the case itself, in the context of the Government's priorities 
and available resources, justify public funding?
In answering the third of these questions his Lordship proposed the following criteria:
The legal strength of the case and the prospects of a successful outcome.
The importance and potential benefit to the assisted person, and the likely cost. 
The wider public interest (as defined in 3.7 Modernising justice).
10 Modernising Justice (1998) p.7.
11 Paragraph 3.7 Modernising Justice p.28.
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The availability of resources and the likely demands of those resources.
The provisions of the Access to Justice Bill 199 812 forming part of a wider programme of 
legal reforms outlined in Modernising Justice proposes (in relation to civil matters13) the 
establishment of a Community Legal Service (CLS), run by a Legal Services Commission 
(CLS). Under a Funding Code drawn up by the Commission and approved by the Lord 
Chancellor, a criteria explaining the funding of individual cases is to be publicly available. 
Under Part 1: Clause 7 (which also gives effect to Schedule 2 and excludes from the scope 
of the CLS Fund specific types of services14) the Lord Chancellor may amend the Schedule 
(subject to affirmative resolution procedures15). In addition, the Lord Chancellor may issue 
directions to the Commission authorising it to provide services within excluded categories 
in exceptional circumstances. For example, the Lord Chancellor may direct that a personal 
injury case (generally excluded under Schedule 2 as appropriate for conditional fees) 
suitable for funding by the CLS where exceptionally high investigative or overall costs are 
likely to be necessary, or where issues of wider public interest are involved. Although 
public funding is still theoretically possible therefore, it seems unlikely (given the complexity
12 Introduced in the House of Lords 2nd December 1998, 
the Bill is currently in its Third Reading.
13 The Bill replaces legal aid services for both
civil and criminal services. The Community Legal 
Services Commission will replace legal aid in civil 
and family cases.
14 In addition to other exclusions under Schedule 2, only 
basic information and advice will be available for disputes 
involving allegations of negligent damage to property or
the person (personal injury), apart from clinical negligence.
15 Clause 23(3).
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of the toxic tort) that cases such as R eay a n d  Hope  will qualify for future legal aid.
As far as 'conditional fee agreements' are concerned, Section 58 of the Courts and Legal 
Services Act 1990 sanction such arrangements. Conditionai fee agreements allow clients 
to agree with their lawyers that the lawyer will not receive ail or part of the usual fees or 
expenses if the case is lost; but that, if it is won, the client will pay an uplift (success fee) 
to the solicitor in addition to the usual fee. In July 1995, conditional fee agreements were 
allowed for a limited range of cases including personal injury. Unfortunately for the 
potential plaintiff however, conditional fees are not as simple as they first appear. To begin 
with the plaintiff may have to make disbursements (to cover medical or other expert 
reports, court fees or enquiry agent's fees) which may involve significant costs before a 
lawyer can make an informed decision about the prospects of success. Secondly the 
plaintiff is obliged to take out an insurance policy to cover himself for up to £1 00 ,000  of 
the other side's costs, payable if the plaintiff loses. Thirdly the insurance scheme "Accident 
Line Protect" will only apply to personal injury cases other than those involving medical 
negligence16. Fourthly in order to qualify for such an insurance policy, plaintiffs' solicitors 
must be a member of the Law Society's Accident Line Scheme which means they must 
have at least one member of their firm on the Law Society Personal Injury Panel.
16 Currently medical negligence cases are thought to be 
excluded on the basis of complexity of scientific 
evidence and uncertainty of outcome. Although 
under review, it is possible that toxic torts 
may well find themselves excluded for similar 
reasons.
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Interestingly the recent test case of lung cancer victims v tobacco companies has cast 
doubt on the success of conditional fee arrangements for toxic tort plaintiffs who fail to 
qualify for public funding under either the current system17, or as envisaged in the 
Access to Justice Bill 1998. Unfortunately for the claimant, under traditional tort 
doctrine, the generic character of the pollutant, its latency period, and the fact that 
synergism often remains undetermined has serious risk implications for any would be 
solicitor taking on such litigation. The main concerns that emerge from the case include:
Claims of Champerty The Defendants' Imperial Tobacco/ Gallaher Group claimed 
that the common law misdemeanour of champerty (maintenance) should apply to 
the case. Although abolished by the Criminal Law Act 1967 s. 13, it is still 
regarded as against public policy (s. 14).
Payment of Costs The Plaintiffs sought a ruling on whether the solicitors/PIaintiffs 
would be liable for any costs against the companies and wanted an Order to debar 
the tobacco companies from trying to recover costs from Jthe lawyers/Plaintiffs 
involved, should the plaintiffs lose. The Defendants challenged this Order on the 
basis that it was neither necessary nor appropriate and would fetter the Courts' 
discretion over costs. Mr. Justice Wright identified "the advertised willingness of 
the solicitors to conduct the litigation" as the stimulus that ultimately led the 
plaintiffs to instruct Leigh Day to bring proceedings on their behalf. As a 
consequence of the costs issue, it is alleged the solicitors were coerced into a 
private arrangement with the tobacco companies barring the firms from further 
action against the tobacco companies for a period of ten years.
17 In January 1995 the Legal Aid Board made a limited grant 
of legal aid for a full review of merits, quantum and 
the total likely costs involved in pursuing an action 
against the tobacco companies. In July 1996 all the 
applications were refused, the refusal was expressed to 
be "on the merits". In 1996, after legal aid refusal,
Leigh Day St Co. offered to fund the claims against the 
tobacco companies on behalf of a number of lung cancer 
sufferers under a conditional fee agreement. In so doing 
Leigh Day joined two other firms Irwin Mitchell St Co. and 
Bindman and Partners (Bindman and Partners later dropped 
out).
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Implementation of a Gagging Order An Order made by Mr. Justice Popplewell 
gagging the lawyers from making statements to the media was upheld, despite, in 
the opinion of the plaintiffs, this 'gag7 constituting a breach of the right of free 
speech as guaranteed under the European Convention on Human Rights18.
Judicial Discretion and the Limitation Act The Limitation Act 1980 requires 
plaintiffs to being actions within three years. Thirty six of the fifty two lung cancer 
victims commenced their actions more than three years after their diagnosis of lung 
cancer, so technically could have been excluded. However Sec. 33 of the Act 
allows the Judge to exercise discretion and permit cases to proceed if he believes 
this would be in the interests of justice. In making this decision the Judge will 
consider certain factors including:
a) Length of delay and reasons why the plaintiffs did not sue earlier.
b) Unfairness to Defendants because of lost evidence.
c) Defendants role in creating delay.
d) Strength of overall case.
One of the main factors to be taken into account when considering an application under
s.33 is the extent to which the Plaintiff will be prejudiced by the operation of the time-bar
(if a direction under s .3 3 (l) is not made). Referring to Dale v British Coal
Corporation19 and Forf>es v Wandsworth20 Mr. Justice Wright said:
The prospects of success include not only the Plaintiff's chances of being able to 
establish his primary case on liability, but also the quantum of any likely recovery 
having regard both to the extent of his injuries and the extent to which any 
damages otherwise recoverable may fail to be reduced as a result of any allegation 
of contributory negligence which appear on the face of it to be open to the 
Defendants21.
18 Article 10: Freedom of Expression.
19 Dale v British Coal Coip [1992] PIQR 373 at P. 380-381.
20 Forbes v Wandsworth HA [1997] QB 402 at p.417 E per 
Stuart Smith L.].
21 Judgment Handed Down 9th February 1998. Case Number 
S 97/113-116 Hodgson at Ors v Imperial Tobacco Ltd S  
Ors.
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Mr. Justice Wright declined the request of eight of the lead plaintiffs to pursue claims 
outside the time limit. He went on to say "taking a broad view, it seems to me plainly 
legitimate to say that the prospects of success in this litigation on behalf of any plaintiff is 
by no means self evident".
In light of Mr. Justice Wright's comments and discussion with their clients, Leigh Day sc 
Co. issued a statement saying that forty six of the fifty two clients had decided to abandon 
all claims against the Defendants and that they, Leigh Day and Irwin Mitchell had decided 
not to continue with the litigation. The remaining plaintiffs at the time of writing are still 
considering their position.
In his Keynote Address to the Solicitors' Annual Conference (1 9 9 7:7)22, Lord Irvine of
Lairg in optimistic tone, said of the conditional fee arrangement:
Excluding claims for money or damages from legal aid will put those on low 
incomes, as well as those on middle or higher incomes, on equal footing - taking 
forward a civil case will depend on whether or not it has merit to persuade a lawyer 
to handle it on a "no win, no fee" basis. The decision whether or not to go ahead 
with any particular case will depend on its strength, not on the financial resources 
of the client.
Other alternatives to conditional fee arrangements were proposed by the Bar (Contingency 
Legal Aid Fund) and Law Society (Conditional Legal Aid Fund). Both proposed 
fund operated schemes on the basis that clients winning cases would be obliged to pay into 
a central fund a percentage of the damages received. The funds would then
22 The Keynote Address was given in Cardiff 
on the 18th October 1997. For a full copy 
of the text, please see Appendix 7.
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be used to meet the cost of clients losing cases and possibly the administration costs of the 
fund itself. In response to these proposals his Lordship said "I cannot conceal from you 
that I doubt whether a Contingency Legal Aid Fund points the way forward" (Ibid)
Lord Woolf M.R. in his 'Samuel Gee Lecture' delivered to the Royal College of 
Physicians23, compared the present civil justice system to a diseased organ:
There are plenty of other diseases to which the system is prone, including the lack 
of certainty as to what will be the consequences of becoming involved in litigation, 
the fact that it fails to allow for the inequalities in resources of the parties and it 
is excessively adversarial.
According to Parascandola (1997:147) "We currently live in a world of silent risks 
caused by invisible agents acting through mechanisms poorly understood". Thus 
expansion of the toxic tort will continue to preoccupy lawyers, judges, scholars, policy 
makers, and the 'world at large' who although concerned with the deficiencies of the 
present system, are equally concerned by access to a just settlement in any future 
system.
Identifying problems of the American toxic tort, Brennan (1989) highlights the adversarial 
process, polarisation of views, the 'hired gun' phenomenon, the complexity of scientific 
evidence, judicial misunderstanding of evidence, and the problem of causation as particular 
obstacles for the toxic tort litigant. In discussing the need for reform, Brennan proposes: 
a) modification of existing rules and procedures;
23 Lord Woolf MR gave the Samuel Gee Lecture 
on Tuesday 13th May 1997. For a full copy 
of the lecture please see Appendix 8.
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b) the introduction of 'science panels';
In modifying existing rules and procedures, Brennan suggests the role of the judge should 
become more active and less passive; that Special Masters24 in the US [or Court 
Assessors25 in this country] could assist at pre-trial and procedure level26. As far as expert 
witnesses are concerned, he suggests more innovative evidential rules which in turn allow 
for greater judicial discretion; and finally (supported by Lord Woolf and still highly 
controversial) the use of court appointed experts.
The 'science panel' proposed by Brennan involves a panel of scientists assisted by lawyers 
and concerned citizens who adjudicate on specific questions of causation and formulate a 
consensus opinion on the causal dispute under question. The 'science panel' emerges from 
a Toxic Substances Board, "the role of the Board is to provide a source of unbiased expert 
opinion that help the court consider toxic causation [thereby leaving] the deterrence and 
compensation [element] primarily in the hands of the courts" (Ibid:71). The Board would 
therefore assist the courts understand the causal connection without supplanting the role
24 The role of Special Master in the US is to provide
advice and guidance as well as assist the judge in the 
handling of complex scientific and technical issues.
25 Lord Woolf in his Final Report (1996) suggests the
appointment of Court Assessor to sit with the judge 
during the trial. According to Lord Woolf, the 
appointment of a Court Assessor would ensure judicial 
understanding of the issues throughout the trial and be 
particularly helpful in cases where there is an array of 
complex scientific expert evidence.
26 Special Masters appointed under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 53 have already "assisted courts with 
asbestos litigation, hazardous waste site litigation 
and Daikon Shield litigation" (Brennan 1989:6).
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of judge or jury.
Although not all Brennan's ideas would adapt for English law purposes, many of his
proposals do receive general support from Lord Woolf, in particular: court appointed
experts; court assessors; a less adversarial approach; more judicial education. However,
if a serious attempt is to be made to resolve the ongoing problems of the toxic tort plaintiff,
perhaps as Armstrong (1995:99) suggests, the distinction between areas of private law and
public law needs to be reconsidered:
The existence of the private conflict becomes an opportunity to clarify and 
determine the standards by which society governs itself. Those standards include 
the Rule of Law, the maintenance of which transcends the interests of the private 
parties in order to achieve justice for those who are never involved in actual 
proceedings.
Taking this a stage further, it is clear the establishment of causal relations remains an 
impossible hurdle for the toxic tort plaintiff to overcome. While legal principles, liability 
and judicial decision making stay unchanged, it is difficult to see how recent proposals 
recommended by Lord Woolf or Lord Irvine will impact upon the plight of these claims. 
In the meantime, increasing hazards, greater scientific complexity and growing 
environmental awareness suggest a public willingness to embark upon civil action27. 
Therefore, it is perhaps ironic that despite the best intentions and highest aims from some 
of the most outstanding legal minds of our age, toxic tort plaintiffs look set to remain both 
victims of their personal injury and the civil justice system post millennium.
27 Victims embark upon civil action from an individual and 
utilitarian perspective (ie: deterrence, public interest 
and environmental protection).
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS
ABSORBED DOSE Quantity of energy imparted by ionising radiation to unit mass such
as tissue.
ALLELES Alternative forms of gene.
ALPHA PARTICLE A  charged particle which is emitted during the radioactive decay of
some radionuclides; it consists of two protons and two neutrons and 
has a net charge of + 2 . It is a high linear energy transfer 
radiation.
ARGON
A TO M
ATO M IC
NUCLEUS
BECQUEREL
BETA PARTICLE 
CAESIUM 134
CAESIUM 137
CASE CONTROL 
STUDY
CANCER
CARCINOGEN
This is a beta emitting radionuclide with a half life of approximately 
two hours.
Smallest portion of an element that can combine chemically with 
other atoms.
The central part of an atom at which the positive nucleus and, 
therefore, the number of electrons in the atom associated with that 
nucleus.
The Standard International (SI) Unit for the number of nuclear 
disintegrations taking place per second in a quantity of radionuclide 
containing matter.
A  negatively charged electron or a positively charged positron 
emitted from a nucleus in certain types of radioactive disintegrations.
This is a beta and gamma emitting radionuclide with a half life of 
about 2 years.
This is a beta emitting radionuclide with a half life of approximately 
30 years.
A  type of epidemiological study in which the occurrence of possible 
explanatory factors for a disease is compared between those with the 
disease (cases), and a representative sample of non-cases (controls) 
from the same population.
A  disease characterised by the proliferation of ceils leading to local 
growth (tumour), to local invasion and to metastasis.
A  substance which causes cancer.
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CARCINOMA
CELL
CHROMOSOME
CONFIDENCE
LEVEL
COLLECTIVE
EFFECTIVE
DOSE
COHORT
COOLING
PONDS
CONTAMINATE
COSMIC RAYS
CRITICAL GROUP
CRITICAL
ORGAN
A  cancer arising from epithelial tissues. Most human cancers are 
carcinomas.
The basic unit which makes up all living organisms.
A  threadlike structure in the nucleus carrying the genetic information 
arranged in a linear sequence. It is composed of a DNA molecule.
A  95%  confidence level is a range of values that has a 95%  chance 
of containing the true value; it provides an indication of the precision 
of the estimates odds ratio.
The quantity used to express the total radiation exposure to all the 
organs and tissues of the body in a group of individuals. It is 
obtained by multiplying the mean effective dose by the number of 
people exposed to a given source of radiation.
A  team commonly used in epidemiological studies to denote a group 
of subjects with some common feature such as residence or place of 
work.
Area of the Seilafield site where newly arrived fuel rods are stored 
under water to allow the decay of volatile isotopes. The rods 
produce considerable heat which is removed by a flow of cooling 
water through the ponds.
Radioactive material in particulate, gaseous or liquid form present in 
places where it should not be.
High energy extra -terrestrial ionising radiation. Mostly absorbed by 
the earth's atmosphere.
A  defined group of people who receive more radiation from a given 
source than the average population.
The organs and tissues of the body have varying degrees of 
radiosensitivity to ionising radiation. For the purposes of radiation 
protection, it is necessary to consider the radiosensitivity with respect 
to specific effects as well as to the dose received.
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CURIE (Ci)
DECANNING
DECAY
DELETION
DNA
DISCHARGES 
DOSEMETER 
DOUBLING DOSE
EFFECTIVE DOSE
EFFECTIVE HALF 
LIFE
EMBRYO
EMISSIONS
ENZYME
EXTERNAL
RADIATION
DOSE
The old unit of radioactivity (the number of nuclear disintegrations 
per second occurring. The curie has now been superseded under the 
SI system by the becquerel (Bq), equal to one disintegration per 
second.
The first process in the cycle of nuclear fuel reprocessing in which the 
casing is separated from the fuel.
The process by which radionuclides change from one atom to 
another emitting ionising radiation as they do so.
Usually a chromosome abberation in which a proportion of a 
chromosome is lost. May also refer to loss of any DNA  
segment.
Deoxyribonucleic acid. The molecule that controls the structure and 
function of cells and is the material of inheritance.
The release of liquid effluent from an industrial site.
An instrument which measures radiation doses or dose rates.
The radiation dose that would double spontaneous mutation rates. 
It is used for estimates of genetic risks from ionising radiation.
The quantity derived from equivalent dose to represent the 
combinations of doses to different organs and tissues.
The half life for the quantity of a radioactive substance in the body.
The young organism arising from the fertilised egg cell.
The release of a gaseous effluent from an industrial plant.
A  protein which is the product of an enzyme-coding gene. Enzymes 
speed up, enable or control chemical reactions in living systems 
without being used up in the reactions.
Dose which is received by an individual as a result of exposure to 
sources of radiation from outside the body.
3 77
FACTOR
FALL-OUT
FAST BREEDER 
REACTOR
FILM BADGE 
FISSION
FISSION
PRODUCTS
GAMMA-RAYS
GAS COOLED 
REACTOR
GENE
GENE POOL
GENETIC
DISEASE
GENOME
GONAD
A  variable the values of which fall into or have been allocated to 
discrete categories (eg place of residence, date of birth).
The transfer of radionuclides produced by nuclear weapons from the 
atmosphere to earth.
A  type of nuclear power reactor which produces more fissionable 
material than it consumes.
One of the devices used for estimating external radiation dose. It 
consists of a photographic film in a holder and is normally worn on 
the front of the body. Processing of the film allows estimation of the 
dose received by the wearer.
The splitting of a nucleus into two or more fragments. The process 
may be spontaneous or may be induced. Only certain nuclides, all 
of them very heavy, can fission. The energy manifests itself in heat 
which is harnessed in power reactors, or in shock when harnessed in 
weapons.
The material fragments resulting from fission of a heavy nucleus.
Photons emitted from the nucleus of a radionuclide during 
radioactive decay.
A  nuclear reactor which uses gas, usually carbon dioxide, to cool the 
pile. In Britain these reactors use "magnox" fuel.
A  unit of inheritance; a specific sequence of bases along the DNA  
molecule.
The sum total of the genes in a breeding population.
Any genetically conditioned disorder ultimately caused by a particular 
gene-determined defect.
The entire repertoire of genes in a cell in an organism.
A  reproductive organ (ovary in females and testis in the males) in 
which gametes (ova and sperm) are produced.
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GRAY
HALF-LIFE
HIGH LET 
RADIATION
INTERACTION
INTERNAL
RADIATION
DOSE
IN VITRO
IN V IV O
IO D IN E-131
IONISING
RADIATION
IRRADIATED
ISOTOPE
LEUKAEMIA
The Standard International (SI) Unit of absorbed dose on ionising 
radiation. 1 Gy = 1 joule of energy absorbed per kilogram of 
matter such as body tissue.
The time for the activity of a radionuclide to decay to half its original 
value.
A  type of ionising radiation that leaves a high average density of 
energy deposition along the tracks that it produces in tissues, for 
example alpha particles, neutrons. It is usually more damaging to 
body tissue than is low LET type of radiation.
Difference in the effects of one or more explanatory variables.
Dose which is received by an individual as a result of radioactive 
material inside the body.
Studies carried out on material from an animal under artificially 
controlled conditions.
Studies carried out in the intact animal.
A  beta and gamma emitting radionuclide with a half-life of about 8 
days. It accumulates in the thyroid.
Radiation that can deliver energy in a form capable of removing 
electrons from atoms and turning them into ions.
Having been exposed to radiation. In the context of the Piles it is 
usually the neutron bombardment which is the most significant.
Forms of an element having the same atomic number (number of 
proteins) but different atomic mass (number of neutrons + 
proteins).
Cancer of the white blood cells. Leukaemias can be derived from the 
myeloid or lymphoid series. The cells infiltrate the bone marrow, the 
blood stream and other organs, eg: liver, spleen, kidneys.
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LINEAR ENERGY
TRANSFER A  measure of the density of energy deposition in the tracks of
ionising radiation. See High and Low LET.
LOW LET
RADIATION A  type of radiation that leaves a low average density of energy
deposition along the tracks that it produces in tissues, for example 
gamma rays, X-rays, beta particles. It is usually less damaging to 
biological tissue than his high LET radiation.
LYMPHOID TISSUE 
AND LYMPHATIC
ORGANS The organs and tissues of the body containing appreciable numbers
of lymphocytes, for example lymph nodes, thymus, spleen, tonsils.
LYMPHOMA A  tumour of the lymphoid tissue.
M AG NO X
MALIGNANCY
METASTASIS
MILLISIEVERT
MITOSIS
MOLECULE
MULTISTAGE
CARCINO­
GENESIS
A  type of nuclear fuel which is encased in a Magnesium alloy. It is 
also the name given to the gas cooled reactors using the fuel.
The essential property of cancer cells which is demonstrated by their 
ability to proliferate Indefinitely to invade surrounding tissue and to 
metastasize to other organs.
The spread of cells from a primary tumour to a non-contiguous site, 
usually via the blood stream or lymphatics with the establishment of 
a second growth.
mSv: A  unit of equivalent dose and effective dose.
Somatic cell division. The division of a nucleus following replication 
of the chromosomes so that the resulting daughter nuclei have the 
same number of chromosomes as the parent nucleus.
A  collection of atoms bound into a well defined unit forming a stable 
chemical compound.
The development of tumours is regarded as a multistage process in 
which at least three separated sequential processes, initiation, 
promotion and progression, have been described.
MUTAGEN Mutation inducing agent: these can be physical or chemical.
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M U TAN T
M U TATIO N
M U TATIO N
RATE
NATURAL
RADIATION
NHL
NUCLEUS
NUCLIDE
ONCOGENE
OXIDE FUEL
PHOTON
PILE
Any allele (alternative form of gene); or an individual carrying such 
an allele.
A  permanent heritable change in the amount or structure of the 
genetic material in an organism, resulting in a change in the 
characteristic of the organism. The alterations may involve a single 
gene, a block of genes, or a whole chromosome. A  mutation in the 
germ cells in sexually reproducing organisms may be transmitted to 
the offspring. A  mutation that occurs in somatic cells may be 
transferred to descendent daughter ceils within the organism.
The rate at which mutations occur at a given locus.
Natural radiation pervades the whole environment. Radiation 
reaches the earth from outer space. The earth itself contains 
radionuclides and natural radionuclides are present in the food we eat 
and in some of the elements in our body. Everyone is exposed to 
such radiation, which is frequently referred to as background 
radiation. The principal sources are: Cosmic rays; Terrestrial gamma 
rays; Radon decay products; Internal radiation.
Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma (blood disease involving a tumour of the 
lymphoid tissue).
The central part of an atom.
An individual species of atom characterised by its mass number, 
atomic number and the energy state of its nucleus.
A  gene whose protein product may be involved in processes leading 
to transformation of a normal cell to a malignant state. It can either 
be an altered normal gene, ora normal gene incorporated into a virus 
which then causes transformation when the virus infects the cell.
Nuclear fuel consisting of pellets of Uranium oxide. Used in 
Advanced Gas Cooled Reactors and Water Cooled Reactors.
A  quantum of electromagnetic radiation, regarded as a particle with 
zero rest mass and charge.
The name given to the part of a nuclear reactor which contains the 
fuel and their moderating systems.
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PLUTONIUM
POINT
M UTATION
PRESSURISED
WATER
REACTOR
PROMOTION
(TUMOUR)
PROTON
QUALITY
FACTOR
RAD
RADIATION
An actinade that can exist in several different isotopic forms. The 
principal isotopes, together with their main decay pathway are as 
follows
Plutonium-238: An alpha emitting radionuclide with a half-life of 
about 86 years.
Plutonium-239: An alpha emitting radionuclide with a half-life of 
about 24 ,000  years.
Plutonium 240: An alpha emitting radionuclide with a half-life of 
about 6 ,600  years.
Plutonium-241: A  beta emitting radionuclide with a half-life of about 
13 years and which decays as an alpha emitter.
Plutonium-242: An alpha emitting radionuclide with a half-life of 
about 379,000 years.
A  mutation that is specifically localised on a chromosome.
A  type of nuclear power plant which has a pile cooled by water kept 
under pressure.
The ill understood and protracted process whereby initiated ceils 
undergo clonal expansion to form visible tumours. The mechanism 
involved are diverse but, in different contexts, include sustained tissue 
damage and cycles of cell distribution and regeneration, immune 
suppression, hormonal imbalance, alterations in intercellular contacts 
and release of ceils from normal growth control. Specific 
agents have been characterised but their mode of action is unclear.
An elementary particle with a positive electric charge.
The factor by which absorbed dose of a given radiation is multiplied 
in order to obtain its dose equivalent for radiation protection 
purposes.
The old unit of absorbed dose of ionising radiation.
100 rad = 1 gray.
In this context, usually shorthand for 'ionising radiation'.
Forms of energy (sub-atomic particles or electromagnetic waves) 
which can propagate through space, and causes radiation damage by 
ionisation, in its interaction with matter.
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RADIATION
DOSE
RADIATION
WORKER
RADIOACTIVE
HALF-LIFE
RADIOACTIVITY
RADIOISOTOPE
RADIONUCLIDE
RADON
RED BONE 
MARROW
RELATIVE
BIOLOGICAL
EFFECTIVENESS
RELATIVE RISK 
REM
REPROCESSING
A  general term, often shortened to 'dose', for a measure of exposure 
to ionising radiation.
A  person working with radioactive materials. Often used to mean 
classified person.
The time taken for the activity of a radionuclide to lose half its value 
by decay.
A  property of radionuclides of spontaneously emitting ionising 
radiation.
An isotope of an element whose nucleus is unstable and undergoes 
spontaneous decay.
An unstable nuclide that emits ionising radiation.
A  naturally occurring radioactive gas which is one of the decay 
products of uranium. Radiation from radon accounts for the majority 
of the annual dose received by the average member of the UK 
population, at around 50% of the total.
The component of marrow which contains the bulk of the stem cells 
from which blood ceils are formed.
(RBE) A  quantity describing the relative effect of various types of 
radiation on tissues. In radiobiology it is defined as the ratio of a 
dose of reference radiation required to produce an identical biological 
end point to the dose of the radiation being tested when all the 
physical and biological variables, other than the radiation quality, are 
kept as constant as possible.
The probability that an event will occur.
The old unit of dose equivalent. The absorbed dose (rad), is 
multiplied by the Quality Factor for the particular type of radiation. 
100 rem = 1 sievert.
A  process, the purpose of which is to extract Uranium and Plutonium 
from spent fuel.
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RETROVIRUS
RNA
SARCOMA 
SELLAFIELD SITE
SIEVERT 
SOMATIC CELLS
SOMATIC
EFFECTS
SPERMATOGIUM
STACKS
STATISTICALLY
SIGNIFICANT
STEM CELLS
STOCHASTIC
EFFECTS
STRONTIUM-89
A  virus in which the genome comprises RNA.
(Ribonucleic acid) RNA governs all protein manufacture. It differs 
from DNA by having extra -OH group on the ribose sugar and 
although, it too has four nitrogenous basis, it contains uracil instead 
of thymine as well as adenine, cytosine and guanine. It can exist in 
both single and double stranded forms and it governs all protein 
manufacture.
Tumour developing in the connected tissues of bones and muscles.
The composite name given to the BNFL site in West Cumbria which 
includes the Windscale nuclear fuel reprocessing facility and the 
Calder Hail nuclear reactor.
The name for the SI unit of dose equivalent.
All cell types in an individual other than those which are, or give rise 
to germ ceils.
The effects of radiation on the body of the person or animal exposed 
(as opposed to genetic effects).
The sequence of events from stem cell spermatogonia to mature 
spermatozoa.
Tall ventilation chimneys from the Windscale piles on the Sellafield 
site; they contain filers to remove particulates.
Shown by statistical testing to be unlikely to have arisen by chance.
Cells that can produce either undifferentiated it partially specialised) 
or differentiated (if fully specialised) ceils.
Those radiation effects (such as cancer induction) where it is the 
probability of the effect occurring which depends on the dose, rather 
than the severity of the effects.
A  beta emitting radionuclide with a half-life of about 50 days. It is
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STRONTIUM-90
STUDY
POPULATION
THORPE
TOXIN
TRANSGENIC
MOUSE
TRITIUM
TUM OUR
TUM OUR
SUPPRESSOR
GENE
URANIUM
VARIABLE
chemically similar to calcium and tends to concentrate in bone.
A  beta emitting radionuclide with a half-life of about 28 years. It is 
similar to calcium and tend to concentrate in bone.
All the subjects included in the study. This may include cases and 
controls.
Thermal Oxide Reprocessing Plant. A  plant for the purpose of 
reprocessing enriched Uranium oxide; fuel used by Advanced Gas 
Cooled reactors and Water Cooled Reactors.
A  general term for a chemical agent, often of biological origin, but 
not always) which can cause injury or disease.
A  mouse that has had a foreign gene introduced by means of gene 
transfer techniques in all of their cells. New information is then 
passed on through the germline of the adult.
A  radioactive isotope of hydrogen. It emits low energy beta 
radiation and has a radioactive half-life of 12.3 years.
A  swelling or growth. It usually implied a collection of cells. A  
tumour may be benign (ie ceils do not invade or metastasize) or 
malignant.
A  gene whose continued expression is thought to be essential for 
normal growth and differentiation of ceils. Many tumour suppressor 
genes probably exist. Deletion or suppression of such genes lead to 
tumour development. They are recessive at the level of individual 
cells which means that both alleles must be inactivated before a 
tumour develops.
A  naturally occurring element with atomic number 92. It is present 
in nature as two isotopes uranium 235 and uranium 238.
A  quantity that varies. Any attribute, phenomenon or event that can 
have different values.
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VIRUS Any of the infections, sub-cellular and ultra-microscopic particles
representing potentially pathogenic agents, whose replication in the 
cell and transmission by infection results in characteristic reactions of 
the host cells and host individuals. Viruses are independent genetic 
systems which possess an evolutionary history of their own. They use 
the synthetic machinery of living cells to direct the synthesis of 
specialised particles which contain the viral genome and transfer it to 
other cells.
WHOLE BODY
DOSE A  term used to represent dose from approximately uniform
irradiation of an individual, and to distinguish it from dose to 
particular body organs and tissues.
WINDSCALE
PLANT The nuclear fuel reprocessing facility situated within the Sellafield site.
X-RAYS A  type of electromagnetic radiation whose photons have energy
lower than most of gamma-rays but higher than that of ultra-violet 
light. Most X-rays are not of sufficient energy to cause ionisation.
ZIRCONIUM-95 This is a beta emitting radionuclide with a half-life of about 65 days.
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APPENDIX ONE
THE
ACADEMY OF EXPERTS 
MEMBERSHIP 
QUESTIONNAIRE
the
UNIVERSITY
GREENWICH
the
UNIVERSITY
of
GREENWICH
26 th  May 1997
Dear Member,
The purpose of th is  questionnaire is to gain some understanding of your  
background as an exp ert w itness. In  total th e re  a re  th ir ty  fo u r questions 
centred around the experience of sc ien tific , medical and technical exp erts  as well 
as a fina l section th a t evaluates membership opinion of jud ic ia l decision m aking.
The questionnaire has been designed by a Senior L ec tu rer a t the U n ive rs ity  of 
Greenwich, who is also a researcher at the London School of Economics and  
Political Science in  h er fina l year of a doctoral thesis in  law under the  supervision  
of Professor Carol H arlow . In  addition to provid ing  em pirical data fo r the thesis  
however, the questionnaire w ill also, on completion of the doctorate form the  basis 
of membership inform ation fo r The Academy of E xperts  who w ill have access to the  
find ings fo r  th e ir  own purposes. F u rth e r inform ation on the project may be 
obtained from yo u r Chairm an, M r. M. Cohen.
In  o rder to ensure as h igher response ra te  as possible, i t  would be appreciated  
i f  you could complete the profile  specification and questionnaire b y  tick ing  the  
appropriate answers and re tu rn in g  the booklet in  the  prepaid  envelope as soon 
as possible (idea lly  w ith in  the next six w eeks).
A ll the inform ation provided w ill of course be kep t con fidentia l, and in  o rder to 
safeguard anonym ity, names and occupational details have not been included in  
the questionnaire.
I  look forw ard  to receiv ing you r response and would lik e  to take th is  opportunity  
of thanking you in  advance fo r your assistance.
Yours s incerely ,
Rebecca H arrison .
Avery Hill Campus
Southwood Site 
Avery' Hill Road. Eltham 
London SE9 2UG 
Telephone: +44(0)181-331 8000
University o f Greenwich, j  charily and company 
limited by guarantee, registered in England 
(reg. no. tiX672(Ji. Registered Office:
Bexley Road. Eltham. London SEd 2PQ
PROFILE SPECIFICATION
(P le a s e  answer th e  fo llo w in g  q u es tio n s  b e fo re  co m p le tin g  th e  q u e s t io n n a ire )
QUALIFICATIONS:
PROFESSIONAL TITLE:
a) Hale (
b) Penale (
ETHNICITY:
European Vhite 
European Black 
European Other 
Asian Chinese 
Sontb Asian 
Commonwealth Vhite 
Commonwealth Black 
American Black 
American Vhite 
Middle Eastern 
Other
a) Under 35 years
b) 35 to 55 years
c) 55 to 63 years
d) Over 63 years
Is English your first language? Yes
No
If not, are you fluent in English?
Yes
ROLE OF EIPERT WITNESS
(Please answer all questions by ticking the lost appropriate box)
1) Has a solicitor ever prepared you in advance for a case with regard to the following?
- Rules of evidence
- Oral testiaony
- Written reports
- Cross exaaination
- Media attention
- Adjonrnaent/delay of case
- Legal terainology/jargon
- Meeting of experts
a). Yes, coapletely b). Yes, partly c). Not at all
2) Have yon ever been sent on a training course to prepare yon for the role of expert witness?
a). Yes ( )
b). No ( )
3) Would you describe your area of research as:
a). New/novel ( )
b). Established ( j
c). Controversial ( )
4) Have you, in your role as an expert witness, ever been subjected to (what you considered to be) witness 
ridicule?
a). Often ( )
b). On occasion ( )
c). Never ( )
5) Have you ever experienced a conflict of interest during a trial?
a). Often ( )
b). On Occasion ( )
c). Never ( )
6) Have you at any point in your experience as an expert witness felt your professional coipetence was being 
challenged?
a). Often ( )
b). On occasion ( )
c). Never ( )
EXPERIENCE OF BEING AN EIPERT WITNESS
7) Id yoor experience as an expert witness does the solicitor generally make yon feel part of the tea*?
a). Yes, usually ( )
b). Sonetiaes ( )
c). Rarely ( )
d). Never ( )
8) In your experience as an expert witness do you think there are unrealistic deadlines iaposed on you?
a). Yes ( )
b). No ( )
9) In general do you think there are too aany aeetings with:
Solicitors a). Yes ( ) b). On occasion ( ) c). No ( )
Other Experts b). Yes ( ) b). On occasion ( ) c). No ( )
10) Has your scientific/aedical/technical research ever been aisrepresented by Counsel?
a). Often ( )
b). On occasion ( )
c). Never ( )
11) Have you ever been asked to give evidence on an area which was beyond your specialism?
a). Yes ( )
b). No ( )
12) Have you ever incurred any personal expense as a consequence of trial alteration/adjournment/delay?
a). Yes ( )
b). No ( )
13) Have you ever incurred any inconvenience as a consequence of trial alteration/adjournsent/delay?
a). Yes ( )
b). No ( )
14) In your experience, do you find the system of 'booking' expert witness time in advance to be an effective 
and reliable indicator of the time you actually spend in court?
a). Yes ( )
b). No ( )
15) Has the impartiality of your evidence ever been challenged under cross-examination?
a). Yes ( )
b). No ( )
16) Has your evidence ever broken down under cross-examination?
a). Often ( )
b). On Occasion ( )
c). Never
17) Voald you describe your experience as an expert witness as:
a). Positive, on the whole ( )
b). Mixed ( )
c). Negative, on the whole ( )
18) Has opposing Counsel ever suggested that your research is based on any of the following?
Fraud a) Yes ( b). No
Misrepresentation of data a) Yes ( b). No
Poor nethodology a) Yes ( b). No
Misinterpretation of data a) Yes ( b). No
Junk science a) Yes ( b). No
Pseudo science a) Yes ( b). No
Deception a) Yes ( b). No
19) In yonr opinion, has yonr evidence ever been unnecessary or inappropriate to a case?
a). Often ( )
b). On occasion ( )
c). Never ( )
20) Have you ever given expert evidence via live video links or satellite?
a). Often ( )
b). On Occasion ( )
c). Never ( )
21) In your experience as an expert witness, have you ever suffered froo what you perceived to be age 
discrimination in respect of being considered either too young or too old?
a). Often ( )
b). On Occasion ( )
c). Never ( )
22) How nany tines have yon given written evidence as an expert witness?
a). 1-5 tines ( )
b). 5-10 tines ( )
c). Over 10 tines ( )
23) How nany tines have you given oral evidence as an expert witness?
a). 1-5 tines ( )
b). 5-10 tines ( )
c). Over 10 tines ( )
24) Over how nany years have you been an' expert witness?
a). 1-5 years ( )
b). 5-10 years ( )
c). Over 10 years ( )
KIPKRIBNCB OF JUDICIARY
25) In general (in yonr experience as an expert witness) have yon fonnd the jndiciary to be:
- Helpful a). Often ( b). On occasion ( ) c). Never ( )
- Patient ( ( ) ( )
- Balanced ( ( ) ( )
- Disrespectful ( ( ) ( )
- Courteous ( ( ) ( )
- Intiaidating ( ( ) ( )
- Rude ( ( ) ( )
26) Has a judge ever suggested that you have adopted a partisan approach when presenting evidence?
a). Often ( )
b). On Occasion ( )
c). Never ( )
27) Has a judge (in your opinion) ever lisunderstood the point of your evidence?
a). Often ( )
b). On occasion ( )
c). Never ( )
28) As scientific, ledical and technical expert evidence often relies on statistically based aethodology, do 
yon consider that your evidence would be aore accessible if judges were given soae fora of statistical 
training?
a). Yes ( )
b). No ( )
29) In your experience as an expert witness, do you think a judge (when basing his decision on the balance of 
probabilities) should adopt applied probabilistic reasoning (statistically based foraulation) to his evaluation 
and judgaent of the case?
a). Yes, where appropriate ( )
b). No, not necessary ( )
30) In your experience have you found that judges rely aore on presentation of evidence rather than content?
a). Yes ( )
b). Soaetiaes ( )
c). Never ( )
31) As a expert witness, would you support proposals for a judicially appointed scientific advisor to sit with 
the judge in order to facilitate better judicial understanding of the evidence?
a). Yes ( )
b). No ( )
32) Do you agree with Lord Voolf that court appointed expert witnesses would increase the independence of 
experts and reduce the potential for partisanship?
a). Yes ( )
b). No, not necessarily ( )
33) In your opinion, and on balance, do yon think that the engagement of a coart appointed expert witness may 
help to reduce any of the-following:
- unnecessary polarisation of issues a). Yes ( ;) b). No
- unnecessary expense a). Yes ( ;) b). No
- unnecessary delay a). Yes ( :) b). No
- unnecessary complexity a). Yes ( ;1 b). No
34) Based on yonr experience, do yon consider that a High Coart Jadge sitting alone can gain sufficient 
comprehension and understanding of scientific evidence to be able to resolve complex cases based on the 
testimony of opposing expert witnesses?
a). Yes, usually ( )
b). No, never ( )
c). Possibly ( )
Based on your experience as an expert witness, please use the space provided for anj  additional comments you 
yon would like to make:
Thank you for taking the time to complete this questionnaire.
Expert Witness Questionnaire
RESULTS 
160 sent out
99 returned =  62%  response rate 
92 of the 99 correctly completed =  93%
7 incorrectly completed (7%  not incorporated into final figures) 
43 out of the 92 responses (47% ) chose to make additional 
comments on the back page of the questionnaire.
Gender
Male
Female
78
14
Ethnicity
a. European white
b. European white
c. European other
d. Asian Chinese
e. South Asian
91
0
0
0
f. Commonwealth white
g. Commonwealth black
0
0
0
0
0
0
h. American black
i. Americna white 
j. Middle Eastern 
k Other
Age
a. Under 35 years
b. 35 to 55 years
c. 55 to 63 years
d. over 63 years
0
55
22
15
Is English you first language?
yes
no
91
1
Professional Title of Experts
3 x Chartered Civil and Structural Engineers.
7 x Chartered Civil Engineers.
1 x Computer and Automation Consultant.
2 x Consultant Clinical Neuro Psychologists.
5 x Consultants.
1 x Consultant Anaesthetist.
2 x Consultants Accident and Emergency Medicine.
1 x Consultant Chartered Engineer and Surveyor.
1 x Consultant Child Neurologist.
1 x Consultant Ear Nose and Throat Surgeon.
1 x Consultant in Disability Therapy.
6 x Consultant Engineers.
1 x Consultant Geo-technical Engineer.
1 x Consultant Industrial Microbiologist.
4 x Consultant Mechanical Engineers.
1 x Consultant Neurologist.
1 x Consultant Occupational and Aviation Medicine.
1 x Consultant Occupational Physician and Toxicologist.
1 x Consultant Osteopath.
2 x Consultant Orthopaedic Surgeons and Traumatologists.
4 x Consultant Orthopaedic Surgeons.
1 x Consultant Otolaryngologist.
2 x Consultant Paediatrician.
1 x Consultant Pharmacologist.
1 x Consultant Plastic Surgeon.
1 x Consultant Plastic and Hand Surgeon.
1 x Consultant Surgeon.
1 x Consultant Surgeon and Professor of Colo-Rectol Surgery.
2 x Consultant Trichologists.
1 x Director of Operations and Nursing.
12 x Doctors.
1 x Electrical Scientist.
1 x European Engineer.
1 x Forensic Consultant Engineer.
1 x Independent Medical Practitioner/Forensic Physician.
1 x Independent Consultant in Occupational Health and Safety Management.
2 x Nursing Consultants.
3 x Occupational Therapists.
1 x Orthopaedic Consultant.
1 x Paediatric Nursing Consultant.
1 x Physiotherapist.
1 x Professor and Head of the Univ. Dept, of Surgery (Univ. of Birmingham). 
1 x Professor of Medicine.
1 x Professor of Reconstructive Surgery.
2 x Registered General Nurses.
1 x Senior Contracts Manager.
1 x Senior Scientist.
2 x Specialist Speech and Language Therapist.
1. Has a solicitor prepared you in advance for the following?
Yes Partly No
Rules of Ev. 16 29 47
Oral Test. 16 31 45
Written Rep. 23 39 30
Cross Exam. 4 26 62
Media Att. 10 10 72
Adj/Delay 12 26 54
Legal Term 15 26 51
Meet of Expert. 20 31 41
2. Have you ever been given training as an expert witness?
yes 53
no 39
3. Would you describe your area of research as:
a. new/novel 10
b. established 72
c. controversial 10
4. Have you ever been subjected to witness ridicule?
often 1
on occasion 23
never 68
5. Have you ever experience a conflict of interests in a trial?
often 1
on occasion 14
never 77
6. Has your competency ever been challenged?
often 4
on occasion 43
never 45
7.1n your experience as an expert witness does the solicitor generally make you feel part 
of the team?
a. yes, usually 56
b. sometimes 26
c. rarely 9
d. never 1
8. Are there unrealistic deadlines imposed on you?
yes 48
no 44
9. Are there too many meetings?
yes 1
on occasion 12
no 79
10. Has you scientific/medical/technical research ever been misrepresented by Counsel?
a. often 2
b. on occasion 23
c. never 67
11. Have you ever been asked to give evidence which was beyond your specialism?
yes 51
no 41
12. Have you ever incurred personal expenses as a consequence of 
trial alteration/adjournment or delay?
yes 54
no 38
13. Have you ever incurred any inconvenience as a consequence of trial/adjournment or 
delay?
yes 76
no 16
14. Is booking expert witness time in advance an effective and reliable indicator of the 
time spent in court?
yes 15
no 77
15. Has the impartiality of your evidence every been challenged under cross examination?
yes 18
no 74
16. Has you evidence every been broken down under cross examination?
often 0
on occasion 10
never 82
17. Would you describe your experience as an expert witness as:
a. positive, on the whole 66
b. mixed 17
c. negative, on the whole 9
18. Has opposing counsel every suggested that your research was based on any of the 
following:
Yes No
Fraud 0 92
Misrep. 5 87
Poor Method. 10 82
Misinterp. 16 76
Junk Sc. 0 92
Pseudo Sc. 4 88
Deception 0 92
19. In you opinion has you evidence ever been unnecessary or inappropriate to a case?
often 0
on occasion 31
never 61
20. Have you every given expert evidence via life video links or satellite?
often 1
on occasion 3
never 88
21. Have you ever suffered from age discrimination?
often 3
on occasion 7
never 82
22. How many times have you given written evidence?
1-5 4
5-10 10
over 10 times 78
23. How many times have you given oral evidence?
1-5 29
5-10 16
over 10 times 4
24. Over how many years have you been an expert witness?
1-5 20
5-10 27
over 10 years 45
25. In general (in your experience as an expert witness) have you found the judiciary to 
be:
a. b. c.
often on occasion never
Helpful 65 24 3
Patient 66 25 1
Balanced 69 22 1
Disrespectful 4 16 72
Courteous 75 15 2
Intimidating 4 37 51
Rude 1 20 71
26. Has a judge every suggested that you have adopted a partisan approach when 
presenting evidence?
a. often 0
b. on occasion 4
c. never 88
27. Has a judge (in you opinion) ever misunderstood the point of your evidence?
a. often
b. on occasion
c. never
2
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28. Should judges have some form of statistical training?
yes 34
no 58
29. Should judges adopt applied probabilistic reasoning to his evaluation and judgement 
of the evidence in a case?
yes 48
no 44
30. In your experience have you found that judges rely more on presentation of evidence 
rather than content?
a. yes 9
b. sometimes 54
c. never 29
31. Should there be a judicially appointed scientific advisor to 
sit with a judge?
yes 54
no 38
32. Do you agree that court appointed experts would reduce the likelihood of 
partisanship?
yes 37
no 55
33. In your opinion, and on balance, do you think that the engagement of a court
appointed expert witness may help to reduce any of the following:
yes no
unnecessary polarisation of issues 55 37
unnecessary expense 52 40
unnecessary delay 51 41
unnecessary complexity 47 45
34. Based on your experience, do you consider that a High Court ]udge sitting alone can 
again sufficient comprehension and understanding of scientific evidence to be able to 
resolve complex cases based on the testimony of opposing expert witnesses?
a. yes, usually
b. no, never
c. possibly
51
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ADDITIONAL COMMENTS BY EXPERT WITNESSES
Solicitors
"It is unreasonable for solicitors to ask for ones availability to attend court and then to 
ignore it by issuing a subpoena. This is high handed and unfair and an abuse of the 
subpoena system".
"My main gripe is that solicitors (the vast majority) do not keep me in the picture with 
what is going on in the case and leave all requests to the last minute".
"Unrealistic deadlines are invariably the fault of the solicitor who has been careless with 
the case".
"More use could be made of discussion with the expert from the other side - with the 
notable exception of'experts' who are known to be partisan - biased - not many, but they 
do exist".
"Those who instruct experts should recognise experts absolute impartiality
They should also be more efficient so that last minute settlement or adjournment becomes
unnecessary"
"I feel it would save a lot of time and effort (not to mention stress) if agreement could 
be reached in advance over which aspects of an expert's testimony were accepted and 
which were in contention. This would enable the experts to direct their time and efforts 
accordingly. May be a court appointed expert could adjudicate on such matter.
I find it frustrating that well considered reports are sometimes not reviewed in sufficient 
depth prior to the start of proceedings".
"Main problem is solicitors poor communication skills and tendency to work at arms 
length by means of hastily dictated and sometimes convoluted letters. Few appreciate the 
fact that their work would be greatly eased if they brought experts in as quasi team 
members".
"I have had solicitors asking me to alter my reports to present their client in a more 
favourable light - asking to prepare a biased report".
" 1 .Statements of Claims/Pleadings should not be solely drafted by Solicitor/Counsel.
2. Solicitors should appoint experts as soon as issues are clear.
3. Solicitors should advise experts of likely court requirements of experts ie: when 
they will be required and not leave it vague for the experts to assume.
4. Solicitors should make more effort to pay experts fees on agreed timescales".
"Lack of payment for cancellation of cases (through settlement of case) [is] often a 
problem".
"Patients cannot be fitted in at short notice for major surgery. NHS annual leave is 
needed to attend court and cancellation of operating lists and clinics [are] not recognised 
by [the] legal profession; loss of private earnings (as on annual NHS leave) not 
recompensed".
"Mostly a report is all that is required from medical specialists and one does not know in 
most cases what the solicitor does with the report. It is sometimes obvious, because I am 
asked to refer to other's reports, where mine is the one the solicitor has chosen to present 
to counsel. Also, universally I have been asked about availability in the next 6-9 months 
for 3 cases - but often one hears nothing more after sending the report and often one has 
to 'chase' the solicitor to pay for the report".
"Most instructing solicitors, in my experience, have 'bland' perceptions of the role of 
certain professional groups. Such perceptions are simplistic and unsophisticated - ie: a 
psychologist - and beyond this there is little appreciation of speciality 
eg: Educational Psychologist, Clinical Psychologist etc.".
"The most negative aspect of being an expert witness is trying to receive payment - 
despite having an agreed timescale".
Lawyers
"What really would solve many disputes is, the parties getting together, if necessary with 
experts and not resorting to law. Many lawyers and insurers create the case, where none 
should exist in the first place".
"Most lawyers/insurers use the expert merely as a 'tool' and do not accord sufficient 
respect or acknowledgement of years of experience and special training. Many 
lawyers/insurers devalue the 'expert system' by favouring amenable or prejudiced 
experts who approach a case not openly but from a skewed 'frame of reference', this fans 
the adversarial flames and adds to costs and time.
Few lawyers have the courtesy to inform experts that a case has been settled and the file 
may be closed. Too many lawyers treat experts in an arrogant way".
"There is an immediate requirement for ongoing education for Barristers and QC's".
ludges
"As a technical expert I believe that I have a duty to make my reports 'user friendly' and 
that I must try to explain things so that lay people can understand. Padding and prolix 
discussion of non relevant issues are also to be avoided. A  report usually gets read by 
severally highly paid people who need to understand it before a judge ever sees it and 
clarity saves time and money.
I think that judges may be influenced by a well written report where technical explanations 
are rendered comprehensible insofar that when he has to recap he will refer to the report 
that he finds easiest to read and is most likely to answer the question that is in his mind. 
The other thing that I would say to you is concerning court training. Expert witnesses do 
not get the opportunity to give evidence in court often enough to acquire proficiency by 
this alone. Training in procedure, cross examination and general bearing is essential".
"By and large my experience has been positive. My main comment would be the 
apparent lack of understanding of technical issues by the judge, which impeded clear 
resolution of often complex problems".
"Despite denial to the contrary, the pervasive and perverting influence of Freemasonry is 
all too evident when medical cases come to trial".
"Judges are highly analytical and reasoning and are quite capable of assimilating complex 
arguments and drawing appropriate conclusions".
"The knowledge of judges varies considerably; some know the subject very well and giving 
evidence is easy, others have no idea about the subject and therefore do not understand 
the complexities of detailed expert evidence. I doubt if they would take kindly to having 
an advisor sitting next to them.
The bias of the judge is still evident in some cases to the point that it is visible to all in the 
court. This does not help to create an image of the law being impartial.
A  lot of time is wasted either for a court to become available or counsel having last 
minute conferences related to potential settlement of a claim".
Experts
"The expert should be skilled at presenting his arguments clearly and enable the Judge to 
understand the technical issues".
"Medical issues are less clear ie: more subjective than some technical specialities".
"There is a difference between a person that has expertise and a competent expert 
witness. The former can damage a case by their evidence because of arrogance, lack of 
objectivity and intolerance of others. None of these are necessarily partisan but, in some 
respects they are worse. As a relatively young expert, I consider this criticism to be 
particularly appropriate to the 'older end'. Perhaps they should accept that their 
intellectual powers are fading, and pass the stress and skill that typifies expert work to 
those at the peak of their intellect, rather then saturated with experience".
"In my experience an expert can only demand the respect deserved by making it clear to 
ail concerned that the main concern is truth - whoever is paying?"
"In my opinion, it is essential for expert witnesses to be accredited members of the 
Academy of Experts to signify their standing as professional expert witnesses in their 
respective fields".
"There needs to be much more respect for expert time and availability for court 
attendance by listing officers and some judges".
"The biggest problem experts face is getting issues to the stage whereby a judge can 
understand them; some issues are technically too complex for the court and should have 
a technical assessor".
"Each [expert] operates to a quite different perspective/paradigm. A  Court [appointed] 
official might well need to identify an appropriate expert but might well encounter 
considerable difficulties in finding/locating or even assembling a panel to give a balanced 
view in a given situation".
"Most expert witness reports do not get to trial as a good expert should advise his 
appointing solicitor if a case has little or no chance of success".
[When distinguishing between expert evidence on liability and quantum] "In my 
experience [liability] is more controversial than [quantum] where my opinion has usually 
been accepted".
Woolf Proposals
"I thoroughly support the Woolf proposals but a professional register of accredited experts 
has to be developed against criteria set by the Lord Chancellor's Dept, and professional 
bodies"
"In my field the use of court appointed experts is likely to result in injustice. This is 
because many "experts" only ever practice in one area of the profession and have little 
appreciation of how the other side operates. The safeguard against opinions formulated 
by such experts is the appointment of experts who have experience which is broad enough 
yet 'expert' enough to see the wider picture. An expert with apparently appropriate 
credentials often has little appreciation of overall matters".
"Re: proposal for 'court appointed witnesses' - it would be interesting to learn from 
where a court (circuit area) would find the appropriate expert of a given expertise - and 
thence - the method proposed for selection and appointment".
"I think Lord Woolf's proposals show a naive faith in the impartiality of a medical expert 
without a legal training".
"I have seen the French system in operation. Here the case was 'tried' effectively by four 
experts judiciaries appointed by the ]udge. I seldom saw the latter during a case which 
lasted 11 years in the Tribunal de Commerce de Paris. I have to say that I had no more 
confidence in these court appointed experts, in fact less, than I did in the judges before 
whom I testified in Canada. I though that the latter had a very good grasp of complex 
technical issues."
"I approve of the Woolf proposals to have court appointed experts as undoubtedly the 
present adversarial system does lure a small number of 'experts' to be less than impartial. 
The problem will be how to make available and vet/accredit a list of suitably impartial 
expert 'experts'".
Discrimination
"I feel at times discriminated against due to my sex".
System
"The system of not knowing if or not you will be going to court until the very last minute 
is infuriating - surely someone can invest a better system".
"In my field of personal injury litigation, there are some cases where it is necessary to 
delay settlement (final) for several years on account of the nature of the disability. But 
I believe that liability should be established as soon as possible to facilitate interim 
payments, based on professionally assessed needs.
I believe the majority of cases take unnecessarily long to settle and that the emotional 
distress caused to the plaintiff and relatives is disproportionate to the financial gains. If 
at all possible the adversarial element and the number of experts should be reduced".
Legal Aid
"Too many cases are not rejected by the Legal Aid Board because there is no case. 
Experts should be able to do a rapid adjudicating process to dismiss more cases getting 
aid".
"There should be a clear understanding by solicitors that the contract to prepare a report 
is with them, not with the Legal Aid Board. There should be no delay in agreeing 
payment on the grounds that the fee has to be agreed".
"I think there should be a more efficient system whereby the Legal Aid Board would be 
able to consider cases (particularly medical ones) in more detail, and exclude those that 
have no possible justification for proceeding further".
APPENDIX TW O
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(c. 30)
An Act to make. I'or civil proceedings in England and Wales, pro- 6100 
vision as to the adm issibility in evidence o f statements o f opinion and 
*the reception o f expert evidence: and to facilitate proof in such pro­
ceedings o f any law other than that o f England and W ales.
[ 12th June 1972]
Application of Part I of Civil Evidence Act 1968 to statements of 
opinion
I . — ( I )  Subject to the provisions o f this section. Part I (hearsay cvi- 6101  
dencc) o f the C iv il Evidence Act 1968. except section 5 (statements pro­
duced by computers) shall apply in relation to statements o f opinion as it 
applies in relation to statements o f fact, subject to the necessary modifica­
tions and in particu lar the m odification that any reference to a fact stated 
in a statem ent shall be construed as a reference to a m atter dealt with  
therein.
(2 ) Section 4 (adm issibility o f certain records) o f the C iv il Evidence Act 
1968, as applied by subsection (1) above, shall not render admissible in 
any civil proceedings a statement o f opinion contained in a record unless 
that statem ent would be admissible in those proceedings if  made in the 
course o f giving oral evidence by the person who originally supplied the 
inform ation from which the record was compiled: but where a statement 
o f opinion contained in a record deals w ith a m atter on which the person 
who orig inally  supplied the inform ation from which the record was com­
piled is (or would i f  living be) qualified to give oral expert evidence, the 
said section 4, as applied bv subsection (1) above, shall have cficct in rela­
tion to that statement as i f  so much o f subsection (1) o f that section as 
requires personal knowledge on the part o f that person were om itted.
Rules of court with respect to expert reports and oral expert evi­
dence
2.— ( I ) I f  and so far as rules o f court so provide, subsection (2) o f sec- 61 02  
lion 2 o f the C iv il Evidence Act 1968 (w hich imposes restrictions on the 
giving o f a statement in evidence by virtue o f that section on behalf o f a 
party  who has called or intends to call as a witness the maker o f the state­
m ent) shall not apply to statements (w hether o f fact or opinion) contained 
in expert reports.
(2) In  so far as they relate to statements (w hether o f fact or opinion) 
contained in expert reports, rules o f court made in pursuance of sub­
section ( I ) o f section 8 of the C iv il Evidence Act 1968 as to the procedure 
to be followed and the other conditions to be fulfilled before a statement 
can be given in evidence in civil proceedings by virtue o f section 2 of that 
Act (adm issibility  o f out-of-court statements) shall not be subject to the 
requirem ents o f subsection (2) o f the said section 8 (which specifics cer­
tain m atters o f procedure for which provision must o rd inarily  be made by 
rules o f  court made in pursuance o f the said subsection (1 )).
(3) N otw ithstanding any enactment or rule o f law by virtue o f which 
docum ents prepared for the purpose o f pending or contemplated civil pro­
ceedings or in connection w ith the obtaining or giving o f legal advice are
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in certain circumstances privileged from disclosure, provision may be 
made by rules o f court—
(rt) for enabling the court in any civil proceedings to direct, with  
respect to medical matters or matters o f any other class which 
may be specified in the direction, that the parties or some of 
them shall each by such date as may be so specified (or such 
later date as may be perm itted or agreed in accordance w ith the 
rules) disclose to the other or others in the form of one or more 
expert reports the expert evidence on matters o f that class 
which he proposes to adduce as part o f his case at the trial; and 
i h) !br prohibiting a party who fails to comply w ith a direction 
given in any such proceedings under rules o f court made bv v ir­
tue o f paragraph U ) above from adducing in evidence by virtue  
o f section 2 o f the C iv il Evidence Act 1968 (adm issibility o f out- 
of-court statements) except with the leave o f the court, any 
statement (w hether o f fact or opinion) contained in any expert 
report whatsoever in so far as that statement deals w ith matters 
o f any class specified in the direction.
(4) Provision may be made by rules o f court as to the conditions subject 
to which oral expert evidence may be given in civil proceedings.
(5) W ith ou t prejudice to the generality o f subsection (4) above, rules of 
court m ade in pursuance o f that subsection may make provision for prohi­
b iting a party who fails to comply w ith  a direction given as mentioned in 
subsection (3) (6) above from adducing, except w ith  the leave o f the court, 
any oral expert evidence whatsoever w ith respect to m atters o f any class 
specified in the direction.
(6 ) A ny rules o f court made in pursuance o f this section may make d if­
ferent provisions for different classes o f cases, for expert reports dealing  
w ith matters o f different classes, and for other different circumstances.
(7) References in this section to an expert report are references to a w rit­
ten report by a person dealing wholly or m ainly w ith  matters on which he 
is (or w ould if  liv ing be) qualified to give expert evidence.
(8) N o th ing  in the foregoing provisions o f this section shall prejudice 
the generality o f section 75 o f the C ounty Courts Act 1984, section 144 of 
the M ag istra tes ’ Courts Act 1980 or any other enactment conferring 
power to make rules of court; and nothing in section 75(2) o f the County  
Courts Act 1984 or any other enactment restricting the matters with  
respect to which rules o f court may be made shall prejudice the making of 
rules o f court in pursuance of this section or the operation o f any rules of 
court so made.
A m ended by M .C .A . 198U, s .154 and Sched. 7. S .C .A . 1981. s .152(4) and Sched. 7 and by 
C o u m y Courts Act 1984. s. 148(1) and Schcd. 2.
Admissibility of expert opinion and certain expressions of non­
expert opinion
6103 3.— (1) Subject to any rules of court made in pursuance o f Part I o f the
C iv il Evidence Act 1968 or this Act, where a person is called as a witness 
in any civil proceedings, his opinion on any relevant m atter on which he is 
qualified to give expert evidence shall be admissible in evidence.
(2) It  is hereby declared that where a person is called as a witness in 
any civil proceedings, a statement o f opinion by him on any relevant 
m atter on which he is not qualified to give expert evidence, if  made as a 
way o f conveying relevant facts personally perceived by him . is admissible 
as evidence o f what he perceived.
(3) In  this section “ relevant m atter" includes an issue in the proceed­
ings in question.
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Evidence of foreign law
4.—  ( I )  It is hereby declared that in civil proceedings a person who is 61 04  
suitably qualified to do so on account o f his knowledge or experience is 
competent to give expert evidence as to t he law o f any country or territory  
outside the United  K in g d o m .. or o f any part of the U n ited  K ingdom  other 
than England and W ales, irrespective of whether he has acted or is 
entitled to act as a legal practitioner there.
(2) W here any question as to the law of any country or territory outside 
the United  K ingdom , or o f any part o f the United K ingdom  other than 
England and W ales, w ith  respect to any m atter has been determ ined  
(w hether before or after the passing o f this Act) in any such proceedings 
(not being proceedings before a court which can take ju d ic ia l notice o f the 
law o f that country, territory or part with respect to that m atte r)—
(a)  any finding made or decision given on that question in the first* 
mentioned proceedings shall, if reported or recorded in citable  
form, be admissible in evidence for the purpose o f proving the 
law of that country, territory or part w ith  respect to that 
matter: and
(b) i f  that finding or decision, as so reported or recorded, is 
adduced for that purpose, the law of that country, territory or 
part w'ith respect to that m atter shall be taken to be in accord­
ance w ith that finding or decision unless the contrary is proved:
Provided that paragraph (b) above shall not apply in the case o f a find­
ing or decision which conflicts w ith another finding or decision on the 
same question adduced by virtue o f this subsection in the same proceed­
ings.
(3) Except with the leave o f the court, a party to anv civil proceedings 
shall not be perm itted to adduce any such finding or decision as is m en­
tioned in subsection (2) above by virtue of that subsection unless he has in 
accordance with rules o f court given to even other party to the-proceed­
ings notice that he intends to do so.
(4) T h e  proceedings referred to in subsection (2) above arc the follow­
ing. whether civ il or crim ina l, nam ely—
(a) proceedings at first instance in any of the following courts, 
namely the H ig h  C ourt, the Crown Court, a court o f quarter  
sessions, the C ourt o f Chancery o f the county palatine o f L an ­
caster and the C ourt o f Chancery of the county palatine o f D u r­
ham;
(b) appeals arising out o fan y such proceedings as arc m entioned in 
paragraph (a) above:
(r) proceedings before the Judicial Com m ittee o f the Privy Council 
on appeal (w hether to H er M ajesty in Council or to the Jud ic ia l 
Com m ittee as such) from any decision o f any court outside the 
United K ingdom .
(5) For the purposes o f this section a finding or decision on any such 
question as is mentioned in subsection (2) above shall be taken to be 
reported or recorded in citable form if. but only if. it is reported or 
recorded in w riting in a report, transcript or other document which, if  that 
question had been a question as to the law of England and W ales, could 
be cited as an authority  in legal proceedings in England and W ales.
Interpretation, application to arbitrations, etc., and savings
5.— ( I )  In  this Act ‘"civil proceedings’* and "court" have the meanings 6105  
assigned by section 18(1) and (2) o f the C iv il Evidence Act 1968.
(2) Subsections (3)  and (4) o f section 10 o f the C ivil Evidence Act 1968 
shall apply for the purposes o f the application o f sections 2 and 4 o f this 
Act in relation to any such civil proceedings as arc mentioned in section
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18.' 1 >U) and (A) o f that Act (that is to say civil proceedings before a tri­
bunal other than one o f the o rd inary courts o f law. being proceedings in 
relation to which the strict rules o f ev idence apply, and an arb itra tion  or 
reference, w hether under an enactment or not) as they apply for the pur­
poses o f the application o f Part I o f that Act in relation to any such civil 
proceedings.
(a: Nothing in this Act shall prejudice—
U ) anv power of a court, in any civil proceedings, to exclude evi­
dence (w hether by preventing questions from being put or 
otherwise) at its discretion: or 
{b\ the operation o f any agreement (whenever made) between the 
parties to any civil proceedings as to the evidence which is to 
be admissible (w hether generally or for any particu lar pur­
pose) in those proceedings.
Short title, extent and commencement 
6106 6 .— ( I ) This Act may be cited as the C iv il Evidence Act 1972.
(2) Th is  Act shall not extend to Scotland or Northern Ire land .
(3) Th is  Act, except sections 1 and 4(2 ) to (5) shall come into  force on 
1st January 1973. and sections 1 and 4(2 ) to (5) shall come into force on 
such day as the Lord C hancellor may by order made by statutory instru­
ment appoint; and different days may be so appointed for different pur­
poses or for the same purposes in relation to different courts or 
proceedings or otherwise in relation to different circumstances.
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E v i d e n c e  
I. G e n e r a l  R u l e s
General rule: witnesses to be examined orally (0.38, r.1)
38/1 1. S u b je c t  to  the  p ro v is io n s  o f  these ru les  a n d  o f  the  C i v i l  Evidence .Vi
1968 a n d  the C i v i l  E v id e n c e  A c t  1972, and  a n y  o th e r  enac tm en t r rb n ^  
to  e v idence ,  a n y  fac t  re q u i r e d  to  be p ro v e d  a t  the  t r ia l  o f  a n y  action Ixxw 
b y  w r i t  b y  th e  e v id e n ce  o f  w i tnesses  s h a l l  be p ro v e d  by the examination*/ 
• the  w itnesses  o r a l l y  a n d  in  o p e n  C o u r t .
Th is  rule was taken from (h r form er 0 .3 7 , r . l ,  as amended by R.S.C.. (N o.3) 1*117. »V 
R.S .C . (Sum m ons for D irections) 1954.
Am ended bv R .S .C . (A m endm ent) 19(19 (S .l 19(19 No. I 10.5) and by R.S.C. (Anirivlm-w 
N o .4) 1979 (S .l. 197*1 No. I 5 12).
38/1/1 Effect of rule Th is  re lei s to a general rule ol the law o f e vide nee, but is of limiter) M l*  
cation. It  dors not apply to anv m otion, petition or summons (r .2 (3 ))  or any other |in»r^4 
ing except an action commenced by w iit , and it does not apply to any intrrli*-u«m 
proceeding in such an action, but only to the tria l, though n also applies to trials ol n u n  *  
questions o f fact or law, references, inquiries and assessments ol damages (r.H) It 
applies to evidence o f la r i , not opinion, and it only provides that where a fact is to Ix- pr-wW 
by the evidence o f witnesses they shall be examined orally and in open Court.
Pursuant to S .C . A . 19f) I , s.87, r.2( I ) ol t he present ( Jrder enables the Court to or dr i tV  
the affidavit o f any witness may be read at the trial il in the circumstances ol the r.isr it the*, 
it reasonable so to order, r. 2 A allows for the proof ol a witness, exchanged under the ml- %. 
be treated as the evidence in chief o f the witness provided directions to that effect li.nr (*->-» 
given h\' the M aster or Judge, and r.4 enables the Court to order that evidence ol anx pr 
t icu lar fa c t may be given at the tria l in such m anner as it directs. Th e  Civil Ex iilrmr 5 ' 
1968, V o l.2, 1*1.18, para.6080. and i t  20 33. enable hearsay evidence to be adduced m m t 
proceedings under certain conditions. See also 0 .2 5 , rr.2  and 3. which call upon ilir On*- 
on the hearing ol the summons for d im  (ions, to exercise its powers, for the purpose of u \n |  
costs, under the C iv il Evidence Act 1968 or the Civ il Evidence Act 1972 and the ruler «>(iV 
O rd e r. See also 0 .2 6  which enables the Court to allow the adm inistration ol iiiteirogjtors  
to the parlies as to laris in issue, and enables the and enables the answers to be put inn< 
deuce and 0 .3 9  under which evidence on oath may in spci ial eases be taken before an r«i<* 
in rr  and put in at the tria l. Agreements mas also be made as to the mode o f giving rxiilrw, 
(0 .2 5 ,  r.4 and sec “ Affidavit evidence bv agreem ent.” p ara .3 8 /2 /5 ). In  Adm iralty, si r O T  
rr.21 (8) 30, 31. 4 1(6) 12(3).
Accordingly the effect ol the present rule is merely that, subject to the above liiiiiun rs  
the evidence ol witnesses at a trial is to be given bv their exam ination orallv and in Court.
A party has the right to choose which witnesses to i all and in what order ( II i nr or \ Hn • •  
[1968 | P.501; j 1966) I A ll E R. 105). In  c ivil prot eedings, the it ial Judge has no i « i» m  »■ 
dictate to a litigant what evidence he should lender ( 7 ’nr link (./won v. Tahansan .S71.V f i l l ! '  
[19871 I W .L .R . 4 13, P .O .).
Since I here is no propri I x in a w il ness ol la< I . mil in an ex pert witness as to the fa its hr 1-.** 
observed and his own independent opinion on them , it is the du ly  o f a witness In mm* i» 
Court and give evidence in so far as he is directed bv the Judge to do so, and therefore i  uw 
tract by which a witness binds him self not to give such evidence before the Court is unit it  rt 
to public policy and w ill not be enforced bv the C ourt ( I  lo t ninny Shipjnng (in. .S’.. 1. v. Saudi I »- 
of>e Line Ltd. [1979] I W .L .R . 1380; [ 19791 3 A ll E .R  l7 7./>n f.ord Denning M R ).
38/1/2 Oaths and solemn affirm ations— The O aths Act I978  consolidated the Oaths Art l*«w 
and (he O aths Acts 1888-1977, which were repealed, see V o l. 2, para.6166.
l ’he form and m anner in which any oath may be adm inistered in England and W ain j*») 
in the U n ited  K ingdom  generally are governed by the O aths A rt 1978. which also valiihtn 
oaths adm inistered in a form and m anner other than that prescribed by law or to » 
w ho at the tim e o f  taking it had no religious belief.
T h e  O aths Act 1978 also governs the form of a solemn affirm ation and the circiimxurvrs 
in which a person who objects to being sworn may be perm itted to make his solemn a(lirm» 
tion instead o f taking an oath , or in relation to a person to whom il is not reasonably priin
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•m particular circumstances ol (lie case.
Sil 'r x  of the statem ent. W here the statement has hern m ade, il may later he accepted >7r 
■fryed in circumstances which recognised the gravity and importance of the truth being 
Mk mn the particular occasion, and therefore the subsequent acknowledgment of the troth ol 
mKta had been said am ounts to a sufficient acknowledgment: R. v. Governor « / I ’cn lnn rillt 
Singh [19811 1 W .L .R  1031; [1981) 3 A ll E.R . 23, D  C.
Exam ination o f w itn e s s e s
tx a m fn a llo n -ln -c h le f— In  exam ination-in-chief, leading questions may not as a rule be 38/1/3  
pit. hoi the C ourt has a discretion to relax the rule so far as justice may require. A witness 
m n  rrfrrsh his m em ory by referring to any w riting made by himself at the time of the trans- 
wmtm about which he is being exam ined, or at any subsequent time if the Court considers it 
mm rW-n fresh in his m em ory, or even if  made by another person if  read w ithin such time by 
* •  M tn m , and if  when he read it he knew it to be correct A Judge in his discretion max 
y»r»m a witness, who had begun to give evidence, to refresh his memory from a statement 
mrnir rwarrr the tim e o f  the events in question even though it was not strictly a contcm pur- 
rmax record provided he was satisfied that I ) ihc witness due to the lapse o f time could not 
m recall the entails o f the events, 2) the statement represented his memory o f those events 
arrr the time, 3) he had not read it before coming into the witness box, and 4) the state- 
m m  wax not referred to by the witness again (R  v. Da Silva. The Times. August I 7, 1989)
Cut an expert witness m ay refresh his m em ory by reference to professional treatises Mm any  
a«dk writing or treatise must be shown to the adverse party if hr requires it, and he may  
iw examine upon it. T h e  evidence in chief must be confined to facts w ith in  the witness’s 
m  knowledge, except where he is called as an expert on questions on which expert evidence
•  admissible, eg. hand w ritin g , science, or trade. By the C rim in a l Procedure Act 1865. s 3 
lagyhrd in C iv il Evidence Act 1968), "a  party producing a witness shall not be allowed to 
X f r K h  his credit by general evidence o f had character; but he m ay, in i asr the witness shall
•  Aw opinion o f the judge prove adverse, contradict him by other evidence, or by leave ol the 
fmt^e proxe that he has m ade at other times a statement inconsistent w ith his present testi- 
newx, but before such last-m entioned proof can be given the circumstances of the supposed 
rm m rn i. sufficient to designate the particu lar reason, must be mentioned to the witness 
omi hr must be asked whether or not hr made such statement " T h e  discretion o f the Judge 
iw Vr this section is absolute and w ithout appeal ( Rice v Howard  ( 1886) 16 Q .B  I) . 681, R \
H'i&rmi (1913) 29 T .L .R .  188). It is entirely in the discretion of the C ourt whether a party  
• V  < alls his opponent m ay treat him  as hostile ( / ‘ rice v. Manning  ( I 889) 42 C h. D. 372. C  A )
W to admissibility o f evidence o f telephone conversations, see Jacobt \ Jacobi and Solomon
ir *y .)  I A ll E .R . 67.(Vrunsel has a discretion to call such witnesses as he pleases and in the order that hr 
'W»wes. and the C ourt should not overbear that discretion, e.g. by insisting that the party or 
a particular xvitness should be called before another w itness (Unscne v. Briscoe [19681 I* .501. 
f l ( ’. I but although where this has happened, the appellate Court w ill not readily find that
•  Cat was wrongly done was done w ithout ill-rlTcd , still il w ill examine the irregularity  to sec 
•V th r r  any prejudice or even possibility o f prejudice has been occasioned to the person who  
Van hren wrongly com pelled to call witnesses in a different order from that which hr intended 
aw.) wanted ( Barnes v. B.R .G . ( Business Torms) l t d  f I *17 *5) I W .l .  R 1565. | I9 7 6 |  I All E R
m
C ro ** -« x a  ml n a t io n —-There is no light to cross-examine a witness called met civ to pro- 3 8 /1 /4  
Im r  documents w ithout bring sworn either to proxe or identify them, nor a witness sworn by 
vmtakr and nut exam ined in chief to any m aterial extent before the mistake is discovered.
>v.i if a witness is in ten tionally  called and sworn hr may be cross-examined, though not 
examined in chief. A witness called and exam ined by the C ourt may, if  the Court perm its, be 
/*■•■»» examined (Goulson v. Disborough [ I 894 | 2 Q .B . .116; but as to this rase see Rr b.noch and 
Bock &  Go ’s A ib itra tion  | I 9 I ( I |  I K .D . 327, ( I .A  ). Attesting xvilnesses to a w ill or 
mdicil may be cross-examined by the parts calling them, as (hex are witnesses ol the (a u n t  
Im , I V Jones (1908) 24 T .L .R . 839; Oakes v. I ' g ’ ell [ 1932 I I* .19). II a p ln in lilfm  libel is pul in 
V  Ihii simply for cross-exam ination, lie cannot be cross-examined to credit: see Bracegirdle 
. /W e , (1859) I F. &  E. 536; Hobbs v. T inting  [ 1929 1 2 K .D . I ,  p. 12, C .A .
Ir> • ross-examination leading questions may in general be put, and the right to truss- 
examination is not lim ited by the exam ination-in -ch ief but extends to the whole o f the issues 
w iKr action but the answers o f a witness respecting any fart irrelevant to the issues mnv not 
contradicted except his answer to the question whether he has been previously convicted.
I V  Judge m ay d isallow  vexatious questions irrelevant to the issue. I lie conviction o f a 
m m  in a I oil cnee (s. 25 o f the Com m on Law  Procedure Act 1854. i r-enacted in ( j i i i i i i i . i I I ’ rn- 
m K nr Act 1865, s.6 , and R. v. Baker [1895] I Q .B . 797, p .800 except ol course for ‘ ‘spent” 
m m  in a I offences under the Rehab ilitation o f Offenders A rt I 974) or to any question lending  
♦* ih.,w partia lity  on the part o f the xvitness if he denies the facts suggested may be put to him  
»• w jv  ,»f cross-exam ination as to credit (An.-Gen. v. Hitchcock ( 18-17) I I ’.x 91). The previous 
.axMMent or contradictory statement made by a witness in previous civil proceedings or a
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direct m o t  e\ idence hy h in t wnutct lie .i(h ttis \ih lt ' (( ti\ i l  Iw it le i set' /\c  I J968, s..3, sec Vnl 2  ^
18) Previous sta tem en t* in  writing nerd  mil b r prorlui r*l unless r rq u ir ifl by I lie J nd e^. Si» I
I lie witness is to he cm lira  dieted by I lie writ ini' Ids a I ten l inn inns I be draw n to the parts W 
used Cor (hat purpose (Com m on I.aw  Procedure A d  18.54, re-enacted in Criminal I’rtxMj* 
Act 186.5, s.5 and applied in C rim ina l Kvidrnee A d  1968). A witness is not romprlliN* » 
answer any question tending to expose him to any kind ol crim inal oflcnc.c or penaln fW 
Judge decides as to the tendencv ol nnv question to incrim inate the witness [Ex ft. Rrrrm*
‘(1882) 2D C lli.I). 201, C .A ) .
A  co-defendant not interested in a question between the p laintill and his co-defcilHie’ i 
not entitled to cross-examine such co-drlcndani (R r W agstnff’(1907) Ob I . .T . 605). I.ixW * 
givcn by one party a lien ing  another party in the same litigation cannot be made adntne** 
against such party unless there be a right to cross-examine. The  evidence of a rcsporvVn 
cannot be used against a co-respondent alter refusal ol leave to cross-examine (Allow \l»  
f 1894| P.248).
R a-exam lnation There IS a right to I c-examme to explain answers given in rrossnr>» iualion.
3 8 /1 /5  Exclusion o f  w itness from  the C o u rt— O n the application o f either party thr O w  
rnay at any time order all witnesses on both sides, other than the one under cxaniirutK*i » 
w ithdraw , and not to leave the C ourt again after giving evidence so as to communiratr 
other witnesses before they give evidence. (T h is  practice was approved in Re Rights*** 
Green v. Nightingale f 19751 I W .L .R . 80.) The  order is discretionary, and not withstanduj 
Oulram  v. Out rain [ I 87 71 W .N . 75, and Pennimati v. H il l  ( 1876) 21 W  R . 245, should not i r m  
ally include the parties.
T h e  practice relating to the exclusion o f witnesses from the Court “ does not apph iM 
never has applied to the parties themselves n r  their solicitors or their expert witnesses. 
arc never excluded from the court" (per Sir John A rnold I*.in Tomlinson v. Tomlinson (IfWf | 
W .L .R  322, p .327; (1980) I All E .R . 593, p‘,596.
38/1 /6  W itness called by Ju d g e —The ju d g e  may call a witness whom neither party prnprwi 
to call, and m ay examine him himself; but since such witness is not the witness of ntko 
party, neither has the right to cross-examine him , though the Judge would usuallv atVw 
either, or (possibly) both parties to do so ( Lallan  v. Calvert [ I9 6 0 ]  2 Q .B . 201; [I960] I VJ 
E .R . 281, C .A .; Re Enoch and Zaretzkr, liock &  Go. ’s Arb itration  [ 1910| I K .B . 327, C.A . lim* 
ing dictum  of Esher M .R ., in Coulson v. Disborough [ 1894] 2 Q .B . 316).
In  com m ittal proceedings lor contempt ofC .ourt. which are ol a quasi-criminal cliataor- 
thc C ourt has power to issue a subpoena o f its own motion upon a witness to attend to 
evidence or produce documents ( Yianni v. Yianni | I9 6 6 |  I W .L .R . 120; [1966] I All f. 1 
231).
38/1 /7  R eb u ttin g  ev id e n c e --T h e  Judge at the trial has a discretion to allow the pl.iinntf u 
adduce rebutting evidence: ( I ) in answer to evidence ol the defendant in support of an iu»  
the proof o f which lay iqjon him ( W illiams v. Davies ( I8 8 3 ) I C r. & M . 464; IVright v. Il’U-a 
(1850) 9 C .B . G5U; J’enn \  .Jack  ( 1866) E .R . 2 Eq. 314); and thr p lain tiff docs not lose liis rx+i 
to have such discretion exercised in his favour by not giving evidence in the first instan<r *• 
rebut the plea set up hy the defendant, although the nature o f the defence was disrlosni W 
the cross-examination oT the p la in tiffs  witnesses (Shaw v. Beck (1853) 8 Exclt. 392); (2) 
the p la in tiff has been taken bv surprise, or the evidence is contradictory (Bigsbv v. Duhr— 
(1876) 4 C h .I )  24; Budd v. Davison (1881) 2 9 W .R  192; Rogers v. Manley (188(1) 42 L.T.
But on the trial o f a claim  and counterclaim , the issues on each being identical, the planW 
was not allowed, alter the evidence on the claim  was closed, to call further rvidrnrr ■ 
answer to defendant's evidence in support o f counterclaim  (Green v. Serin (1879) 13 O P  
589, 597). Of. also Barker v. Furlong [ 1891) 2 Ch. I 72.
38 /1 /8  Defendant's ev iden ce— I f  a Judge is prepared to decide in favour of defendant n 
respondent w ithout hearing his evidence, his counsel may insist on the evidence hnnc t»-* 
heard, but il he does not, the ('..A . m ay allow the evidence to he taken before rrvrrjin i a* 
decision (E x p. Jacobson (1883) 22 C h .I )  3 I2 );  or the case may he sent hack by the limn* <i 
Lords to take thr defendant's evidence (Singer Co. v l l  i/san ( I865) 3 App. Cas. 376).
Evidence as to co sts— Evidence w ill not be adm itted alter judgment for thr puq»i** •< 
influencing the costs (M ayor o j B risto l v. G. It'. Rr. [ I9 I6 |  W .N . 47); (J. Millensted v.
House l.td  \ I 937] I K .1S. 717, Cl. A. (statement as to payment into C.ourl). But in non-nv*** 
claims, in respect ol which payment in ln ta io r t  under ( 1.22 is inappropriate, cvidrncr st *t 
nller to settle made belore the trial in a letter marked “ without prejudice" as to the mu* <f 
costs, may be adm itted and w ill be given the same consequences as a payment in tindrr t > 
exceeding the am ount recovered (See 0 .2 2 , r.14 and 0 .6 2 , r .9 (d), Cults v Head | I98t| I VI 
E.R . 597, C .A ., applying Calderhank v. Calderbank | I9 7 6 | Earn. 93; | 1975] 3 A ll E R 331. »-.* 
Computer Machinery Co. v. Drrsrher ( 1983 1 1 W .L .R . 1379; | 1983 | 3 A ll K R . 153).
f* - by the attesting w 11 n r u  j i l l . IV I ., , .     __ ____ _______
h' tan w lirrr the parties inlcrcstctl are before the C.ourt it is not net essarv to prove by t\\r  
****-ilmg witness any instrum ent to the valid ity  of which attestation is not requisite, and such 
•wTumrnl may be proved by admission or otherwise as if  there had been no attesting wit- 
to t there (s. 26 o f the C . I.  1’ . A. 1854; I fo r thinglon v. Moore (1891) 64 I.  T  338) Ih e  signature 
d  i  tmmferor was allowed to be proved hy a person who knew thr handw riting, though the 
snenfrror and an attesting witness were available (Clarence Hotel (Ilfracombe) Ltd. (1902) 54
*J U7).ii I ) .
Dm  of an In terpre te r— Sec Re Trepca Mines Ltd. [ I9 6 0 ] I W .L .R  24; [19591 A ll E .R .
''H The proceedings o f the C ourt must be in English and a lay litigant has no legal right to 
tyvn his case through an in terpreter (ib id ). But the Court has a discretion to allow a foreign 
W in !  to address the C ourt through an in terpreter and to refuse to allow the evidence in 
l/sflnh to be translated ( In  the Estate o f  Fuld, deed.(No.2) [ 1965] I W .L .R  1336; (196.6] 2 A ll 
I It 637).
Privilege of w itness-— The mere statement by a witness of his belief that his answer to a 38/1/10  
*«*stion will tend to crim inate him  is not sufficient to excuse h im , but the Court must sec 
r-:*n the circumstances o f the case anti the nature of thr evidence requited, that there is 
*r»*oeiihle ground to apprehend danger to the witness from his being compelled to answer 
Lm P Reynolds (1882) 20 C h .D . 294).
Ev)d«nce (Foreign D om inions and Colonial D ocum ents) Act 1 9 3 3 —See nn under 
• 10. ai to proof by production o f foreign registers under this Act.
IWcordlng apparatus— As to admission o f evidence o f interview recorded without 38 /1/11  
ledge of one party, sec / / .  Parker Ltd. v. Mason [1940] 2 K .B . 580, C .A  ; and as to the 
*Sfht of a witness to refresh his memory by reference to a tape recording made by him at the 
mw, R. v. M ills  [1962] I W .L .R . 1152; [1962] 3 A ll E .R  298, C  C  A . A recording made hy 
Mxhanical means w ithout hum an intervention is in the nature o f real evidence and is 
►Amitiible evidence, e.g. tape recordings (R  v. Maqsud A l i  [1966] 1 Q .B . 688, [1965] 2 All 
L R 464); and radar recordings o f echoes o f ships in collision (The Statue o f Liberty [ 1968] 2
VI F. R. 195).
Motas of ev idence given In other proceedings— e.g. notes taken by justices' or cor- 
t» m ' clerk. As to the extent to which they can be used, sec Brinckley v. Brinckley [ 1965] P .75;
[1^63] I All E .R . 493. Sec C iv il Evidence Act 1968, s.4 
Ortatamped d o cu m en t— By the Stam p Act 1891, s. 14(4) unless the duty and penalty arc 38/1/1 2 
rod .t  the tria l under s.14(1) an instrum ent "(specified in the First Schedule) executed in 
part of the U n ite d  K ingdom  or relating, wheresoever executed, to any property situate, 
rr to any m atter or thing or to be done in any part o f the U nited  K ingdom  shidl not, except in 
criminal proceedings, he given in evidence or be available for any purpose whatsoever,
* J n i  it be duly stam ped in accordance w ith the law in force at the time when it was first
executed."Notwithstanding the words “ be given in evidence or be available for any purpose what- 
n e t,"  an insufficiently stamped promissory note may be handed to a witness to challenge his 
(■f-oJIections (B ircha ll v. Bullough  (1896] 1 Q .R  325).
Evidence by affidavit (0 .38 , r.2)
2.— ( I ) T h e  C o u r t  m a y ,  a t  o r  be fore  the t r ia l  o f  an a c t io n  b e g u n  b y  w r i t ,  38/2
order th a t  the  a f f i d a v i t  o f  a n y  w i tn e s s  m a y  be read  at the t r ia l  if in  the c i r ­
cumstances o f  the  case i t  t h in k s  it  reasonab le  so to o rd e r .
(2) A n  o r d e r  u n d e r  p a ra g r a p h  (1)  m a y  be m a d e  on  such  te rm s  as to the 
fil ing and  g i v i n g  o f  cop ies  o f  the  a f f id a v i ts  and  as to the p r o d u c t io n  o f  the 
deponents fo r  c ro s s - e x a m in a t io n  as the  C o u r t  t h in k s  f i t  b u t ,  s ub jec t  to  a ny  
•uch te rm s  a n d  to  a n y  su b s e q u e n t  o r d e r  o f  the  C o u r t ,  the  d e p o n e n ts  sha l l  
not lie  s u b je c t  to  c r o s s -e x a m in a t io n  a n d  need no t  a t te n d  the t r ia l  fo r  the
purpose.
( j )  I n  a n y  cause  o r  m a t t e r  b e g u n  b y  o r i g i n a t in g  s u m m o n s ,  o r i g i n a t in g  
motion o r  p e t i t i o n ,  a n d  o n  a n y  a p p l i c a t io n  m a d e  by  s u m m o n s  o r  m o t io n ,  
evidence m a y  be g iv e n  by  a f f id a v i t  un less in  the  case o f  a n y  such  cause, 
matter o r  a p p l i c a t io n  a n y  p ro v is io n  o f  these ru les  o th e rw is e  p ro v id e s  o r  
the C o u r t  o th e rw is e .d i r e c ts ,  b u t  the C o u r t  m a y ,  on  the  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  a n y  
party, o rd e r  the  a t te n d a n c e  fo r  c ro s s -e x a m in a t io n  o f  the  p e rso n  m a k in g  
in v  such a f f i d a v i t ,  a n d  w h e re ,  a f te r  such  an o rd e r  has been m a d e ,  the  p e r ­
mit  in q u e s t io n  docs n o t  a t te n d ,  h is  a f f id a v i t  sh a l l  n o t  be used as e v id e n c e  
1*11110111 the leave  o f  the C o u r t .
38/2 A/1
38/2 A/2
t e r m s  a s  t/to- ( J o u r t  s h a l l  l l t i n k  J l i s t ,  w r i t t e n  s t a t i n u n t s  of I lie o ra l rvttlentr
w h i c h  t h e  p a r t y  i n t e n d s  t o  l e n d  o n  a n y  issues o l (;tci (o he dec ided at il*
t r ia l.
(3 )  D i r e c t io n s  g iv e n  u n d e r  p a ra g r a p h  (2 )  m a y —
(<7 ) m ak e  difrerent p ro v is io n  w i t h  reg a rd  to  d i l l e r c n l  issues of fan 
or d i f f e re n t  w itnesses;
( b )  r e q u i r e  a n y  w r i t t e n  s ta te m e n t  served to  he s igned by tV 
in te n d e d  w itness ;
(c ) r e q u i r e  th a t  s ta te m e n ts  be f i led  w i t h  the  C o u r t .
(4)  S u b je c t  to  p a ra g r a p h  (6 ) ,  w h e re  the  p a r l y  s e rv in g  a sta tement undo 
p a ra g ra p h  (2)  does no t  ca l l  the w i tn e s s  to  w hose  e v idence  it relates rr 
o th e r  p a r t y  m a y  p u t  the  s ta te m e n t  in  e v id e n c e  at the t r ia l .
(5 )  S u b je c t  to  p a ra g r a p h  (6)  a n d  un less the C o u r t  o therw ise  ordrr\ 
w h e re  the  p a r t y  s e rv in g  the  s ta te m e n t  does ca l l  such  a witness .it tHr 
t r i a l —
( a )  the p a r t y  m a y  no t w i t h o u t  the co n se n t  o f  the  o th e r  parties <t
the  leave o f  the  C o u r t  lead e v id e n ce  f r o m  th a t  w itness the sub­
s tance  o f  w h ic h  is no t  in c lu d e d  in  the  s ta te m e n t  served, cxrrj* 
in  r e la t io n  to  n e w  m a t te r s  w h ic h  h ave  a r isen  in  the course oftrr 
t r ia l ;
( b ) the C o u r t  m a y ,  on  such  te rm s  as il th in k s  ( it ,  d i rec t  that d* 
s ta te m e n t  se rved ,  o r  p a r t  o f  it ,  sha l l  s ta n d  as the evidence n  
c h ie f  o f  the  w i tn e ss  o r  p a r t  o f  such  e v idence ;
( c)  w h e th e r  o r  n o t  the  s ta te m e n t  o r  a n y  p a r t  o f  it  is referred to dur­
ing  the e v idence  in  c h ie l  o l  the  w i tn e ss ,  a ny  p a r t y  may pul iU 
s ta te m e n t  o r  a n y  p a r t  o f  it  in  c ro s s -e x a m in a t io n  o f  that witncv
(G) W h e re  a n y  s ta te m e n t  served  is one to w h ic h  the C i v i l  Hvidener Aa» 
1968 a n d  1972 a p p ly ,  p a ra g ra p h s  (4 )  a n d  (3 )  sh a l l  take  effect subject t*
the p ro v is io n s  o f  those A c ts  and  P a r ts  I I I  a n d  I V  o f  th is  O rd e r .  The ser
vice o f  a s ta te m e n t  p u r s u a n t  to a d i r e c t io n  g iv e n  u n d e r  paragraph (7 
s ha l l  n o t ,  un less e x p re ss ly  so s ta ted  by  the p a r t y  s e rv in g  the samr, 
t rea te d  as a n o t ic e  u n d e r  the  sa id  A c ts .
(7)  W h e re  a p a r t y  fa i ls  to  c o m p ly  w i t h  a d i r e c t io n  g iven  under par* 
g ra p h  (2)  he s ha l l  n o t  be e n t i t le d  to  a d d u c e  e v id e n c e  to w h ic h  such d im  
l io n  re la ted  w i t h o u t  the leave o f  the  C o u r t .
(8)  N o t h in g  in  th is  ru le  sh a l l  d e p r iv e  a n y  p a r t y  o f  h is  r ig h t  to treat 
c o m m u n ic a t i o n  as p r i v i le g e d  o r  m ak e  a d m is s ib le  ev id e n ce  otherwise in>4 
m iss ib le .
Added hy R .S .C . (A m endm ent No. 2) I!I8(> (S .l P.Utb N<>. I 187).
Amended hy R.S.C. (Amendment) I'.lttll (S.l. HHIH Nu. I t til).
Scope and operation Of this rule I Ins rule makes an enormous and nntahle 
towards the open system ol pre-tria l procedure. It empowers the H igh C.ourl lo i l i in i* * *  
parly  at any stage ol the proceedings to serve on the other pat ties the written statrinrnti -t 
the oral evidence whir It that party intends to lead on any issues ol tael to he decided si -V 
trial
However, the t itle specifically provides in para. (H) that it w ill not “deprive am pain 
the right to treat any commitment inn as privileged, or make admissible evidence m liro *  
inadm issible." T h is  provision makes il abundantly  clear that the rule slops fat short ol aft--* 
ini' the substantive lights ol the parties. The valid ity  ol this rule was uitsuceesshilb iXa1 
Irngrd  in Comfort Hotels Ltd. v. Weoth/n Stmlium Ltd. \ 1(1881 I W .L .R . 1172 in whit It llofl'n**" 
J. held that the rule was entirely procedural.
It embodies a fundam ental innovation in the law and practice relating to the id inv* o 
the intended trial witnesses o f the patties and relating to the eonlidenliality ol thru v r-  
nients or “ proofs" o f evidence. It provides a radical alteration to the manner ol chi. t.lt-'-^  
the evidence in chief o f witnesses at the trial by their oral exam ination in open C.omi. j* p .  
vidccl by r . l  above. Above all it greatly improves the pre-trial process by prostiluic *W 
m achinery for enabling all the patties to know before the tria l precisely what l.ut* »- 
intended to be proved at I he tria l, and by whom , and I bet e by it ret 11 tees delay, costs j o -1 •'» 
opportunity for procedural technicalities anti obstruction towards the it ial
■ m o l a t  a c c e l e r a t i n g  t h e  p r o c e s s  :-■ ^   ■■ -  ,, _____
(2) the elim ination o f any element of “ surprise" before or at the trial as to the witnesses
evh party intends to call at the tria l or as to thr substance of their evidence. 1 be parties w ill 
longer be able to spring or to be exposed to surprises as to the trial witnesses or their evi­
dence, but w ill be required to “ place their cards on the table";
1.1) the prom otion o f a fair settlement between the parties. W ith  all or substantially all the 
hrtual evidence before them , subject to cross-examination, the parties w ill be able to make a 
w nrr realistic appraisal of the strengths and weaknesses o f their own and each o th er’s cases,
• kwh should contribute towards the la ir and expeditious disposal o f the proceedings by 
■ulrmcnt or otherwise;
ft) the avoidance o f a tria l, thereby saving a great deal of wasteful tim e, ellort and cost on 
■V part of the practitioners, (he judiciary and the Court stall", as vscll as the parties and their 
fctinrjses;
111 the identification o f the real issues and the elim ination o f unnecessary issues;
tM the encouragement o f the parties to make admission of facts, which they arc olten
■tuctant to do;
(?) the reduction in the num ber o f pre-trial , , 1 ‘ ions, such as foi further and better 
funiculars o f pleadings or for further discovery of documents or for interrogatories,
<fl) the provision of the fram ework whereby routine and cvidencc-in-chicf can be given in
•m m ary form, see para. 5(A).
(9) the im provem ent o f thr process o f cross-examination,
(10) the concentration o f both the parties and thr trial Judge on the real matters in contro­
versy between the parties;
As in the case of pre-trial disclosure of expert evidence (sec para. 1 8 /5 5 /2 ), so in the case ol 38/2 A/3 
Aw pre-trial service o f witnesses’ statements under this rule, the machinery is intended to be 
“©crated on the basis o f fairness and m utuality  its between the parties, so that neither party  
•would he able or be allowed to operate such machinery to obtain an unlair or undue advan- 
t»<r over any other party, as for exam ple, by obtaining thr statements of the witnesses of the 
•ppmite parly before the trial w ithout nt the some lime serving the statement of their own wit- 
•01 on that party. T h e  rule is designed to provide for the simultaneous ext li.ingr of the wit 
•rssej’ statements on the parties on or before a fixed dale whit It may be t ailed "the ext hange 
4 itr.” This general rule o f practice may no doubt be subject to variation according to thr  
vpetial circumstances o f any particu lar ease, but always the param ount consideration w ill be 
*• maintain fairness and im partia lity . It w ill be in very special circuinstam  es that the ( ’.ourl 
•tfl tive a direction, not for thr simultaneous exchange of witnesses’ statements by the par­
ses, but for th r sequential service by one party  on the other o f his witnesses' statements to be 
WVrwrd at a later date by the service by that other party o f his witnesses' statement (see K ir- 
fvf v British R a il Engineering Ltd. [1081] I W .L .R . 1165; [ 19811 3 A ll L .K . 147, C .A . setpicn- 
n»l vrvicc of experts' reports).
I'ndrr this rule, the prior consent o f the parties is not required to empower the Court to 3S /2A /4  
pse a direction under para (2 ) for the service o f witnesses' statements Nevertheless, everv 
r*rnuragcmcnt w ill be given by the C ourt to the parties to agree between themselves to serve 
»ttnesses statements on each other, and if  required, the direction o f the Court w ill recite that 
« rt made by consent.
This rule applies to any “ cause or m atte r.”  I l  empowers the Court to order the service ol 
fcvtnessrs' statements, not only as between the plaintiff and the defendant on both the ( laim  
•md counterclaim ( if  any) but also as between the plaintiff and each of two or more dt-lcnd- 
■  ti and further as between two or more defendants themselves, whether or not a contribu- 
notice has been served by one o f them on the other or others. I he rule also applies to 
•*<»d patty proceedings, not only as between the defendant and the third party and any snb- 
•rquent parties but also as between the p la im iira n d  the third party and any subsequent par- 
on the same basis which enables thr C ourt to give directions for the discovery o f 
♦xum tn ls  between them , or on which they may interrogate ra th  other ( h.den v 11 to r dole 
tlW ?) 14 C h .D . 221, 15 C h .D . 287, and see para. 16/1 /21)
D irections fo r  s e rv ic e  o f w itn e s s e s ’ s ta te m e n ts — T h e  direction of the C ourt under 38/2A/5 
(2) for the pre -tria l service by the parties of the witnesses' statement may be made “ at 
*»» nagr" of the proceedings to which the rule applies but w ill norm ally be made on the 
Wiring of the application or summons for directions. In  the conduct of ( llficial Referees'
W nnrM  under ( ),16 , r .6 (2 ), the Court w ill nevertheless give such a direction, but it w ill pro- 
«vV that it should take effect on or before a specified date by which time the pleadings will 
V»-te Iwen closed and discovery com pleted. A party may include in the application or suin- 
«»>-*•» for directions a specific application for a direction under para. (2 ), hut in the absence of 
snth an application, the C ourt may nevertheless give such a direction I f  the dale of trial of 
»  »<non has been or is being lixed the C ourt w ill ord inarily  allow a reasonable m argin o f 
**■*<, u v , six to ten weeks before that date before which the direction under para (2 ) should 
t»kr r irrit. I l 'n o  date of trial has been fixed, the Court and the parties w ill use their best 
e».W»vnr* to estimate that date, so as to provide for pre-trial service o f the witnesses’ state- 
w n u  i.| ih r parties, since this is one o f the cardinal objectives of the rule
^
*->/ii<zft v% nsudclc~< ihy K .S X l .  ( S i t m n in u s  Cor D i r e c t io n s )  '1934. a n d  a s 10 pa ru. (3) frnm liv W nrcr 0 .3 8 , r. I .
7 he o rd e r is u sua lly  m ade  on (lie hearing o l d ie  summons for directions or on appli.»:*» 
by notice unde r it. 7 ’lic rule is o f  especial value w here tlie witness is abroad, or tlir r\vV«  
w ill not lie contested. A draft of the proposed affidavit should hr submitted for (lieconoV* 
ation o f the other side helore the up|*heniinn, unless it is clear what it w ill contain It nr* 
practicable to make such an order where the evidence w ill he strongly contested u*i ■ 
credibility  depends on the ( iourl's view ol the witness (e.g. the evidence of an eye-witnnt * 1 
running-down ac tion, or o f witnesses in an action for reetilieation where there is litllr 
m entary evidence—  Hnnhntr v. Henderson | IH 9 5 ) I C.lt. 71*2; (.'onshintinidi v. Rnlli [ I91)J O  
•127) 1 hr fact that an aflidavit has been used on an interlocutory application gives n» of*
to read it at the trial (Perkinc v. Sinter (IH 76) I C h .D  Hi; Him khiirn I'n inn  v. lirnoki (IP'1 
C h .D . (iH).
3 8 /2 /2  A d jo u rn e d  s u m m o n s  — O n  an adjourned summons c vide nee liled alter the time lord V 
the M aster lor filing ev idence will not he adm itted without leave, whic h mav he ohuirvrd » 
the hearing w ithout formal application; seats, where 110 time has been lixed (R< Ckifbn 
(18(18) 36 W .R . HOG).
C onstruction— In the ease ol an O .N. for construction or other relief it is sufficient I*  
affidavit to state who ate the trustees or executors and beneficiaries without stating (n irp  1 
requisite for explanation) dev olution ol their title. This does not apply where application * » 
deal with a fund in C ourt or appointm ent o f trusters or a vesting order or where (Irvnhm* 4 
the title or the trusteeship is an issue (D irection ol Judges of ( f i t . I ) . .  February. 10-14)
Notice of m otion —Allidav its lilt’d prior to amendment o f .1 notice o f motion mav hr *v4 
at the hearing without leave [ l ie  K ing &  (In c Trade M ark  | 1892| 2 (fit. 462).
Persons Other than deponents mav in special circumstances he called nil the lirinrn 4 
a motion: thus arb itrators were allowed to give evidence on a m otion In set aside an »»
where the Court could not ascertain the facts from the affidavits ( l.rtsrrarh  v Srhnlii |I*1)»! J
K .B . 353).
3 8 /2 /3  C ro s s -e x a m in a tio n  u p o n  a ff id a v it  W h e n  an allidav it has once been liled In 
parly , the opposite party is entitled to use statements therein as admissions hy deponent 
Flic practice in ha 11 km  pic v is dillcrc l i t , and such an allidav it 11 not usrd bv depnurni <»» 
not hr treated as an admission bv him  ( lie  ('.alien | I9 2 4 |  2 Ch. 515. lulluwing At p >>e 
(I8H 2) 2 0 C h .D . 126).
I he aflidavit may he allowed to he used in C.ourl though the < 1 nss-examinnlinn is 
(Is ie ts  v. James (1HH7) 32 C .lt.I). 326. p .331).
I lie C ourt mav refuse to act on an aflidavit where the deponent cannot he i rnss-rxam 
{Shea v. Creen (1MH6) 2 T .L .R . 533; and see Thr I'a r iiia n  (IHH7) 13 I’ .D  Hi); and if "V 
deponent does not attend for cross-examination where notice to ernss-cxaminr leit v*-x 
given the affidavit cannot lie leatl in his absence without leave (see ( ) 3H, r 11 I bn rx*
applies in bankruptcy ( Rr lin t tain ley ( I'M 5) HI I ,. | k  It 11120).
Cross-exam ination on affidavits liled 011 a summons under the ( .ompanies Act I'lllt, i Ml 
w ill not lie ordered to he taken in Court except inn lei spei ial cii t 11 instances [R r Inure I /**-• 
e lf., Co. (IHHH) 5H I.. I 12)
I here can he no cross-examination under p ara .(3) on an affidavit showing 1 atise a p ir *  1 
garnishee order n o t ( / r j'ftis  v. Tninlinian  | IHK7) it I I..K . 103); mu on an allidav it ilisil.»*s| 
the names ol the persons constituting a lin n  under O .H I, r.2 (.\hrahnrns v. Dunlap I'nnr^rs 
Tyre Co. [ 19051 I K .B . 46. C  A T
There is a discretion to order cross-examination o f a deponent alter his allidav it I1.0 
used (Strauss v. (inldschniidt (IH 92) H I I. R. 230).
A dcpondeui cannot he cross-examined on an allitlavit claim ing diplomatic immiiitin t 
confirmed hy the A ll. -d e n . ( h.ngrtke v Mimnann \ I'I2H| A .(I. 133).
I he Court w ill, if  necessary, make an ordet lot cross-examination o f a foreign wit nut o-»
dent out ol the jurisdiction (Stratus v. ( laid si hrnidl ( 111(12) H I I ,. R . 230).
W here there is a 1 pies lion ol mi it ive or ol good faith ol deponent, the ( a m il ought nut t- V 
asked In act without cross-exainitial ion, see Rr Smith nnet Pan ret I | I (112J Ch. 301, ('. A
I n proceedings hy originating summons, e.g. for m aintenanee under M .C.A. 1073. 1 J" • 
parly  cannot he denied the right to cross-examine the opposite party or his witness upnn !•» 
aflidavit, at any rate where such aflidavit has been read to the C ourt, and so inridi null. « 
such proceedings (here is no room lor a submission ol “ no case to answer" ( l.indn all t /.-w 
w a ll [10 6 7 1 I W .L  R 143; | 10671 I A ll F .R . 470, C .A  ). ( )n the olhei hand, a pativ 1. ».« 
hound to t ross-examine the opposite parly  or his witness upon their affidavits, and the ( 
mav lor 111 its view w ithout hearing such cross-examination (R r D . H. I I 1 nee. r \  p I  he l)eh~ 1 
/ / .  C ahrirl 119661 1 W .L .R . 565; | MI6(i| 2 A ll F. R 3H, C .A  ).
C ioss-exam inalion on an affidavit w ill not generally he allowed on matters exituimtu* » 
the ipiestion in (hr particu lar proceedings in which die allidav it was lilerl (Rr SH I
I.tit 11‘167 | I W .L .R . 799; | 19671 2 A ll F .R . 615).
I l ic it  is a d is c r e t io n  as to  o r d e r in g  c r o s s -e x a m in a lio u  o n  a ll id .iv  ils  li le d  o n  i n i n T - •>*
a o o h e a o o n s  H i t  0 :0 .1  f i l l  t  o  .................  ... "  1
« ^ ’ t/ter Inte rant in not ( A  lay fate) / . t i l . | I ') 7 I | V’ S  R 'VI10, \ \ ‘.17*2 \  K Wt ■ r . \ l .
rr an affidavit has hern made pursuant to an Anton l’d lrr order “ it i annul lie 1 iglu to 
»/*•■% 1 plaintiff the op portunity  o f a roving cruss-examinalion merely because tin plaintiffs 
W*s-or suspicion that the person sought he made thr subject ol the order has not been 
••w eb  o|>en in his disclosure" (prr Peter Cibsnn |. rptoled hy I alconer J in f./fS  I K I . t i l v
N -r  !i*'H5| F.S.R. 421).
I« rofiirmpt proceedings, where a deponent has made an affidavit, lie may lie rinss exam- 
111x111 that aflidavit O n ly  verv exceptionally should a Judge refuse an applii alum  to 
n-’xi examine, e.g., where eross-exaniinalion would In- for a collateral purpose (C.nmrt I'm - 
A Ltd. V. Ila u k e x  Plastics Kid. [ 19 7 11 2 Q . If. 67; 11 *1711 I A ll F. R 1111)
I*  proceedings under para (3 ) i.e. in any rausc or matter begun hy orig inating summons, 
••-y-eatirig motion or petition , and on any application made hy summons or motion, the 
fi»i»i. it  any rate in bankruptcy proceedings, has a disc retion to order the debtor to attend 
rr-ni ex.im inatioii upon his aflidavit. M oreover, in such pror cedings. where a pel son who 
m ulr an affidavit w ith  a view to its being given in evidence has been ordered to attend  
rmxr-rxainination but fails to do so, the C ourt has a discretion whether or not to adm it or 
exc'fwle Mich an affidavit from being used as evidence, hut sueli discretion should usually he 
rwYxcwxl, not at any stage before the trial or hearing, hut only at thr stage ol the tria l or 
Wcori* itself of the cause, m atter or application, for such discretion should he exercised in 
+ *  hgtn uf all the circumstances known to the Court when the allidav it is sought to he read, 
•xfishng the evidence, o f other witnesses (R r a Drhtnr (A ’n. 22R.I o f Ple/i) | I9 7 H | I W I. R 
IM?. (1*170] I A ll F. R. 434, C .A  ).
fcttor* w h o m  c o n d u c te d — T h e  C ourt may order the dependent to he cross-examined 
m V i Ix-fore itself or before an exam iner. For cross-examination o f the deponent ol Ins afli- 
v r  para. 3.
I« the Q .H .D ., in proceedings in Cham bers, the cross-examination is in most < ascs
w-brrd to he held before the M aster or Judge.
Is ( h I), a procedure was introduced to avoid a summons. Sec I ’ rn rtirr Directum ( l!l(i‘.)| I 
*  I R *1113; (19691 2 A ll F .R . 736 (revoked now hy [I9 H 7 | I W . I .  R. 93). and C h .M .P  I" 
su S\, \ ‘n|. 2, l’t.2 , p a ra .534
Vr in examination before a M aster in the C l i . l ) . .  see ( )  32, r I 5.
4a tn cross-examination before an exam iner, see ( 1.39, r 1.
•ob c lto rs  A ct 1 9 7 4  - A  s tn practice and Ibrrn ol a llidavit on application to the io m -  
»re Vol. 2, I ’t . I I , “ Solicitors 
Affidavit e v id e n c e  by  a g re e m e n t - It is still open m the parties to agree that a llidavit 
rxxVni r shall he adm itted at the t iia l , and indeed they ought to he cm ouraged to do so, 
*4*»vrvrr this is practicable (see 0 .2 5 . r.1) hut it may he such an agicem ent w ill nnlv lie 
*4*. m e if it is recorded in t he order on the summons for direct inns (( ). 2 5. i I )
C ro »» -e x am ln a tio n  In C h .D . U nder the lorm ei practice, which M ill p ievails m the 
(  > I) j  ilejioiient m ight he cross-exa mi net I on an allidavit in support ol a < la im m proceed- 
•»<i undr r an ad mi n ist rat ion decree ( ( .art v, R arrrr ( IH56) .3 Sin vSt ( 369); tn on an allidav it
woTing .ii i in iills (Re I.end ( IH Iifi) I ,  R. 2 F<|. (i< *5; and see M nicliain  v (,«<i per ( IH73) I .R  lt> 
1*12). on an affidavit in support o f an application lor leav e to amend (('.athrdu I'uhlirhm g  
f t  \ ft >man (IH f.3 ) I I  W .R  !((•*•) only, however, under spec ial cite imisianc e \. where sm h 
rvit is necessary (see (innvlirnrr v. I .n e i i (IflfU l) 2*4 \V  R 391): and gcneiallv mi affidavits  
lanl on itiierlocuiory applications. But where a motion is ordered to stand ov i i to the lic.tr- 
iberr t ail hr no eross-exaniinalion on an aflidavit used on the m illion , though the plaintiff 
*>v rn notice ol in tention to use il at the hearing ol the action (Singer v . \tidrley ( 11)72) I R 
t ) ) 401; / Ian prr v . ( .(implicit (1865) 13 W .R  1003); and l here can he no t mss-e sum mation
*n allidavit o f d o iiim rn ts  (M anhy  v. Iln c ic k r (Pin. 2) (IH 5 7 ) H De (> .M  Ik <• 17l). I ln l l  v 
11HH5) 29 C .l i l ) .  307); nor on a merely lot mu I a flid av it, eg  an allidav it proving set- 
«i-r I S ihnnat Provident, etc., e\ t.t/i v. ('.nrstnur (IH 63) I 1 W .R  H66).
Urgent C ases —III urgent c ases, e.g. on motions for or to dissolve- injunctions, the heating  
« <J rx.t Im- postponed for the purpose o f cross-examining a deponent ( \ i i i i i in n i  i l/ r  \ Stunning 
I4>1| 10 l la . ,  App. X X ;  l l i ig / i l  v. Spratt [ 1874) W .N . 72); and when- from death, illness, m 
r abroad, the dependent c annot he produced lor t inss-exaininalion, his allidav ii w ill 
V  *lb>v>rtl to he read, for what it is worth ( llrru th ie n ilr  v. Kenrn i ( I Ilf >5) 31 Beav 292. R id lr i v 
1 2 / i  ( IH65) 34 Beav. 329; Davies v. O ttr I 3 W .R  4H I ; . 1 hadorn v I hadorn 21 Beav. 215; Maries 
. U t'U I 5 De (7 .M  & C . 610) see C iv il F.vidcncr Act I96H. s.2. \ ’..l 2. I ’t IH
A dm ira lty— See 0 .7 5 ,  rr 21, 33, 3H, 40.
E j t c h a n g e  o f  w i t n e s s e s ’ s t a t e m e n t s  ( 0 . 3 8 ,  r 2 A )
.’A .— ( I )  . . . .
(2) A t  a n y  s tage in  a n y  cause o r  m a t te r ,  the C o u r t  m a y ,  i f  it th in k s  f it  fo r  
the purpose  o f  d is p o s in g  f a i r l v  a n d  e x p e d i t i o u s ly  of d ie  cause o r  m a t t e r
.  o'- s .o h
38 /2 /4
38 /2 /5
38 /2 /6
38 /2 /7
38 /2A
7 lie  'n o rm a l' t ird e r  in  n il d iv is it ms t i l th r  H ig h  C m iil is ft it th r  e x t liange o f proofs of oi»J
d e u c e  t il w i(n e s s e s  w ith  sin Ii v a r ia t io n s  as m ig h t In* a p p r o p r ia te  u n d e r  th is  ru le  hut wt»— 
th e  a p (> l ir a t i i)n  fo r  s u ch  e x c h a n g e  is o p p o s e d , r lie  M a s t e r ’s disc re t io n  is unfettered . (P tir*  
S aunders a nd  J 'a rln e rs  ( a f i r m )  v . fc tis lg /e n  / . k / . ,  The T im es, J u ly  28. 11) 8 0 .) A  m a jo r  consider*"** 
which the (lo u r) might like to consider is thr ohjeetion o f nnv p a r ty  to the giving of u r t  • 
direction hy claim ing the right to privilege to w ithhold from disclosing the statements i/tS* 
witnesses and even their names (see “ Saving for right o f privilege," para. 30/2A /11).
Under para. (2 ), the (h u m  is empoweterl m d im  I the parties to exchange their winv-wx 
statements o f fact “ il it thinks lit' to do so lor the purpose of disposing fairly and rtp-A 
tiouslv of the cause or m atter and saving costs. O rd in a rily , the parties or our of ihrm 
apply for such a direction, though in the absence o f any such application, it is common po­
lice for thr (a )iir t to inquire o f the parlies whether they have any ohjeetion to such a dtrro>« 
being given. liven il the parties do raise such ohjeetion, the (hm rt mav nevertheless iW 
appropriate direction, if he thinks In to do so. irrespective of the views ol thr pines 
although it w ill take into account the grounds ol ohjeetion advanced hy them.
The appropriate Com  t to give a direction under para . (2 ) is, in the lirst instance, thr M»» 
ter in the Q u e rn ’s Bench and Chancery Divisions, the Patents Judge in patent artinnt. Ar 
( him me tr ia l J udge in commercial act ions, the Ad mi rail \ K eg i si rat in admiralty ai ti'>m »w 
the allocated ( ) flic ial Relci ee in ( ) 11 it ial Kelerees’ lit is in ess.
The  Vice-Chancellor gave the fulh iwing Practice D im  t ion on January 23, 1088
1. Henceforward on the hearing ol the summons lor directions the Mastet will nnrmiK 
make an order under K .S .C ., 0 .3 8 . t.2A  lor the exchange ol witness statements nf all re t  
evidence which any parly intends to lead at the trial. I he ordei will specilv the day on *>F»> 
such exchange is to he made. Any party w ho objects to the making ol such older or drum ■ 
modified order lot such exchange must spei ihcallx r.ii<e the point lot derision on thr urn- 
moos for directions.
2. Henceforward on issuing the summons for direr lions a complete set n( pleading* r r *  
he lodged.
3 8 /2  A /6  T h r  direction given hy the (a u n t under para. (2 ) may make dilfcrent pro* isinm *wt 
regard to di lie rent issues ol fact or different witnesses (pat a. 3(ri)). It may require am w nnn 
statement served to he signed bv I he intended witness ( para . 3(A )), and it may direct tint iV 
witnesses’ statements he filed with the Court (para. 3(c)). The direction may tlirrrlorr V 
either in general lorm , applying to all thr witnesses as to lad  ol the parties, or in spo tW 
form, specifying the issues of fact or thr witness to whom , it w ill , , 1 .
As already slated (see para. 3 H /2A /3 ). save in exceptional circumstances thr d im n*  
given hy the Court under p ara . (2 ) w ill he for the exchange he tween the parties nf thr wn-yx 
statements of the witnesses. This may take the form that the parties “ do mutually \rrif ■» 
each other the statements o f the witnesses as to fact w ithin days or hy the
day o f ’’ (see Practice Form No. .81 A, Vol. 2, pa ta .2 .r> l),
or perhaps more simply “ statements ol witnesses ol lac l | i f  a diietlinn is g iirn  under f+n 
(.“)) (b) n f  the rule, | to serve as evidence in c liir i to he exchanged bv | tfieii/ymg (he tlnle\
I I  a parts' should fail to serve I lie statement ol a witness pursuant to the direction gistn b 
the Court under para. (2) whether il he in the general or spec die lorm , he will not he riui’W 
to adduce evidence to which such direction rel.t les without the leave ol the (aunt (para t i 
In other words, the failure to serve the statement ol a witness as direc ted hy the ('.nun »•? 
result in the defaulting party being unable to call that witness at the trial or indeed tn aiMvt 
any evidence to which such direction relit led, except w ith the leave* o f I hr ( a jnrt.
Such leave will ordinarily  he granted only on let ins, which may well he stringent, e < iF* 
after new evidence has been given, the other parly  should he entitled, if  hr so wisltry. iom 
adjournment of the trial in order to consider such evidence and that the party in tlrbJ  
should pay (hr costs o f and occasioned by the adjournm ent in any event, possibly even c« m 
indem nity basis.
3 8 /2 A /7  C o n te n ts  of w itn e s s e s ’ s ta te m e n ts  -T h e  overriding features o f the written st.itrmrr* 
of th r witness which may hr served pursuant to the direction ol the Court under pan 
are:—
( 1) that they are intended for use at the trial itself: and
(2) that they relate to issues o f fart to he adduced at the- 11 ia l.
Accordingly, the written statement ol such a witness must contain only sue h matrrul lane 
as thr witness is able to prove ol lus own knowledge (</. ( ) I I , i . 5( I ) as to the content w 
aflidavit). Th e  w ritten statement o f the witness is the equivalent o f the oral evident r 
that witness w ill give if  called, in his evidence in chief at the trial. Indeed, the (rial | nclgr ru* 
direct that the statement served or part o f it should stand as the evidence in chief of duct >r» 
ness or part o f it  (para. 5(/>) cf. 0 .3 8 , r.43, putting expert reports in evidence). I,ike I b rued 
evidence of the trial witness, the written statement served must he full and complete: ii mw 
he "the truth , the whole truth and nothing hut the tru th ." It must he emphasised that rV 
party serving the witness statement may not lead evidence from his witness, the suhstan<r<f 
which is not included in the statement served, except as to new m atter or with the ronv-iu ■*
■■Tmioible' e\ me ueT t pa l > 1.11; j ■ ... n — ________
•uriD in i of inform ation or bedief even if tire grounds and rcasonTTlir.iinl act1 gls i w ------  ----------- --------
O I I ,  r. 5(2) as to the contents o f affidavits for inlcdoc.ulory proceedings). Unless sir stated 
W rSr party scr\’ing it, the written statement of the witness will not he treated as evidence 
■•Art the rules relating to hearsay evidence (para (6 ) and sec 0 .3 8  I’ t . I l l )  In  the O tl'u ia l 
fcrirtrei’ Courts, the general practice is that any objection as to the admissibility of all or 
ynm id > witness statement w ill norm ally he heard after the witness has prnducrd his statc-
«*** and sworn to its truth.
Id r  the oral evidence o f the trial witness, a w ritten statement must not contain any 
rrrfn  mons of opinion, but hr confined otdy to matters o f fact. Unless so stated by the party  
•rorng it, the w ritten statement w ill not he treated as an expert report under the rules rclat- 
■g *> expert evidence (para (6) and sec 0 .3 8 , I ’ t. IV ) .
T V  written statement o f a witness should not seek to anticipate thr evidence of a w itness 
4  Aw opposite party and to contradict it or otherwise to deal with it It is not thr function of 
4* written statement o f a witness to answer questions that may he put in cross-examination, 
w  ,wdy to answer questions as would he asked in his exam ination in chief. H ow rvcr the w it- 
•nm u iirm rn t should contain all thr evidence which he might hr expected to give wcrr hr to 
W examined orally at the tria l.
fo rm  Of w itnesses’ statements—T h r  statement should he expressed in the lirst person 38/2A/8 
w*4 it should state
I II the full name o f th r witness:
(?) hu place o f residence or if  hr is m aking thr statement in his professional business m 
ik e r  occupational capacity, thr address at which he works, the position he holds and thr 
of his firm or employer:
■ It his occupation, or if  he lias none, his description
s 11 thr fact that he is a parly  to the proceedings or is the employee of sin h a pat Is
I V  statement o f the witness should represent his evidence in chief and should he treated 
m 4 Kr was giving evidence in thr. witness box. It should hr stated in a < Irar straightloi w aid  
w n n i r  form, and should use thr language of thr witness, his ifssnstmtna rerha I nr the sake 
4  rbm v  it should follow the chronological sequence of the events or m alle i d r.ill w ith. For 
4* cikr of easy and ready reference, it should he divided into paragraphs numbered con- 
uwrsrrtsrly, each paragraph being as far as possible confined to a distim  t por lion o f Ins ev t- 
V»ec If  thr statement contains dates, sums or other numbers, they should hr rxpressrd in
and not in words.
TKr statement should he on paper complying w ith the requirement ol < ).(>(•, r I and should 
W filly Irg ihlr. It should norm ally he typed double spaced on one side of thr pa prr only 
K ix r  it is used at the tria l, it should hr paginated either individually  as a separate statc- 
twtm or as one o f several statements contained in a file. 11 it mentions any document or dor u- 
■wwn. thr reference to each of them should, where possible, hr given in the margin.
I V  statement must he signed hy the witness if so recpiirrd hy die Court (see para 3(/>)) 
rsen without such a requirem ent it is obviously sensible that the statement should hr
bv him and da ted . It may he desirable for the signature of I lie witness to he witnessed 
*• i responsible person who should stale his name, address and occupation and verify by his 
»»■ signature the fact that the witness signed thr statement in his present e.
!( thr Court so rrq u irrs  the written statement of the witness must he liled svitIi the (a u n t
Xa 'i  3(e)) The statements should therefore not he hound with thit k plastit sit ips or .m \ - ehr which would ham per filing I he filing of these statements w ill enable the trial 
to rrad them before th r  tria l, and if he does so, hr will no doubt annotm rr dial fact at 
beginning o f the tria l. W hen reading the statement, whether before or at thr tria l, the 
r i d  Judgr w ill also no doubt exclude frotn his m ind any objectionable m atter contained in 
■vi •t iir in rn t, such as hearsay evidence or expression of opinion.
Amendment of w itn es ses ’ statem ents— Th e w ritten statement of a witness served 38/2 A/9 
pcw iint to the direction o f the Court under para. (2) constitutes "a docum ent" in the pro- 
and falls w ith in  t fir amending power o f th r Court under O  20, r H( I) .  Flic amend 
■« r»r»rr is likely to he exercised only in exceptional circumstances. I he time lor thr witness 
»» d irt or w ithdraw  part of his statement may best he left to when lie comes to he asked 
¥**-*<( it in thr witness box. Faptally, any argument that the statement of a witness ionium s  
•*> inadmissible evidence or other objectionable m aterial should he Irlt to he heard alter the 
vrr*rss lias produced it at the tria l, as is the practice Indore ( flltcial Kelerees rather than 
fc^ aJt with bv way o f a prior application to compel the statement to lie amended
>uppl«mentary statem ents Of w itnesses - A lthough there is no express provision to 38/2A /10 
fl-i t tin t . the Court has power, if it thinks lit to do so, to direct that a b lithe r w ritten state- 
w n i nt a witness hr served supplementary to that already seised. I hr better practice is that 
•*» r-sMlrncr dealing w ith or contradicting any statements made by witnesses of the opposite 
■•■’ is thoiild hr given orally  rather than he dealt with hy way o f a supplementary statement
V • m plrntrniarv statement may he allowed to he served to give the witness o f a party the
. . i.it |,i« own statement or to answer the statement of the opposite party.
11
. J , J  u  , , _J- « »  ■ MUIi —   —  »■ — .......  ilIJDi nm .l). ■■■■—J * n — i I m i  ,■>< II.III1II *» 1
o t h e r  . s t a t e m e n t s  o f  t h e  w i t n e s s e s  b e t w e e n  t h r  p a r t i e s ,  w h e t h e r  p u r s u a n t  i n  t h e  ( l i r n t r a
t in t lc r  [tarn . (2 ), n r  hy ennsrttt, th r  t r ia l i ls r l l  rem ains an  oral, public 11 ial The written in*-
m ciil o f a witness is not in itself evidence o f (lie case. T lt r  trial .Judge m av, on sneli trrrm» 
lie thinks (it, direct that the si a lenient ol the wit ness should stand as thr evidence in t hie' 4 
that witness or part ofsucli evidence (para. (5 )(A )); indeed such a direction may brtjh rr*  
an earlier statue, e.g. at the lim e ol giving the direction lor the exchange of witnesses’ to* 
mcnts. W hether the statement o f the witness is directed to stand as his ev idence in <h»H 
his testimony is elicited orally at the tt ial, he w ill lie subject to oral cross-examination In 
opposite party under 0 .3 8 , r. I who w ill have the advantage that he w ill have kntmn ■ 
advance what the witness was going to say in his evidence in chic! (see |aeoli, op c i l ). In rV 
absence o f such a direclion, the party calling the witness must elicit his evidence hy lot 
exam illation-iu-chief in the ord inary  wav under 0 .3 8 . r. I .
W here the party serving the state men I o f a wit ness under parti. (2 ). does not call thit »r 
ness at the tria l, no other party may put that statement in evidence at the trial (para II 
W hether or not the content o f the statement ol any party thereof mav he used or referred ► 
the trial w ill o f course depend upon whether or not the trial |udge thinks lit in allow i* <h» j 
allow  such use or reference to he made. ]
Where, thr party serving the w iittcu  statement ol a witness under para. (2) docs call tK* !
witness at the tria l, he must coniine the evidence-in-rhief to the substance of wlul ii o» !
tained in the statem ent, and he must not lead, and will not he allowed to lead, evidence 
him thr substance o f which is not included in the statement (para. 5(n)) unless (i) the o'1*- 
parties consent, or (ii) such additional evidence relates to new matters whic h have .irivm » 
the course o f thr trial (ib id ) or (iii)  the ( aitirt grants leave on appropriate terms which run l» 
stringent. Unless the C.ourl otherwise orders, he w ill n f ctttit sc not he able to lead rvidr-v* 
from the witness which dillers from or < ontradicis the contents ol that statement.
Witness statements which have been exchanged under 0 .3 8 , r .2A arc not pul in rvidrre* 
hy the fact o f exchange hut rem ain confidential until the witness makes the statnnrnt pu'i, 
hy verifying it on oath in the witness box or the party who served the statement waivn »*» 
privilege. In  opening, counsel should not refer to such statement, not should a witness ritW  
by an opposing party he cross-examined hy reference to a statement o f another witness 
might or might not he called hy that opposing party or someone other than the parts 
whose behalf the cross-examination is being conducted. Cross-exam ining counsel mav. K«» 
ever, put to an opposing witness a statement taken on behalf o f the cross-examinrr'i 
client, hut hy so doing he waives his client’s privilege in the statement. I f lie puts to an npp-» 
ing witness only a small pari o f his own c lient’s statem ent, he w ill thereby entitle his nyye 
nent to re-examine that witness on the whole of the statement unless he has agreed 
opposing counsel that only part of a statement m a\ hr- put to a witness without thr»V.fc 
being opened up for re-exam ination or I>\ cross-examining counsel preparing written 
(ions to he handed to the witness either in the witness box or several rlavs previ.*j»*» 
(/■airfield-Alatber I  .h i v. S /trll I I  K I.Id. | I 9 8 9 | I A ll I . R  47li).
38 /2A /12  Saving Of right to priv ilege I ’ara (ft) expressly preserves the tight o f even p.wn e 
withhold Irnm disclosure any com m unication on the grounds of privilege. It is, ol covrrw 
plain that the statement or "proo l”  o f the evirlence o f a witness is a communication lnx>Hvi 
such right extends, since it w ill have been obtained hy the solicitor for the party in hi» pe— 
fcssional capacity for the purpose o f pending or contemplated civil proceedings nr in nwnn 
lion w ith the obtaining or giving o f legal advice and is protected from disclosure ixi rV 
ground o f legal professional privilege (see para 3 8 /3 5 /1 , below relating to the privilege fr-m 
disclosure o f experts' reports). This right clearly also extends to the names or othrr ii|rn»r> 
of the witnesses who have made statements or given “ proofs ' of their evidence In nr fur d» 
purposes of the solicitor for a party acting in his professional capacity (see "Disclosing m m  
of witnesses etc.,” para. 18 / 12 /4 1 ), whom  the party does not intend to call to give r \nlrrv t  w 
the trial.
38 /2A /13  Saving for adm issib ility  of evidence Para. (H) expressly provides that nothing in n *
2 A will make admissible evidence otherwise inadmissible. There is accordingly an nhliem-* 
on the parties preparing the witnesses’ statements to he served pursuant to para. (2) alxnr n 
ensure that they contain no inadmissible evidence. Th is  means that they must lake a r t  c 
omit any hearsay evidence, or statements ol inform ation and belief even if  the grnumh W  
sources thereof are given or any expression of opinion, or any m atter which is si a mb km 
irrelevant or otherwise oppressive (see 0 .4 1 ,  r.b). I f  the statement o f a witness slinul.1 S 
chance contain any such m ateria l, it should he corrected as soon as possible (srr p»-» 
3 8 /2 A /9 ) , or otherwise the opposite party may applv to strike out such uiateri.il, ji>H * 
appropriate cases, for th r service o f a fresh statement ( ib itf)
38 /2A /14  A vailability of w itness statem ents  —Solicitors should bring to Court extra w 
witness statements so that they can he made available to the Press and members ol the put** 
as the evidence in the case was in the public dom ain ( Pearlier Statement ( .iitnitierrinl Oner E** 
lire t. The Timet. August 23. 19ft!) 1. O th er divisions o f the M ich C. m ill ?n:tf r ln ’irlp fu • * •.......   «
t — (1) W ith o u t  p re ju d ic e  to  ru le  '2, the. C.ourl n ia y ,  a t or \ ic to rc  TfTc m A  ItH -i 
e/ in v  a c tio n , o rd e r  th a t  e v id e n ce  o f  a n y  p a r t ic u la r  fac t s h a ll he R iven  at 
»*v tr ia l in  such  m a n n e r  as m a y  be sp e c ifie d  by  the  o rd e r .
(2) T h e  p o w e r  c o n fe r re d  by p a ra g r a p h  (1)  ex tends  in  p a r t i c u la r  to 
'■wilering th a t  e v id e n c e  o f  a n y  p a r t i c u la r  fact m a y  be g iv e n  at the  t r i a l —
( a )  b y  s ta te m e n t  on  o a th  o f  i n f o r m a t io n  o r  be l ie f ,  o r
( b ) b y  the  p r o d u c t i o n  o f  d o c u m e n ts  o r  e n t r ie s  in  hooks, o r
(c) by  c op ies  o f  d o c u m e n ts  o r  en t r ie s  in  books, o r
{( f)  in  the  case o f  a fac t  w h ic h  is o r  was a m a t te r  o f  c o m m o n  k n o w l ­
edge c i t h e r  g e n e r a l l y  o r  in  a p a r t i c u la r  d i s t r i c t ,  h y  the  p r o d u c ­
t io n  o f  a s p e c i f ie d  n e w s p a p e r  w h ic h  c o n ta in s  a s ta te m e n t  of th a t  
fact.
Effect ot rule— This rule was taken from  the former ( ),37 , r. I( ’.. 38/3/1
TVvr order is usually made mi the hearing ol the summons for d irrt lions or an application  
Vs rv.tiir under it.
Umltatlon of expert evidence (0 .38, r.4)
4 T h e  C o u r t  m a y ,  a t  o r  b e fo re  the  t r ia l  o f  a n y  a c t io n ,  o rd e r  th a t  the  38/4 
number o f  m e d ic a l  o r  o th e r  e x p e r t  w itnesses  w h o  m a y  be ca l led  at the t r ia l  
thall he l im i t e d  as sp e c i f ie d  b y  the o rd e r .
U U c i  of ru le — Form erly  0 .3 7 ,  r.10. 38/4/1
TKr order is usually made on the hearing of the summons for directions but sec in relation  
»* mtomatic directions in personal in jury actions, (3 .25 , r . f i ( l ) ( r ) .  I his rule itself gives no 
f~stTT to  order the exchange o f  reports o f medical or other expert witnesses ( I I 'orrall v. Retch 
i ! * \ i |  I Q .B . 296; [ 1955] I A ll E .R  363) but this is subject to 0 .3 8 , r.37 see now C iv il F.vi- 
Vrwr Art 1972 and Part IV  o f this O rd e r "E xpert Evidence". The usual form o f order is 
that medical reports be agreed i f  possible, and if  they arc not agreed thr medical evidence 
V  limited to [one or two] witnesses on each side" and an order in sim ilar terms is usually  
w-*de in regard to other expert evidence, lim itin g  the evidence to one witness on each side (or 
r»v> if experts are to be called in more than one field o f specialised knowledge). Some diflt- 
owhx is caused in lim iting  fairly  the expert evidence where the action is by a laym an against a 
p iv s i who pro|K>ses to call his expert employees to give evidence partly  o f fact, as well as an 
rxVprndrnt expert. In  Tnvlnr v. (Ireentng &  Sons. I.It). (1 9 5 6 )(nnrep.) the Court of Appeal on 
J L-rvr 15, 1956, made an order for directions as follows: “ A report by an engineer be agreed if 
pntihle, and i f  not agreed, the expert evidence be lim ited to two independent witnesses for 
rv h  party: provided always that either party may call additional expert witnesses (who may 
s* in the employm ent o f or otherwise connected with such party) but such witness or wit- 
v i srs shall not qualify  on taxation for paym ent as experts."
Where one party desires to call only one expert witness and the other party desires to rail 
w-ev. jn  order lim iting  such evidence to one witness on each side would be proper, though 
possibly unnecessary, since the m aking or refusal o f an order lim iting  thr num ber of expert 
•  wnesses is not conclusive on the question whether it is reasonable or not to call thr specified 
w-rilier of such witnesses and docs not fetter the discretion o f the Taxing M aster whose du ly  
» n to determ ine the m atter (A tw e ll v. M in is  try o f Public flu tld inq  and II  or A f (1 989) I \V  I . R
[|% 9 1  3 A ll E .R . 196).
The |>owrr to lim it the number o f expert witnesses does not extend to excluding expert rvi- 
V-rwe altogether (Sullivan  v. West Yorkshire Passenger Transport Executive [ 1985) 2 A ll E .R . 134,
( \  I
Exp«rt w itnesses— T h e ir  function is (inter a lia) to explain words, or terms o f science or 38/4/2 
m  ijqrcaring on the documents which have to be construed by the C.ourt, to give expert 
•sxrxtxnre to the C o u rt, e.g. as tn the laws of science, or the working of a technical process or 
e x t e r n )  or to inform  the C ourt as to the state of public know lrdgi w ith regard to the matters 
Vvi.fr it: ser C.rasfteld &  Sans L it !  v. Tee hint-(,'hernical l.aboratnnes l.td . (1913) 29 I I .  R 379. 
tn rnh  ( rlanese Ltd. v. C.'nurtaulds Ltd. (1935) 1.52 1..T. 537, 111. " T h e  opinion ol si irm ilic  
wvn uivm proven facts may be given by men of science w ithin their own science" [U n ited  
twin Shipping Hoard v. Ship St. A I bant [ 193 I | A . ( i. 632, B.C ., in which the evidence of a land 
»>rsr\or to deduce t-lie position of the vessels fiom three photographs of a collision at sea 
ckrn from a passing vessel was not accepted). In no ease is it competent for them  to express 
•xvu opinion upon any o f the issues, whether o flaw  or fact, which (lie Court or a ju ry  has to 
Virrnniie  (per Neville  J. in Crosfeld &  Sons v. Techno (,'hemiral l.abnrnton/s l.td . (1913) 29 
r I W t7<li Th us  in a nalent action, an expert witness is not entitled to say what the speci-
a lte ra tio n  is o ln-ittns, th a t heinf* a question fo r the (.'ourt (frrr l .n r t l Tom lin ill /Inlnh (rt/sr* 
/.td. v. Cnurtuulds I.Id. above, p .513). As to  adm issibility o f  expert evidence on the 
w he the r o r not concea lm ent n r  non-disclosure o f a fart is m aterial to the making of a poles W 
insurance, see Locker and It on//. I.td  v. 11 es tern Australian Insurance (in. Ltd. (I03.1)) INI I T
334.
Expert witnesses are entitled at the trial to refer to documents consisting olsuminann V 
the results o f research into the drug alleged to has t- caused the injuries complained 11 *v  
articles anti letters about the drug published in medical journals, and they may do so a* p»“ 
o f the body ol their expertise and il thev do so, the Court would have to admit such d • «• 
menls in evidence, in the sense ol reading them and giving the lat tual assertions m them t >' 
weight as is thought lit, and indeed il an expert refers to the results o f research ptthlislinl t« i 
reputable authority  in a reputable journal, the Court w ill o rd inarily  regard those reni1” «- 
supporting any inferences lairly to be draw n from them , unless or until a different appt-v* * 
is shown to be correct ( I I .  v. S rlin ing  (ihnnirn ls Ltd. | I9 8 3 | I W .K .R . 143; | I983| I All I > 
849).
Kxpert witnesses when giving evidence at trial are entitled to draw on and trl\ •• 
materials produced by others in the area in which the experts have t lir i i expertise, r ( \tv»  
tieal records compiled by the I lorne ( M ice, since subjet t to lim itations, their evidence n *•' 
subject to the rule against hearsay evidence in the same wav as that of witnesses ol l.u t IX < 
Abadnm | I9 8 3 |  I W .K .R . 1 *2<i; J I«.»«:*| I A ll H R. 3(>1).
Kxpert evidence as to foreign law may be given by a person who is otherwise sum** 
qualified to do so on account ol his knowledge or experience, irrespective ol whether hr t -  
acted or is entitled to act its a legal practitioner in the connirv or territory ofth.it law It r>< 
Evidence Act I !I7'2, s.4 ( I ) see V o l.2, I ’t . I It, p a ra .(>1 (HI),
As to prool ol foreign law , see He lleeche v .Smith Am riirnn  Stores Lid. anil (ihihnn Slum In  
[ )933 | A .C . 148; St. I'ierre  v. South American Stores ( ( ia ll i and (.h a m ) L td  | 19371 3 All 1'. 8 U l 
C .A .; Kendal (d/.V) v. Arms Ltd. | 1937) 3 A ll K .R . 577, pp .W J . 383. H  I..
I lie general rule ol law that there is no property in a witness o f fact , 1 . s also 
expert witness and therefore subject to the lim itation that such it witness cannot give n* 
dcncc as to com munications, arising in the course ol his being mstrut ted by one partv, *hx t 
arc protected by legal professional privilege, an expert witness who has been i (insulin! v. 
one side and has given Ins opinion to that side, can there.diet be consulted and ilnortv i-* 
subpoenaed by the other side to give Ins opinion on the lads  ol the case (Harmony Shifrfn*i t » 
,V.,4. V. Saudi I'm rofie Line Ltd. | 19791 I W .I..R . 1381; | I9 7 9 |  3 A ll K.R. 177. C .A .). It n b-% 
ever clearly undesirable that expert witnesses should be involved w ith both sides (ih il r  
W a ller K.J.).
The ( 'ourl has the power to direct that expert evidence lie railed  alter all other evnbr. > 
has been heard (Alfnna d u riih  Insurance (in. v. /la in  (ilarkson, I  he Limes. januaiv  23, I'iK'i. v.* 
of an expert's evidence should be disclosed and not the bare bones ol his report llrno • 
covering letter containing m ailer whit It is m aterial to I he report and ils com lusiniis d.- - 
be disclosed as the parly  calling the ex per I has a dm  v to disc lose die mi list a nee ot hn »s - 
deuce. (Kenning v. L.ie ( im uliuclton, I he I nne\. Novem bei 29. 19119).
1 n A dm iralty  act ions, t he lollowing I ’rnilice Direction as to the Kvidcuce nl Kxpei t \ \  iinncn 
issued by the I ’rcsidenl w ill apply ( I9 ( i8 | 1 W . I .  K 312; | I9 (.8 | I A ll K.R. 447;
W here a party intends to adduce expert evidence, he should produce to the other p.utt t-i 
expert's statement of'proposed evidence, together w ith anv reports, plans, models, c.ihii'» 
lions, etc., relevant to il, lor agreement if  possible, f  ailing such agreement, the ntlu i pe*. 
should deliver to the first party a writ ten statement sei t ing out particulars ol the man cm rx« 
agreed. W here both parlies intend to adduce expert ev idence, each should follow tins p  • 
ordure, f  a ilure by' any parlv  to lollow this piocednre m ay result in a special ordei as u m i'i  
fo r  the appointm ent ol a ( amrt expert, see ( ) .  1(1.
Limitation of plans, etc. in evidence (0.38, r.5)
38/5 5. U n less ,  at o r  be fo re  (be t r i a l ,  the  C o u r t  fo r  spec ia l reasons otherwise
o rd e rs ,  no  p la n ,  p h o to g r a p h  o r  m od e l  sha l l  be rece ivab le  in  evidence at 
the t r ia l  o l  tut a c t io n  un less at least It) ( la v s  before  the comm encement i^ 
the t r ia l  the  p a r t ies ,  o th e r  th a n  the  p a r t y  p ro d u c in g  it ,  have  been given an
o p p o r t u n i t y  to inspec t  it a n d  to agree to the  a d m is s io n  th e re o f  withmu 
fu r t h e r  p ro o f .
38/5/1 E ffect of r u le — This rule was taken (rum the liirmei 0 .3 7 . r. I I ) .  See in relatiun in .mi., 
m atie direct inns in persnnal in jury actions. 0 .2 3 , r.8( I )(</).
(h ire  must be taken at a I ■ iaI to ensure that no plait, photograph or model shall be r r i fn * 1 
in evidence, unless the parties, other than the parly  producing it. have been given a ttnpp ' 
t unity to inspect and agree i I or th e ) udgc for-special reasons makes an order or tl it ci tiun i 'w  
it may be received. In  the event ol the |ttdge m aking such an order or direction the \w »  
must include it in the ('.ertilicate lor the inform, it ion ol the Tax in g  M a s le t.
A n  a p p l i c a t i o n  to  p o w l u c e  a t«l-oi   1 * 1 1
fo i l  identifying what is to be produced and stating that 111 the opinion of die deponent, vhc 
(eum rnt, plan or film , etc. is relevant to an issue in the action and to the hnna (ides of the 
jrkrr party and specifying thr special reasons relied upon for seeking non-disclosme 
(/, ( ititnnest v. Ketlog Co o f  Great lln tn in  11988) I W  K.R 913; \ 1988] 2 -Ml j;. R I . ('■ A )
Revocation or variation of orders under rules 2 to 5 (0 .38 , r.6) 
f>. A n y  o r d e r  u n d e r  ru les  2 to  5 ( i n c l u d i n g  an  o rd e r  m a d e  on  a p p e a l )  38/6 
may, on s u f f ic ie n t  cause b e in g  s h o w n ,  be revoked  o r  v a r ie d  by a s u b ­
sequent o rd e r  o f  I l ie  C o u r t  m a d e  at o r  be fo re  the t r ia l .
Substituted by R S ( !  (A m endm ent) 1974 (S I 1974 No 293) I lux title te p im h u rv  tin 
1 <mrr r 7
Evidence of finding on foreign law (0 .38, r.7)
7.— ( I )  A  p a r t y  to  a n y  cause o r  m a t t e r  w h o  in te n d s  to  a d d u c e  in  ev i-  38/7 
deuce a f i n d in g  o r  d e c is io n  on a q u e s t io n  o f  fo re ign  la w  by  v i r t u e  of sec t ion  
1(2) o f  the C i v i l  K v id e n c c  A c t  1972 shall -—-
( t t )  in  the  ease of an  a c t io n  to w h ic h  O r d e r  2 f>, ru le  I, ap p l ie s ,  
w i t h i n  l 1 d a y s  a f te r  the  p le a d in g s  in the a c t io n  are d e e m e d  to 
be c losed ,  an d
(/>) in  the  case o f  a n y  o th e r  cause o r  m a t te r ,  w i t h i n  2 1 day s a l te r  the 
d a te  on  w h ic h  an  a p p o i n t m e n t  fo r  the  f i rs t  h e a r in g  of the cause
o r  m a t t e r  is o b ta in e d ,
<k in e i th e r  ease, w i t h i n  such  o th e r  p e r io d  .is the  ( a u n t  may spec i fy ,  serve 
notice o f  h is  i n t e n t i o n  on  e ve ry  o th e r  p a r l y  to  the  p ro ce e d in g s .
(2) T h e  n o t ic e  sh a l l  spec i fy  the  q u e s t io n  on  w h ic h  the  f i n d in g  o r  
decision w as  g iv e n  o r  m a d e  a n d  s p e c i fy  the d o c u m e n t  in  w h ic h  it is
i r |>orlcd  o r  re c o rd e d  in  c i t a b le  fo rm .
(.1) In  a n y  cause  o r  m a t t e r  in  w h ic h  ev id e n ce  may he g ive n  by a f f id a v i t .
.m a f f id av i t  s p e c i f y in g  th e  m a t te r s  c o n ta in e d  in  p a r a g r a p h  (2 )  s ha l l  eons t i -  
u i t f  no t ice  u n d e r  p a r a g r a p h  ( I )  if se rved  w i t h i n  the p e r io d  m e n t io n e d  in 
that p a ra g ra p h .
N.I.I..I by R.S.C. (A m end m ent) 1974 (N I 197! N ., 29r>)
O p eration  Of ru le  -T h r  object of s 4 is to avoir! the need to p io w  as a l.u I a ipicMion ol 3 8 /7 /1  
*" r.g ii law w ith  respect to anv m atter ill subsequent proceedings where that question lias 
i l it . i i | i  been the subject o f a finding or decision contained in a judgm ent ol the Ih g li (a u n t
-  in a judgment on appeal therefrom , where such judgment is in a i liable hum  I lie need lot 
i hn ir . in .il arises from t he la cl that the finding ot decision ol the I .nglish ( out i as to w lia l is 
•f <■ f.ueign law  on a particu lar t pies lion or m aile r is essentially a Inn ling ol la. t in l lie par ■
•v ila t  action in which it is made and can have no probative value in any otliei action, and 
:h*rrfore il the same question w ith respect to the same m alle i were to arise in a subsequent 
». non, it would have to lie proved afresh in that act ion.
I he parts in tending to adduce such finding or decision in evident e in subsequent pinfeed- 
■*i<\ rniisl. however, com ply w ith  the m achinery and requirements ol this rule I or ibis pm - 
| . .v ,  he must serve notice o f his intention on cverv other party to the pro. e.-dings and sm It
-  t ia  must com ply w ith lire requirem ents (ri) as to lim e, and (/-I as to content As to lim e,
•he notice must lie served in an action begun by writ w ithin I t days alter ih< r lose ol plead- 
*■>*» ( para .)(•>)) and in any other proceedings, w ithin 21 days all. i tin- date on who I. lie
• |»j«.mimeiil for the (irsl hearing ol the action is obi.lined (p.on l( /r l)  As   m em . tin
ry.(n r musl s|>er ily- the question on which the finding or decision was given or m ade, and 
- i i i i i  also specify the document in which it is reported m recorded in i itable lot in I para 2 11
tn anv cause or m atter in which evidence may lie given bv allidav n . an alhdnvil spei itv lug 
■ hr matters rerprircd to be contained in the requisite notice shall constitute the requisite 
s. .mi r  il served w ith in  the periods above mentioned (para (3)1 II  would seem that in m ler- 
'• « utor v mat t ers, as for eXa niple, on an applicat ion to set aside t he service ol the writ out of 
•hr |tu isdiction, an afhdavii specifying the requisite matters w ill constitiiti the requisite 
r».in r  to adduce in evidence the finding or decision on the question of the foreign law relied
N Ir rid tut; or decision on anv question ol foreign law will lie I lea led as rej tor led or ere. ndcd
1 • 1 ..........        n o is e . io l or
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I t  sh ou ld  be noted  th m  the Ib r r ig t i law  w ith  respect to any matter w ill not be taken tn 1» ■ 
accordance w ith  the  finding or decision specified in the notice served under this rule if it •»•■ 
diets w iili another finding or decision 011 the same question adduced by the s e rv ic e  t /'V  
requisite notice under this rule in thr same proceedings (see proviso to s.4 (2) o f the Caul l>» 
dence Act 1072, V o l. 2, para .6101). M oreover, a party who fails to serve the requisite rvo-r 
tttuler this rule w ill lie precluded from adducing in evidence the finding or decision on 
lie relics except w ith the leave ol the Court (see s.4 (3 )).
O n  the other hand, there is nothing to prevent a party from calling expert evidrmr •« 
foreign law to show that the foreign law 011 the question on which the finding or derio.* « 
relied on has been repealed or abrogated, changed or modified or that the foreign lav* ttm» 
trary  to that finding or decision.
Application to trials of issues, references, etc. (0.38, r.8)
38/8 8. T h e  fo re g o in g  ru les  o f  th is  O r d e r  (o th e r  th a n  ru le  2 A )  shall  apph to
t r ia ls  o f  issues o r  q u e s t io n s  o f  fact o r  la w ,  refe rences, in q u i r ie s  and assess­
m e n ts  o f  d a m a g e s  as they  a p p ly  to  the  t r ia l  o f  ac t ions .
Am ended by R .S .C . (Am endm ent No. 2) 1986 (S .I. 1986 No. I 187).
38/8/1 Effect of rule— This  rule was taken from the form er ( ).37, r.2. 11 is particularly iniporww 
to note that as to assessments o f damages the evidence o f the witnesses must be proved 
their exam ination orally and in open C ourt, save in the case in which some other mide </ 
proof is allowed by order or is otherwise admissible (see rr.2 and 3, and rr.20 ct set] ).
Depositions: when receivable In evidence at trial (0.38, r.9)
38/9 9.— (1)  N o  d e p o s i t i o n  ta ke n  in  a n y  cause o r  m a t t e r  sh a l l  he received™
ev idence  at the t r ia l  o f  the cause o r  m a t t e r  un less—
( a )  the d e p o s i t io n  was taken  in  p u rs u a n c e  o f  an o rd e r  under  Order 
39, ru le  1, a n d
(/>) c i t h e r  the p a r t y  a ga ins t  w h o m  the e v idence  is offered consentt 
o r  it is p ro v e d  to the  s a t is fa c t io n  o f  the  C o u r t  t h a t  the deponent 
is d e a d ,  o r  b e y o n d  the  j u r i s d i c t i o n  oT the  C o u r t  o r  unable from 
s ickness o r  o t h e r  i n f i r m i t y  to  a t te n d  the  t r ia l .
(2 )  A  p a r t y  i n t e n d i n g  to  use a n y  d e p o s i t io n  in  ev idence  at the trial of t  
cause o r  m a t t e r  m u s t ,  a rea so n a b le  t im e  be fo re  th e  t r ia l ,  g ive  notice ofhn 
in te n t io n  to d o  so to  the  o th e r  p a r t y .
(3)  A  d e p o s i t i o n  p u r p o r t i n g  to  be s ig n e d  by  the pe rson  before whom it 
was taken  s h a l l  be re c e iv a b le  in  ev id e n ce  w i t h o u t  p r o o f  o f  the signaturr 
b e ing  the s ig n a tu re  o f  th a t  pe rson .
38/9/1 Effect of rule— This  rule was taken from the form er 0 .3 7 , rr. 18 and 24.
Depositions taken before an exam iner under 0 .3 9 , r. I , do not per se become evidence in tV» 
case. (Fisher v. C. / / .  T. l.td . [19651 1 W .L .R . 1093; (19651 2 A ll K .R . 601). The parti e 
whose instance the evidence was taken before the trial is not bound to put that cvidrnre in r  
the tria l, but he or any other party m ay, and if  he so wishes, must do so, and then the v»h<4e 
deposition becomes evidence ( ib id .). He must bespeak an office copy (sec rule 10 ) and tn* 
reasonable notice o f his intention to do so (para (2 )).
Court documents adm issible or receivable in evidence (0.38, r. 10)
38/10 10.— (1)  O f f ic e  cop ies  o f  w r i t s ,  reco rds ,  p le a d in g s  a n d  docum en ts  filed
in the H ig h  C o u r t  sh a l l  be a d m is s ib le  in  e v id e n ce  in  a n y  cause o r mattrr
and  b e tw e en  a l l  p a r t ie s  to  the  sam e  e x te n t  as the o r i g i n a l  wou ld  In­
a d m is s ib le .
(2)  W i t h o u t  p re ju d ic e  to  the  p ro v is io n s  of a n y  e n a c tm e n t ,  every docu­
m e n t  p u r p o r t i n g  to  be sca led  w i t h  the seal o f  an y  o ff ice  o r  depar tm en t  t^ 
the S u p re m e  C o u r t  s h a l l  be rece ived  in  ev id e n ce  w i t h o u t  fu r th e r  proof, 
a n d  a n y  d o c u m e n t  p u r p o r t i n g  to  be so sca led  and  to be a copy  o f  a docu­
m e n t  f i led  in ,  o r  issued o u t  of, th a t  o f f ice  o r  d e p a r tm e n t  sha l l  lie deemed m 
be an o f f ice  c o p y  o f  th a t  d o c u m e n t  w i t h o u t  f u r t h e r  p r o o f  unless the con­
t r a r y  is s h o w n .
I v r v f  O . r i t ,  r . 7 .  I lu -  I »I t  I . \  1 -. m  i , v_ .................. ....... .... ............
* *  i ' l l  iif “ any office or departm ent of thr Supreme C.oori, " and tins would include c.u.m-
err» Chambers or the A dm ira lty  Registry or the District Registries
Certification o f d o c u m e n ts  fo r  u s e  a b ro a d — The practice is as follows 38 /10 /2
l l  i When n certified copy o f a judgm ent, order or any other liled document is required tor 
we in a foreign or ('.om m onwe.il th ( '.out I the a pplit ant shall bespeak the ret lilted < opy In  mi 
department having the custody ol the docum ent, explaining the purpose Im which the 
6-eument is required.
I hr certified copy w ill norm ally be issued beat ing the name of the olltt i i ol the ( our I 
Suing custody ol the document and authenticated liv one ol the Masters ol the Supreme
< <*ut
• 11 fu rther a lit lien lira  l ion. e.g. by one o f H er M a  jesty's | usl ices ol the Supreme ( amrt ol 
Jidiraliire, or the Lord ( '.hanrrffor. w ill no longer be available rxi rpt when- the upplit .nil is 
►*7' to satisfy the Practice M aster that the foreign ('.nuri 01 authority  Im wltu li the <lo< u- 
•urn n required, w ill not accept as siilln ient the < opy cri tified as in para .2 above.
/Vie (ire P irn  I ion t (Pncnm rnh fu r I \r  Abroad (1 H P  and (.h P  ) | 11 • 7 I | I \ \  I.  R fitM.
It'D ! | 2 All K .R . 16(1).
W  M IM ). No. K ill, V o l.2. P l.3A . para 717.
1 Im practice applies in the Q .H . I ). and the (d e l)  and will prrstim abK lie followed in ilie 
I • ’mb Division, ily  virt tie ol 0 .6 3 ,  i I I , it w ill also be followed in I he Disicn i Regis ( i ies
Certified c o p ie s  fo r  u s e  in th e  R e p u b lic  of E ire  See n Republii of In -land undei 38/10/3
<> 71, r I I
Certified c o p ie s  fo r  u s e  In B e lg iu m  and  F ra n c e — B e lg iu m  lb  A n  I ol an Agicc- 
•^nt between I I . M .  Governm ent in Great Britain and the Belgian G overnm ent, made in 
fcuwels, Decem ber 21, 1928, it is provided that copies oi extracts from judgments, decrees,
•rd n i and other jud ic ia l pr<tcecdings in any ( aun ts o f justice in G reat Britain and N orthern  
Ireland, and affidavits, pleadings or other documents liled or deposited hi any such Gout i,
•M il not require legalisation in order to be accepted as authentic in Belgium provided that 
l>car puma facie evidence ol anthem  i< ily and are certified, in accordant e with the Agree - 
**ent. tn be in conform ity w ith thr original
Franco— A rt. 1 ol an Agreem ent between If  M  Governm ent in the l.I K and the ( iovcrn- 
rvnt nT (he French R epublic , made in Paris, A pril 3, 1937, provides to the same elh-t I in
r*< iid  to France (includ ing  A lgeria).
I hr ( '.erli (ira te  for use in the C en tra l Office is in the billowing form and is signed I in the
Vm .ir M aster or his deputy:
I i i ih ih v  ct r i  m y that the O ffice Copy document hereto annexed is in conlorim is with  
iV  original thereof filed or deposilrrl In the C en tra l O ilie r  ol I he Supi erne Court ol J udit a- 
tire  in England.
“ Dated this day til ,1 9
“ Senior M aster ol the Supreme Court ol 
|ud icature  in England."
L eg a lisa tio n  o f fo re ig n  p u b lic  d o c u m e n ts  For the extent to which the requirem ent 38/10/4 
■~i legalisation" o f foreign public documents has been abolished, see thr Gi invent ton ( I reals 
Vrors N o.32 C m n d .261 7 (1965 )) which came into force on January 21, 1965.
A d m is s ib ility  a b ro a d  o f e n tr ie s  in B ritis h  re g is te rs  Th e  above agreements also 
o irm l in the use In Belgium and France o f copies o f entries in registers kept in Great Britain  
*-<l Northern Ire lanrl, relating to civil status (In n Its . marriages, divorces, deaths, adoptions)
• •-I also of certificates issued by the Patent Office in London iclatm g to Ih itish  patents.
•rsigns and trade marks
Adm issibility In England of entries In foreign registers T h r  m n v n s e  ease (n um b
• S' me in the U n ited  K ingdom  of certified entries in foreign puhlii icgisiers) is prov ided lot 
b  thr Evidence ( Foreign, D om inion and ( lolonial Docum ents) At t 1933. and the ( )alhs and 
I Mile n re (( )verscas Authorities and ( '.nun tries) Ar t 191 >3, whit h enables ( h tiers in ( a mm il
• - 1>e made applying these A i ts to entries in particular registet s ol pat lit ul.it i om it l ies a in h ­
erit u a ted in m anner provided in (lie O rders . U nder the At t of I 9 33. ( lit lei s have been made
• |-plv mg the Act to certain registers o f certain coun tries—nam ely Belgium IS  K & ( 1 1933 
No lit I); C anada — all provinces except O n tario , N ew  Brunswick anil A lberta (S I 1962 
V .? u > 6 ); France— (S R. &  ( )  1937 No. 515), Australia — (S R. & ( ) .  1938 N o ,739); New 
! •  aland - — (S. I. 1959 No. 1306); Baham as— (S .l 1961 No 2911); Barbados— (S .l 1902 
No M l ) ;  Berm uda—- ( S . I  1961 N o .2042); British A ntarctic— (S. I. 1962 N o .2605), British 
tonana (S .l ,  1961 N o .2043); British H onduras— (S .l 1961 N o .2041); D o m in ic a --(S  I 
I ' - . l  N o.20 15); Falkland Is la n d s - (S . l .  1962 N o.2607); Fiji — (S .l 1961 N o 2046); G il.ra l- 
. . .  (S .l. 19 6 1 N o .2047); llo n g  K o n g - ( S . l .  1962 No 642); Jam aica — (S I 1962 N o.643); 
N| itms (S .L  1961 No. 2018); M o n tse rra t- (S .L  1962 N o .641); St. H elena-—(S .L  1961 
V ,  .*ii|9 |. Saraw ak (S .l. 1961 N o .2050); Seychelles — (S .l 1962 No. 2608): Sierra Leone -
38/10/5
  ,»   - . j i ,j- i i j, ui fflif.i«... 1.. i. ,rT roi c tt < »T»i r
(S J . i i k t t  fo & ,l/V U ); B asu to land—  (.S./. I P6.5 No. 1719); G renada— (S .I I960 No N 
K enya  — (S .l. 196 5 No. 1712); .Saint L u c ia - f S . I .  1965 No 1721); lurks and C io . 
Is la nd s— (S .l. 1966 No. 83).
U nder the Act o f 1963, Orders have been made applying the Act to certain registers A
following countries, namely Denm ark^- (S I. 1969 No. I 44), Ita ly — (S .l. I960 No.MSi. rW
U nited States o f A m erica— (S .l. 1969 N o .146), the Republic of Ire land— {S I I'*4
N o .1059), the Netherlands—  (S. 1. 1970 N o .284), specified public registers of the FrrV'H
Republic o f  G erm any and Land Berlin (W est B erlin )— (S .l 1970 N o .819) Luxembouft 
(S .l. 1972 No. 116).
Evidence of consent of new trustee to act (0 .38, r.11)
38/11 I 1. A  d o c u m e n t  p u r p o r t i n g  to c o n ta in  the w r i t t e n  consen t  o f  a person k> 
ac t  as t rus tee  a n d  to h e a r  h is  s ig n a tu re  v e r i f ie d  b y  some o th e r  person slu l 
be e v id e n c e  o f  such  consent .
38/11/1 Effect of ru le— I bis rule was taken from the former 0 .3 8 , r .l9 A .
T h e  sealed consent o f the Public Trustee to act is accepted without verification nr jfM n t  of fitness.
In  the Court o f Protection, the practice is sim ilar to that provided by this rule
For forms, sec ( »h. M . P. F. 3 I , V o l.2, I ’t .2.
38/11/2 A ffidavit of fitness of new trustee— T his should show something as to the position A 
the proposed trustees in respect o f their pecuniary means (p n  K ay  J., Re Castle Stern's T i *  
[18881 *V .N . 179). In  Re Smith's I'n licv Trusts [1894] W .N . 68, K rk ew ich J .. held that an »*• 
davit stating that the proposed trustees were persons o f good credit was sufficient as m ile  
pecuniary means. One affidavit only is as a rule required (see Re Arden [ 1887) W .N. IWh
Evidence at trial may be used in subsequent proceedings (0.34
r. 12)
38/12 i'2. A n y  ev id e n ce  taken  at the t r ia l  o f  an y  cause o r  m a t te r  may lit m o l
in  a n y  s u b s e q u e n t  p ro c e e d in g s  in  th a t  cause o r  m a t te r .
38/12/1 Effect of ru le— I bis rule was taken from the form er ().3 7 , r.2.5. An undertaking dm «i 
affidavit shall not be. used at the hearing does not preclude its being used on an im|mrs « 
Cham bers ( jennersx. Morris  ( I8 6 2 ) If) \V  R 64(1).
Order to produce document at proceeding other than trial (0  38
r. 1 3 )
38 /13  13. A t  a n y  stage in  a cause o r  m a t t e r  ihc C o u r t  m a y  o rd e r  any person n
a t te n d  a n y  p ro c e e d in g s  in  the cause o r  m a t t e r  and  p ro d u c e  any  document 
to  be sp ec i f ied  o r  d e s c r ib e d  in  the  o rd e r ,  the  p ro d u c t io n  o f  w h ic h  a p pon  
to the  C o u r t  to be necessary  fo r  the  p u rp o s e  o f  th a t  p roceed ing .
(2)  N o  pe rson  sh a l l  lie  c o m p e l le d  by  an  o rd e r  u n d e r  p a rag raph  ( l i  >• 
p ro d u c e  a n y  d o c u m e n t  at a p ro c e e d in g  in a cause o r  m a t te r  w l t i ih  )*■ 
c o u ld  no t be c o m p e l le d  to  p ro d u c e  at the t r ia l  o f  th a t  cause o r  matter.
38/13/1 Effect of rule This rule was taken from the former 0 .3 7 , r.7
Th is  rule docs not enable an order to be made for the inspection ol documents in thr tun's
o f persons not parties (Strokes v. Remolds (1889) 22 Q .B .l) .  262) nor dors it confrr
additional right o f discovery against such persons: the object of the rule is to enahlr an
to be m ade at any stage o f a pri needing, but it can only be made for purposes of a pattKVar
proceeding ( Elder v. Carter ( 1890) 23 Q . B I ). I 94; 0  'Shea v. II nod [ 18 9 1 | P. 237, p.2Hti.. /  Ke
chnrd v. Macfarlane [ 1891 | 2 Q .B . 241; I ’enn-Texas Corp. v. M urat Anstalt [19f>4| I (J R V’
[1963] 1 A ll F..R. 258, G .A .; Penn-Texas Corp. v . M u ra l Anstalt (A'o. 2) [ 1964 | 2 Q  H M '
[ 1 9 6 4 ]  2  A ll E .R . 5 9 4 ,  C .A .; Central , \ ’eu'S  C o . v  Eastern Telegraph Co. ( 1 8 8 4 )  .3 3  I .  ) Q  B 2 V
Th e order has the effect o f a subpoena duces tecum Thr order c an br made e\ parte {Re
[1891] I Ch. 323; Z.umbech v. Riggs (19(H)) 48 W .R . 507). The party on whom thr mtVf •
made may on attending w ith the documents raise any legal objection to production (fir 3**>» (1891 )).
In  an action against a m arried woman, the solicitor to the trustees ol the srtilrtitrnt «»  
held bound tn produce it, as tbr defendant could not object to such production l /(*••, - 
Tanner ( 1885) 16 Q .B .l) . I ) .
In personal in jury actions, a different rule applies, see 0 .2 4 . r.7A
Copies O f e n tr ie s  In bankers ’ books Subject to the following rcquucm cm s, a vn\w t>\
•ft entry in a banker's book shall be received in all legal proceedings as pr'tnva lacie evidence 
d rxh entry (s 3): legal proceeding means any civil or crim inal proceeding or inquiry in 
•Wh evidence is or m ay be given anti includes an arb itration (s. 10) lVool is required 
«* that thr book was at the tim e of entry one ol the ordinary books ol the bank, in its t us- 
**6. and the entry made in I be ordinary course ol business. Th e  pi tail may be given orally m 
W iffidavit by a partner or nlliccr ol the bank; (h) that the copy is cor ret I I his pi no I may hr 
in the same m anner by the person who examined thr copy (ss 1. 5). Such person need 
mo he an nlliccr o f the bank; the proof m ay be given by anv person who lias examined the 
~yi with the orig inal entry ( R v. A11 but (191 I ) 75 [. P. I 12). I he bank need not prod tier the 
■esrn.tl Ixmks i f  ss.2-5 are complied w ith Evidence under the Act is prim a facie evidence 
•funti all the world (London and Westminster Rank v. Hutton ( 1907) 51 S .|. 466)
Inspection of books -W h e re  befnte the At t a party had a right to issue a subpoena duces 
lie can now obtain an order for inspection and leave to take copies ol entries (see s 7 
« f  ft- Marshfield (1886) 32 C h .IV  499)
Banking a c c o u n t o f p e rs o n  no t a p a rty  II it is proved to the satisi.n non ol the Court 
Ajt a hanking account, nom inally  that ol a person not a party, is really that ol a parts , or 
Swf thr parly is so closely connet ted w ith il that items in it would be evidence against him  at 
V  inal, then the ( ’.nun in its discretion may ortlei inspctlion brlotc tria l, but great t are 
t lie taken in exercising this jurisdiction, and the order ought not In be m ade without 
»">f to the person (.S Staffordshire Tiarnicnv i Co v Ehhsrnith \ I8 9 5 | 2 Q  II (i(>9. Ironmonger v 
N «  (1928) 44 1 .1., R. 579). “ W hen an account is I he at i mint o( a person who has not hmg to 
*• *ith  the litigation, thr ( '.ourt ought to look to thr r ile d  in prat lit e ol such an order on the 
*8*01 of third parlies, and to take care that this section is not made a means t>( oppression'
*e- Findley M R . .  I'allnck v Carle [ 18 9 8 1 I (111 (1898) p. 5 ). See I.A nn e  v. II ilsnn |19d7 | 2
I  I t  I  19 .
M \r  in exceptional cireiinislanees, the G ourl should not requite a loreigner who is not a 
to the aetion, and in particu lar a foreign bank, to produt r a subpoena and ortlei untlei 
tse Bankers’ Books Evident e At I 1879 t locum flits  outside the juristlit lion concerning bust - 
*rw 11 ^  tis.it'I eel outside it (M acK innon  V. Donaldson. I.u /k in  and Jenrettr Securities Carp | |9 8 b |  
fk  482. | I9 8 6 |  I A ll K .R . 653 (N ew  York B ank), following R v. Cmssman ( I 9 I I I )  73 
r r Vpp R. 302 (Is le  tif M a n  branch o f Barclays B an k)). Orders under the A rt concerned 
«-'S th* uments outside the jurisdiction are so unusual (hat they should ord inarily  be made 
«■ *v *  it r to the bank ( ib id ).
M v lle g e — W here the application is to inspect the books ol the banker ol a party to the 
letctnmi, the latter m ay silt t essltilly claim  protection lot such ol die entiles sought to be 
•tp t. od as wen i Id be pi ol cried  i f  ill the possession ol t he pai ly , provided he claims that pro- 
ui an affidavit o f discovers- in proper form and on adequate grounds ( II tilethnine \ 
n [19211 2 K .R . 7.69): thus thr order was refused as to entries which the parts1 swore 
woM trml to incrim inate him  h ind .) or were not relevant ( V Staffordshire Itntrninvs Co \ 
lU.mrih [ 189.31 2 Q .B . 669) and the a Ifid as it is emit lusise and ta n  not be io n l i adicted ( I 'm  ■ 
•£  \ Wood (1892 )). T h e  Act does not take away any ground o f privilege from, not dors ii 
rxv-nd the right to discovery against, a party, bill il gives a right to discos erv ol documents 
m possession ol ibe parts- ( Perry w  I ’linsplwr Rronge Co. (1895) 71 I. I 831)
Books to W hich A c t a p p lie s  —T h e  A d  applies to books in the custody oi control ol llir  
»» io v 'o  to tin- bank, bv whom  thr entries in the books svrrr origin.ills made (Asylum for
tg-rr S l/.rndyside ( 1906) 22 T . I . .R .  573 C A ).
S t»».k is “ used in the ord inary  business ol the bank’’ w iilun s 9 ol the A i I. though it mas 
tw in d.nls use, il it is kept by the bank, so that they may has-e it in case u is desired to
—*-f to it S.C.).
B in k e r s’ b o o k s  in c lu d e  a re c o rr l o l  a c u s to m e r 's  tra n s a c t io n s  a n d  d e ta ils  o l c h e q u e s  
•►••••■drd b y  a b a n k  f i l l  m ic r o f i lm ,  a n d  a c c o r d in g ly  s tu b  m ic r o f i lm  m a y  be used  In i d ie  p m - 
of p ro s in g  b a n k in g  t r a n  sac  t ions  in  le g a l p r o c e e d in g s  in  a t a m  d a m  c  w i i Ii l lie  A t t ( R a tk e t  
r *  i t  ran [ 198(1] ! W .L .R . 8 8 4 ;  [ I 9 8 0 ]  2 A l l  K.R 8 1 , I ) .C . ), b i l l  t lie  te r m  flo e s  n o t e x te n d  to  
••f-j-tr In te r s  c o n ta in e d  in  a b a n k  c o rre s p o n d e n c e  f ile  a n d  as s u ch  a re  n o t a d m is s ib le  u n d e r  
*»■ A< t (see R . v. Dad son ( 19 8 3 )  1 27  S. ]. 3 9 6 ; ( 19 8 3 )  7 7 ( ii A p p . R  2 9 1 . ( ’. A . ) I ’ a it l  c h e q u e s  
mmt (v ts in g -in  s lip s  r e ta in e d  b y  a b a n k  a l t e r  th e  c o n c lu s io n  o l th e  t ia n s . i t  l io n  to  w h ic h  llic s  
i«rt»»rtl arc n o t “ b a n k e r s ’ b o o k s ’ ’ s s ith in  th e  m e a n in g  o l th e  1 87 9  A c t as a m e n d e d  bs the  
•asking A c t 1979 (W illiam s  v. W illiams \ I 988] Q  U 1 6 1 ,0 .A ) .
Ib rrr  is ju risd iction to make an order in ease o f bankers in Scotland >>t N I relaiid ( Kissnm
.  | I8 9 6 ] I Q . l l .  574).
f^r^Ctlc® On a p p l le s t Io n  Th e  practice in C li. I ). is to apply at ( ’.h ambers and in Q  B I ) 
*• • \ f j \ t r r  on an affidavit o f facts (as to whether this is necessary in all eases, sec Arnott v. 
Hem- ( |HH7) 36 C ’.Ii. I ). 731, p. 736). The affidavit should state ( I ) the nature ol th r proceed- 
mo (2i nri essity lor the inspei tion and for the copies, showing that the entries o f which 
is^ r , 11..a is sought w ill be admissible in evidence at the trial o f the action (H ow ard  v. Real! 
■••"■i 21 Q .B .l) . 2) and (3) the period over which il is proposed that the inspection should
38/13/3
38/13/4
38/13/5
38/13/6
 --------------------------------------------- . . .  - , . . / --T7T-.; ; ) t . ,'rre r r rx s i Trr  w rrr  <Tr. m —r r . r  . n i i t  .i r .. > „ . .  , r . ,< .it s | / i « / • . . . . . t i l  p rm r] r
i
38/13/7 The order— I he o rde r shou ld , as lar as possible, be lim ited to the entries which rrn\ hr
wanted at the hearing, but should be sufficiently wide to enable the applicant to gel coptori \
the requisite entries (Am ott v. Hayes (IH 87) 36 C li . l ) .  7 3 I, p .738). Provided that the mine f
would have been admissible in evidence prior to the Act, an order may be made for imps j
lion and copies under s.7, although the accounts arc kept in the names of other prrvw 7
besides the parties to the action ( Howard  v. Beall ( I 889) 23 Q .B .l) . I ). And see S. r
Tramways Co. v. Ebbsmith ( 1893] 2 Q .B . 869. t
38 /13/8  Criminal proceedings— In  crim inal proceedings the order is made by the Judge ■
Cham bers, and drawn up at the C row n ( )I1 tee. ;
In  proceedings for crim inal libel, defendants, who proposed to plead justification or* J
refused an order for inspection o f the account of the person alleged to be libelled (R v Bern ;
(1913) 2 9 T . I . .K .  635).
Court-mart ia l— Orders have been made by the Judge in Chambers lor production J i
bankers' books before a court-m artia l
Statutory ‘direction’ ’—-A  direction by a stale olbeial made under a statutory authms *
requires proof pursuant to Docum entary I'.videnee Act 1868 (Tyrre ll v. Cule [ 1919] W.N 17
II.  W r i t s  o f  S u b p o e n a
Part I I  was added by R .S .C . (A m endm ent) 1969 (S .l. 1969 No. I 103).
Form and issue of writ of subpoena (0.38, r. 14)
38/14 14.— (1)  A  w r i t  o f  s u b p oe n a  m u s t  be in  F o rm  N o . ‘28, 29, or 3D m
A p p e n d ix  A ,  w h ic h e v e r  is a p p ro p r ia te .
(2)  Issue o f  a w r i t  o f  s u b p o e n a  takes p lace  u p o n  its be ing  sealed by in 
o f f ice r  o f  the o f f ice  o u t  o f  w h ic h  it is issued.
(3)  W h e re  a w r i t  o f  s u b p o e n a  is to  be issued i l l  a cause o r  m atte r  wlti(k 
is no t  p ro c e e d in g  in  a D i s t r i c t  R e g is t ry ,  the a p p ro p r ia te  off ice  for the im ix
o f  the w r i t  is the C e n t ra l  O f f ic e  o r ,  i f  the cause o r  m a t te r  has been in
d o w n  fo r  t r ia l  o u ts id e  the R o y a l  C o u r t s  o f  Justice, e i th e r  the Ccntri l 
O f f ic e  o r  the  re g is t r y  fo r  the  d is t r i c t  c o m p r is in g  the c i t y  o r  tow n  at whkfc 
the cause o r  m a t te r  has been set d o w n  fo r  t r ia l .
(4)  W h e re  a w r i t  o f  s u b p o e n a  is to  lie issued in  a cause o r  m at te r  whit f 
is p ro c e e d in g  in  a D is t r i c t  R e g is t ry ,  the a p p ro p r ia te  o f f ice  fo r  the issue-/ 
the w r i t  is—
( a )  the  re g is t ry ,  o r
( b ) i f  the  cause o r  m a t t e r  lias been set d o w n  for  t r ia l  at a cits <t 
to w n  no t  c o m p r is e d  in  the d is t r i c t  of th a t  reg is t ry ,  either (hit 
re g is t r y  o r  the  re g is t r y  fo r  the d is t r i c t  c o m p r is in g  that cii\  c* 
to w n ,  o r
(c ) i f  the  cause o r  m a t t e r  has been set d o w n  fo r  t r ia l  at the Ro\sl 
C o u r t s  o f  J u s t ic e ,  e i t h e r  the C e n t ra l  O f f ic e  o r  the registry » 
w h ic h  the cause o r  m a t t e r  is p ro ce e d in g .
(5)  Before  a w r i t  o f  s u b p o e n a  is issued a p ra e c ip e  fo r  the issue o f  the 
m u s t  be f i led  in  the  o f f ice  o u t  o f  w h ic h  the w r i t  is to issue; and  the pracctpr 
m u s t  c o n ta in  the  n a m e  a n d  address  o f  the  p a r t y  issu ing  the  w r i t ,  i f  he u 
a c t in g  in  pe rso n ,  o r  the n a m e  o r  f i r m  an d  business address  o f  tha t  party t 
s o l ic i t o r  a n d  a lso  ( i f  the s o l i c i t o r  is the  agent  o f  a n o th e r )  the name or firrr 
a n d  bus iness  a dd ress  o f  h is  p r i n c ip a l .
I b is  r u l r  w a s  a m e n d e d  b v  R S C .  /A m e n d m e n t  N o  .31 1971 6S I | 0 7 | |0 S 3 l
( 0 . 3 8 '  r .1 5) ______ _____
I ’). I he nam es  of tw o  o r  m o re  persons m a y  f ie  in c lu d e d  in  one w r i t  oV 
Htbpoena ad  t e s t i f i c a n d u m .
Amendment of writ of subpoena (0.38, r.16)
lh. W h e re  th e re  is a m is ta k e  in  a n y  p e rs o n ’ s n a m e  o r  address  in  a w r i t  38/16 
e/ u ihpnena ,  th e n ,  i f  the  w r i t  has n o t  been se rved , the p a r t y  b y  w h o m  the 
•  tit  was issued m a y  h ave  th e  w r i t  re-sea led in  co rre c t  fo rm  b y  f i l i n g  a 
t r tnnd  p ra e c ip e  u n d e r  ru le  14(3) in d o rs e d  w i t h  the w o rd s  “ A m e n d e d  a n d  
nr-sealcd.’ ’
Service of writ of subpoena (0 .38 , r.17)
I 7. A w r i t  o f . s u b p o e n a  m u s t  be served p e rs o n a l ly  a n d ,  su b je c t  to  ru le  38/17 
19. the se rv ice  s h a l l  n o t  be v a l id  un less e ffected w i t h i n  12 weeks a f te r  the 
date o f  issue o f  th e  w r i t  a n d  no t  less th a n  fo u r  d a ys  o r  su ch  o th e r  p e r io d  as 
the C o u r t  m a y  f ix ,  b e fo re  the d a y  on  w h ic h  a t te n d a n c e  be fo re  the  C o u r t  is
required.
Intended by R .S .C . (A m endm ent N o .2) 1980 (S .l 1980 N o .1010)
Duration of writ of subpoena (0.38, r. 18)
!R. S u b je c t  to  r u le  19, a w r i t  of s u b p o e n a  c o n t in u e s  to  have  effect u n t i l  38/18 
the co n c lu s io n  o f  the  t r i a l  a t w h ic h  the a t te n d a n c e  o f  the  w itness  is 
requ ired .
Writ of subpoena in aid of inferior Court or tribunal (0.38, r. 19)
19.— ( l )  T h e  o f f ice  o f  the  S u p re m e  C o u r t  o u t  o f  w h ic h  a w r i t  o f  su b -  38/19 
porn a ad te s t i f i c a n d u m  o r  a w r i t  o f  s u b p o e n a  duces te c u m  in  a id  o f  an 
in ferior C o u r t  o r  t r i b u n a l  m a y  be issued is the C r o w n  O f f ic e ,  and  no o rd e r  
of the C o u r t  fo r  the  issue o f  su ch  a w r i t  is necessary.
(2) A  w r i t  o f  s u b p o e n a  in  a id  o f  an  in fe r io r  C o u r t  o r  t r i b u n a l  c o n t in u e s  
m have (‘ f leet u n t i l  the  d is p o s a l  o f  th e  p ro c e e d in g s  before  th a t  C o u r t  o r  t r i ­
bunal at w h ic h  th e  a t te n d a n c e  o f  the  w i tn e s s  is r e q u i re d .
(1) A  w r i t  o f  s u b p o e n a  issued in  a id  o f  an in fe r io r  C o u r t  o r  t r i b u n a l
must he se rved  p e rs o n a l l y .
(4) U n less  a w r i t  o f  s u b p o e n a  issued in  a id  o f  an in fe r io r  C o u r t  o r  ti i- 
Imnal is d u l y  se rved  o n  th e  p e rso n  to  w h o m  it is d i re c te d  no t  less th a n  4 
»h\s. o r  such  o th e r  p e r io d  as the  C o u r t  m a y  f ix ,  be fore  the d a y  on w h ic h  
the a t te n d a n c e  o f  t h a t  p e rs o n  be fo re  the C o u r t  o r  t r i b u n a l  is r e q u i re d  by  
d i r  w r i t  th a t  p e rs o n  s h a l l  n o t  be l ia b le  to  a n y  p e n a l ty  o r  process lo r  f a i l in g  
to obey (be w r i t .
(5) A n  a p p l i c a t i o n  to  set as ide  a w r i t  o f  s u b p o e n a  issued in  a id  o f  an 
in fer io r  C o u r t  o r  t r i b u n a l  m a y  be h e a rd  b y  a M a s te r  o l  the  (Queen’s Benc h 
D o  is ion.
Scop« of rules 14—1 9 —Rules 11—18 replaced the form er ()  37. rr .26 -2 7 A  and 29 34A 38/14 19/1
•  uti * few m inor amendm ents, and r. 19 replaced die form er 0 .3 9 , r.43 (2 ) Th ey  constitute 
-»'<rtlirr with 0 .3 2 ,  r.7 ) a self-contained code relating to writs ol subpoena, and prescribe 
praetier as to form and issue, am endm ent, service and duration. I hey applv to both writs 
' i  «uh|M>rna ad leitificnndain. and subpoena dure\ leiuni I lies also provide the maelunerv lor 
mg the attendance o f witnesses to testify ot to produce dot uments at th r tria l of actions 
«» dir I I  igli d o u r I in I .ontliin or at a tria l centre outside I .ondon. and in aid ol inferior coin Is 
c-xt iiibunals For enforcing th r attendance o f witnesses in Chancery C.hambets, ser ( )  33. 
r 7
Forms Of wr i ts  of subpoena— These must lie in Form '28. '29 or .30 in A pp.A  (see Vol.2. 38/1 4-1 9/2 
Fs ?i whichever is appropriate, with such variations as the circumstances o f the particular  
r ,w  require ( 0 .1 ,  r.9 ). T h e  same forms are to be used w h rtlir i thr writ of subpoena is to
■Miprl the witness to testify or to produce documents or both.
' ■'..............  xJ ••'tiftrnndum  ni.iv include the names ol two or more persons, and a
-38/14-19/3
38/14-19/4
v<~/>.i/viro I f f  is /la v .iW r  fu r  r iK  iT n  inio's w  I iii.sc ~ri . i i in  is ' — . u.—
IK 'S  s o  i ; i r m u |  h r  g i v e n  .1 r r h r  l u n r  o f  is s u  e ,  i t  is  l l i r  p r a c  ( i«-«- i n  is s u e  t h e  s u b p o e n a  is i iS - *  
r e q u i r i n g ’  l l i r i r  in se rtio n , s* i f /1 .1 n n l r  111 d i e  m a r g i n  o f  1 Ik -  w i l l  l i m i t i n g  l l i r  n u m b e r  i4  w»
nesses according In (lie Ice on th c p i net 1 fir  W hen names have been inserted no other tu'se- 
van be substituted (R r Taylor (1912) A VC. '147).
S u b p o e n a  d u ce s  te c u m --  I here is no provision authorising thr inelnsinn of rnutr th»« 
one person in a w rit o f subpoena (Inert tecum A separate w rit of subpoena is therefore rr«|tir»«^  
for each witness whose attendance to produce documents is being enforced.
A subpoena rlucet trrum  need not. before it is actually issued, specify 1 lie document* m V 
1 :: it is sufficient if they are inserted afterwards with reasonable distinctivencss l.W  1
/. R. C. [ 1 1 ) 6 3 )  1 W .L .R . 112; | I9 6 3 |  I A ll K.R. 68n.). But if  a witness, served with j  i - A  
poena in a general form, admits that lie has in his possession the documents thereby rrfrrrW 
to, he must produce them ( l . r t  v. Angus ( IHf>b) L  R. 2 Kf|. 5!); and see Re Emma Silver .Wrrrtf 
Co. (1H7.“i ) I. R. 10 ( il l. 194, where the company was ordered on motion to produce us !«'*« 
on the cross-examination o f its secretary on his affidavit).
It should be observed that the prescribed form of a subpoena duces Ircum appein * 
embody a subpoena ad testificandum as well and therefore if  it is desired for any proper |>urf»w 
to lim it the subpoena simplv to compel the production ol specified documents, that pirr »V 
(lie prescribed form which rcipiires the person served to attend tin1 trial and testify should tw 
deleted.
A lthough films and tape recordings may be "docum ents" so far as discovery is comernr* 
a subpoena duct 1 trrum is in itsell the apt instrument lor compelling their production 11 tV» 
trial. The  Court has an inherent jurisdiction to make orders lor the production and plasir>< -t 
tape recordings and lor the production and showing of cinematograph films, and (lie (A c  
may make an order requiring the witness to provide not only tape recordings and libni hi' 
also the apparatus to operate them, and may further order them to be played over nr ih./w» 
at such place as m ay be most convenient. Th e  application for such an order must, h«n*es*» 
be made on notice to the witness who may object thcrrto , and thr Court has jurisditiHW *• 
refuse to make an order if it thinks it would be oppressive, unreasonable or olhrrwne m  
proper to be ordered and the costs are in the discretion o f the C ourt (Senior v Holduvonh. n 1 
Independent Television News l.td. [ I9 7 6 | ( )  II. 23; ( I97.r)| 2 A ll K R. 1009, C .A .)
W here there is disobedience to a subpoena durei tecum, the ( '.nun has jurisdit linn to rnf 
obedience by i nm m itta l, even though (lie disobedience is not wilful ( R. v. Dave ( I908| 1 k k 
333). But a secretary of a com pany cannot be com muted lor disobedience to a suh|xwnj *• 
produce its books when the books have been taken out of his possession by resolution ef rW 
directors (R  v. Stuart (18116) 2 I I..R . 214); but sec Re Emma .Silver M ining C.o.\ as to director* 
sec Re M a n tle  Hose [ 1939) C h 32.
As to the right o f a servant to refuse to produce documents without the authorisation of b» 
master, see Eerie 1 &  Co. v. I.o u n r illr  and Aimhville Ry. [ 19 12 1 I K .ll  I3T>, C .A .
The fact that a banker has received a document upon the terms that it shall not fi 
delivered up, except w ith the consent of the depositors, is no answer to a subpoena duiet ur*m 
requiring the banker to produce the document (R  v Dave [ I90H| 2 k  II. 333).
A pplication for subpoena duett trrum  10 ollieeis ol .1 bank lor production of 1 lie it )»«*• 
refused, as being a m atter to be left for determ ination of the judge at the t rial ( Pat nr II v It 
| 1892) IM 3 7 ). For practice under the Bankers’ Books Kvidence Act. see paras. 38/13/2 el ret
A partner o f a defendant is, under a subpoena duret tecum, compellable in produce Im n y  
of a partnership deed, copies o f which hav e to be signed and retained bv each partner I ) r-o- 
v. Samuel f 1913) 3 K .B . 706).
As to production o f documents kept by tbr Registrar of Companies, see the C.nm|op<n 
Act.
Flic issue of tbc w rit where it is sought to examine medical records of a party or of 1 »» 
ness was serious m atter and not a step to be taken lightly. Inquiries should first hr taken *  
ascertain whether the required evidence rnuld lie made available by other means Whctr rv 
documents were protected by privilege the consent o f the person concerned should fun l» 
sought. It is wrong on receipt of the writ to send the documents to the solicitors who imW  
the w rit. The writ compels the person to whom it is addressed to attend the court If hr • 
unable to do so, the guidance of t he court should be sought. Re SI. (/I minor) ( Hardship-MiE • 
Evidence) (1987) 2 F .L .R . 412.
Is s u e  of w rit of s u b p o e n a — Before a subpoena may be issued, a praecipe dulv cnmplrov 
must first be liled in the office from which it is to issue.
A ny party may issue a subpoena for the exam ination of witnesses or for thr prodm n<w> -t 
documents by him , at any stage, without thr leave o f the C ourt, i.e. subpoenas issue 11 W 
course w ithout order, for attendance for tria l before a Judge or Official Referee or Master •• 
whom an action or question is referred by order (0 .3 6 , rr. if and I I )  including assessment 4 
damage_s_(0.37, r r . l  and 4).
O n  tbc 1 it her band, sub|x>cnas may not issue to compel the attendance ol a witness (nr A* 
purpose o f proceedings in Cham bers, except w ith Iravr; in the case o f proceedings liefr" » 
Judge, or M aster or Registrar, by a note from the Judge, M aster or Registrar, as thr 
m av be (see 0 .3 2 ,  r.7).
• ' i t  r ..1........................: ... •: , .................... ............................ i s  1 1. , . . .
• t the Central Office._____________________________________________________________________
In  c o m m it ta l p r o c e e d in g s  fo r c o n te m p t  o f  t a u n t ,  w h ic h  p a r ia V r  ot .1 --------------- ---------------- -----
S irjfter, the C ourt has pow rr to issue a subpoena of its own motion ( Ytnnni v Yimou \ \9 6 6 )
I W I. R. 120; (1966) 1 A ll If. R 231)
Arbitration— For attendance before an arb itrator or um pire on a reference by submission 38 /14—19/5  
of Court, subpoena issues as o f course w ithout order (A rb itration  Act 1950, s .12, V o l.2, 
h  IR|.
For attendance before an O ffic ial or Special Referee or M aster, to whom a question has 
‘**-n referred by order for inqu iry  or report, or the action referred for tria l, under 0 .3 6 , sub- 
t»»ni issues w ithout order.
Application o f  A rb itra t io n  A c t to  p r io r  e n a c tm e n ts  as  to a rb itra tio n  S.3 1 ( I ) of A rh  A< t 
l*Vt, applies to all prior or subsequent enactments as to arb itration.
1 he ap|X)intment o f an arb itrato r under the Lands ( '.finises Consolidation At t 1845. is by 
• IR of that Act “ deemed a submission to arb itration ."  Subpoena therefore issues as ol 
"■mr I f  under s.68 o f the Act a party elected to have the compensation assessed by a jury, 
the sherifl declined to summon the witnesses, subpoena issued as ol course 
\p|Miin(mcnt o f an arb itrato r under the Local Governm ent Act 1972, is deemed to be a 
pihnmsion, and subpoena issues as ol course
Acquisition o f  L a n d  A c t  1982: L a w  o f P ro p e r ly  A c t  1925. s 84  By m dei ol I . e . )   I
M K writs o f subpoena for attendance before an official arb itrator under above At ts issued 
m of course anti in addition to the official title ol proceedings should bear the heading "and  
I" the M atter o f tb r A rb itra tio n  Act 1950."
C hannel Is la n d s  a n d  Is le  o f  M a ry  -The S C .A . 1981, s.36 docs not apply as they are not 3 8 /1 4 —1 9 /6  
fu rt of thr U .K . See In terpre tation  Act I97H, Schrd. I; Re Itroun  (1864) 33 L.J Q .B  193. 
fWriiix v. Earmer (1851) 6 F.xcli. Rep. 242. Process in a civil or commercial m aile r can now  
W irrvrd ill the C hannel Islands, see Practice Note (Channel Islands) (1961 ) |(),5 S .). 288
I hr Sum m ary Jurisdic.tinn ( Process) A rt 188 I was applied to the Isle o f M a n  by the Sum- 
\ Jurisdiction Process (Is le of M a n ) O rder, 1928 (S R & ( )  1928, No 377) It follows 
-hwielurr that a C row n Office subpoena in a crim inal m atter runs to the Isle ol M an
C om panies A c t  1 9 8 5  -  A witness summoned under s 5 6 1 must be seiveil with a summons 
mu with a subpoena (Re II  estrrwreland Co. ( I 892) 66 I. I 52). O rd er should not norm ally  
*w> made on a director to produce documents held by the company I Re M a rr llr  Hose | |93M|
H N 281 )
Nu process liu com pelling production of anv document kept by the Registrar may issue 
without leave of th r C ourt (s .7 10 (1 )). .* , ' ation is made ex parte to M aster in O ld ) ,  and
U  H I) A Chancery M aster usually requires to see an opinion ol counsel in support.
C om ptro lle r o f  p a te n ts  - Subpoena issues from thr ( '.enlr.il ( )ITu r as ol i nurse, to i nmpel 38 /1  4—1 9 /7  
Vw attendance ol witnesses before the com ptroller of patents, who. in (bis respect, is in the 
w w  |M>siiion as an O ffic ia l Referee.
C onduct m o n e y — As to lender o f conduct money, see N ( '. A 1981, s 36(4). I his is a con- 
6-vin pre-requisite lo proceedings against a person who defaults in complying with a sub-
f.
E x am in er  T h e  attendance of an alfidavit witness lor i loss-examin.ition mav (when mu e 
■•nlri lot cross-ex,nninalion lias been obtained) be compelled by subpoena under ibis 
•ufi w nli,Mil order.
1 nlrss a subpoena is issued, the attendance of a witness before an examinei cannot be 
■ •oqwllrd on m illion  (Stuart v. Ila lk is  Co. (1881) 32 W .R . (i7b| and as a m atter ol practice a 
u lp io i . i  before an exam iner, directed to the witness to lie exam ined, issues as of course 
without order under this rule.
k*+dical A c t  1 9 5 6 --  P urs nan I to Schedule 1, para.5( I ) w rits of subpoena are issued out of 
■Vw ( >ntra l ( )llicc.
S ubpoenas  may lie issued for attendance before Disciplinary C om m ittee under the I ’m- 
W os .us Supplem entary to M edicine Act 1960 (see 2nd St lied.. Part I I .  para .2, ol that A r t )
Nurses (A m e n d m e n t)  A c t 1961- Subpoenas may be issued under s.9.
Solic ito rs  A c t 1974— a p p lic a t io n s  u n d e r -  See rules printed m 119 3 2 1 W .N . p .3.33 3 8 /1 4 -1 9 /8
\ln« | For the purpose ol an application before the Coinm itlee ol l l ir  Incorporated Law  
*•« o i\  io strike I be name ol a solicitor oil the Roll ol Si ilicitoi s oi to ret pm e a solu itoi to 
trsiwri allegations contained in an alfidavit, writs of subpoena ad testiju andum and duces tecum 
—>*i. pm siia nt lo s. 46( I I ) o f the 1974 A ct, be issued out ol the Cent ral Office. Forms o f sub- 
App to rules printed (1932) W .N . p 333 (M is c .) and | I9 3 9 |  W  N 123 (M is c .) An 
* fir Ini substituted service by registered post of die subpoena mav be obtained in Chambers  
V ,  Yol 2, P i.11.
w-tnpss m Eire T h e  H ig h  C o u r t  has n o  p o w e r  to  issue a s u b p o e n a
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A ct Ifl.'i-f, the S cottish  C ou rt issues a warrant o f citation and under s.67 of the jutltrittr’ 
(N o rth e rn  Ire la n d )  Act 1978, the Court o f N orthern Ireland issues a subpoena These p— 
cesses arc served (by serving a copy and producing the orig inal) on the witness in Knell'd 
For procedure where the witness disobeys warrant or subpoena, see s.3 of the Act.
Witness in Scotland or N. Ireland required in England— Sec S .C .A  1981, s.36, as to m *  
o f subpoena by leave where witness is in Scotland or N . Ire land T his section apphn <r 
attendance before an O .R . or arb itrator on reference under an order.
Application in Chancery and Q .B . ex parte in Chambers without summons (in practice tn  
M aster except in commercial cases); on affidavit stating reasons order indorsed on afhdnw
In  Fam .D . ex parte to Registrar on affidavit. Th e  order is not drawn up.
Service of subpoena— Personal sendee is necessary, though substituted service mn f* 
ordered. W here a witness persistently refused admission to her house for the purpose c>lie 
vice, the Judge ordered substituted service by post (Dyson v. Forster (1908) (unrep.), Jelf J te 
Chambers, February 7, 1908).
As regards the time of sender, particular attention must be paid to the amendment of r 11 
which clearly requires that the subpoena .must be served, not only w ithin  I 2 weeks of its t»r» 
but also, not less than four days or such other period as the Court may fix before the div r* 
which attendance before the Court is required.
D uration of subpoena— Th e subpoena continues to have efTcct until the conclusion r! 
the trial at which the attendance o f the witness was required. Where the trial is abortive t ( 
where the ju ry  disagrees, semble fresh subpoenas would have to be issued; but not ir«*>* 
where the tria l is adjourned.
Subpoenas In aid of Inferior Court or tribunal— Such subpoenas arc issued out of tW 
C row n Office, as o f course, no order is necessary ( r. 19 and sec Soul v. Inland Revenue 0 »  
missioners [1963] 1 W .L .R . 112; (19631 1 A ll E .R . 68n , C .A  ).
A subpoena can generally be issued out of the Crown Office to aid an inferior tribunal » 
the following circumstances, namely where the inferior tribunal ( I )  is recognised by law, I f  
is acting jud ic ia lly  or quasi-judicially; (3) is acting upon evidence, although that evidrnrr 
need not be on oath, and (4) has insufficient power o f its own to compel the attendants </ 
witnesses or the production o f documents; Currie v. The Chief Constable o f Surrey (1987] I 
W .L .R . 215; (1982) I A ll E .R  89 (subpoenas issued to compel witnesses other than pobrr 
officers, to attend and give evidence at a police disciplinary hearing conducted under tW 
Police (D iscipline) Regulations 1977).
Para. (2) of r . 19 states the duration of the w rit of subpoena issued m aid of an infrr« 
Court or tribunal in much the same way as in the case o f a tria l (r. 18).
Para. (4) of r . 19 is designed to m itigate tbc inconvenience that may be caused by the %rr 
vice of a Crown Office subpoena so near the date on which the witness is required to ittn A  
as to preclude an application being made to set it aside.
Para. (5 ) o f r. 19 changes the practice as to setting aside a Crown Office subpoena issued » 
aid of an inferior Court or tribunal by conferring this jurisdiction on a Master of the Q B B 
An application to set aside any other subpoena issued out of the Crown Office must still Vw 
made to a D ivisional C ourt. I t  is made by two clear days’ notice of motion.
Setting aside subp oen as— Applications to set aside subpoenas in the Central OfTicre* 
a D istrict Registry are made to the Q .B . Masters or District Registrars (see R. v. huettwi 
Review [1928] 2 K .B . 644; Macbryan v. Brooke (1946) 2 A ll E .R . 688, C .A .). In  the Chanom 
Division, they arc also made by summons to the Master.
As to setting aside C row n Office subpoenas, see previous note.
The  power of the M aster to set aside a subpoena does not extend to a witness summo» 
issued under s.97 of the M agistrates’ C ourt Act 1980 (previously s.77 o f the 1952 Act), W  
application to set aside such a witness summons is made to the Court out of which stimrrv** 
was issued or to the Divisional Court of the Q .B .D . (see C rim ina l Procedure (Attendance*/ 
Witnesses) Act 1965, s.2, and R. v. Hove Justices, ex p. Donne (1967) 2 A ll E.R . I253n).
The  more convenient course is to apply to the D ivisional Court o f the Q .B .D ., which kr» 
an inherent jurisd iction to set aside a witness summons served under s.97 of the Magistrates 
Courts Act 1980 (previously s.77 o f the 1952 A c t) if there has been an abuse of the proem */ 
thr Court or i f i t  is clear in fact that the witness cannot give relevant evidence (R. v. D u n  J/ 
ex p. Secretary o f State fo r  Home Department ( I9 7 2 | 1 Q .B . 232; f 1971 ) 2 All E.R . I 126).
On all applications to set aside subpoenas, the Court is concerned to sec that the parties At 
not abuse their privilege o f summoning witnesses (Raymond v. Tapson (1882) 22 Ch I) I**, 
p.435, C .A .) . A witness served w ith a subpoena cannot have it set aside merely by swrartr  ^
that lie can give no m aterial evidence; but if the Court is satisfied that the writ of subpoena a* 
testijiteindum has not been issued bona fide lor the purpose o f obtaining relevant evidrnrr i nt 
that the witness named in it is in fact unable to give relevant evidence, il will set it ii»V 
Such an order w ill not prejudice the power o f the Judge at the trial to ortlcr the witnn* w 
attend if lie thinks his presence is necessary (R. v. Raines (1909) I K .B . 258). The Court * 
also set aside a subpoena in a ease where a statute excludes thr power to issue it (R  v l i f e
Ii I'Ha tes U» dc>«_ liTi tt1 Ills 'Tt  I - III I II I   __
l l * H l  W .N . 195; R 1 .1 ..R. 84 ~ ------------ --------
I hr Court w ill also set aside a subpoena ad testificandum which is oppressive by forcing a 
party to reveal in form ation, e.g. as to the extent o f his assets and his testamentary intentions, 
w proceedings in which lie is not a party and his privacy ought not to be invaded in that way 
1 v. Morgan ( I 9 7 7 1 la m . 122; [1977] 2 A ll K .R . 515)
A nibporna duces tecum or an application in the nature o f such a subpoena, such as an order 
*■> produce a film  and to show it may be set aside or refused where it appears that the request 
« irrelevant, fishing, speculative or oppressive (see Senior v. Holdsivorlh, ex p Independent Iele- 
AVtfj Ltd. [1976] Q .B . 23; (1975] 2 A ll F. R. 1009, C .A  ).
Foreign subpoena — W here a foreign C ourt issued a subpoena ordering thr disclosure o f 38/1 4—1 9/1 2 
Axunirnts by tbr London branch ol an Am erican bank which concerned clients of thr bank 
*»it which would be in breach o f the bank’s duty o f confidentiality, the English C ourt has 
p-»rr to restrain the disclosure o f such documents by the English branch (Re a Bank, The 
f -w i, February 4, 1983)
I I I .  H e a r s a y  E v i d e n c e
Interpretation and application (0 .38, r.20)
20.— (1) I n  t l i i s  P a r t  o f  th is  O r d e r  “ ( lie A c t ’ ’ m eans  the C i v i l  E v id e n c e  38/20 
Act 1968 and  a n y  exp re ss io n s  used in  th is  P a r t  o f  th is  O r d e r  a n d  in  P a r t  1 
of the A c t  have  the  sa m e  m e a n in g s  in  th is  P a r t  o f  th is  O r d e r  as th e y  have 
tn the said Pa r t  1 .
(2) T h is  P a r t  o f  th is  O r d e r  s ha l l  a p p ly  in  r e la t io n  to the  t r ia l  o r  h e a r in g  
of an issue o r  q u e s t io n  a r i s in g  in  a cause o r  m a t t e r  and  to a reference, 
inqu iry  and  assessment o f  d a m a g e s ,  as it a p p l ie s  in  r e la t io n  to  (he t r ia l  o r  
hearing o f  a cause o r  m a t te r .
Added by R .S .C . (A m endm ent) 1969 (S I.  1969 No I 105).
Scope and operation of Part III— Pan 111 contains the rules which wcic authorised, and 38/20/1 
«  wMtir eases required, to be made by s 8 of the C iv il Evidence Act 1968 (hereinafter referred 
to as "the A ct” ). T hese rules provide the machinery for adducing hearsay evidence at the 
m a l  nr hearing o f civil proceedings in the High C ourt. T hey should be read together with 
Part I of the A rt (see V oi .2, P t. I 8) which provides for thr adm issibility o f hearsay evidence in 
re s it  proceedings. Part I o f the Act has been brought into force (or the Supreme ( ’.ourl (except 
l»  bankruptcy proceedings) as from October I,  1969 (S T . 1969 No. I 104) from which date 
m I »nd 2 and part o f s. 6 o f the Evidence Act 1938 were repealed; see s. 20 of tbr A ct.
I h r  < lasses o f hearsay evidence which arc dealt with by Part I I I  of this O rd rr  include.
(1) Section 2 statements, i.e. statements made out of court, whether orallv or iir writing  
and whether the person m aking such a statement is or is not called as a witness (sec 
rr.2 I and 22);
(2) Section 4 statements, i.e. statements contained in records (see r r .2 1 and 23);
( 31 Section 5 statements, i.e. statements produced by computer (see rr.2 I and 24);
( t ) Statements in provisions legal proceedings (see rr 2 I and 28),
(5) Statements affecting the credib ility  of a maker of out o f court statement (see rr 21 
and 30 and s.7 o f the A ct);
(6) Inconsistent statements made by person not called as a w itness (see r r .2 I and 31,
and s.3 of the A ct).
Pan I I I  of this O rd e r docs not apply to the classes o f hearsay evidence admissible under 
• * tJ the A rt, see V o l.2, P t. I 8.
In broad outline, the machinery provided by these rules for adducing hearsay evidence 
'p r r jtrs  in a two-stage process by thr service ol the requisite notice and counter-notit r by 
tree tvartv on the other.
1 be lirst stage is for the party who desires to adduce hearsay evidence at the trial to serve 
■Ve rr.piisur notice of bis intention to do so on every other party (see r 21 ) and such notice 
~-ju  toinaio thr necessary particulars according to what is the particular c lass of hearsay 
esvlerwr to which it relates (see r.22 (s.2 statements); r.23 (s. l statements); r 24 (s.5 stale- 
•»rnti|. r.2B (statements in previous legal proceedings); r.3 l (inconsistent statements)) It is 
t » the party who seeks to adduce evidence at the trial to take I he in itia l step ol serving the 
r'-yiiMtr notice upon all the other parlies. I f  he complies with this obligat ion, l i e  will ( u n l e s s  
t . .-untrr • notice is served on h im ) be in a position to adduce such hearsay evidence at the 
■f'»l tf and in so far as it is admissible under the Act. I f  he defaults in complying with this 
• ration. or if  a counter-notice is duly served, he will not be entitled to adduce such hearsay
cviclcncc at tbc tr ia l,  subject, however, to the overriding discretion o f the Court to admit 
evidence (see r.29) or to his being able to show that the maker o f the statement is un»s*
able.
The second stage is for any party served with a notice under r .2 I , if  he so wishes, to sent t 
counter-notice requiring a person mentioned in thr notice to be called as a witness at the tnW 
(see r.2f>( 1)). I f  the notice under r.2 I stales that that person cannot or should not be called » 
a witness and this is disputed, the counter-notice must contain a statement to that elTect i»» 
r.2 6 (2 )). W here a question arises as to the reasons stated under a r.2 I notice for not ralhn* » 
person as a witness, the Court may on the application of any party, determine that questr» 
before the trial or give directions as to its determ ination e g. as a prelim inary issue (srr r 2b 
by the service o f such a counter-notice, a party can, subject to the person named in the tv**-* 
being unavailable and subject to the overriding discretion of the Court under r.29, m w *  
either that the named person who might otherwise not attend the trial at all should be c j I W  
as a witness or otherwise that the statements to which the notice under r.2 I relates will rx< W 
adm itted in evidence at the trial (see r.2 fi(4 )). O n  the other hand, if the service of twit 
counter-notice is unreasonable, the party may sulfer a penalty in costs (see r.32).
I be procedure for the service of a counter-notice does not apply with respect to statrmerm 
made in previous legal proceedings (sec r .'26(3)) but in relation to such statements the 
lies may apply to the Court for directions (see r.28). O n  the other hand, if a party drum m 
adduce evidence as to the credibility o f a person whose statements arc sought lo be addurW 
under s.2 or s.4 o f the Act and who is available to be called, he must either serve a rnunv' 
notice requiring that person to be called as a witness or, if the statements were made in 
vious legal proceedings, apply by summons to the M aster nr Registrar for a direction that W 
will be so called (see r.30). In  A dm iralty  actions, special provisions in this regard apply, • •
0 .7 5 , r.25.
3 8 /2 0 /2  f I'c m achinery ol Part 1 11 o f this O rder is designed to achieve two main objectives 1*1 thx 
all questions concerning the giving o f hearsay evidence at thr trial should, so far as pr»c* 
cable be dealt with and disposed of before the trial, so that the trial itself should prt<m4 
smoothly without unnecessary objections relating lo such hearsay evidence, and (k) that » 
relation to any hearsay evidence which any party desires to adduce, there should be no nr 
prises at (he trial.
It should be emphasised that these rules tlo not make any statement of fact admiwASr 
which is otherwise not admissible. They  are merely procedural in their operation and d« ir» 
allect the substantive law I lie test ol whether any hearsay statement is admissible r\xlrr«-» 
is governed by Part I of the Act. Indeed, r.29 confers express power on the Court, ifit ihtr*i 
it just to do so, to allow statements falling within ss.2, 4 or 5 of the Act to be given in rMdrrvt 
at the trial, even though there has been a non-compliance with the procedural rrquitemem 
on the part of the adducing party by failing either to serve a r.2 I Notice or to call a wurv-w 
required to be called by a counter-notice under r.26. ( )n the other hand, where the adduce* 
party has complied with the procedural requirements of these rules relating to slatrnver* 
falling w ithin ss.2, 4 and 5 of the Act, and cither there is no counter-notice or it can be ibr—s 
that the m aker is unavailable, it would appear that the Court has no discretion to rxdwV 
such a statement (sec s.8 (3 )(o) o f the Act). Nevertheless, mere compliance with the 
does not by itself tnake the statements evidence at the trial; the adducing parly must in Uo 
put in evidence the statement or such of the statements as arc contained in the r.21 Notxr m 
he desires to put, and they will then form part o f his evidence at the trial.
These rules do not apply to evidence by affidavit, which is governed by r.2 (see r 21'* 
nor do they alTecl the operation o f 0 .4  1, r.5, as to the contents o f affidavits (see r.21 (4)) rr» 
do they detract from the powers of the Court under r.3, to order the manner in whirh r>» 
dence of particular facts may be given at the trial (sec r.21 (4 )).
It) A dm iralty  actions, certain special provisions apply; see 0 .7 5 , r r .2 5 ( l), 31(3), 32 
38.
M oreover, these rules do not apply to any interlocutory proceedings but only to thr itx<-> 
of "d ie  trial or hearing of the cause or m atter,” i.e. at the stage w hen the cause or mattrt • 
being finally disposed of by the evidence of a witness given orally anti in open court (srr r I 
I hey apply, however, to a reference, inquiry and assessment of damages as they apply ir • 
trial (sec para. (2 )).
For forms, sec Kditorial Forms, F.F I 13, V o l.2. F’t.2, paras.601 el teq.
Notice of intention to give certain statements in evidence (0 38 
r .21)
38/21 ‘21.— (1) S u b je c t  to the p ro v is io n s  o f  th is  ru le ,  a p a r t y  to a cause t*
m a t t e r  w h o  des ires  to g ive  in  ev idence  a t the t r ia l  o r  h e a r in g  o f  th r  cauv 
o r  m a t t e r  a n y  s ta te m e n t  w h ic h  is a d m is s ib le  in  ev idence  by v ir tue  of vr- 
l i o n  2, 4 o r  5 o f  the A c t  m u s t—
( a )  in the  ease o l a cause o r  m a t t e r  w h ic h  is re q u i re d  to be set tl.n.*
a f te r  i t  is set d o w n  o r  so a d jo u rn e d ,  or w i t h i n  such o th e r  p e r io d  
as the  C o u r t  m a y  spec i fy ,  and
(b ) in  th e  case o f  a n y  o th e r  cause o r  m a t te r ,  w i t h in  21 days  a f te r  the 
d a te  o n  w h ic h  an a p p o in tm e n t  fo r  the f i rs t  h e a r in g  o f  the cause 
o r  m a t t e r  is o b ta in e d ,  o r  w i t h in  such  o th e r  p e r io d  as the C o u r t  
m a y  sp ec i fy ,
•xtst on eve ry  o th e r  p a r t y  to the cause o r  m a t t e r  no t ice  o f  his des ire  to do  
r*. and the n o t ic e  m u s t  c o m p ly  w i t h  the p ro v is io n s  o f  ru le  22, 23 o r  24, as 
Ae c ircum s tances  o f  the case req u ire .
(2) P a ra g ra p h  (1)  sh a l l  n o t  a p p ly  in  r e la t io n  to  any  s ta te m e n t  w h ic h  is 
•dmissiblc as e v id e n c e  o f  a n y  fact s ta ted  th e re in  by  v i r t u e  no t o n ly  o f  the 
vax] sect ion 2, 4  o r  5 b u t  by  v i r t u e  a lso o f  a n y  o th e r  s t a tu to r y  p ro v is io n  
»uhii t  the m e a n in g  o f  sec t ion  1 o f  the A c t .
(3) P a ra g ra p h  ( I )  s h a l l  n o t  a p p ly  in  r e la t io n  to  a n y  s ta te m e n t  w h ic h  
tmv pa rty  to  a p r o b a te  a c t io n  desires to  g ive  in  e v idence  at the t r ia l  o f  tha t  
x tto n  and w h ic h  is a l leged to have  been m ad e  by tbc  deceased person  
whose estate is the  su b je c t  o f  the a c t io n .
(4) W h e re  by  v i r t u e  o f  a n y  p ro v is io n  o f  these ru les o r  o f  a n y  o rd e r  o r  
/ r r c t i o n  o f  the C o u r t  the  e v idence  in  any  p ro ce e d in g s  is to be g iven  by 
E l a v i l  then ,  w i t h o u t  p re ju d ic e  to p a ra g ra p h  (2 ) ,  p a ra g ra p h  (1) sha l l  not 
*pplv in re la t io n  to  a n y  s ta te m e n t  w h ic h  a ny  p a r t y  to the p roce e d in g s  
-V-tirrs to  have  in c lu d e d  in  a n y  a f f id a v i t  to be used on  his  b e h a l f  in  the 
r r r v r f d in g s ,  b u t  n o t h i n g  in  th is  p a ra g ra p h  sha l l  a ffect the o p e ra t io n  of 
tV d r r  41, ru le  5, o r  the  p o w e rs  o f  the  C o u r t  u n d e r  O r d e r  38, ru le  3.
(5) O r d e r  65, ru le  9, s h a l l  no t  a p p ly  to  a n o t ice  u n d e r  th is  ru le  b u t  the 
(Vmrt m ay  d i r e c t  t h a t  the  no t ice  need no t be served on a ny  p a r l y  w h o  at 
fhe t ime w h e n  se rv ice  is to  be effected is in  d e fa u l t  as to  a c k n o w le d g m e n t  
•/ service o r  w h o  has no  a dd ress  fo r  serv ice.
Amended by R.S.C.. (W r it  and Appearance) 1979 (S .l. 1979 N o .I 716).
A pplication o f r u le - -T h is  rule makes il obligatory on the party who desires to adduce 
W.rxas statements admissible under ss.2, 4 or 5 of the A rt to serve notice of his intention to 
t .  »i ..n r \r r y  other party. Failure to comply with this requirement may cause serious preju- 
*« <• t<. another party, who w ill be unable to serve the requisite counter-notice under r.26.
m i\ ,  subject to the discretion of thr Court under r.29, preclude thr party from giving in 
e.mtrn. r at the trial a statement which would othcrwisr hr admissible under ss.2. 4 or 5 of 
St t Com pliance w ith this rule is therefore of cardinal importance to thr parly who 
to rr!v on hearsay statements admissible under ss.2, 4 or 5 of thr Act.
Ih n  rule applies to statements that fall w ithin ss 2, 4 or 5 of the Act, and also to mconsis- 
»■*« statements intended to be given in evidence made by a person mentioned in a r 21 
W r  who is not to be called as a witness at the trial (see r.3 I (2 )).
fh n  rule applies to hearsay evidence contained in a document exhibited to an alhdavit, 
m r  tiitem rn ts  contained in an exhibit are not deemed to be included in the alTidavil for all 
and therefore the exemption Irom service of a notice tinder this rule conferred by 
r» 'i(ra p h  (4) in relation to evidence “ or lo be given by affidavit” does not extend to docu- 
•w-im exhibited to an affidavit ( Re Kotcot Interplanetary ( l i . K .) L td  [ 1972 ] 3 All I. R 829) 
Where one parly  gives notice in accordance with this rule that hr intends to rely upon 
V » r \iv  evidence and the other party intends to rely upon that evidence, the other party  
at. old also give notice under this rule. In  l.etraiet l  td. v. Dymn Ltd. (1976] R I ’.C • 63, p 68 
w i . v i\ r \  itlrn re  given by the p la in tiff at a previous trial was not admitted upon the drlentl- 
< application, even though the p la in tiff had given notice under this rule of an intention to 
up«>n the evidence. S im ilarly , where either party has included documents in a list ol 
>«xm ruh disclosed on discovery and the other party desires to rrlv  upon thr contents ol 
4W me dficutnents as proving the truth of w hat is staled therein, that parly  should give notice 
■.sVr this rule. Minnetota M in ing  &  M fg . (lo. v Jnhntnn &  Johnson L td  ( 1976] F.S.R  6; ( I976 | 
I  T f . 67 I , C. A ., where the obligation to give notice was waived 
On thr other hand, this rule does not apply to any ou l-of-Court statement which is admiss- 
Mx m evidence independently of Fart I of the Act (p a ra .(2 )) e.g. admissible by virtue o f any 
statutory provision or by agreement ol* thr parties (see s. I ( I ) o f the Act).
1Vr% rule tiers also not apply to statements made by the deceased in a probate action I 41 >.
I Vo rule does not extend to a statement containing expert evidence, since this would 
i« it , , rvsvi.m  o f the rvoress provisions relating to the admission o f expert evidence
/ 5 9 7; V '/9 ^ 7 j 3 All~E.R. \ m ) ‘ "  ,n‘rrna“onal ~l:,a  |TDuT] n f  1 I
38 /21 /2  Parties  to be served  bv r 21 N o t lr a i-i.„
"rcc",r,f-h' ^  ■*"«••*. ■» -  
38 /21 /3  Tim e for service of r.21 N otice— t i ... m i- a , i
imo <*.„ *•» ,j* put^  £ c !S s x ,c£ ,& inp,,a(,)w — -A—  
r^^V'co,™;'o X tn i1" ? ^ ; 1":?! n S  21 “- t    ,c,"i?g dow°»
1 he classes ol cases which (all w ithm  ra ( l WA\ \ ■ i • .
adjourned into C ourt, include trials before the Offler.1 R cfc£  "Tria l?  ! l ' ‘°  * *  iC'
P ^atlc^and 'gam fsh cc 'lssu cs '^nd 'jria l*1'')*/ ' 7 '™ ' ' ' *  a 'SO
duly served, th e y  also include rcfcrrncM  and ■ ' n ' i S l u m i c 7 n r Id !  ^
......
D ie  period o f 21 days is s im ilar lo that provided by O  27 r 't for th e  « - r 
adm it or produce documents T h r  ( („ ,n  I, i \ .  ’ service of not mo »
■ w » 1  M  c T n , " '  r , " " "  / " ' !  r' g “ r<‘ ' °  ' i ," '■  rlC  ■ in ' 'd m i r . l l y  „ e 0 .7 1
fo r , , ,  h ' i , ' n? „ , V ^ ,  ° 1 X  p t " S , “ " p c d f o l  r ‘ " " *
l e V i r K — : - t r r  f “ t t . e : V c r /u -
; r b ' ; !  f7 " '  W " «  fv e n  .,, ,hc ,r i, l.  The p T ^ T a "  “ l l  ^  t t l T  “  « “  '
(O extend  lo such notice A n v  obiet lio n  that . r •) l w ■ i r  u n , ,r r / ■ ' ‘ w  r.8, would
S t ^ ^ S ~ H = 5
As to A dm ira lty  actions, see 0 .7 5 .
For forms 0 0 .2 1  Notice, see Editoria l Forms. EF 1-4, V o l.2 , Far, 2, paras. 601 „  „ f
S t 3 t  n o t ! ? e  ( 3 3 ? ? ^  bV  ° f s e c t i o n  2  o f  t h e  A c t  : c o n te n U  erf
38/22 22.— ( I )  I f  the  s la l c m c n t  i.s a d m is s ib le  by  v i r t u e  o f  sect ion 2 o f  ihr In
b c u U r T o f -  "  ° ,hCTW,5C " ’ an  in  3 d ’ ~ ' -  "«= m u s t  e u l t L t ^
W  was m a d c ^ laCC d r c u m s ,a n c c s  “ > <>r  '■> w h ic h  the s t a t e s  
( * )  th e  pe rson  hy  w h o m ,  and  the person  to  w h o m ,  the s t a t r m -
( { )  t h e  s u b s t a n c e  o T  \Y»c sicvte.im iTW  mi , >*-,—      ---------------------------- ----
(2) I f  the s ta te m e n t  is a d m is s ib le  by  v i r t u e  o f  tb c  said sec t ion  2. a m \  v- .vs 
wudr in a d o c u m e n t ,  a c o p y  o r  t r a n s c r ip t  o f  the. d o c u m e n t ,  o r  o f  the rc\-  
nan t  pa rt  the reo f ,  m u s t  be a n n e x e d  to the n o t ice  and  the no t ice  m u s t  con- 
i«n  such ( i f  a n y )  of the  p a r t i c u la r s  m e n t io n e d  in  p a ra g ra p h  ( l ) ( f l )  and  (b )  
m are not a p p a r e n t  o n  the  face o f  the d o c u m e n t  o r  p a r t .
(1) I f  the p a r t y  g i v i n g  the  n o t ic e  alleges th a t  a n y  pe rson ,  p a r t i c u la r s  o l 
•  hnm arc c o n ta in e d  in  the  n o t ic e ,  c a n n o t  o r  s h o u ld  n o t  he ca l le d  as a w i t -  
at the t r i a l  o r  h e a r in g  lo r  a ny  o f  the reasons spec i f ied  in  ru le  2 j ,  the 
•.Mice m ust c o n ta in  a s ta te m e n t  to  th a t  effect s p e c i fy in g  the  reasons re l ied  
en
Statement adm issible by virtue of section 4 of the Act: contents of 
notice (0 .38 , r.23)
23.— (1) I f  the  s ta te m e n t  is a d m is s ib le  by  v i r t u e  of sec t ion  4 ol the. A c t ,  58/25 
rSr notice m u s t  h a v e  a n n e x e d  lo  it  a co p y  o r  t r a n s c r ip t  o l  the  d o c u m e n t  
rem a in ing  the  s ta te m e n t ,  o r  o f  the re le v a n t  p a r t  the reo f ,  a n d  m u s t  con- 
u m —
(a) p a r t i c u la r s  o f —
( i)  the  p e rso n  b y  w h o m  the reco rd  c o n ta in i n g  the s ta te m e n t
w as  c o m p i l e d ;
( i i )  the  p e rs o n  w h o  o r i g i n a l l y  s u p p l ie d  the i n f o r m a t io n  f r o m  
w h i c h  the  re c o rd  was c o m p i le d ;  and
( i i i )  a n y  o t h e r  p e rson  th ro u g h  w h o m  th a t  in f o r m a t io n  was s u p ­
p l ie d  to  th e  c o m p i l e r  of t h a t  re c o rd ;
a n d ,  in  th e  case o f  a n y  such pe rson  as i.s re fe r red  to in  ( i )  o r  ( i i i )  
a b o v e ,  a d e s c r ip t io n  o f  the  d u l y  u n d e r  w h ic h  th a t  pe rson  was 
a c t in g  w h e n  c o m p i l i n g  th a t  rec o rd  o r  s u p p ly in g  in fo r m a t io n  
f r o m  w h i c h  th a t  re c o rd  was c o m p i le d ,  as the  case m a y  be;
(b ) i f  n o t  a p p a r e n t  on  the  face o f  the  d o c u m e n t  a n n exe d  to the 
no t ic e ,  a d e s c r ip t i o n  o f  the  n a tu re  of the rec o rd  w h ic h ,  o r  p a r t  
o f  w h i c h ,  c o n ta in s  the  s ta te m e n t ;  a n d
(<-) p a r t i c u la r s  o f  the t im e ,  p lace  a n d  c i r c u m s ta n c e s  at o r  in  w in c h  
th a t  re c o rd  o r  p a r t  was c o m p i le d .
(2) I f  the  p a r t y  g i v i n g  n o t ic e  a lleges th a t  a n y  pe rson ,  p a r t i c u la r s  ol 
vSnm are c o n ta in e d  in  the  n o t ic e ,  c a n n o t  o r  s h o u ld  no t be ca l led  as a w i i -  
at the t r i a l  o r  h e a r in g  fo r  a n y  o l the  reasons spec if ied  in  ru le  2S, the 
•*Mjr r  m us t  c o n ta in  a s ta te m e n t  to  th a t  effect s p e c i fy in g  the reason re l ied
Statement adm issible by virtue of section 5 of the Act: contents of 
notice (0 .38 , r.24)
>|  (1)  I f  the  s ta te m e n t  i.s c o n ta in e d  in  a d o c u m e n t  p ro d u c e d  by a
o < m p u tr r  an d  is a d m is s ib le  by  v i r t u e  o l sec t ion  r> ol the  A c t ,  the n o l i t  i 
m in t  have a n n e x e d  to  it  a c o p y  o r  t r a n s c r ip t  ol the  d o c u m e n t  c o n ta in in g  
ihe s ta tem en t ,  o r  o f  the  r e le v a n t  p a r t  th e re o f ,  a n d  m u s t  c o n ta in  p a r t i c u la r s
< 4 -
(n )  a p e rson  w h o  o c c u p ie d  a resp o n s ib le  p o s i t io n  in  re la t io n  to  d ie  
m a n a g e m e n t  o l the  re leva n t  a c t iv i t ie s  lo i  the p u rp o s e  of w h i t  Ii 
the  c o m p u t e r  was used r e g u la r ly  d u r i n g  the m a te r ia l  p e r io d  ol 
s to re  o r  process in f o r m a t io n ;
( b )  a p e rso n  w h o  at the  m a te r ia l  t im e  o c c u p ie d  such  a p o s i t io n  in  
r e la t io n  It) the  s u p p ly  o f  i n f o r m a t io n  to the c o m p u te r ,  be ing  
i n f o r m a t i o n  w h ic h  is re p ro d u c e d  in  the s ta te m e n t  o r  i n f o r ­
m a t io n  f r o m  w h ic h  the in fo r m a t io n  c o n ta in e d  in  the s ta te m e n t
m m  n  o f  t h e  c o m p u t e r  d u r i n g  the m a te r ia l  p e r io d ;  
u n c i  w h e r e  t h e r e  a re  (w o  o r  m o r e  p e r s o n s  w h o  fa l l  w i t h i n  any  o f  (lie fnrrp1* 
in g  s u b p a r a g ra p h s  a n d  some o n l y  o l those pe rsons  a re  at the date of v t
v ice  o f  the. n o t ic e  c a p a b le  of b e in g  ca l led  as w itnesses at the trial t« 
h e a r in g ,  the p e rso n  p a r t i c u la r s  o f  w h o m  are  lo  be c o n ta in e d  in the notxv 
m u s t  be su ch  o n e  o f  those pe rsons  as is at t h a t  d a te  so capab le .
(2)  I he n o t ic e  m u s t  a lso  s ta te  w h e th e r  the  c o m p u te r  was oprr.innc 
p r o p e r ly  t h r o u g h o u t  the  m a te r ia l  p e r io d  a n d ,  i f  no t ,  w h e th e r  any rrspm 
in  w h ic h  i t  w as  n o t  o p e ra t in g  p ro p e r l y  o r  was o u t  o f  o p e ra t io n  during im 
p a r t  o f  t h a t  p e r io d  w as  su ch  as to  a f fec t  the p r o d u c t io n  o f  the document « 
w h ic h  the  s ta te m e n t  is c o n ta in e d  o r  the  a c c u ra c y  o f  its con ten ts .
(3) I f  the  p a r t y  g i v in g  the  n o t ic e  a lleges t h a t  a n y  pe rson ,  part icular* </ 
w h o m  a rc  c o n ta in e d  in  the n o t ice ,  c a n n o t  o r  s h o u ld  no t  be called as a *>t 
ness a t  the  t r i a l  o r  h e a r in g  fo r  a n y  o f  the reasons spec i f ied  in rule 23, ib» 
n o t ic e  m u s t  c o n ta in  a s ta te m e n t  to  th a t  e ffect s p e c i f y in g  the reason relied 
on .
Reasons for not calling a person as a witness (0.38, r.25)
38/25 25. T h e  reasons re fe r re d  to in  ru les  2 2 (3 )  2 3 (2 )  and  2 d (3 )  are that d*
pe rson  in  q u e s t io n  is d e a d ,  o r  b e y o n d  the seas o r  u n f i t  bv  reason of hn 
b o d i l y  o r  m e n ta l  c o n d i t i o n  to  a t te n d  as a w i tn e ss  o r  th a t  desp ite  the r \ r r  
cisc o f  rea s o n a b le  d i l ig e n c e  it has no t  been poss ib le  to id e n t i f y  or find h i*  
o r  th a t  he c a n n o t  re a s o n a b ly  be expec ted  to have  a n y  recollection 
m a t te rs  re le v a n t  to the  a c c u ra c y  o r  o th e rw is e  o f  the s ta te m e n t  tovvhx i 
the  n o t ic e  relates.
3 8 /2 2 -2 5 /1  A pplication of rr.22 , 23  and 2 4 - -  I lirsc rules apply It• .stalrm rnts which arc ;kIiiii«>-**’ 
under ss.2, 1 am i 4 of tlir  Act rrspcc (ivi-lv. They  specify in great detail the p.nii. 
rctpiired to he. contained in a r.2 I Notice relating to s.2 or s.4 or s 4 statements, as tlw < 
m ay be. In  essence, these particulars re lied  the direct oral evidence which would li.ivr 
given at the trial for which the hearsay statement is being substituted. Under these rulo « • 
im perative that the r.2  I Notice must contain the specified particulars, and il is also impr«» 
live that, where applicable, the notice must contain a statement that the maker ol thr ,ti«* 
mcnt cannot or should not be called as a witness at the ttia l and must specify llir in><  
relied on; see r.2.1).
11 should be noted that r.22 also applies to a notice under r.4 I ; see r.4 1 (2).
For the defin ition o f “docum ent'' see s. I0 (  I ) ol the Act. U nder r.22 (2 ) if  the he.us.o 
mcnt was made in a document which thr- opposite party cannot understand unless it i* in n  
eribed, a transcript must be annexed to the notice.
I Ins transcr ipt ol evidence in crim inal proceedings is admissible in evidence imrl< r »■! 
and 4 ol the A d . and probably, also, the transcript ol l l ir  Judge's summing-up is .tdinnv*# 
in evidence under s. l o f the Act as being a record compiled by a shmthund vviiici in I.* 
capacity as sin It ( Taylor v. Taylor [ I ? 17111 I W .L .R . I I -IM; | I 97(l| 2 A ll K R . 609. (1 A . I-V  
documents, e g.  a tithe m ap and survey made under the T ith e  Act 1846, are a d r m s s i l .u  •  
evidence of the lacts staled therein mulct s I I I )  of the A it  (Ann'At v. D aru l | I ‘.1711 I \ \  I I  
1671; (1071 | 3 A ll K .R. 1066).
3 8 /2 2 -2 5 /2  S tatem ents produced by co m p u te r— R.24. which relates to computerised m .-r.fi « 
ol course, somewhat novel. It should be read closely w ith ss.r> and 6 (4 )(r ) ol the At t 
U nder para.f I ) oT r.24, there should generally be no need to specify more than our 
falling w ithin each ol the categories ol persons set out in subpat as. I a) (h) and ( i ) anti m.W-4 
in many instances, it may well be that only a single pet son, who comes within all thro P - -  
categories, would need to be specified T h e  need for the three categories mentioned in 'Ow 
three subparagraphs is lo provide an opportunity  to the opposite party, by serving a i .. ,■ •-> 
notice under r.26, to require the person named in each category to be ealled as a voter,, r 
the tria l, so as to hear him  give his evidence and if  necessary to cross-examine hint in  :*» 
computer system, so far as it relates to the “ business side” (see suhpara. (n)) the worn, r# 
ensuring that the relevant inform ation is accurately fed into the com puter (see suhpar* t 
and the “ hardw are” and program m ing o f the com puter (see suhpara.(r)). Il sln.nH W 
emphasised that the rule requires that the persons who are specified in the r.2 l notiir nvV* 
these three subparagraphs should be persons who ire capable of being called as w tinm n •/ 
the trial rather than those who arc otherwise unavailab le, although they may also |«nvn  
necessary qualifications to come w ith in  these categories.
Para. (2 ) o f r.2'1 red rets s .5 (2) (c) o ft  lie Act. Th is  provision requires the r.21 Not it r ol 
to a statement produced by computer to state in relation to that statement that the —
v»or krO nronei ly or iliac u s  t .u tu .e , l i rn t  v,iu i iirn n —rrv cm ...  ^ —t.-.,,-, ,,,. ,,,—,   .___
provision is necessary in order to enable the opposite party to decide w fic ifirt or not u> i\\s- 
futr that the conditions specified in s..4(2)(< ) of the Act has e been satisfied 
•>101 r a computer is a device by means ol which in form ation is stored or proi essed, a pi in I - 
•ns which is part o f that device is a statement produced by the computet , and il the run- 
specified in the C iv il F.vidcncc Act I 968, s 6 and r.24 are complied w ith, and it is clear 
rVjt thr operator who lerl the in form ation in to the com puter could not reasonably be 
op rttrd  to have any recollection ol that inform ation, the prin t-out w ill be adm itted in rvi- 
(see I i.  v. E w ing  [ I Q . B .  104!); | I9 8 4 |  2 A ll K .R . 64.0, C. A decided under the 
I onun.il Kvidenee Act 196.4, s. I ).
Reasons fo r  n o t c a llin g  a p e rs o n  as a w itn e s s  R 2 .4 specifies the conditions which 38/22-25 /3
rrrvlrr the maker o f a statem ent or a person concerned in the com pilation of an ord inary  or 
o'Tipiilrrisrd record unavailab le , i.e. the reasons why lie cannot or should not be called as a 
•  ltnrsr at the tria l. The terms of the rule arc taken verbatim Ircun s.8(2)(A) ol the At t ( aim- 
parr the grounds for ordering depositions to be taken before thr trial under 0.4(1. r.1; see
f t  i t  .10/1/4.
Thr five reasons that can be relied on under s.0(2)(/>) o f the Act and under r 24 for not 
rjrimg a person as a witness at the trial or hearing are disjunctive, so that il any one n f  those 
*r»vini is established on the balance o f probabilities, it is not necessary to establish any other 
rr»v.n, e.( il it be so established that the m aker o f the statement is beyond the se as, it is 
snnrc rssary to establish also that he cannot be found by the exercise ol reasonable diligence, 
i~ l moreover, if any one such reason is so established, the ('.ouri has no residual jurisdiction  
*■> oc hide his statem ent bv reference to other circumstances ( Hauwl \ 11V<I M i/llnm l< I'tiu rnger
T-tt-f>ort Executive | 1974 | 4 A ll K R 64ft)
Where a party seeks to giv e ill evidence: a statement made by a pci son said to be beyond 
if*  sras, it is not necessary to show that efforts had been made to procure the maker of thr 
iMtrnirnt to give evidence at the tria l, since the (ac t that he is abroad is in tlsell a snllie ieiil 
" iv . t i  for adm ittin g  the statem ent, and the (u n til has no disc retion lo exc lude cl ( / ’iermay 
Co. S.A. v. Chester | 19781 I W .L  R 4 11; f I97H| I A ll I. R 1244. C  A )
A« to the determ ination  o f questions whether a person c act or should be called as a witness. 
t r r  r 2 7
Khr C.hannel islands and tbr Isle o f M a n  are "beyond thr seas" for the purposes cif the 
Civil l.videncc Act 1968, s.8(2)(/>) and r 2.4, and accordingly a statement hv a person living 
»v (n iriiis rv  is admissible under the Act o f 1968 and the rule as ev idence- o f thr facts slated 
rS*rrm ( Enver International I.til. v. C.nnnnn I-thru Snlei Ltd. (No. 2) | 1*487 | I \V I . R 1.4(17; | 1987 |
I Ml K R 986).
Counter-notice requiring person to be called as a witness (0 .38, 
r.26)
26.— (1) S u b je c t  to  p a ra g r a p h s  (2 )  a n d  (3 ) ,  a n y  p a r t y  to  a cause o r  38/26 
matter on  w h o m  a n o t ic e  u n d e r  r u le  21 is served  m a y  w i t h i n  21 days  a f te r  
service o f  the  n o t ic e  on  h im  s e r v e  on the p a r l y  w h o  gave the no t ice  o r  a 
co u n te r -no t ice  r e q u i r i n g  th a t  p a r t y  to  ca l l  as a w i tn e s s  at the  t r i a l  m heat ­
ing o f  the cause o r  m a t t e r  a n y  pe rso n  ( n a m in g  h im )  p a r t i c u la r s  ol w h o m
n r  co n ta in e d  in  the  n o t ic e .
12) W h e re  a n y  n o t ic e  u n d e r  r u le  21 c o n ta in s  a s ta te m e n t  th a t  a n y  p e i -  
w,n p a r t i c u la r s  o f  w h o m  a re  c o n ta in e d  in  the  n o t ic e  c a n n o t  o r  s h o u ld  not 
Ivr called as a w i tn e s s  fo r  the  reason  sp e c i f ied  th e re in ,  a p a r t y  sha l l  no t be 
ent i t led  to  serve  a c o u n te r - n o t i c e  u n d e r  th is  ru le  r e q u i r i n g  th a t  pe rso n  to 
Ix- ca lled as a w i tn e s s  at the  t r ia l  o r  h e a r in g  o f  the  cause o r  m a t te r  unless 
hr i ( in tends  th a t  t h a t  p e rso n  can  o r ,  as the  case m a y  be, s h o u ld  be ca l le d ,  
jn d  in  th a t  case he m u s t  in c lu d e  in  his  c o u n te r - n o t i c e  a s ta te m e n t  to  th a t  
efTret.
(3) W h e re  a s ta te m e n t  to  w h i c h  a no t ice  u n d e r  ru le  21 re la tes  is one to 
w h ich  ru le  38 a p p l ie s ,  no  p a r t y  on  w h o m  the  n o t ic e  is served  sha l l  be 
r n t i l l c d  to  serve  a c o u n te r - n o t i c e  u n d e r  th is  ru le  in  r e la t io n  to th a t  s ta te ­
ment. b u t  th e  fo re g o in g  p ro v is io n  i.s w i t h o u t  p re ju d ic e  to  the  r i g h t  o f  a n y  
jv i r ty  to  a p p l y  to  th c  C o u r t  u n d e r  ru le  28 fo r  d i r e c t io n s  w i t h  respec t to  the
a d m is s ib i l i t y  o f  t h a t  s ta te m e n t .
(4) I f  an y  p a r t y  to  a cause  o r  m a t te r  b y  w h o m  a n o t ic e  u n d e r  r u le  21 is 
w r v rd  fa ils to  c o m p ly  w i t h  a c o u n te r - n o t i c e  d u l y  served  on  h im  u n d e r  th is  
. I- • i . I ..vr ...... / , f  r !»/. r/.-icMuc n o r r i f i c d  in  ru le  25 a o n l ie s  in  r e la t io n
38/26/1
38/26/2
      r .v « 7 /i' vlfi / 1 T ' i \ T  ~Tn r r r r ~  <T7) u  11 t ?‘r=T> <> r i —;i /1 if  i v m n f m — p i fp im t  r i *r r »
p o w e r s  o f  t h e  C o u r t  u n d e r  r u l e  2.9, the  s ta te m e n t  tn w h ic h  l l i r  nor>♦ 
u n d e r  r u l e  21  re la tes  sha l l  no t  he a d m is s ib le  at the t r ia l  o r  hearing of tV  
cause o r  m a t t e r  as e v idence  o f  a n y  fact s ta ted  th e re in  by  v ir tue  o l 'sn tu*
2, 4 o r  5 o f  the  A c t ,  as the  case m a y  he.
A p p lic a tio n  o f ru le —  I h r broad object of tins ru lr  is to enable a parly, against *«b — • 
hearsay statement under ss.2, ‘1 or 5 o f the Act may be adm itted in evidence in consri| — 
o f the service on him o f a r.2 l Notice, to require, by means o f a rounter-notice, tlir 
ancc o f  the person who made such statement to attend the trial and lo give direct nrd r« 
drnce o f the facts relied on and to be cross-examined thereon. The rule operates, as it - 
to exclude what would have been admissible as secondary evidence o f the fans contained H ■ 
hearsay statement by requiring the best evidence ol sueh facts to be given at the trial
Any party on whom a r.2 I Notice has been served is entitled, at his own risk as tn com «* 
serve a counter-notice under this rule, subject to the im portant exception that no mun*-* 
notice can be served under this rule if  the r.2 I Notice relates to statements made in prrsv« 
legal proceedings. In  relation to such statements, however, an alternative procedure to -v 
service o f a counter-notice is provided, nam ely, an application for directions under r it » 
the adm issibility o f such statements; sec para. (3).
A counter-notice under this rule must be served w ith in  21 days id ler the servicr of the r T 
Notice. As to the extension ol such time, see 0 .3 ,  r..1). As to A dm iralty  actions, see O *3 
r .32(4).
A  counter-notice under this ru lr  cannot require that a person should be called as a v i's-« 
at the tria l, i f  the r .2 1 Notice had staled that he cannot or should not be called, unless %•*% 
counter-notice itself contains an express statement (hut such person can or should Ix- o " - i  
In  such case, the question whether such person ran or should be called as a ssitnrss it -V 
trial may be determ ined by the M aster or Registrar before the trial on thr t ( ' in -* J 
either party under r.27 or for directions under r.28. As to A dm ira lty  actions, see ().7.V t .A 
In  order to be effective, however, th r counter-notice under this rule must successful!* n>» 
an issue regarding the reason alleged in the r .2 1 Notice for not calling the maker of llir v i ­
olent as a witness at the trial or hearing, and if  thr counter-not ice is ineffective in this irq r • 
the r.2 1 Notice takes effect to make such statement admissible (Rasool v. IIV.it Midln*4< fr-  
senger Transport Executive [ 1974] 3 A ll K .R . 638).
As lo costs occasioned by the unreasonable service o f a counter-notice, see r.32
E ffe c t o f s e rv ic e  o r n o n -s e rv ic e  o f c o u n te r -n o t ic e  -  I f  a counter-notice under r >  • 
not served, the party serving thr r.2 I Notice w ill be relieved o f thr obligation to call n  i  »■* 
ness at the trial the person or persons who made the statements to which that notice irC*> 
He must, however, still satisfy the trial C ourt that those statements are admissible tn «-*» 
deuce by virtue o f the provisions o f Part I o f the Act or any olhci slatutoiy provis ion-' w 
agreement of the pat ties (see s. I of the A c t). Thus, for exam ple, under s.2(3) of tlir At t ■ 
"firs t-hand" hearsay evidence o f an out-of-court oral statement is admissible (unless to t  
statement was made in previous legal proceedings) and therefore such statement can nn!t 
proved by a person who heard it, and he must be called lo say so, even if  no cotinlrt tv/i • 
under this rule has been served.
O n thr other hand, the service ol a counter-notice under this rule has, subject to tlir la­
nding discretion o f the Court under r.29, or unless for any o f the reasons specified in t ’ • >»«• 
person who made the statement is not called as a witness, the following elfects, n tiiirK
(1) to exclude altogether a s.2 statement made orally , i.e. what may be tailed n..f*»g 
"firs t-hand”  hearsay;
(2) to exclude altogether a s.2 statement made in a document;
(3) to exclude a s.4 statement, i.e. a statement contained in a record, altogether if 'V 
counter-notice relates to the person who orig inally  supplied the information. I-.* i 
it relates to a person who ret onled the in form ation, only il that "ret u n lit"  t> 
called; and
( I)  to exclude a s.5 statem ent, i. r  a statement produced bv computer, onlv il the j*- 
son specified is not called.
I licsc consequences (low front ss.2, 1 and ft ol the Act, as well as in part lim n para I It TV 
failure to call, in response to a counter-notice under this ru lr. a person specified in lltil 0-5* 
tcr-notice makes the statement m entioned in the r.2 I Notice inadmissible at the trial t*« r** 
extent indicated above. I f  the statement is a s.2 statem ent, calling the maker in response t- 1 
rounter-notice does not itself make the statement admissible unless the ( aittrt in its dm t»tr« 
so directs. II il is a s. 1 statem ent, its adm issibility depends upon whether the person t ail'd « 
response to the counter-notice is th r original inform ant or "the recorder" ol the statement 1 
it is the former, calling him does not make the statement admissible unless the C.ontt in r> 
discretion so directs, but il it is tlir  la tter, calling him does make thr record admissible II r. » 
s..1) statem ent, calling the person concerned in thr coin pita t ion ol a computerised rrcmd it »» 
make the record admissible where the counter-notice relates only lo the person so called 
r . . .  r ... r ..................... -
as a witness (O.38777Z7 7 -_________ ______ ___________ _____
27.—  (1) W h e re  it» any  cause o r  m a t t e r  a q u e s t io n  arises w h e th e r  any >a 'SWir - —
fbr reasons spec i f ied  in  ru le  25 a p p l ie s  in  r e la t io n  to  a person  p a r t i c u la r s
*4 whom are c o n ta in e d  in  a n o t ic e  u n d e r  ru le  21 , the  C o u r t  m a y ,  on  the
ip n l i r a i io n  o f  a n y  p a r t y  to  the cause o r  m a t te r ,  d e te rm in e  th a t  q u e s t io n
M n r r  the t r ia l  o r  h e a r in g  o f  th e  cause o r  m a t t e r  o r  g ive  d i r e c t io n s  fo r  it to
^ d e t e r m i n e d  b e fo re  the  t r i a l  o r  h e a r in g  a n d  fo r  the m a n n e r  in  w h ic h  it is
** he so determ ined.
12) Un less the  C o u r t  o th e r w is e  d i re c ts ,  the  s u m m o n s  b y  w h ic h  .111 a p p l i ­
cation u n d e r  p a r a g r a p h  (1)  i.s m a d e  m u s t  be se rved  b y  the  p a r t y  m a k in g  
the a p p l ic a t io n  o n  e v e ry  o th e r  p a r t y  to the cause o r  m a t te r .
(3) W h e re  a n y  such  q u e s t io n  as is re fe r red  to in  p a ra g r a p h  (1 )  has been 
determined u n d e r  o r  b y  v i r t u e  o f  th a t  p a ra g r a p h ,  no a p p l i c a t io n  to  h a v e  it 
determined a fresh  a t  d ie  t r ia l  o r  h e a r in g  o f  the cause o r  m a t t e r  m a y  be 
avide unless the e v id e n c e  w h ic h  it is sought to a d d u c e  in  s u p p o r t  of the 
app licat ion c o u ld  n o t  w i t h  rea so n a b le  d i l ig e n c e  have  been a d d u c e d  at the 
Wearing w h ic h  re s u l te d  in  the d e te r m in a t i o n .
Directions with respect to statement made in previous proceed­
ings (0 .38 , r.28)
2ft. W h e re  a p a r t y  to  a cause o r  m a t te r  has g iv e n  n o t ice  in  a c c o rd a n c e  38/28 
* u h  rule 21 t l ia t  he des ires  to  g ive  in  ev idence  at the t r ia l  o r  h e a r in g  ol the 
( j t ts r  n r  m a t t e r —
( a )  a s ta te m e n t  fa l l i n g  w i t h i n  sec t ion  2 (1 )  o f  the A c t  w h ic h  was 
m a d e  b y  a p e rs o n ,  w h e th e r  o r a l l y  o r  in  a d o c u m e n t ,  in  the 
cou rse  o f  g i v i n g  e v id e n c e  in  som e o th e r  lega l p ro ce e d in g s  
( w h e t h e r  c i v i l  o r  c r i m i n a l ) ,  o r  
(/>) a s ta te m e n t  fa l l i n g  w i t h i n  sec t ion  4 (1 )  o f  the  A c t  w h ic h  is c o n ­
ta in e d  in  a r e c o rd  o f  d i r e c t  o ra l  e v id e n ce  g iv e n  in  som e  o th e r  
lega l  p ro c e e d in g s  ( w h e th e r  c iv i l  o r  c r im in a l )  
t n t  p a r ty  to  the  cause  o r  m a t t e r  m a y  a p p ly  to  the  C o u r t  fo r  d i r e c t io n s  
orx lr r  th is  ru le ,  a n d  the  C o u r t  h e a r in g  such  an  a p p l i c a t i o n  m a y  g ive  d i re c -  
tK>m as to w h e th e r ,  a n d  i f  so o n  w h a t  c o n d i t io n s ,  the  p a r t y  d e s i r i n g  to  g ive  
»h< s ta tem en t  in  e v id e n c e  w i l l  be p e rm i t t e d  to  d o  so a n d  (w h e re  a p p l i ­
cable) as to the  m a n n e r  in  w h ic h  th a t  s ta te m e n t  and  a n y  o th e r  ev idence  
f n r n  in those o th e r  p ro c e e d in g s  is to be p ro v e d .
Application of rules 27 and 28— These rules, which should be read w ith r.33, together 38/27—28/1 
frvM«lr the m achinery for enabling all questions concerning the adducing o f hearsay statc- 
»wnt, at the tria l, so far as practicable, to be dealt w ith and disposed of before thr trial.
TVete three rules relate to the following matters or questions, namely.
To  the determ ination of questions whether a person can or should be called as a
witness at the tr ia l, see r/27  
<tl T n  directions w ith  respect to statements made in previous legal proceedings; sec
r 28
trl T o  directions that a person whose credibility  as the maker of a hearsay statement is 
licing attacked should br called as a witness at the trial; sec r ..JO;
( / )  For lease that an out-of-court statem ent, whether made orally  or in w riting, he 
given in evidence, even though the person who made it is to lie called as a witness at 
the tria l, sec r.33 and s .2 (2 )(a ) of the Act;
(»! For directions as to the m anner in which oral statements made in previous legal 
proceedings should be adm itted in evidence at the tria l, sre r.33, and s.2 (3 ) ol thr 
A e t ;
(f) For leave that a hearsay statement contained in a record he given in evidence, even 
though the person who originally supplied the inform ation from which the record 
was Compiled is to be called as a witness at the tria l, see r.33 anil s. f (2 )(o ) o f the 
A rt;
r ‘ For directions as to the m anner in which a document or copy or m aterial part
77
r T / v r d i  i n l r j i r i r r i  f . .  Ti i - ( l i f  n l -*  ■ . . - .■  ~v^. flrr  r H .xp <
s.6f I ) o f  l l i r  A c t.
F o r  f o r m s  o f  s u m m o n s ,  s r r  /id  iln ri.il Forms. F I 1(1 13, Vol. 2, I*i .2, pirns. 610-613 
An application under r .27 tn determ ine whether a person can or should he railed it  i  * *  
ness at the trial must he made by summons, but applications relating to any other r l t» 
above matters or questions may be made by summons or on the summons for dirci'tintu *w 
notice thereunder. As to A dm ira lty  actions, see 0 .7 5 , r.25.
3 8 /2 7 -2 8 /2  Question w hether person can or should be called as a w itness—Thr q.K-**.
whether the m aker o f a hearsay statement can or should be called as witness at tlir tnil m  
arise either:
( 1) when a r.2 I Notii e contains a statement that he cannot or should not hr called m i 
witness at the tria l and specifies the reason relied on, and the counlcr-noiicr mA- 
r.2() states that he can or should be so called; or
(2) when a party desires to adduce evidence to attack the credibility of the niakrt of 
statement who is mentioned in a r.21 Notice; see r.30.
Such a question m ay also arise when a r.21 Notice relates to a hearsay statement mxV » 
previous proceedings, though in such case the application should be lor directions undn i 5  
and not lor determ ination under t 27; see r.2b(3).
The  application under r.27 must be by summons, and unless the Court otherwise dim^t 
such summons must be served by thr party m aking the application on every other parti, »V 
for this purpose w ill include every third and subsequent party, but not a party who hat hA-e 
to acknowledge service or who has no address for service; see 0 .6 5 , r.9. As to Admtrds 
default actions, see 0 .7 5 , r .32 (3 ).
O n thr hearing ol such an application, the ( loin t may determ ine the question raised »■?*>. 
m arily or ii may give directions for it to be determ ined before the tria l, e.g. by dircctini rV 
tria l ol tin issue, which by consent may be tried by the M aster; see 0 .3 6  r.9 l or foitre 4 
summons and order, see F.ditorial Forms, F.F 6 7, V o l.2, 1*1.2, paras. 606-607.
The statement o f a person who was, but is no longer, in the employ o f the opposite pir*. 
will not be allowed to be adduced in evidence at the tria l, since there is no reason uh* rte 
m aker o f the statement could not be called as a witness ((Leenairay v. Homelea Fittingi (l*<U- 
Ltd. 1198.5] I W .L .R . 231).
Once the question whether a person can or should be called as a witness at (hr trill kw 
been determ ined before the tria l, il cannot be raised or determined afresh at the trial, estry 
upon fresh evidence which could not w ith reasonable diligence have been earlier addu-.*-< 
(p a ra .(3 )) , e.g. by reason ol a change ol circumstances, as where a sick person mat h»o 
rccovcrrd or a potential witness m av have returued from abroad. A pariv  seeking to raise th. 
question afresh at the trial should give notice to the opposite party, stating thr ground •* 
which he seeks to have the question determ ined afresh.
3 8 /2 7 -2 8 /3  D irections respecting statem ents m ade In previous proceed ings—An apnltran*
for directions respecting statements made in previous legal proceedings, whether annmnt"- 
u niler s. 2 or s. 4, may be inatle by anv part v, including thr parly  who served thr r.21 Nut* > 
Th e a pp I Kit I ion should be made bv summons oi a not ice uni h r  the summons lor dun tv «•« 
to (he M aster, which must be served on everv othet pat tv. As to A dm iralty  actions, srr O 71
r.25.
Rule 28 docs not provide any lim e w ithin which such an application is rrquirrd tn 1* 
made, but it should ord inarily  be made as soon as practicable alter the service of tlir r Jt 
Notice. 11 is desirable that the parties should know, as early as possible, and as long as mr 
be before the tr ia l, what the position i.s w ith  regard to the adm issibility o f statements math r  
previous legal proceedings.
O n  the hearing or such an application thr Court has wide powers whether lo exclude iit-l 
a statement notwithstanding that it otherwise fulfills all the conditions necessary for adrtmu 
b ilily  or to order such statement to be admissible in evidence at th r trial; and thr Court hn » 
wide discretion to impose appropriate conditions on the admissibility ol such a statement
W here, however, thr defendant alleges that the conviction relied on in the statement <t 
claim was erroneous (see 0 .1 8 , r.7A (3 )(/» )) the C ourt, in the exercise ol its discretion urwlo 
r.28. w ill more readily adm it on thr part ol the plaintiff the statements made by the wiirv-n 
m the crim inal proceedings, lor otherwise the plaintiff 'm ay be compelled to rail as h i mo 
witness those who gave evidence in the crim inal proceeding. The  defendant will therein ein 
the advantage of being able to cross-examine them, instead of calling them as his witnesses »• 
discharge thr burden o f showing that the conviction was erroneous (sec s. I I (2)(u) of the An 
and see also 15th Report o f the I.aw  Reform Com m ittee, C m ud. 3391 (1967) para 22). Tie 
same position w ill apply, mutatis mutandis, where the defendant alleges that the finding •! 
adultery and adjudication n f patern ity was erroneous (see O  18, r .7 A (3 )(6 )).
File position may perhaps be different, where thr defendant denies that the convictne 
finding ol adultery or adjudication of paternity is relevant to any issue in the proceedings I srr 
0 .1 8  r.7 A (3) (r )). In  such case, the burden o f proving relevancy lies on the plaintiff, and ( r  
this reason different considerations may apply to the admissibility o f the statements ni.idr U 
witnesses in the previous legal proceedings; and thr Court may, in its discretion under t 7* 
impose terms for th r adm issihilil v o f such statements, e.g. that the witness if  available shun!'
b e  r  d ie d  I I  d i e  o d  d
h  * 1 ^ ' < | 'U f  5 l » f n  J l l l y .  v . . . . f i ____________
or r a ile d  as a w itn e s s  a t It ic  t r ia l  l l ic  f - m in  h as  p.V5CT~  n ■ iu  n i o , . . .. ............................................
■ ifc’r r 27
l «  t im  of summons, see F.ditorial Forms, E F 8, V o l.2, l ’t.2 , para 6(38
*o*r«r of Court to allow statement to be given in evidence (0.38, 
r.29)
70.— ( l ) W i t h o u t  p re ju d ic e  to  sect ion  2 (2 )  ( a )  and  4 ( 2 ) ( a )  o f  the  A c t  a n d  38/29 
r th f  28, the C o u r t  m a y ,  i f  i t  th in k s  i t  j u s t  to  d o  so, a l lo w  a s ta te m e n t  fa l l in g  
wrthin sect ion 2 (1 ) ,  4 (1 )  o r  5 (1 )  o f  the A c t  to  he g iv e n  in  e v idence  a t  the 
sriil or h e a r in g  o f  a cause  o r  m a t t e r  n o t w i t h s ta n d in g —
(a ) th a t  th e  s ta te m e n t  is one in  r e la t io n  to  w h ic h  r u le  2 1 (1 )  a p p l ie s  
a n d  t h a t  th e  p a r t y  d e s i r i n g  to  g iv e  the  s ta te m e n t  in  ev idence  
has fa i le d  to  c o m p ly  w i t h  th a t  ru le ,  o r
( b ) t h a t  t h a t  p a r t y  has fa i led  to  c o m p ly  w i t h  a n y  r e q u i r e m e n t  o f  a 
c o u n te r - n o t i c e  r e la t in g  to th a t  s ta te m e n t  w h ic h  was served  on 
h im  in  a c c o rd a n c e  w i t h  ru le  2 6 .
(2) W i t h o u t  p re ju d ic e  to  the  g e n e ra l i t y  o f  p a ra g r a p h  ( I )  the C o u r t  m a y  
exercise its p o w e r  u n d e r  t h a t  p a ra g ra p h  to a l lo w  a s ta te m e n t  to he g ive n  
«  evidence at the t r i a l  o r  h e a r in g  o f  a cause o r  m a t te r  i f  a re fusa l to  r x c r -  
<h<- that p o w e r  m ig h t  o b l ig e  the p a r t y  d e s i r i n g  to  g ive  the s ta te m e n t  in 
e»vlrnrc to  ca l l  as a w i tn e s s  at t h r  t r ia l  o r  h e a r in g  an o p p o s i te  p a r t y  o r  a 
prr ton w h o  is o r  w as  a t  the  m a te r ia l  l im e  the  s e rva n t  o r  agent o f  an  
eypoxite p a r t y .
A pplication o f r u le -  T h is  rule is nf paramount im portance in the procedural code fur 38/29/1 
with hearsay evidence (see 13th Report of thr I .aw Reform Com m ittee, C.tnnd 2961
rW>) paras. 25 and 31).
It implements s.R(3)(ti) o f the A rt by expressly conferring upon thr Court a residual dis- 
•rr*»>n u> adm it a hearsay statement in evidence, notwithstanding the failure to comply w ith  
(U requirement to serve a notice under r .2 l with respect to sm h statement or tn i all a wu- 
>l thr trial in response to a counter-notice served under i .26 I he principle undei ly ing 
+ *  rulr is that non-e.ompliance w ith the procedural requirements ol thr rules should not b\ 
rwt( result in the exclusion o f m aterial hearsay evidence which is otherwise admissible, but 
( anirt should have power, if it thinks it just to do so, to allow such statements to lie given 
m rstdrnce. T h e  rule is rem edial in its intent and operation and the overriding discretion 
the rule is designed to enable the Court to do what is just in the particular i ircum - 
,,f die ease. C.J. 0 . 2  (non-com pliance w ith rules) I he Court can, for example, waiv e 
A» nr* rxsary requirem ent ul'giving notice in advance ( 7Vtv/»r v. lav ln r ( 197ll| I 13 I . R I Mil;
• I *  TTi) i  A ll E .R  609, C .A ) .  In  (ieorge Dnlnnd l t d  v H laikhurn Rnh\nn dailies ( jf C.o. | I9 7 2 |  I 
3* I R 1388; [1972] 3 A ll E .R . 959, Geoffrey l.a n r  J. adm itted hearsav evidence at the trial 
w«»ithstanding the failure to com ply w ith the rules as to p iio r service ol the requisite nolii e 
I  he principle on which the C ourt should exercise its discretion under rr.28 and 29 should 
'« the furtherance o f justice, and on this basis, transcript of evidence given in crim inal pro- 
•m lm p  should be adm itted  on terms that an opportunity be given to challenge such evi- 
Ir tx r  bv i ross-examination (Tremellege (Selangor) L td  v. AVeA'W [ 19 7 I | 1 \ \  I, R 226; |1 9 7 l|  I 
U  r. R 940). But the C ourt can only exercise its discretion under this rule in favour of a 
M d ilim g  party if it is in possession of all the relevant facts, and therefore there can be no 
exercise o f such discretion il thete has been, for any reason, a deliberate withholding  
the Court o f  the reason for non-com pliance w ith the requirements of this rule (Lord \
Irw n  119711 I W .L .R . 623; (1971 ] 2 A ll F, R. 983, C .A  ) O n  the other hand, the Court mav 
pe,fwdv exercise its discretion, w ithout imposing any terms, to adm it a statement lo be giv en 
t»rvwiener at the tria l or hearing, although no proper notice has been given, where to do so 
* -* iM  not cause prejudice or injustice to thr other party, hilt not where there is ground lo 
M f p a r  that injustice w ill be caused or that the other party will lie m ateria lly  prejudn «•«I or 
»»".Karrassrd ( Atom s v. Stratfoid-on  .1 ron Rural D istrict dounnt | I 97 11 I \V  I . K 1059, | 1973 | 3 
s/1 I. R 263, C  A  .).
Where one party gives notice in accordance with this title that he intends to ielv upon 
' o i u v  eviilcnee and the other party also intends to rely upon that evidence, thr other parlv  
*-** * iId also Riv e notice under this rule. In l.etrnset l.td. v Dyrno L td  [1976] R.P C'. 65. p.68 
Vw.rsav evidence given by the plaint i IT a t a previous trial was not adm it led upon tlir  dele m l- 
s application, even though the p la in tiff hurl given notice under this t u lr of an intention to 
•et> u|von die evidence. S im ilarly , where either parly has in titu led  dot umenis in a list ol 
S . titneutj disclosed on discovery and the other party desires to rely upon the contents ol 
s. -ir dot umenis as proving the truth o f what is stated therein, that party should give noiu r 
••■ '•I this title (Minnesota M ining &  M fg . do. v . Johnson &  Johnson l.td  [1976] F.S.R. 6; [ I9 7 6 |
"  . » > / • «  . . I . ...... i | ....... I>lit<:i ■ in n  to  g iv e  n o tic e  w a s  v v a iv e t l).
t u n  h i t  i n i  s,  d u n  / ’ . I I I  /  u t  I I I . i l  ; \ i t  I I I  I ' . l l i l l  i i . i s  I i / i l . - n  r< I I I I .  I . t  i r l r i i t - i ’ A r t  ' I • >1 v ,h  W i  7 " ^ ^
hud been sn id  d im  ii s lm u ld  be given a l ib e ra l in ir i p rrtatinn  (see per Denning I. | in Ir^m  ;
v. l.am htd  and C.noke ( C'ontrartors) Ltd. ( I !).')! | 2 K.M  937, p. 917; and /><> Devlin I. | in A-r !
mam Ltd. v. Mrtrnfm litan I'olice D id r ir t  ltrce ie r{\\\H '}\ \ I W . l .  R 63 I , |>. < > r> 7; | I9 6 I |  I AID I 
381, p. 393) and dial ifa ttv  statement is adm itted in evidence, still the weight to hr at ink*-* j
lo it is a mat lei that remains tn I >e t i msidei ed I >\ I lie ( a m rl. As tn the w eight tn lie at l.u li'-i i
hearsay evidence, see s.6 (3) nl llie A i t, \'n l.2 , IM. 18.
I’ara. (2) ol t Ins rule sin tries nut a pal t ienlar la d  nr tn lie rim  side red l>y thr Court in r»r»**» j
ini; its discretion whether to allow a statement in he given in evidence, namely, that the n-L :
sal to do so m il'll! require a party to call as his witness the opposite party or Ins servant •» 
agent. The  need lor this provision is to ensure that the < otinter-notice procedure slmuM 
result in compelling; one party to call as his witness the opposite parly  or a servant nr ac*r* t  j
his, and para. (2) while not imposing any obligation on the C.ourl. gives guidance to it *• I
exercise its discretion to prevent this happening. j
Restriction on adducing evidence as to credibility of maker, etc. of 
certain statements (0.38, r.30)
3 8 /3 0  30. W h e r e —
(a) a n o t ic e  g iv e n  u n d e r  ru le  21 in  a cause o r  m a t te r  relates to *  
s ta te m e n t  w h ic h  is a d m is s ib le  b y  v i r t u e  o f .sec t ion  2 or 1 of ttw 
A c t ,  and
(b ) th e  pe rson  w h o  m a d e  the s ta te m e n t ,  o r ,  as the  case may he, tb  
p e rson  w h o  o r i g i n a l l y  s u p p l ie d  the  i n f o r m a t io n  f rom  which thr 
re c o rd  c o n ta in i n g  the  s ta te m e n t  was c o m p i le d ,  is not ca l led***  
w i tn e s s  at the  t r ia l  o r  h e a r in g  o f  the  cause o r  m a t te r ,  and
(r)  n o n e  o f  the  reasons m e n t io n e d  in  ru le  23 app l ies  so as to prr 
v e n t  the p a r t y  w h o  gave  th e  n o t ic e  f r o m  c a l l in g  tha t  person a* * 
w i tness ,
no  o th e r  p a r t y  to  the  cause o r  m a t t e r  s ha l l  be e n t i t le d ,  except with tlv 
leave o f  the  C o u r t ,  to  a d d u c e  in  r e la t io n  to  th a t  pe rson  a n y  evidence whi<h 
c o u ld  o th e rw is e  be a d d u c e d  b y  h im  b y  v i r t u e  o f  sec t ion  7 o f  the Ac t  imlr*i 
he gave  a c o u n te r - n o t i c e  u n d e r  ru le  2f> in  respect  o f  th a t  person or applied 
u n d e r  ru le  28 fo r  a d i r e c t i o n  th a t  t h a t  pe rson  be ca l le d  as a witness at th* 
t r ia l  o r  h e a r in g  o f  the  cause o r  m a t te r .
38/30/1 Application of ru le— This  ru lr is based upon s.8 (1 ) ol the Ai t (see.13th Report nt iW 
Law  Reform C om m ittee, C nm tl. 2964 (1966) para. 33). T h e  object o f the rule is tlut, il a* 
credibility  of the maker o f an otil-o f-C ourt statement is sought to be attacked, he should I* 
called as a witness at the trial and should be able to defend himself, fo r  this purpose, tlir r»V 
requires a party who intends to take this course either to serve a counter-notice under r 
or, if  the statement was made in previous legal proceedings, to apply for directions tmdrr i 7* 
that the m aker o f the hearsay statement should be called as a witness at the trial.
f lic  rule gives the Court a discretion to adm it evidence impugning the credibility of <1* 
maker o f a statement who has not been c alled as a witness at the trial in response to a r>*r» 
ter-noticc but whose statement has nevertheless been adm itted in evidence under tbe d* 
cretionary powers o f the C ourt under r.29.
I he rule gives the Court a liir lhe r discretion to allow evidence to be admitted at l.u loin r*v 
credibility  ol the m aker o f a statement, notw ithstanding the failure to serve a couutrr-nut** 
in respect of that person, e g if  a party discovers that that person has made an inronsittrw 
statement only when it is too late to serve a counter-notice under r.26.
Notice required of intention to give evidence of certain inconsl*- 
tent statements (0 .38, r.31)
38/31 31.— (1) W h e re  a pe rso n ,  p a r t i c u la r s  o f  w h o m  were  con ta ined  in *
n o t ic e  g iv e n  u n d e r  ru le  21 in  a cause o r  m a t t e r ,  is not to  be r a i le d  as a wit- 
ness at the  t r ia l  o r  h e a r in g  o f  the cause o r  m a t te r ,  a n y  p a r t y  to  the cause << 
m a t te r  w h o  is e n t i t le d  a n d  in te n d s  to  a d d u c e  in  re la t io n  to th a t  person an* 
e v id e n ce  w h i c h  is a d m is s ib le  fo r  the  p u rp o s e  m e n t io n e d  in  section 7(l)(b 
o f  the  A c t  m u s t ,  no t  m o re  th a n  2 1 d a y s  a f te r  se rv ice  o f  th a t  no t ice  on him 
serve on  the  p a r t y  w h o  gave th a t  n o t ice ,  n o t ic e  o f  h is  i n te n t io n  to do  so 
r ) \  u . , i , .  <><>/n  t o n  vt.-. li  ...... ............. ....................... t... ....... t   ; r .»
relates were a s ta te m e n t  ac ln i iss i t t lc  t>y v i r t u e  ot a. *,\ “ i „  .....  1 — __
Cl) T h e  C o u r t  m a y ,  i f  i t  t h in k s  i t  j u s t  to  d o  so, a l lo w  a p a r t y  to  g ive  m  
r*»drncc at the t r i a l  o r  h e a r in g  o f  a cause o r  m a t t e r  a ny  ev idence  w h ic h  is 
*1missib lc  fo r  the  p u rp o s e  m e n t io n e d  in  the  sa id  sect ion  7(1 ) ( b )  n o t w i l h -  
t u n d in g  th a t  the  p a r t y  has fa i le d  to  c o m p ly  w i t h  the p ro v is io n s  of p a ra -  
C r j p h ( l ) .
Application ot ru le— Th is  rule applies where the m aker n f a statement w h irh  is the sub- 38 /31/1  
rxt nf a r.21 N ntirc  i.s not going to be called as a witness at the trial I n silt It event, nf course,
■ would be useless to serve a counter-notice under r.26, but this rule provides an alternative  
pm<rdure where it is sought to attack the credibility  o f that person, by putting in evidence 
weenistent statements made by him which are admissible under s .7 (l)(/> ) of the Act. In  
«wh rare, a notice under this rule must be served and such a notice must contain the same
rifticulars as if it were a notice under itilc  21. For form of notice, sec F.ditorial Forms, F.F 9.-f 2. IM. 2.
Costs (0.38, r.32)
32. I f —  38/32
( a )  a p a r t y  to  a cause  o r  m a t t e r  serves a c o u n te r -n o t ic e  u n d e r  ru le  
26 in  respec t  o f  a n y  person  w h o  is ca l le d  as a w i tn e ss  at the 
t r i a l  o f  th e  cause o r  m a t t e r  in  c o m p l ia n c e  w i t h  a r e q u i r e m e n t  
o f  the  c o u n te r - n o t ic e ,  a n d
( b )  i l  a p p e a rs  to  th e  C o u r t  t h a t  i t  w as  u n re a s o n a b le  to  r e q u i r e  
t h a t  p e rs o n  to be c a l le d  as a w itness ,
then, w i t h o u t  p re ju d ic e  to  O r d e r  62 a n d ,  in  p a r t i c u la r ,  to  ru le  10(1) 
thereof, the  C o u r t  m a y  d i r e c t  t h a t  a n y  costs to  th a t  p a r t y  in  respec t o f  the 
p repara t ion  a n d  se rv ic e  o f  the  c o u n te r - n o t ic e  s h a l l  n o t  be a l lo w e d  to h im  
*rwl th a t  a n y  costs  o c c a s io n e d  b y  the  c o u n te r -n o t i c e  to  a n y  o th e r  p a r t y  
iha l l  he p a id  b y  h im  to  th a t  p a r t y .
Amended by R .S .C . (A m end m ent) 1986 (S .L  1986 No. 632).
Application Of r u le —-Th is rule gives express guidance to the Courts in relation to costs 38/32/1 
•here a counter-notice under r.26 is unreasonably served. Th e  discretion o f the C ourt is in 
»■> way fettered, but particu lar attention is drawn to 0 .6 2  r. I0 ( I ). Th is  rule indicates a clear 
ferwral practice that the unreasonable service o f a counter-notice should result in the party  
iT-ewemed paying the costs thereby occasioned, as well as that party bring disallowed any 
tmtv in respect o f the preparation and service of the counter-notice. (Sec I 3th Report o f Law 
I fk im i Com m ittee, C m n d . 2961 (I9 6 G ) para. 24).
Certain powers exercisable In chambers ( 0 . 3 8 ,  r .3 3 )
33. T h e  j u r i s d i c t i o n  o f  the  C o u r t  u n d e r  sec t ions  2 (2 ) ( « ) ,  2 (3 ) ,  4 (2 ) (n )  38/33 
»nd 6( 1) o f  the  A c t  m a y  be exe rc ised  in  c h a m b e rs .
Application Of ru le— T h is  rule enables the powers of thr Court under the specified sec- 38/33/1 
'wo* i.f the Act to be exercised in C ham bers, with the object that they should be so exercised 
V<r>re the trial; sec para. 3 8 /2 7 -2 8 /1 .
Statements of opinion (0 .38 , r.34)
34. W h e re  a p a r l y  to  a cause o r  m a t t e r  des ires  to g ive  in  e v id e n ce  bv 38/34 
\ i r t u e  o f  P a r t  I o f  the  A c t ,  as e x te n d e d  b y  sec t ion  1(1) o f  the C i v i l  K v i -  
dence A c t  1972, a s ta te m e n t  o f  o p in io n  o th e r  th a n  a s ta te m e n t  to  w h ic h  
Part IV' o f  t h i s C ) r d e r  a p p l ie s ,  the  p ro v is io n s  o f  ru les  20 to 23 a n d  25 to 33 
th.t ll a p p ly  w i t h  such  m o d i f i c a t io n s  as the C o u r t  m a y  d i re c t  o r  the c i r c u m -  
» U it r rs  o f  the  case m a y  re q u i re .
.* n o  t rg t i <17 t NJ.« 2*>r*)
. 11 . ■ I v L- ‘ - : >,., - ..T ' , , , , , ,  , , , , ,  f ,. i a. i 1 «it i jk- i . i v i i  lA 'tr trn c r  A n  P  ~r
fsrc \5>f 2, para . 6100) which im plemented llir  recommendations o f  tlir  Scvrnlcrnih Rrpf 
of ll ir  I .;uv Reform f  to m in iiirr , (tum id  4 180 ( I <170)) refuting m i In- a (I n i iss i tiili r y in n iT r. > 
ol siairm ents of opinion.
1 lie  r lT r r l  n f  s. I is I n  a p p ly  I ’a n  i o f t  lie  C iv i l  l iv id r o r e  A r l  I 'H ill ( s r r  V o l . 2 ,  paras (7 * 0 r  
.1 ( i f . )  w h ic h ,  s u l i j r r l  In  s p r r i l i r d  e n n d ilin n s  m a k r s  h e a rs a y  e v id e n c e  n l s la trn irn ls  nf I v *  
a d il l is s ih l r  in  r iv a l p r n e r  r d in ^ s ,  In  si a I n  o n  its  n l o p in io n ,  a n d  I lie  r  Ilia  I n f  il l  is ru le  is In 
l l i r  m a c h in e r y  n l a d d u c in g  h e a rs a y  r v i d r n r r  of s ta te m e n ts  n f  fa i l ,  as e n la rg e d  in rr ?f> T  
a n d  2 5 - 3 3 ,  a b o v e , In  s la i r m r n ls  o f  n p in in n  w ills  s n eh  m n d i l i r a lm n s  as l l i r  C o u r t  mav H e w  
n r  l l i r  c ir c u m s ta n c e s  n f  l l i r  ra s e  m a y  r n j i i i r e .
A c c o r d in g ly ,  l l i r  p a r ly  w h o  d e s ire s  In  a d d u c e  h e a rs a y  e v id e n c e  n l la y  n p in in n  al I lie tr.2 
m u s t d is c lo s e  th e  s ta te m e n t  c o n ta in in g  th a t  n p in in n  a n d  m u s t s erv e  I lie  re q u is ite  notice <7h» 
in te n t io n  in  re ly  u p o n  s u ch  s ta te m e n t  o n  e v e ry  e ith e r  p a r ty  as r e q u ir e d  by  r .2 1, and »•» I 
n o tic e  m u s t c o n ta in  th e  h e a rs a y  p a r t ic u la r s  as r e q u ir e d  b y  i t . 2 2  a n d  2 3 , w ith  th r  nuxhfv* 
l io n  th a t  th e  s ta te m e n t  In  b e  a d d u c e d  in  e v id e n c e  a re  s ta te m e n ts  n f  o p in io n . I f  no rnuntr* 
n o tic e  is s e rv e d  p u r s u a n t  to  r .2 ( i ,  r e q u ir in g  th e  w itn e s s  w h o  m a d e  t h r  s ta te m e n t in l ie u t W  
a l th e  t r ia l ,  d ie  s ta te m e n t  w o u ld  b e c o m e  a d m is s ib le  a l th e  l im e  as r v i d r n r r  o f  any  m a tim  I  
la y  n p in in n  c o n ta in e d  in i l ,  as w e ll  as o f  a n y  l a r i  s la te d  in  il w h ic h  w as  k n o w n  lo  l l ir  w nrvx  
as a re s u lt e it h e r  n l h is  o w n  o b s e rv a t io n s  o r  o f  h is  g e n e ra l  p ro fe s s io n a l k n o w le d g e  nr rq « —• 
n ic e .  I f  s u ch  r o u n te r -n o t ic e  i.s s e rv e d , th e  s ta te m e n t ,  o f  course, w o u ld  not be  admiwibV »• 
th e  t r ia l  un le ss  th e  w itn e s s  h im s r l l  w a s  c a l le d  n r  u n le ss  he w as  u n a v a ila b le  fur anv of 
re a s o n s  s p e c ifie d  in  r .2 5 ,  n r  u n le ss  th e  ( a u t i l  g i \  rs  le a v e  lo r  I lie  s ta te m e n t In  h r  admitted *  
e v id e n c e  u n d e r  i .2 d .
T h e  C i v i l  K v id r n c r  A n  11(72, s .l  e x c lu d e s  s ..5 o f  th e  C i v i l  E v id e n c e  A i l  I ‘Mill (siairmr»«< 
p ro d u c e d  b y  c o m p u te ts )  a n d  lit is  ru le  e x c lu d e s  a n v  re fe re n c e  in  r .2 1
I V .  E x p e r t  E v i d e n c e
Interpretation (0.38, r.35)
38/35 35. In  l l i i s  p a r i  o l th is  O r d e r  a re fe rence  to a s u m m o n s  for t lirc i u**rt»
in c lu d e s  a re fe rence  to a ny  s u m m o n s  o r  a p p l i c a t io n  lo  w h ic h ,  under am i /  
t l iese R u les ,  ( ) r d e r  25, ru les  2 to  7, a p p ly  a n d  exp ress ions  used in this I’jm 
o f  th is  O r d e r  w h ic h  a rc  used in  the ( l i v i l  E v id e n c e  Ac t  I 072 have the s.ttr-' 
m e a n in g s  in  th is  P a r t  o l  th is  O r d e r  as in  th a t  A c t .
38/35/1 Scope and operation Of Part IV  Part IV  nl this O fd c i was addrd by R.S.C. ( .W * "  
men I ) I 0 71 (S .l. 1(171 Nii. 295) and conlains the rules which were a ill lu >i isrd In hr mail/ t» 
s.2 n f the C iv il Evidence A n  I '(72 (see V o l.2. para t i l (10) w ith respect in expert repirn *-»7 
oral expert evidence, which suhsluntialb im plem enied the recommendations nl llir Srvr* 
leenlli Report o f the Law  Reform Com m ittee on Evidence o f t  )pinion and Expert Kvidetv# 
C m nil. T1R9 ( 1**70)) which ilsell so far as i iin ierns medical expert rvidrnrr in i n r v n i t  
in jury actions lias followed and adopted die reeom niendal ions n f the Com m itter on l ’rr»/nV 
Injuries Litigation, ( '.innil. 3ti()I ( I9 b 9 ) paras. 277 283).
I'liese rules rrs lric l l l ir  right nl the parlies in adduce esp rit evidence in civil prutrnti-se. 
as a m aile r nl course, and they pros ide die mat liinerv lor die prc -iiia l disclosure In r» 1 
party lo die o ilier ol die medical and m in i expert evidence intruded in be relied on .it i'« 
trial.
Il should be stressed dial s.2 nl die C iv il Evidence Act l((72 has not abrogated tin-tub 1 
substantive law dial llie re pi iris ol experts pi epa i ed lot die purpose o f pending nr um i'i* 
plated civil proceedings m in i onnecl ion with die nhiuiniiig  ol giving ol legal advice .or t»s 
vilegcd from disclosure (see 117in n / lv .  Reich | I955J I Q  IL 2IH); | I 9 5 5 | I A ll E.R. 3h3. <. V 
Hr Saxton tired. | I9b 2 | I W .L .R . 9(>Jt; | I9b2 | 3 A ll E .R . 02, ( ..A .;  (dint Inn v. Mann T-.grrMa i /•*• 
sans) Ltd. 111)7-11 1 W .L .R . Iii2: | I9 7 1 |  I A ll E .R . 153, C .A .) ’. I bis rule ol law remaini « 
operation, and such reports rem ain privileged dot umenis. anil one parly cannot ioiii|m-I r*» 
disclosure ol such reports In  die opposite party, unless such privilege is waived (ibid i lb- 
elfect of s. 2 of the 1072 Ac I and ol I ’a i l  I V  is In preclude oral expert evidence being .ulilun-* 
at the trial or hearing n f any cause ni m aile r except in die following circumstances
(u) w ith die leave nl die ( amrl;
(7>) where all parlies agree;
(r) where il is given by allidav ii (r. 3(i(2) ) or
(d) where in accordance w ith  die rules under I’a il IN' die C ourl has given a ib irm *  
llia l it may be so adduced in evidence.
The m achinery provided by die rules of I ’arl IV  is as follows. The m bs no longri 
linguish between ililferenl classes ol expert evidence. Th e  ( amrl will ordinal ily order tlir 
closure ol all expert reports unless there are special reasons lot not doing so The eouin !.i • 
as ye I not determ ined whai are likelv lo amount in “ special reasons ’’ The Com I max dc' • 
dial pari nnlv of the ext>eri evidence sboold (>>■ <11-.I i • . . • •
•  M 'lC rtl w i t h o u t  firs t l ie in g  i l is i  Insect | i  V . i )  W i n n  l l i r  t \ ; m t  m 1h »m  i « i  n  i \w -
V «rd is railed as a witness, bis repot I mav be pm in e\ itteie e al die out set ol Ins iw .im in- 
i'*  ei in chief (r .T t ) ;  and die opposite p a lly  may himself put in evidence anv e sp rit icport 
A-v It xrd lo him (r. 12) I leal sav ex pel I eviilem e max I w arl mi I led win n the ex pel I i anno I 
•* »K<.iilei not be called as a w iin i ss in die same way as oilier he.iisav e\ idem c max l>e .u ln iil- 
(r 41). Any direel ion giv en by die ( ami I lit c, be i evoked i u v al i' d bv a siibsei pu ill d u n  
s e n  ( r 4 1 ) ;  and the failure o r  refusal lo it  imply w ith anv direi lion g t v  i i i  bv die (  ami I  as i n  
A- per-trial disclosure of expert evtdenee will result in die parly being unable In adduce sin It 
rsvtrnir at die tria l unless the C ourt gives leave.
I hr mles of this Pari o f ibis O rder constitute a radical dcpai line  in die law and prai tii e 38/35/2 
■bung to adducing expert evidence al die trial of civil pioccedings. In  the lirst place, die 
Tthi " f a party to call such expert evidence as he i houses at the trial has been ics irii led by 
A* provision that he can only do so subject lo die leave of die (a m r l or agreement between 
*• trie parlies or subject to com pliance w ith die direction of the Com  I that he should disclose 
Vt-er die trial tbc substances o f such expert evidence lo any oilier parly  but this is subject in 
Arf i are of actions for personal injuries to 0 .2 5 . r 8 ( I ) ( A) and (r). In  die second place, die 
isjhi of a party lo w ithho ld  the disclosure of Ins expert evidence until die li ial has been m oili- 
ted bv the provision d ial lie is required lo make such disclosure before die li i.i l as a eon 
♦'■■in precedent to using it at the trial unless the Court considers dial there are spei ial 
for not ordering surli disclosure. These rules thus make a significant advance in die 
fcm lion of a more open svstcm of pre-tria l proceedings so as lo enable I lie par I us lo pi epa ic 
»*»i presrii I I heir respective cases on thr basis ol m a in  ial evident e kii'ivui lo I hem miIm i 
A.»n in do so in die dark. The objects imended lo be ai liiev ed by die rules aie many and mav 
raid in include the follow ing, lo assist the parties lo reach a fair settlement or perhaps a 
tmlemenl on a fairer basis in die light, rather than in die dark, concerning die rx p r ii cvi- 
k rx r , In avoid surprise at die Ii ial, to securing agreed expert rcixirts and thus obv iating die 
w-r-if for the attendance ol experts at die tria l, lo shorten die ev idem e at die trial by ideniilv - 
ihr matters o f expert opinion which arc really in controversy between llie parlies, and lo 
<~ejblr die experts themselves lo prepare their evidence on those m aiie is  more thoroughly 
wxd helpfully. In  these several ways, these rules are designed lo im prove die condiii i and die 
yuluv of civil trials, by reducing < os I , del a v and vexation pa i tit ula 11 v in ilia l l bey avoid sue 
row at the tria l and the unnecessary attendance at d ir  tria l o f experts who could be more
»**(ullv employed elsewhere
I hr machinery for the pi e -lria l disclosure of expert evidence is, how ever, intended lo nprr- 
r-» on the basis o f fairness and m utua lity  as between I be parlies, and ennv ei selv dial neither 
far tv »lion I d be able or should I ie allowed to operate such machinery so .is to oveneai h any 
s»Vrf< pa i (y, by obtaining llie disclosure ol die par l v s  expert ev idem e lie lore the trial without 
«r .Ae lamr lime disclosing his own expert evident e lo dial parts or being pi o  lu lled lioni i a 11 - 
on h expert evidence at die (civ il) tria l. lo  achieve su ili fairness and mutnulitv the 
*«.»'hmrry is in truded  lo operate so as lo prov ide for the simultaneous cxi hangc of expeil's  
—puTi on or before a fixed dale which il may be convenient lo call die “ exchange d a te ,” and 
A* (rallies w ill be expected and required, lo carry out arrangements lor die exchange ol 
»vf«rt rrjxvrts in the sense o f simultaneously disclosing (heir reports to each oilier I his nor- 
m l r nlr of practice w ill no doubt be subject lo va rial ions subject lo the special < ii cu instances 
d  funicular cases, but always die overriding consideration will be to m aintain Ian m ss and 
••jtiiah iv  between die parlies. The terms ol the rules do not lim it die powns ot the (a m rl in 
or i In  s it can make for the disc Insure of experts* re pm is. and I be i elm r i i i  spei ial cm nut- 
. 'K u o , as where die area o f inquiry goes back many ye.us and involves investigation ol the 
fTuniiirs various working conditions and die slate ol know ledge about die i nnscqiiem i s ol 
ju 'iii ill.• r activities, r.g. excessive noise, an order not lor siinulianeous but Im die sequential 
ha ngr of experts' reports is la ir and proper (AiiAii/) v. Hnli<h R tiil l\n t;in trnn i; I. id  \ l'iM t| I 
h I. R I lt)5; (191331 3 A ll E .R  M 7, C .A  allirm ing [ I9 II3 ) I W  I , R I'M); | l!'M3| I A ll I . R 
I '.S' How ever in personal injuries actions, die pi a ml ill is now required lo serv e bis nu < In a I 
•svtenrr with bis statement o f i laim .
FW*trlctions on adducing expert evidence (0.38, r.36)
1<>.— (1) E x c e p t  w i t h  the  leave o f  the C o u r t  o r  w h e re  all  p a r t ie s  agree, 38/36 
»»o expert e v id e n c e  m a y  lie a d d u c e d  at the t r ia l  o r  h e a r in g  ol a n y  c ause o r  
■ M it r r  unless the p a r t y  seek ing  to a d d u c e  the  e v id e n c e —
( i i ) has a p p l ie d  to  the C o u r t  lo  d e te rm in e  w h e th e r  a d i r e c t io n  
s h o u ld  be g ive n  u n d e r  ru le  37 o r  4 I (w h ic h e v e r  is a p p r o p r ia te )  
a n d  has c o m p l ie d  w i t h  a n y  d i r e c t io n  g ive n  on the , , 1 c a t io n ,  
o r
( b ) has c o m p l ie d  w i t h  a u to m a t ic  d i re c t io n s  ta k in g  o f fe r t  u n d e r  
O r d e r  25. ru le  } )( ! ) ( /> ).
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38/36/1
38/36/2
t o  b e  < m b y  n H i ( t n  \  i t  i i i  s / 1.i // .1 f l e e t  t!i< r n f o r c f m c i ) ( tm c fe r  a i t )  oili<r 
p r o v i s i o n  o f  t he s e  R u le s  ( c x r c p t  O r d e r .  if),  r u l e  !)) o l  a d i m  lion given
u n d e r  t h i s  p a r i  o f " t h i s  O rd e r .
S-
Amended by R .S .C . (Amendment N o.2) 198 0 ( S I  I 980 No. 10KM and by R.S ( ’. (Attirrvl 
mem 1987 (S .l. 1987 No. I 128).
E ffec t of ru le  — I lie rllrc l is to preclude cverv parly Irom addin ini’ any ex pen evident r »■ 
the trial or hearing ol any cause or m atter rxcrp l ( I ) with the leav e ol the C'.onrl or (21 whor 
all the parties agree or (8) where the ev idence is given hv affidavit or (4) where the |urt> 
seeking to adduce such evidence has first applied to the C.ourt to determine whether or rv« 
and i f  so to what extent, lie must disclose the substance o f his expert evidence to any o th e r 
party before the trial and he has complied with such direction or (8) where hr has rnmpliot 
with the autom atic directions under 0 .2 8 . r .8 ( l) (A ). It thus becomes of prime importing 
that every party , whether plaintilVor defendant or third party, intending to use expert m  
dcncc ol any character at the trial o f civil proceedings lo apply to the (a m rl for a dirrrtr* 
under rr.37 and 4 1, as the case may he, lor otherwise he will simply he prevented fn»t 
adducing such expert evidence al the tiia l, un less  he se< iocs the consent of all the other |x*r 
ties or applies lo adduce such evidence by allidavit I lie sanction lor lailure ol any partv «• 
apply' lor the direction ol the (a m rl to adduce expcil evidence al the trial is the elleciro 
exclusion ol th r expert evidence ol that party.
The application for a direction tinder r 37 (expert oral ev idence) or r.4 I (expert rvidrrw 
contained in statem ent) must be made by summons to the Master or District Registrar t* n 
the case may he, e.g. to the c ircuit Judge taking O llie ia l Referee business in Official Krfnr» 
actions, to the Judge in charge ol the Com m ercial Court in commercial actions, tn thr 
A dm iralty  Registrar in adm iralty actions. Th e  application may be made at any stage of tie 
proceedings, though it should ordinarily  he made at the hearing o f the summons for tlitrr 
lions or by notice under such summons. 1 nr Iced, bv virtue o f 0 .2 5 , r.3 , consideration mint 
given at the hearing o f the summons for directions as to whether orders or directions ittvVr 
I’art IV  o f this O rder should he made or given, if  net cssai y by the Court or its own nmtre 
and therefore all parties must, where practicable, make an application on the hearing i•( tVe 
summons for directions for leave to adduce expert evidence at the trial and as to tlir if* 
closure of experts’ reports (see Practice Direction (b'.ridrncr: H.xperf) | 1974] I W .I..R , 901; | I ti tJ 
2 A ll E .R . 906). The application may he made after the action is set clown for trial. Iiut «/ 
course it should he made at a reasonable time before the tria l, precisely because it ntu 4* 
required lor the purposes o f the tria l. A lthough the rule seems to require each partv to milf 
a separate application to the C ourt, it would seem that in practice if  any party maker v j  * 
application, the Court w ill he in a position to deal w ith th r question whether or not il rlwrrW 
give a direction as to thr pre-trial disclosure of the expert evidence o f the other parlies In it* 
ordinary case, no affidavit would he necessary on the hearing ol anv such application
A lth o u g h  th e  C o u r t  has  p o w e r  u n d e r  0 . 8 8 .  r .4  lo  l im i t  th e  n u tn h /r  o f  m e d ic a l or inhr- 
c x p e i t w itn e ss es  lo  h r  c a lle d  at th e  t r ia l ,  il h as  n o  p o w e r  tm d e t th is  r u le  o r  u n d e r its inheres* 
j l i r i s d ' t  t io n , w h e re  a p a r ty  has  m a d e  d u e  a p p lic  a t io n  u n d e r  th is  r u le ,  to  b a r  th a t partv I n *  
c a ll in g  a n  e x p e r t  w itn e s s  a t th e  t r ia l ,  e.g. e x p e r t  a c tu a r ia l  e v id e n c e , a n d  at th r  in ir r lo ru t -n  
s ta g e , th e  M a s te r  o r  I lie  ) u d g e  in  ( 3 lu m b e rs  is no t r o t  it led  in  ru le  o n  th e  a d m is s ib ility  of o t  
e v id e n c e  (S u lliv a n  v . l i e d  Y o ik x h ir r  I 'a t ie n g e r  l i a m / m i l  l \ \ r t u t i r r  \ l'tM.r>| 2  A l l  E .R . 134. (1 A I
I he ru le  le a v e s  il o p e n  to  th e  p a r lie s  to  a g re e  th a t  a ll  n i anv o l th e m  m a y  a d d u rr  rv|^~  
e v id e n c e  a t th e  t r ia l  w i th o u t  s e e k in g  a d ir e c t io n  o f  th e  ( a im  t w h e th e r  o r  not there  sliouM  
a n y  p r e - t r ia l  d is c lo s u re  o l s u r li  e x p e r t  e v id e n c e , f o r  th is  p u rp o s e  a ll  th e  p a rtie s  i i i i im  . i f f *  
on  th is  c o u rs e , a n d  s u ch  a g re e m e n t s h o u ld  be e x p lir  it a n d  p re c is e . It  re m a in s  to  h r srm •• 
w h a t e x te n t p a r lie s  in  c iv i l  p ro c e e d in g s  w h o  h a v e  th e  m e a n s  at h a n d  to  id en tify  iv h a tiv -V  
e x p e rt i sc o n  w h ic h  I h e y  d i l le r .  to  a v o id  th e  n e r d  lo r  th e  a t te n d a n c e  a t th e  t r ia l o f  their r i p — 
w itn e ss es , to  re d u c e  costs a n d  e l im in a te  s u rp r is e  a t th e  Ii ia l ,  s h o u ld  a g re e  u p o n  the o o p *  *  
c o u rs e  o l w ith h o ld in g  fro m  e a c h  o th e i th e ir  re s p e c t iv e  e x p e rt e v id e n c e  so as to  he in tbr p »  
i l io n  o f  a d d u c in g  s u ch  e v id e n c e  a l th e  t r ia l .  I f .  h o w e v e r , th e y  a ll a g re e  u p o n  this m u rv  i 
w o u ld  seem  th a t  th e  C o u r t  w i l l  h a v e  n o  o p t io n  h u t lo  a llo w  s u ch  e x p e rt evidence t.. 
a d d u c e d  at th e  t r ia l .
O n  th e  o th e r  h a n d , th e  p o w e r  to  o r d e r  th e  n  im p u ls o r y  d is c lo s u re  o f  ex  p e rt evidence urxVr 
r r .3 7 ,  o r  4 1, d o es  no t a lfe e t th e  r ig h t o f  any p a r ty  v o lu n ta r i ly  to  d isc lo s e  his ow n rv |»rn  
re p o rts  to  th e  o p p o s ite  p a r ty  in  t h r  n e g o tia t io n s  b e fo re  l i t ig a t io n  is s ta rte d  n r  ih r r r a f ir r  jt »• 
e a r l ie r  s ta g e  th a n  th e  s u m m o n s  lo r  d ir e c t io n s . The  v o lu n ta r y  d is c lo s u re  o f  stielt r r p r »  
w o u ld  m a k e  it e a s ie r  to  d e m o n s tr a te  to  th e  C o u r t  th a t  th e  re le v a n t e x p e r t  ev idence  tm 1 .4  
sides is o f  a k in d  w h ic h  is a p p r o p r ia te  lo r  a n  o r d e r  fo r c o m p u ls o ry  e x c h a n g e : and in 
e v e n t, th e  d is c lo s u re  o l s u ch  re p o t t is a c o n d it io n  p re c e d e n t to  its a d m is s ib i l i ty  as ol tight *■ 
e v id e n c e  a t th e  t r ia l
I h is  ru le  d o es  n o t a p p ly  to  e x p e r t  e v id e n c e  w h ic h  is p e r m it te d  to  be  g iv e n  In  .i lle b .t  
I he o b v io u s  re a s o n  is th a t  th e  t i l in g  o f  a n  a l l id a v i t  a n d  its s e rv ic e  on  th e  o th e r  parties n r  
c lfee tiv 'e  a m e a n s  o f  s e c u r in g  th e  d is c lo s u re  o f  e x p e r t  e v id e n c e  as is p ro v id e d  hv Pan l \  • 
th is  O r d e r ;  a n d  m o r e o v e r ,  il w o u ld  be  h ig h ly  im p i  at lit a b le  lo  a p p ly  th e  provis ions ■•( ■*» 
l ’a r t  r tf th e  ( J rd er lo  p ro c e e d in g s , s ilt It as in te r io r  u lo r v  p ro t i-e rlin c s  in  w h ic h  ev idem  > «• .
T , i• -v rule floes nol \t» *.• ivototvs V’v» wnu ii
• pplv (%CC O . \ 04 , r. I 0( C>) ) .
this rule explicitly excludes the modes of com mittal ami sequestration lot d ir enforce- 
•eenl of the orders cir directions of the Court lor the compulsory disclosure of expert cvi- 
Vnre, since such stringent modes would lie inappropriate. O n  the other hand, the title 
ferognises that thr sanction for the failure or refusal to comply with such orders or tlirec- 
v f l i  of (he C ourt could he the stay or dismissal ol thr action or the striking out of the 
Arfrtirc, as the case may be.
Direction that expert report be disclosed (0.38, r.37)
.17.— (1) S u b je c t  to p a r a g r a p h  (2 ) ,  w h e re  in  a ny  cause o r  m a t t e r  an 38/37 
app l ica t ion is m a d e  u n d e r  ru le  36 (1 )  in respect o f  o ra l  e x p e r t  e v idence ,  
then, unless the  C o u r t  co n s ide rs  th a t  there  are  spec ia l reasons lo r  no t  
doing so, it  s h a l l  d i r e c t  th a t  the su b s tance  o f  the e v idence  be d isc losed  in 
thr fo rm o f  a w r i t t e n  r e p o r t  o r  re p o r ts  to such  o th e r  p a r t ie s  an d  w i t h i n  
such p e r iod  as the  C o u r t  m a y  spec ify .
(2) N o t h in g  in  p a r a g r a p h  ( 1) sha l l  re q u i te  a p a r t y  to d isc lose a fu r t h e r  
medical re p o r t  i f  l ie  p roposes  to  re ly  at the t r ia l  o n ly  on the re p o r t  p r o ­
vided p u rs u a n t  to  O r d e r  18, ru le  1 2( 1 A )  o r  (1 13) b u t ,  w h e re  a p a r t y  c la im -  
mg damages fo r  p e rso n a l  in ju r ie s  disc loses a fu r t h e r  re p o r t ,  th a t  re p o r t  
»hall be a c c o m p a n ie d  b y  a s ta te m e n t  o f  the  spec ia l d a m ages  c la im e d  a n d ,  
tn this p a ra g r a p h ,  “ s ta te m e n t  o f  the spec ia l da m a g e s  c la im e d  lias the 
u m e  m e a n in g  as in  O r d e r  18, ru le  12( IG ) .
Substituted by R .S .C . (A m endm ent N o .4) 1989 (S .l 1989 No 2427)
of experts (0 .38, r.38)
38. In  a n y  cause o r  m a t t e r  the C o u r t  m a y ,  if it th in k s  f i t ,  d i r e c t  th a t  38/38 
there be a m e e t in g  “ w i t h o u t  p re ju d ic e ’ ol such  e xpe r ts  w i t h i n  such 
fx r i tx ls  be fore  o r  a f te r  the  d isc lo su re  o f  th e i r  re p o r ts  as the C o u r t  m a y  
sperify, fo r  the p u rp o s e  of id e n t i f y in g  those p a r ts  of th e i r  e v idence  w h ic h  
i r r  in issue. W h e r e  such  a m e e t in g  takes p lace the exp e r ts  m a y  p re p a re  a 
joini s ta te m e n t  i n d i c a t i n g  those p a r ts  o f  th e i r  ev idence  on  w h ic h  they  arc, 
jnd  those on  w h ic h  they  a re  n o t ,  in  a g re e m e n t . ’ ’ .
Substituted by R .S .C . (A m endm ent) 1987 (S .l. 1987 No. 1423).
Disclosure of part of expert evidence (0.38, r.39)
39 W h e re  the  C o u r t  con s id e rs  tha t  a ny  c i r c u m s ta n c e s  re n d e r in g  it  38/39 
undesirable to  g ive  a d i r e c t io n  u n d e r  ru le  37 re la te  to  p a r t  o n ly  <>1 the e v i ­
dence s o u g h t  to  be a d d u c e d ,  the  C o u r t  m a y ,  i f  i t  t h in k s  f i t ,  d i re c t  d is-  
dosurc o f  the  r e m a in d e r .
A m e n d e d  by R .S .C . (A m endm ent) 1987 (S .l. 1987 No 1423)
Eft*ct of rules 37 and 39^—T h e  effect is to provide, in the <:;iscs in which they apply, lor 38/37—39/1 
tVr compulsory disclosure, and ord inarily  for die compulsory exchange, of experts' reports, 
parts thereof, before the tria l. As a result o f the substitution of the new rule 37 there is now 
distinction between personal in jury and non-personal in jury actions so far as the dis-
• Vvurr of rxpert reports is concerned.
It lhould be observed that if  the Court shall decline to direct or order that a party s 
r»perti' re|v>rts should be disclosed, that party w ill thereby he at liberty to withhold Ins 
n p r t C  reirorts and to adduce oral expert evidence at thr trial. I hc rll'cci of not giv ing a 
4-rrftion that one party ’s expert's report should be disclosed is to tree that partv from  
Enclosing that report and entitling him to call that expert lo give his oral testimony at 
iW trial. In  this connection, il should he observed that, just as in the case ol thr dis- 
rfcwurr of experts’ reports where, on the principle of fairness and m utuality, the Court
•  at ordinarily order the compulsory exchange of such reports, so if it should decline to 
•e lrr one party to disclose his experts' reports, the Court will ord inarily  decline lo order 
r«v disclosure o f the experts' reports of thr opposite party, so that l>oth parties w ill hr
to w i t h h o l d  their experts’ reports from disclosure and to call the experts to give oral 
catcnrr at the tria l. It i.s only in exceptional circumstances that the Court would hr 
—■tin»r| to order one party to disclose Art experts' reports, while declining to give a d irrc-
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PART 32 
EXPERTS AND ASSESSORS
Contents of this Part
Duty to restrict expert evidence Rule 32.1
Interpretation Rule 32.2
Experts - overriding duty to the court Rule 32.3
Court’s power to restrict expert evidence Rule 32.4
General requirement for expert evidence to be given in Rule 32.5
written report
/
Written questions to experts Rule 32.6
Court’s power to direct that evidence is to be given by a Rule 32.7 
single joint expert
Instructions to a single joint expert Rule 32.8
Power of court to direct party to provide an expert report Rule 32.9 
Contents of report Rule 32.10
Use by one party of expert’s report disclosed by another Rule 32.11 
Meeting of experts Rule 32.12
Consequence of failure to disclose expert’s report Rule 32.13
Expert’s right to ask to court for directions Rule 32.14
Assessors Rule 32.15
Duty to restrict expert evidence
32.1 Expert evidence should be restricted to that which is reasonably required
to resolve the proceedings .
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Interpretation
32.2 A reference to an ‘expert’ in this Part is a reference to an expert who has 
been instructed to give or prepare evidence for the court.
Experts - overriding duty to the court
>
32.3 (1) It is the duty of an expert to help the court on the matters relevant to his
expertise.
(2) This duty overrides any obligation to the person from whom he has 
received instructions or by whom he is paid.
Court’s power to restrict expert evidence
32.4 (1) No party may call an expert or put in evidence an expert’s report without
the court’s permission.
(2) When a party applies for permission under this mle he must-
(a) name the expert he wishes to use; or
(b) if it is not practicable to name the expert, identify the field in which 
he wishes to call expert evidence.
(3) If permission is granted under this mle it shall be in relation only to the
expert named or the field identified under paragraph (2).
(4) The court may limit the amount that the party who wishes to call the
expert may recover from any other party by way of the fees and expenses 
of the expert.
(5) The court may vary or withdraw any permission given under this mle.
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General requirement for expert evidence to be given in a written report
32.5 (1) Expert evidence is to be given in a written report unless the court directs
otherwise.
(2) If a claim is on the fast track, the court will not direct an expert to attend a
hearing unless it is necessary to do so in the interests of justice.
Written questions to experts
32.6 (1) A party may put to-
(a) an expert instructed by another party; or
(b) a single joint expert appointed under rule 32.7,
written questions about his report
(2) Written questions under paragraph (1 )-
(a) may be put once only; and
(b) must be for the purpose only of clarification of the report; 
unless in either case,
(i) the court permits; or
(ii) the other party agrees.
(3) An expert’s answers to questions put in accordance with paragraph (1) 
shall be treated as part of the expert’s report.
Court’s power to direct that evidence is to be given by a single joint expert
32.7 (1) Where two or more parties wish to submit expert evidence on a particular
issue, the court may direct that the evidence on that issue is to given by 
one expert only.
(2) The parties wishing to submit the expert evidence are called ‘the 
instructing parties’.
(3) Where the instructing parties cannot agree who should be the expert, the 
court may-
(a) select the expert from a list prepared or identified by the instructing 
parties; or
(b) direct that the expert be selected in such other manner as the court 
may direct
(4) The court may vary a direction given under this rule.
Instructions to a single joint expert
32.8 (1) Where the court gives a direction under rule 32.7 for a single joint expert 
to be used, each instructing party may give instructions to the expert.
(2) When an instructing party gives instructions to the expert he must, at the 
same time, send a copy of the instructions to the other instructing parties.
(3) The court may give directions about -
(a) the payment of the expert’s fees and expenses; and
(b) any inspection, examination or experiments which the expert wishes 
to carry out.
(4) The court may, before an expert is instructed-
(a) limit the amount that can be paid by way of fees and expenses to the 
expert; and
(b) direct that the instructing parties pay that amount into court.
(5) Unless the court otherwise directs, the instructing parties are jointly and
/p t  \
severally liable for the payment of the expert’s fees and expenses.
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Power of court to direct a party to provide information
32.9 Where a party has access to information which is not reasonably
available to the other party, the court may direct the party who has 
access to the information to-
(a) to prepare and file the information; and
(b) to serve a copy of the information on the other party.
Contents of report
2.10(1) An expert’s report must comply with the requirements set out in a practice 
direction.
(2) At the end of an expert’s report there must be a statement that -
(a) the expert understands his duty to the court; and
(b) he has complied with that duty.
(3) The expert’s report must state the substance of all material instructions,
whether written or oral, on the basis of which the report was written.
(4) The instructions referred to in paragraph (3) shall not be privileged
against disclosure but the court will not, in relation to those instructions-
(a) order disclosure of any specific document; or
(b) permit any questioning in court, other than by the party who 
instructed the expert,
unless it is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to consider the 
statement of instructions given under paragraph (3) to be inaccurate or 
incomplete.
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Use by one party of expert’s report disclosed by another
32.11 Where a party has disclosed an expert’s report, any other party may use 
that expert’s report as evidence at the trial.
Discussions between'experts
32.12(1) The court may, at any stage, direct a discussion between experts for the 
purpose of requiring the experts to-
(a) identify the issues in the proceedings; and
(b) where possible, reach agreement on an issue.
(2) The court may specify the issues which the experts must address when 
they meet
(3) The court may direct that following any discussion between the experts 
they must prepare a statement for the court showing-
(a) those issues on which they agree; and
(b) those issues on which they disagree and a summary of their reasons 
for disagreeing.
(4) The contents of the discussion between the experts shall not be referred to 
at the trial.
(5) Where experts reach agreement on an issue during their discussions, the 
agreement shall not bind the parties unless the parties expressly agree to 
be bound by the agreement.
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Consequence of failure to disclose expert’s report
32.13 A party who fails to comply with a direction to disclose an expert’s report 
may not use the report at the trial or call the expert to give evidence orally 
unless the court permits.
Expert’s right to ask court for directions
32.14 (1) An expert may file a written request for directions to assist him in carrying
out his function as an expert.
(2) An expert may request directions under paragraph (1) without giving 
notice to any party.
(3) The court, when it gives directions, may also direct that a party be served 
with -
(a) a copy of the directions; and
(b) a copy of the request for directions.
Assessors
32.15(1) The court may appoint a person (an ‘assessor’) to assist the court in 
dealing with a matter in which the assessor has skill and experience..
(2) An assessor shall take such part in the proceedings as the court may direct 
and in particular the court may-
(a) direct the assessor to prepare a report for the court on any matter 
at issue in the proceedings; and
(b) direct the assessor to attend the whole or any part of the trial to 
advise the court on any such matter.
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(3) If the assessor prepares a report for the court before the trial has begun-
(a) the court will send a copy to each of the parties; and
(b) the parties may use it at trial.
(4) Any remuneration to be paid to the assessor for his services shall be 
determined by the court and shall form part of the costs of the 
proceedings.
(5) The court may order any party to deposit in the court office a specified 
sum in respect of the assessor’s fees and, where it does so, the assessor 
will not be asked to act until the sum has been deposited.
(6) The court may vary or revoke an order made under this mle.
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APPENDIX FIVE
DRAFT PROTOCOL OF BEST PRACTICE IN THE INSTRUCTION AND 
USE OF EXPERTS
In troduction
This protocol is intended as guidance to help those who instruct experts in all cases  
excep t fam ily  m atters and make use of expert evidence to do so more effectively and 
more efficiently. It is also intended to facilitate better communication and dealings between 
the expert and the instructing party and more widely between the opposing parties to a 
dispute. It incorporates and m ay be read in conjunction w ith  the Academy of Experts 
Model Form of Expert's Report and the Law Society's codes of practice. A ssistance from  
an expert m ay be needed at various stages o f a d ispute and for d ifferent purposes, 
the expert perform ing a d ifferent role in each o f these respects. The balance  
betw een the  duties to the party instructing the expert and the duty to the court w ill 
d iffer depending  upon the context. However, w hen preparing a report for use in 
evidence at court or w hen giving oral evidence, the expert has a prim ary duty to  the  
court o f ob jectiv ity  and partiality. Whilst it is for the parties to decide whether or not and 
if so to what extent to adhere to the specific provisions of the protocol, they do reflect 
principles which a court will expect litigants and experts to observe. The court is likely to  
take adherence to  the protocol into account in exercis ing its d iscretion as to  costs.
A p p o in tm en t
1 Those appointing experts, before doing so, ought to consider whether the 
appointment is reasonable and/or necessary, for which the following factors ought to 
be taken into account (and are likely to be taken into account by a court in 
exercising its discretion as to costs):-
(a) what the facts in issue are likely to be;
(b) whether those facts might be proved by existing available witnesses;
(c) whether an expert is necessary to prove those facts;
(d) w hether opinion evidence from  an expert is likely to be relevant or 
helpful to the court;
(e) whether an expert is necessary to put those opinions into evidence;
(f) whether the court will be assisted by the expert in relation to the issues or 
whether the issues are ones which the court can determine alone;
(g) the cost of the expert balanced against both the importance of the opinion to 
the issues in the case and either the value or importance to the client of the 
case.
2 An expert should not be appointed if he/she is unable to produce a report within a 
reasonable time of instruction, having regard to the timetable of the case. The time 
within which the expert should produce a report should be agreed on appointment. 
Where the agreed time limit cannot be met, notice of the delay should be given by 
the expert as soon as possible.
3 Appointment should be of an expert of an appropriate level of seniority, experience, 
expertise and training.
4 Econom y in the use of experts and a less adversarial expert culture is to  be 
encouraged. Parties should consider w hether they m ight instruct one expert 
in a particu lar d iscipline, to w hom  both parties have no objection, to  w hom  
each party m ight put questions, either before or after the report is prepared  
and disclosed, and w hether one expert m ight be jo in tly  instructed from  the  
outset. W here  the parties decide to  retain the ir own experts, they should  still 
consider w hat steps m ight be taken to narrow  the issues betw een them  and  
save costs, w hether sequential d isclosure o f experts reports (rather than  
m utual exchange), or d iscussions and m eetings betw een experts, or 
otherw ise.
5 Sharing expert evidence is likely to  be m ore appropriate in relation to  the  
quantification  o f a claim  than to  establish ing prim ary liability and w ill be 
especia lly  pertinent in low er value claim s w here proportionality  o f costs is 
required to  be in the m inds o f the parties”.
Term s o f B usiness
6 Terms of business should be agreed between the expert and those instructing 
him/or at the outset. These should include:
(a) The basis of the expert's charges: either daily or hourly rates and an
estimate of the time likely to be required, or a fee for the services.
(b) Treatment of travelling time and likely expenses and disbursements.
(c) Rates for attendance at court and contingency provisions for payment of the
specified fee in the event of late notice of cancellation of a court hearing.
(d) Provision for a preferred timing of payment.
7 Payments to an expert witness contingent upon the nature of the evidence given or 
upon the outcome of a case must not be offered, accepted or made.
8 Any agreement with an expert which will provide the expert with repeated 
instructions whether in return for discounted fees or otherwise should not be made.
9 Those instructing an expert should make it clear if fees are to be paid by a third 
party, including the Legal Aid Board, any special provisions this might require, 
and/or if payment of those will be subject to taxation.
Instructions
10 A copy of this protocol will be given to the expert upon instruction.
11 The expert should be kept informed regularly about the timetable for the 
proceedings and any deadlines for the preparation of his/her report/advice.
12 Those instructing experts should ensure that they give clear instructions (in writing 
unless this is not practicable) specifying the requirements w hich  w ill usually  
include the follow ing:
(a) basic information such as names, addresses, telephone numbers, dates of 
birth, and dates of incidents;
(b) the type of expertise which is called for;
(c) the purpose for requesting the report, and a description of the matter to be 
investigated;
2
(d) questions to be addressed;
(e) the history of the matter, identifying any factual matters that may be in 
dispute;
(f) details of any relevant documents stating which if any (i) the expert may 
refer to in the report and (ii) the expert may not refer to and why;
(g) whether proceedings have been commenced (in which case a copy of the 
pleadings should be provided) or are contemplated, the identity of the 
parties, and whether the expert may be required to attend to give evidence;
(h) whether the expert will be expected to confer with experts instructed by other 
parties with a view to reaching agreement on the issues or narrowing those 
in dispute;
(i) whether prior authority to incur the estimated fees needs to be obtained 
before the instructions can be confirmed;
(]) in the case of medical reports; where the medical records are situated
(including, where possible, the hospital record number); whether consent to 
an examination and disclosure of records has been given; and whether the 
records are to be obtained by or provided for the expert;
(k) whether this report is intended as advice or for use in court;
An expert who does not receive such clear instructions should request them or 
withdraw from the case in default.
13 D epending on the com plexity  o f the features o f the case, a d iscussion
betw een the expert and those instructing him /her is recom m ended in order to  
ensure that the p leadings accurately reflect the expert’s opinions on the  
issues.
14 An expert must not express an opinion outside the scope of his/her competence.
Experts should as soon as possible after being instructed, identify any aspects of a 
commission with which they are unfamiliar, or with which they are not competent to 
deal, or on which they require further information or guidance.
15 Instructions should be accepted only in matters where the expert;
(a) has the knowledge, experience, academic qualifications, or professional
training appropriate for the assignment;
(b) has the resources to complete the matter within the timescales and to the
standard required for the assignment;
(c) is competent to deal with the issues involved.
R eports
16 While it is the expert's duty:-
(i) to explain to the client and his/her instructing lawyer both the weaknesses 
and the strengths of the case; and
(ii) when providing a report, or giving evidence in court, to be objective and not
to mislead the court; and
(iii) when giving evidence in court, to assist the court and be impartial,
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save w here, as a m atter o f law, fo r h im /her to  identify any re levant recognised  
body o f opin ion not a lready referred to in the report, w hich d iffers from  th at o f  
the expert.
17 It is not the expert's duty ta-
(iv) anticipate arguments which may be put forward by the party opposing 
his/her instructing client; or
(v) address in the final report matters which are not in issue.
18 In providing a report complying with the principles in clause 23, the expert-
(i) must express any qualification or reservation which would affect his/her 
opinion;
(ii) must not be asked to and must not amend, expand or alter any part of the 
report to reflect an opinion which is not the expert's true opinion;
(iii) may be invited to amend or expand a report for the purposes of 
completeness, or clarity, or readability, or to ensure factual accuracy or 
internal consistency;
All experts reports should include the following:
(i) The expert's curriculum vitae.
(ii) A statement of the source of instructions and the purpose of the report.
(iii) Basic information, for example names and dates of birth in a personal injury 
action.
(iv) A chronological history of the matter.
(v) A statement of the methodology employed.
(vi) Details of the documents or any other evidence upon which any aspect of 
the report is based.
(vii) A copy of a summary of the instructions.
(viii) A declaration that the report has been prepared in accordance with this
protocol.
20 In addressing questions of fact and opinion the report should have regard to the
following:-
(i) Matters of fact and opinion should be clears distinguished and kept separate 
from each other in the report.
(ii) Where there is a conflict of evidence the expert should not express a view in 
favour of one of the competing sets of facts. However, if an expert can 
exclude one set of facts as being improbable or less probable because of his 
particular learning and experience, he should express that view and give  
his reasons therefore.
(iii) The source of statements of fact relied upon should be clearly identified 
within the following categories:
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(a) observed by the expert
(b) observed by others, stating whom
(c) contained in the instructions or documents supplied, identifying 
which
(d) assumed, stating upon what basis
(e) inferred, stating the logic applied.
(iv) Each opinion expressed by the expert should be the expert's own. If the 
opinion was not formed by the expert independently it should be clear from 
whom it was adopted.
21 In structuring the report the expert should bear in mind the following:
(i) The report should stand alone and avoid cross reference to external 
documents where possible.
(ii) The style should be concise and text arranged in short sentences and 
paragraphs.
(iii) The report should be in the first person singular and signed personally by 
the expert.
(iv) Appendices should be used where the inclusion of material in the main body 
of the report would render it less clear.
(v) Conclusions should be given in the final section of the report before 
appendices and should be cross-referenced to the text which supports them.
22 Where parties have agreed to the jo int instruction of a single expert, the
expert’s report should set out clearly the issues which are of particular 
concern to the respective parties (where these are different), and should set 
out the questions which each party has raised with the expert and the 
expert’s answers to the questions.
Procedure
23 Following completion of the report, the expert is entitled:
(a) to be advised whether, and if so when, the report has been disclosed to the 
other side;
(b) to an opportunity to consider and comment upon any other expert's report 
which deals with the same issues;
(c) to be kept informed of the progress of the action including any amendments 
to the pleaded case relevant to the expert’s opinion.
24 The parties and their lawyers should consider and, if appropriate, take steps aimed
at agreement of experts' evidence, or narrowing the issues. The instructing party 
should also consider, as the circumstances of the case demand, whether a 
discussion would help the parties and their lawyers identify the issues. 
Where each party to the proceedings instructs its own expert, the experts should be 
encouraged to communicate or meet to seek to agree the facts or otherwise narrow 
the issues in dispute. Such communications cannot be disclosed to the Court, will 
not bind the instructing parties and should take place as soon as practicable with 
regard to the issues in dispute.
5
25 If a meeting is to take place, the parties, their lawyers and the experts should co­
operate to produce a concise agenda for that meeting reflecting the issues in the 
case on which the experts should give their opinions. The agenda should wherever 
possible consist of questions to which the experts can state their agreement or 
disagreement to facilitate the preparation of a note defining those matters which are 
agreed and those which are still in issue.
26 If there has been a meeting or communication, a note stating the areas of 
agreement and disagreement should be prepared and agreed between the experts 
without delay preferably at the time of the meeting or communication. This note 
may be produced to the Court. Those instructing experts must not give and experts 
must not accept instructions not to reach agreement at such meetings on areas 
within the expert’s competence.
Attendance at trial
27 If audio-visual link technology facilities are available which permit the expert
evidence to be heard without requiring the expert's attendance at court but also
without compromising in any way the quality or the purpose of the evidence, then
those instructing experts should consider using them.
28 Those instructing an expert should make all reasonable efforts to ensure that a trial 
date is arranged that is convenient for the expert, and should keep him/her informed 
about the trial date/trial programme and to give him/her as early notice as possible 
of the dates on which he/she is likely to be required to attend.
29 An expert must take all steps to ensure that he/she is available to attend court if and 
when required, but should be aware that a solicitor may need to serve a subpoena, 
in the event of difficulties.
30 Whenever experts are required to attend court, all parties should ask the court to
hear the expert evidence when convenient and out of the normal chronology if 
necessary.
31 When giving evidence at court, the role of an expert is to assist the court and to
remain independent of the parties: experts should give evidence in an objective and 
unbiased way and confine that evidence to matters within their competence.
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D e a r  M r .  J u s t i c e
F u r t h e r  t o  my t e le p h o n e  c o n v e r s a t io n s  w i t h  t h e  J u d i c i a l  S t u d ie s  
B o a rd  and t h e  L o rd  C h a n c e l lo r s  O f f i c e ,  I  am w r i t i n g  t o  you  /
d i r e c t l y  i n  t h e  hope t h a t  you may be w i l l i n g  t o  a s s i s t  me i n  t h e
d e v e lo p m e n t  o f  some e m p i r i c a l  r e s e a r c h  I  am c u r r e n t l y  u n d e r t a k in g  
f o r  my d o c t o r a l  t h e s i s .
I n  a d d i t i o n  t o  b e in g  r e g i s t e r e d  as a P h .D  s t u d e n t  w i t h  P r o f e s s o r  
C a r o l  H a r lo w  (Law D e p a r tm e n t )  a t  t h e  London S c h o o l o f  Econom ics  
and P o l i t i c a l  S c ie n c e ,  I  am a l s o  em p loyed  as a S e n io r  L e c t u r e r  
a t  t h e  U n i v e r s i t y  o f  G re e n w ic h .
My r e s e a r c h  c e n t r e s  a ro u n d  t h e  i s s u e  o f  e x p e r t  e v id e n c e  ( i n
p a r t i c u l a r  s c i e n t i f i c  e x p e r t  e v id e n c e )  and t h e  c h a l l e n g e  such  
e v id e n c e  poses f o r  t h e  e x p e r t ,  t h e  a d v e r s a r i a l  sys te m  and most 
i m p o r t a n t l y ,  j u d i c i a l  d e c i s i o n  m a k in g .
One o f  t h e  a r e a s  t h a t  I  f i n d  p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n t e r e s t i n g  (a n d  w o u ld  
l i k e  t o  d e v e lo p  f u r t h e r )  i s  t h e  c o n t r o v e r s i a l  c l a i m  p u t  f o r w a r d  
b y  some aca d em ic s  t h a t  ju d g e s  s h o u ld  be e n c o u ra g e d  t o  a d o p t  
" a p p l i e d  s t a t i s t i c a l  p r o b a b i l i s t i c  r e a s o n in g "  t o  t h e i r  d e c i s i o n  
m a k in g  p r o c e s s .  The re a s o n  p u t  f o r w a r d  t o  j u s t i f y  such  c la im s  
i s  b as ed  on t h e  n o t i o n  t h a t  ju d g e s  s h o u ld  be a b l e  t o  p r o v i d e  t h e  
m e t h o d o lo g ic a l  r a t i o n a l e  f o r  t h e i r  ju d g m e n ts .
The t r a d i t i o n a l  v ie w  i s  t h a t  o f  t h e  A m e r ic a n  Ju d g e , C a rd o z a ,  who 
s a i d  t h a t  a ju d g e  must " b a la n c e  a l l  h i s  i n g r e d i e n t s ,  h i s  
p h i lo s o p h y ,  h i s  l o g i c ,  h i s  a n a lo g ie s ,  h i s  h i s t o r y ,  h i s  cu s to m s,  
h i s  sen se  o f  r i g h t ,  and a l l  t h e  r e s t ,  and a d d in g  a l i t t l e  h e r e  
and t a k i n g  o u t  t h e r e ,  must d e t e r m in e  as w i s e l y  as he c a n ,  w h ic h  
w e ig h t  s h a l l  to p  t h e  s c a l e s " .  L a t e r  w r i t i n g s  r e f e r  t o  ju d g e s  as  
b e in g  " r a t i o n a l  a c t o r s "  w i t h  ju d g e s  h a v in g  t o  r e c e i v e  and a s s e s s  
i n f o r m a t i o n ,  t o  c a l c u l a t e  a c c o r d in g  t o  p a ra d ig m s  t h a t  h a v e  a h ig h  
p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  g i v i n g  t h e  r i g h t  a n s w e r .  W h i le  o th e r s >  v ie w  t h e  
j u d i c i a l  p ro c e s s  as h a v in g  t o  i n t e g r a t e  " r a t i o n a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  
and p e r s o n a l  p e r s p e c t i v e s " .  The r a t i o n a l  p e r s p e c t i v e  i s  s e r v e d  
b y  a d e c i s i o n  based  on s c i e n t i f i c  f a c t  and d e d u c t io n ;  t h e  
o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  p e r s p e c t i v e ,  by a d e c i s i o n  t h a t  w i l l  g u id e  f u t u r e  
c a s e  la w  and l e a d  c re d e n c e  t o  t h e  j u d i c i a l  p r o c e s s ;  and t h e  
p e r s o n a l  p e r s p e c t i v e ,  t o  a j u s t  d e c i s i o n  f o r  t h e  c a s e  a t  han d .
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Today s c i e n t i f i c  e v id e n c e  ( g e n e t i c s ,  e p id e m io lo g y ,  t o x i c o l o g y )  
i s  becom ing e v e r  more c o m p le x ,  i t  r e l i e s  on (a n d  u s e s )  
m e th o d o lo g y  w i t h  w h ic h  many ju d g e s  a r e  u n f a m i l i a r .  Such e v id e n c e  
t y p i c a l l y  i n v o lv e s  t h e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  c o m p l ic a t e d  s e t s  o f  
s t a t i s t i c a l  d a t a  w h ic h  t h e n  im poses on l e g a l  n o t io n s  o f  
c a u s a l i t y .  I n c r e a s i n g l y  h o w e v e r ,  i n  a d d i t i o n  t o  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  
and c o m p reh en s io n  o f  s t a t i s t i c s ,  some a c a d em ic s  w o u ld  l i k e  t o  
t a k e  t h i s  p ro c e s s  a s t a g e  f u r t h e r  by p r o p o s in g  t h a t  ju d g e s  a l s o  
a p p ly  s t a t i s t i c a l l y  b as ed  p r o b a b i l i s t i c  r e a s o n in g  t o  t h e i r ,  
u l t i m a t e  d e c is i o n .
W h i le  I  a p p r e c ia t e  t h a t  t h i s  i s  a somewhat u n u s u a l  r e q u e s t ,  I  
w o u ld  be v e r y  i n t e r e s t e d  t o  know y o u r  v ie w s  on t h i s  d e v e lo p m e n t ,  
i n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  w h e th e r  you h a v e  had t o  d e a l  w i t h  cases  o f  t h i s  
k i n d ,  and i f  so , w hat p ro b le m s ,  t h e y  p r e s e n t e d .
I n  a d d i t i o n ,  i t  w o u ld  be v e r y  h e l p f u l  t o  r e c e i v e  y o u r  comments 
on t h e  f o l l o w i n g  o b s e r v a t io n s :
i )  t h e  d i s t i n c t i o n  b e tw e e n  la w  and s c ie n c e  i s  becom ing  
i n c r e a s i n g l y  b l u r r e d ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n  c a s e s  w here  t h e r e  i s  
an a r r a y  o f  com plex  e x p e r t  e v id e n c e ;
i i )  t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  v ie w  o f  t h e  ju d g e  (a s  e x p re s s e d  by C a rd o z a  
and o t h e r s )  i s  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  o f  t h e  r o l e  o f  t h e  j u d i c i a l  
d e c is i o n  m aker;
i i i )  w h i l e  s t a t i s t i c a l  a n a l y s i s  o f  e v id e n c e  can  f a c i l i t a t e  t h e  
a t t a in m e n t  o f  l e g a l  o b j e c t i v e s .  P r i n c i p l e s  u n d e r ly i n g  t h i s  
a n a l y s i s  s h o u ld  n o t  c o n t r o l  t h e  e n t i r e  p r o c e s s  o f  j u d i c i a l  
f a c t  f i n d i n g  o r  j u d i c i a l  d e c i s i o n  m ak in g ;
i v )  " a p p l i e d  p r o b a b i l i s t i c  r e a s o n in g "  i s  an a p p r o p r i a t e  m ethod  
upon w h ic h  t o  b ase  t h e  u l t i m a t e  d e c i s i o n  o f  a c a s e .
Thank you f o r  t a k i n g  t h e  t im e  t o  r e a d  t h i s  l e t t e r .  I  hope t h a t  
t h e  s u b je c t  m a t t e r  i s  s u f f i c i e n t l y  i n t e r e s t i n g  t o  s t i m u l a t e  y o u r  
r e s p o n s e .
I  lo o k  fo r w a r d  t o  h e a r i n g  f ro m  you i n  t h e  n e a r  f u t u r e .
Y o u rs  s i n c e r e l y ,
R ebecca H a r r i s o n .  
S e n io r  L e c t u r e r ,  
Law S c h o o l .
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I come here this morning to announce an integrated package of proposals, on every 
one of which I intend to consult w ith  the profession.
There has been a lot of trailing, speculation and advance comment. You are about to 
hear the real thing as a whole. Hear it through and judge it when you have considered 
it all.
You all know that major change is on the way. The thing to do w ith  change is to 
manage it through consultation and in a spirit of consultation.
Your Society today is in strong progressive hands w ith  your new President Philip 
Sycamore, as it was under Tony Girling. I look forward to the consultations that w ill 
take place w ith  your profession under its present leadership. But firs t I should tell you 
what I have in mind.
The message from the Prime Minister at the Labour Party Conference was strong and 
clear. The route to a Britain that becomes a model 21st century nation is 
modernisation of our institutions. What follows is that hard choices are unavoidable.
On 2 May, I inherited tw o great challenges - the failure of the civil justice system to 
fu lfil its role as a guarantor of people's rights; and the collapse of public confidence in 
legal aid. Today I set out how we can make civil justice a model system; where it 
needs to be modernised and how; and the tough choices we have to make.
There are tw o  major priorities, tw o  main targets. First, legal aid has become a 
leviathan w ith  a ferocious appetite. I have to grapple w ith  that. Second, the civil 
justice system is a machine w ith many faults. I plan to remove them. Those are my 
targets, taking control of legal aid and modernising civil justice.
Civil justice today is too expensive and too exclusive. The very rich and the very poor 
have access but middle income Britain is left out in the cold - and middle income 
Britain is the overwhelming majority of people in this country. They cannot litigate 
because the lawyers' fees are so high and because they cannot afford the risk of 
losing and having to  pay their opponent's lawyers' fees as well.
Not only is civil justice far too expensive for people to afford because of the scale of 
the costs: they are deterred from pursuing good cases because they cannot make any 
rational assessment of how much it w ill cost them in the end. These and the level of 
costs are the biggest bars to access to justice.
And civil justice is too expensive for the taxpayer as well. It is the taxpayer who 
today funds a costly legal aid scheme that fails to provide the right kind of help at the 
right time to the people who need it most. The taxpayer also pays in the end for the 
w ider cost to the economy of unnecessary delay and complexity in the civil justice 
system.
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My reforms aim to drive down costs for the benefit of the individual litigant and 
ultim ately the taxpayer; and, at the same time, to throw  open the doors of the justice 
system to all who need to enter. The civil justice system should be accessible for 
everyone - not just the very poor and the very rich.
Before I say more, I acknowledge tw o debts the system owes. The firs t is to Lord 
W oolf, for his tw o  distinguished and historic Reports. The second is to Sir Peter 
Middleton. His review of civil justice and legal aid, commissioned on 6 June, was 
delivered to me at the end of September. There have been many, often conflicting, 
proposals sw irling round the issues of reform. Sir Peter's report has provided me w ith 
a strong fram ework against which these proposals can be evaluated. His Report is 
being printed as I speak. It will be published on Monday.
We just have to get a grip on legal aid expenditure. Let us look the facts in the face. 
Net expenditure in 1990-91 was £682 million. Only 6 years later, expenditure had 
rocketed to £1,477 million. That is an increase of 11 5%.
90%  of the legal aid bill goes mainly on lawyers' fees. That bill has consistently risen 
faster than the number of cases handled. In the last 4 years average payments in civil 
legal aid have increased by more than 43% . The number of people helped has actually 
gone down by 9%. Since 1993-94, the cost of legal aid has risen by 22% . But the 
inflation rate over the same period was only 7%. The taxpayer is paying more for less.
No other area of public expenditure has grown so fast over so short a period of time. I 
am not claiming to be the first Lord Chancellor who has said this - but I am determined 
to be the Lord Chancellor who finally tackles the problem and brings legal aid under 
control.
Legal aid must be re-focused. It must be made a tool to promote access to justice for 
the needy - not be seen by the public as basically a means of keeping lawyers in
business. It is the people's needs that justify  a legal aid system in the first place. It is
their needs, not the needs of legal aid suppliers, that jus tify  asking every taxpayer to
commit £57 a year to keep the scheme going.
The resources available for legal aid are finite. The days of free-flowing public 
expenditure are gone for ever. No Government could tolerate an ever-growing, 
demand-led budget tha t just cannot be controlled.
I have thought for a long time about the future of legal aid. The future lies in 
contracting for services, in both criminal and civil cases. The way ahead is contracts 
that w ill specify in advance just what services are being bought, and at exactly what 
prices.
It is only through contracting that Government can hope to gain sufficient control over 
the shape of the legal aid scheme to ensure that resources are targeted on the needy. 
To stop cases going on far too long. To cut out waste and duplication. To trim  costs 
and expense. And to focus this vital fund on the people who need it.
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Legal aid work w ill, in time, be restricted to those providers who have a contract w ith  
the Legal Aid Board. No longer demand-led, as now, the civil legal aid scheme w ill 
become more responsive to the Legal Aid Board which w ill purchase - at agreed and 
fixed - I emphasise fixed - prices - services which have been determined in advance 
under plans made locally on the advice of Regional Legal Services Committees.
No lawyer can be compelled to contract at a fixed price. Lawyers must make a 
commercial judgment. Depending on how each case progresses, the fixed price in 
every case w ill, at the end, seem too high or tw o  low. It is called "taking the rough 
w ith  the sm ooth". It is the overall outcome from all contracts on which lawyers' 
profitab ility w ill depend.
Legislation w ill be needed before contracting can be introduced. There remains much 
detailed planning work to be done. The Legal Aid Board's franchising scheme offers a 
foundation for the management of contracts but, as you know, so far it focuses 
centrally on the management of lawyers' firm s and their business, not on the quality of 
the legal services they provide.
I want to  see the Legal Aid Board developing quality standards too - effective quality 
assurance and control. And I want to see tha t developed as part of a move towards 
contracting for legally aided services. Lawyers must become more precise in their 
predictions. Those predictions should be monitored by the Legal Aid Board, against 
achieved outcomes. This is an important means by which the Board w ill judge 
whether particular firms deserve to continue to be awarded contracts. But there are 
no doubt other ways in which competence and quality can be assessed. Clearly this is 
something that demands consultation between the Government and the professions. 
That consultation w ill take place. You w ill, I am sure, want to join me in 
demonstrating that it is only high quality services tha t are being provided. I w ill 
welcome your views on how best to test that, monitor it and, where necessary, weed 
out contractors who do not measure up to high quality standards.
I propose also to extend contracting to criminal legal aid. In the medium-term, the 
greater part of criminal work w ill be drawn into contracting arrangements. But we 
need to work hard to decide how the interests of justice in criminal cases - particularly 
the rights of defendants and the need to avoid delay - can be dovetailed w ith  a 
contracting system managed through the Legal Aid Board. That work is already in 
hand.
Contracting at fixed prices, agreed in advance, will give the Government control over 
the legal aid budget. It will enable choices to be made. It w ill allow us to set 
priorities, and to shape the budget to f it  the country's needs and circumstances. It w ill 
give the com munity the chance to choose between spending money on legal aid and 
spending it on, for example, health or education. But this reform must go hand-in-hand 
w ith  better ways of prioritising the cases which call on the legal aid scheme for 
assistance.
A grant of legal aid depends on the case passing what is commonly called the merits 
test. That test needs tightening.
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Too often the Legal Aid Board is told that a case has a "good" or an "average" chance 
of success w ithou t any hard reasoning or evidence to back up the claim; and w ithout 
the lawyer having to nail his colours to the mast of a precise percentage prospect of 
success. Lawyers w ill be required to do that in future. Of course they can only do so 
on the basis of the evidence then available to them. But woolly unquantified advice 
can have no place in a reformed legal aid scheme.
My approach to legal aid is no different from the approach I would expect of 
reasonable people who can afford to pay for their own litigation. They would require a 
very high likelihood of success - at least as much as 75% , unless there is some 
compelling reason, such as loss of the home, for taking a greater risk. I would not 
myself litigate at my own expense w ith any lesser prospects of success, and would 
probably require a good deal better. I am against a go-go litigation culture which tries 
it on in speculative cases - cases should never go forward on that basis and certainly 
never at the expense of the State. I can see no reason w hy the state should fund a 
poor person to  engage in litigation which a prudent person - who could himself afford 
to fund it - would not enter at his own expense, unless the interest to be protected 
was very important to them, say keeping a roof over the fam ily 's head.
In cases where it is the prospects of success which are central, I hope to see the 
merits test stipulate a 75%  likelihood of success. Starting litigation is not like putting 
£1 each way on a horse in the Derby. We all have speculative flutters. Litigation is 
hugely expensive; the downside of losing is appalling. No prudent person would run 
the risk of litigating out of his own resources w ith less than a 75%  likelihood of 
success. I cannot see why the State should bear the costs of weak litigation where 
the penalty is on the unassisted defendant who cannot recover his costs from the 
legally-aided pla intiff.
I also intend tha t the merits test should, in future, reflect the pressure on the legal aid 
budget. Sir Peter Middleton says in his report that this should be one factor to be 
brought into the equation alongside the importance of the case to the individual and 
the likelihood of success. It is only by bringing the overall availability of resources into 
play tha t the Government can guarantee keeping legal aid w ith in an annual pre­
determined budget. But by careful planning in the contracting process - and granting 
overlapping contracts that last for several years ahead - we shall ensure that there is a 
steady level of services available at all times to meet the priority cases identified 
through the merits test.
The changes I propose to the merits test w ill require legislation, so I cannot give you a 
timetable for change now. My intention, in the interim, is to invite the professions and 
other interested parties to offer their advice on how the reformed test should be 
framed and operated in practice.
Before I move on from the merits test, I acknowledge there are categories which 
would not pass the test, and where the predicted cost would be disproportionate to 
the likely benefit to the individual - but where it is plainly in the public interest for a 
particular point of law to be examined, or for a precedent to be established. I believe it 
would be right to make special arrangements for these cases.
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I am attracted by tw o  proposals which have been made to me by Sir Peter M iddleton 
fo r handling these cases of public importance. First, that the Legal Aid Board should 
establish a separate fund specifically designed to carry them forward. And, second, 
tha t consideration should be given to placing them under special judicial management.
It would be d ifficu lt to  establish a separate budget for public interest cases until the 
cost o f civil legal aid overall has been brought under control; and I certainly do not 
w ish to  discourage people from using other existing sources of funding to bring public 
interest cases. But I have decided that these proposals deserve serious thought and 
discussion. My officials will be consulting widely on this issue over the coming 
months.
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I have one last point to make about deciding which cases deserve legal aid. The last 
Government proposed that everyone who receives assistance from the legal aid fund 
should pay a minimum contribution. They argued that this was the only way to  ensure 
tha t poor litigants had a real personal commitment to their action.
Sir Peter Middleton has re-examined this issue. He has concluded that it would be 
reasonable for the Government to ask for a contribution of five or ten pounds, even 
from those who are dependent on Income Support.
This is one of the few  recommendations from Sir Peter Middleton which I am unable 
to accept. Income Support is set at levels which are intended to meet essential needs: 
housing, food, warm th. There is no fat. People living on Income Support have no 
money to  spare to help finance the legal aid scheme. These are among the poorest in 
society. I cannot accept that they should be expected to pay a fla t rate charge as a 
ticket of admission to legal aid. Besides that, a fla t rate contribution reflects only on 
the ability o f the individual to pay. It says nothing about the merits of the individual's 
case. We should be relying in these cases on the merits test, not ability to pay a 
contribution, to determine which cases should be assisted from the legal aid fund.
Mr President, I turn now to the linked question of conditional fees.
Individuals need to know what their costs w ill be before they start on litigation. That 
is important if everyone is to feel that the justice system belongs to them - not just to 
the very rich and the very poor. I want to eliminate as much uncertainty as possible. 
The way forward is to widen access to conditional fee agreements, the "no w in, no 
fee" system.
My Department w ill be consulting over the next few  months on the maximum possible 
extension of conditional fee agreements to all civil proceedings, other than fam ily 
cases, from April, 1998. Conditional fee arrangements mean that the risk of bringing a 
case is shared between the litigant and his lawyer. They therefore provide an 
incentive for lawyers to take more care in their advice, their assessment of prospects, 
and the steps they decide to take in litigation.
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Conditional fee agreements have been working well in the personal injury field. "No- 
win, no-fee" agreements are, for the great majority of people, the only practicable way 
of pursuing their rights.
The Law Society has been very positive about the benefits to be obtained from 
conditional fees. I hope the Society w ill sit round the table w ith  the Government to 
ensure that these advances are delivered.
Some of you w ill, I expect, be less enthusiastic about my next proposition. The 
extension of conditional fee agreements to a wide range of cases must prompt the 
question: "should legal aid also be offered in cases where other arrangements already 
exist to support litigants?" I think not. Subject to consultations, I expect to  exclude 
most claims for money or damages from legal aid. Legal aid w ill continue to be 
available for all civil cases not claiming damages or other money: for example, care of 
children; judicial review; and the threat of homelessness, not to mention the whole of 
criminal legal aid.
Excluding claims for money or damages from legal aid w ill put those on low income, as 
well as those on middle or higher incomes, on an equal footing - taking forward a civil 
case w ill depend on whether or not it has the merit to persuade a lawyer to handle it 
on a "no w in, no fee" basis. The decision whether or not to go ahead w ith  any 
particular case w ill depend on its strength, not on the financial resources of the client.
If lawyers th ink the case too risky even to enter into a success fee arrangement, I do 
not think we should be looking to the taxpayer to support what w ill be, by definition, a 
case w ith  insuffic ient prospects of success. It is one thing to expect taxpayers to 
subsidise the poor so that the poor can enjoy the things that taxpayers can afford for 
themselves: it is quite another to ask them to subsidise a case which they would not 
themselves be able to pursue w ithou t a conditional fee agreement.
An alternative approach which has been suggested is that, rather than leaving the less 
w ell-o ff to  make "no-w in no-fee" agreements, there should be a contingency, or 
conditional, legal aid fund - a CLAF for short. People would still receive legal aid in the 
traditional way, but successful litigants would hand over some of their winnings to the 
Fund to help meet the cost of the cases that lose. This is a listening Government, so I 
am willing to  consider this proposal. I do, however, have major concerns about the 
way this Fund would work. It is not suggested, at any rate by solicitors, that 
conditional fee agreements which have worked so well should be swept away and be 
replaced by a Contingency Legal Aid Fund. Would there not be a real risk tha t only 
weaker cases would be supported by a CLAF, because lawyers would prefer to cream 
off the stronger cases under "no-w in no-fee" agreements and so recover their ordinary 
fees plus the success fees? So I ask, would CLAF not become the exclusive preserve 
of the weaker cases?
So I cannot conceal from you that I doubt whether a Contingency Legal Aid Fund 
points the w ay forward. But I readily acknowledge that my proposal needs to be 
carefully developed to avoid any question of undue hardship for those who are 
currently eligible for legal aid.
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Even before making this announcement, I have already received suggestions: for 
instance, tha t there should perhaps be provision for the Legal Aid Fund to meet the 
insurance premiums, to  protect, against the risk of loss, those who are eligible for legal 
aid, and w ish to enter into conditional fee arrangements. There is also an argument 
tha t medical negligence is a special case, because substantial costs are incurred in 
investigating it before a view can be formed whether it has the prospects of success 
to  merit carrying it forward. The question is whether the lawyers should accept these 
costs as a commercial risk they should bear in arriving at a decision whether to  make a 
beneficial conditional fee agreement.
These are examples of the issues we w ill have to resolve in the next few  months. I 
have given w hat I hope is a very clear indication of the direction in which /the 
Government wishes to  move. But it is essential that the details are right. We seek to 
avoid any rough edges, and any new inequities. We shall be consulting w idely and 
openly. We are an open Government, committed to openness. I have deliberately 
avoided trying to settle all the details behind the closed doors of Whitehall. I w ant an 
open exchange of views on those details.
My officials w ill, next week, be inviting the professional bodies and others to join them 
for immediate discussions on the important details of how we take forward extending 
conditional fee agreements and reforming legal aid.
I am willing to  consider any arguments made to me, but I w ill always test them against 
the principle tha t legal aid exists only to remedy an imbalance between the poor and 
those who are better-off, not to put the poor in a privileged position.
Mr President, three key changes are at the heart of my vision for the future of legal 
aid:
- altering the basis of payment to contracts at agreed, fixed, prices;
- tightening the merits test; and
- the w idest possible extension of conditional fee arrangements, and reliance on 
them in preference to legal aid from the taxpayer.
Some of these changes w ill require legislation. So I am not yet in a position to predict 
the timetable. But you should know that major changes are on their way.
The suggested extension of conditional fees for most civil proceedings except fam ily 
cases would, at last, give middle income Britain a real opportunity to enforce its rights 
in the courts. The poor, the rich and the merely "com fortable" should enjoy equality of 
access to legal advice and representation. I repeat: those between the very poor and 
the very rich are the overwhelming majority of people in this country.
But to extend conditional fees and refocus legal aid is not enough. We must also make 
radical changes to the culture of civil justice, its procedures and its structures.
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In his Reports, Lord W oolf identified five fundamental weaknesses in civil justice. 
These were excessive delay; excessive cost; undue complexity; uncertainty over the 
amount of tim e and money likely to be involved in bringing a case; and, perhaps w orst 
of all, unfairness, where a financially stronger party can exploit all the other failings of 
the system to  defeat an opponent. I agree w ith Lord W oolf. I am pretty sure all of you 
do as well.
Reducing delay and complexity in the courts, and fixing costs at the outset of cases, 
w ill reduce expense for both the individual and ultimately the taxpayer. It w ill promote 
certainty and confidence.
This Government embraces Lord W oolf's vision of a more efficient civil justice system: 
a modern civil justice system designed for the tw en ty-firs t century, in which people 
who are legally aided, and those who are not, have equal access to simpler, faster 
procedures for securing their rights.
Mr President, I turn now to the steps we intend to take to deliver.
First, we w ill expand the small claims procedure. This has been a major success of the 
civil justice system. It is simple, fast and cheap. In a study published in 1996, the 
National Audit Office found widespread satisfaction among users: e ighty-two per cent 
of claimants surveyed found the small claims procedure very or fairly easy to use; and 
seventy per cent of plaintiffs considered the procedure either very or fairly cheap. 
Sixty-eight per cent of claims were heard w ith in twelve weeks of the defence being 
filed. The speed, simplicity and inexpensiveness of the small claims procedure makes 
it a model of its kind.
The last Government raised the small claims lim it from £1,000 to £3,000 in January, 
1996. The effects of that change have been monitored, as Lord W oolf proposed. I 
am now satisfied tha t we are ready to implement the next step. I therefore propose 
that the small claims lim it should be raised to £5,000 as part of an overall package of 
reform.
The last Government left at £1,000 the lim it for personal injury claims in the small 
claims procedure. I know this has been controversial w ith  personal injuries solicitors. 
There has been pressure for all personal injury cases to be taken out of small claims. I 
am not, however, persuaded that this would be in the interests of all personal injury 
litigants. Many of the injuries involved are very minor, and the cost of pursuing 
damages in the county court would be quite disproportionate to the damages sought. I 
am persuaded that the small claims procedure is an effective means of dealing w ith  
these small personal injury cases.
From an opposing standpoint, I have had to consider arguments that higher value 
personal injury cases should also be dealt w ith as small claims. I am not convinced. 
Claims of this value may involve more serious injuries. They need careful investigation 
of a kind not appropriate to small claims. They require the professional assistance of 
lawyers. So my intention initially is that only cases valued at under £1,000 should be 
dealt w ith  as small claims.
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We also want to help those who must have access to a more sophisticated judicial 
process. We w ill adopt Lord W oolf's proposals for more "hands on" management of 
cases by judges, transferring power from lawyers to judges, and giving the courts 
greater control over the progress, cost and length of those cases as they move to  trial. 
I intend to oversee the creation of tw o  new routes through civil justice to replace the 
complexities of the present: a "fast-track"; and a "m ulti-track", designed to  deal 
appropriately and proportionately w ith  civil cases which are not suitable for the small 
claims court.
Cases allocated to the "fast-track" w ill be subject to a fixed timetable, requiring the 
case usually to  be heard w ith in th irty  weeks of allocation. I have considered the views 
of those who have advocated that all personal injury claims should be in the "m u lti­
track" and excluded from  the "fast-track". I do not believe so extreme a case to bp 
made out. There may be personal injury cases where the claim is up to £15,000 
where certainty about costs and a fixed timetable in the "fast-track" are appropriate.
Cases allocated to the "m ulti-track" w ill be those of higher value or greater com plexity 
which w ill benefit from a greater level of judicial intervention, tailored to the special 
features of each dispute. So many personal injury claims may qualify for "fast-track", 
and some may not.
The Government intends to have these tw o  tracks up and running in April 1999. This 
is six months later than the last Government's plans. I never believed that October 
1998 was an achievable date for implementation of the "fast-track" and "m ulti-track". 
I know that the professions have also had their doubts. And so does Sir Peter 
Middleton. It is more important to allow ourselves a little headroom to get the reforms 
right. If you act in haste, you repent at leisure. April 1999 w ill give us the extra time
we need to make sure we secure what we want.
Lord W oolf recommended that the "fast-track" procedure should deal w ith  all cases up 
to £10,000. If th is had been in place last year, eleven thousand cases would have 
been disposed of in the "fast-track". My view is that even more litigants should be
able to benefit from the speed of the "fast-track". I therefore intend to  initiate
consultation on whether the "fast-track" lim it should be set at £15,000.
The strength of the "fast-track" w ill be the strong judicial control imposed on the 
progress of cases. The responsibility to be put on the judges is great. They must not 
fail because the public w ill believe that the judges have failed if the reforms fail.
But tough judicial control may not be enough on its own to ensure that the "fast-track" 
works well. I have been persuaded by both Lord W oolf and Sir Peter Middleton that 
judicial management must go hand-in-hand w ith  a fixed costs regime if the 
Government's objectives for cheaper, faster, more certain justice are to be achieved.
The introduction of the fast-track, in April 1999, should be accompanied by an 
associated fixed costs regime. Much work, however, remains to be done on the detail 
of how the regime would operate in practice.
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My Department is funding research from the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies into 
"fast-track" costs, based on hypothetical cases. The Law Society has tw o  
representatives on the Steering Committee for this project. The Bar Council has one. I 
am grateful to the professions for their contribution to  this study. I intend to consult 
them fully.
If justice is to  be accessible to all, we must address all the other factors which exclude 
people from the court system. I intend to look again at the structure of civil court 
fees. My starting point is that the cost of the civil courts should be met by those who 
use them. As I said in Parliament in July, I do not accept there is a constitutional right 
to a court system which is free at the point of delivery. That would be a misuse of the 
word "constitu tional". I do, however, accept that people should not be excluded from  
the court system because the fees they are asked to pay are unfair. ✓
The civil fee structure is irrational and hopelessly out-of-date. It needs to be reformed. 
I w ill be issuing a Consultation Paper next month inviting discussion on the principles 
which should underlie a new fee structure.
The aim is a rebalancing of the fee structure which w ill be much fairer to all court 
users, reflecting the cost of the various components in litigation as it is carried forward 
to the conclusion of the trial. Such a structure should avoid a disproportionately large 
fee being levied at the outset as a ticket of admission.
Meanwhile, I want to help the many who cannot afford the fees already in place 
because of their low incomes. A t present, only those in receipt of Income Support are 
exempt from all court fees. In response to concerns raised in Parliament, I propose to 
extend exemptions to  those in receipt of income-related Job Seeker's Allowance, or 
Family Credit, or Disability Working Allowance. I intend that this change should come 
into effect at the end of next month.
I believe tha t I have described a radical package of reform designed to modernise the 
civil justice system and promote access to justice for all who need it. But these are 
not reforms intended simply to deal w ith  the problems of today. I have my sights set 
on another, longer-term, goal - a Community Legal Service.
The development of a Community Legal Service was a Manifesto pledge. We said we 
would "develop local, regional and national plans for the development of Legal Aid 
according to the needs and priorities of regions and areas."
The principal aim of a Community Legal Service will be to help people decide if their 
problem is really a legal one and, if it is not, to point them in the right direction for 
appropriate help. There are many existing information and advice sources: the CABs, 
the Law Centres, the Advice Centres, and mediation bodies. We intend to co-ordinate 
these services under a coherent scheme which w ill provide a service to the whole 
public which is both easy to access and to understand.
11
We have already brought the voluntary sector into the legal aid scheme by contracting 
w ith  advice agencies to  provide help. In addition, we have now launched the firs t 
Regional Legal Services Committee - a network covering the whole of England and 
Wales is to fo llow . These Committees w ill be providing key information and advice to 
the Legal Aid Board and Government about the needs and priorities of the regions they 
serve. In the firs t instance, this w ill allow the Board to develop local, regional and 
national plans for meeting those needs through the legal aid scheme. And contracting 
w ill give the Board enough control to ensure that the right level of service can be 
provided, delivered in the right ways, and tailored to the requirements of each area.
Local communities should have a strong say in the development of information and 
advice services which meet their needs. In the longer term, the work of ,*the 
Committees w ill help shape the development of a Community Legal Service. All thi£ 
chimes w ith  the Government's broader policies of devolving powers to people locally.
I do not expect the development of a Community Legal Service to lead to greater 
demands on the public purse. The resources needed w ill come from the re-focusing of 
the legal aid scheme as a tool to help poor people solve social welfare problems by 
gaining access to the justice system.
This re-focusing w ill be achieved by a combination of better prioritisation, contracting, 
and the use of conditional fees fo r money claims.
This can be no more than an outline of the Government's intentions for the Community 
Legal Service. Much more work needs to be done to develop this proposal. I have 
decided to create a Project Team w ith in my Department to  develop and carry forward 
detailed plans. I w ill be embarking on a consultation process and encourage all of you 
to help by expressing your views. We are all part of the community. We w ill all have 
a stake in a Community Legal Service.
As the Prime Minister said at the Labour Party conference, Government is about hard 
choices. It is also about leadership, and being beholden to the whole country, not to 
any vested interest. I am not a Lord Chancellor committed to change for its own sake. 
But I w ill not flinch from  taking d ifficu lt decisions if I believe them to be the right ones. 
My job is to  act in the w ider public interest.
There w ill be those in the profession who w ill oppose these reforms. The Bar 
expressed its concerns first. Barristers are, of course, reared in a culture that they are 
paid, w in, lose or draw. For them it would be a culture shock to be paid only if they 
win, but not if they lose. Conditional fee agreements are, however, well understood 
and accepted by solicitors. There will be some who w ill see their own financial future 
disturbed. But I also know that many in the professions want to see reform and 
modernisation of both legal aid and civil justice. They know that change is inevitable 
and desirable. The legal system must develop or decay. I know what I want to see 
happen.
12
Conditional fees w ill enable middle income Britain - the overwhelm ing majority of 
people in this country - to regain access to the court system to  enforce its rights, w ith  
the only risk the risk and cost of losing. The poor w ill also benefit from conditional 
fees, while the legal aid system will be focused more clearly on helping the needy w ith  
social welfare problems which have a direct effect on the quality of their lives. The 
taxpayer benefits from the establishment of firm  control over legal aid expenditure. No 
longer w ill legal aid grow and grow, while delivering less and less. And the nation w ill 
benefit from a faster, fairer, more open legal system.
To any sceptics in this Hall, I say this: before you leap to oppose, reflect:
The package I envisage will bring great benefit to you; extending conditional fees into 
so many new areas means more business; the public w ill believe that the risks and the 
benefits for lawyers in these new arrangements will motivate lawyers to do their very 
best for their clients. More rapid procedures in the civil courts w ill enable you to deal
w ith more cases, more quickly - upping your overall caseload - as more people,
especially from middle income Britain, gain access to justice though the new terms.
It gives me no pleasure to say this: but I do believe that, today, public cynicism at 
lawyers and the undue length and complexity of our current court procedures causes 
the great majority of the public to see lawyers as representing no more than an old- 
style vested interest.
I doubt if anyone in this Hall would seriously argue that the legal profession in recent 
years has done anything other than fall lower and lower in public estimation. I want to 
reverse that. I want, as Lord Chancellor, to preside over a legal system that is so 
highly respected for its speed, its economy and efficiency, tha t lawyers can begin to 
compete in public esteem w ith teachers and doctors and nurses in what they put into 
society.
The new regime I have mapped out today should go a long way to heighten the public 
standing of lawyers. I cannot, however, achieve that on my own. I look to you for 
support so that, together, we can carry these changes forward into the 21st century - 
not in an atmosphere of mutual recrimination, but in a spirit o f co-operation. That is 
the way I w ant to modernise the part of the institutions of our country for which I, and 
you, share responsibility.
End
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APPENDIX EIGHT
SAMUEL GEE LECTURE 
ROYAL COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS 
TUESDAY 13TH MAY 1997 
MEDICS LAWYERS AND THE COURTS
I am honoured and grateful for being allowed to give this lecture. Honoured because the
lecture is given in memory of Samuel Gee who is a most distinguished former Fellow of this
College. I am delighted to note that like myself he had the advantage of being educated at University 
College London, of which I am proud to be Pro-Chancellor.
I also observe that he was one of the most brilliant teachers of his time although he had
“certain mannerisms” (not identified) which students delighted to mimic. It is reassuring that even 
the most distinguished medical practitioner can have human failings.
I am grateful to have this opportunity of saying publicly the extent to which I am indebted '
to the Royal Colleges in general and this Royal College in particular for the help which they gave me 
during my inquiry into Access to Justice.
I am also grateful for the opportunity to discuss with you the reforms which I have 
recommended as a result of that inquiry. However before turning to those reforms, I would like to 
stress that in general my experience is that the relationship between the medical profession on the one 
hand and the judiciary and the courts on the other has always been of a high order. The courts are 
very conscious that in many fields of litigation, they depend on the expert medical advice in order to 
come to a just decision.
The general approach of the courts is to apply the standards which the medical profession 
adopt. Thus we judge whether there has been negligence in the treatment of a patient by asking 
whether or not the medical treatment which is the subject of complaint accords with standards which 
any recognised section of the medical profession regards as acceptable. If the treatment does accord 
with such a standard, then in general we do not categorise it as negligent. By adopting this standard 
the courts have managed to hold the balance fairly between the interests of the patient and the interest 
of the profession. By striking the right balance, the courts reduce the risk of proper medical 
practice being undermined by the fear of litigation and the need for compensation to be paid where 
treatment is of an unacceptable standard. In addition the courts do not impose their ethical standards 
upon the medical professions. Wisely, on the whole they leave the medical profession to determine 
what is, and what is not, ethical behaviour.
However, because of the increasing complexity of society, members of the medical 
profession are from time to time faced with problems as to whether or not a particular course of 
treatment is or is not lawful. When the medical profession have problems of this nature, they can 
rightly expect the courts to provide them with an answer. It is primarily the responsibility of the 
courts to define what is lawful and what is unlawful behaviour. Furthermore if the problem needs to 
be resolved urgently because the health of a patient is at stake, then the courts are under a heavy duty 
to ensure that it is resolved expeditiously. Here I believe the courts can take pride in what they have 
achieved with the co-operation of the legal profession.
First of all, the courts have significantly changed their attitude to giving advisory 
declarations in relation to medical issues. At one time it was the courts practice not to grant advisory 
declarations as to whether future conduct would or would not be unlawful. This meant that a doctor 
could be faced with the choice of either not giving treatment or taking the risk of giving treatment 
and having that treatment later condemned as unlawful. Now it is clearly established that if there is a 
doubt as to the lawfulness of treatment, the court can rule on this in advance of the treatment being 
given. As a judge of first instance I was by chance involved in the three cases upon which the present 
approach is based. The first case was one involving the Royal College of Nursing who were 
concerned as to what part a nurse could properly play in procuring an abortion without being under 
the direct supervision of a doctor. The second was as to the lawfulness of doctors providing advice 
to children on methods of contraception when they were below the age which it was lawful to have
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sexual intercourse with them. The third case involved an issue as to what advice and assistance could 
lawfully be given to an individual who wished to terminate his life.
An area where it has been particularly important that the courts should be willing to grant 
advisory declarations is where a patient is unconscious as a result of an accident or illness and is 
incapable of stating whether or not he consents to a particular course of care. The law has laid down 
that in such circumstances a doctor may lawfully treat such a patient as long as he acts in the patients' 
best interest. Indeed, if the patient is already in his care he is under a duty to treat him. The case 
which made this clear was only decided in 1989.1 That was a case in which it was obvious that it 
would be desirable to sterilise an adult woman of unsound mind and the court held it was lawful for 
the operation to take place.
However, doctors are not entitled to impose treatment on someone who is of sound mind, 
however much that treatment might be in his interest, if he does not consent to have that treatment. 
A patient may if he or she wishes starve him or herself to death. But what of a situation where what 
is involved is a decision as to whether to provide or to continue to provide treatment or care which 
could or might prolong the life of a patient if the continuance of the treatment is futile? Futile since 
it would not confer any benefit upon the patient. This was the issue that came before the court in a 
particularly acute form in relation to Anthony Bland, the young man who was a victim of the 
Hillsborough football disaster. He was 21 years of age when the matter came before the House of 
Lords. He had been in a persistent vegetative state for 3lh  years. The House of Lords drew a 
distinction between two situations. The first would be euthanasia and unlawful. It is bringing a 
patient's life to an end by positive steps, such as administering a drug to bring about his death. The 
second is not prolonging the patient's life by discontinuing medical treatment. This includes 
stopping artificial feeding and the administration of anti-biotic drugs when it is known that the result 
will be that the patient will die. This is lawful. This is subject to a proviso which again involves the 
standards of the profession. The proviso is that responsible and competent medical opinion is of the 
view that it is not in the patient's best interest to prolong his life. Two members of the House, Lord 
Browne-Wilkinson and Lord Mustill, were especially concerned about having to reach a decision. 
This was because this is an area where it is particularly important that Parliament should review the 
law. They also recognised that the solution which was being provided was not ideal. As Lord 
Browne-Wilkinson said:
"How can it be lawful to allow a patient to die slowly, though painlessly, over a period of 
weeks through lack of food, but unlawful to produce the immediate death by a lethal 
injection, thereby saving his family from yet another ordeal to add to the tragedy that had 
already struck them? I find it difficult to find a moral answer to that question."
As perhaps could be forecast, Parliament has not provided the legislation which their 
Lordships thought desirable and so the courts are still having to develop the law on a case by case 
basis.
Since the Anthony Bland case there have been a reasonably substantial number of other cases 
where similar assistance has been sought in the courts. Some of the cases have been variations of the 
Anthony Bland case. Others have raised different issues. There has recently been a case where a 
mother was in danger of inflicting injury upon herself and the loss of the baby she was about to have 
because she suffered from a needle phobia. The needle phobia was preventing her making any 
decision at all. The situation was extremely urgent and the court at first instance sat at 9.25 to 9.55 
in the evening so that it could grant a declaration. An an appeal was heard on the same day from 
11.00pm to 1.00am and a declaration granted by the Court of Appeal with the consequence that later 
that morning the mother having learnt of the decision of the court voluntarily gave her consent and I 
am happy to say that she was delivered of a healthy child.
F v. The West B e rk sh i re  Heal th  A u t h o r i t y  (M e n ta l  
H e a l t h  A c t Commission i n t e r v e n i n g )  [ 1 9 9 0 ] 2  A. C.
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The courts also recognise that cases of this nature need a special form of case management. 
As the issues were often of a similar nature to those dealt with by the Family Division the cases were 
allocated to that Division so that the Family Division judges of the High Court could develop 
expertise in their disposal. Furthermore the President of the Family Division laid down procedures 
which would ensure that they received the urgent attention they required. The consequence is a 
marked improvement in the ability of the courts to assist the medical profession and in so doing the 
interests of justice and the needs of the public.
Turning to medical negligence litigation the story is not so happy. Medical negligence was 
given a high profile during my inquiry and has been the subject of a number of the recommendations 
which I have made. This is because medical negligence was one of the areas of litigation - I 
emphasise one of the areas of litigation - where it was obvious to anyone involved that the civil 
justice system was not working satisfactorily and radical change was desperately needed. I am 
confident that no one who has personal experience of this subject would dispute this diagnosis.
The recommendations I have made for the improvement of the handling of medical 
negligence cases are but an example of my recommendations for the improvement of litigation 
generally. If the general recommendations are not sound then I have to acknowledge my 
recommendations as to the handing of medical negligence cases must be flawed. _
It is because of this I now refer to a campaign of opposition to my recommendations upon 
which Professor Michael Zander has felt it right to embark. I do so, because if he is right in the 
criticisms which he makes, then the support which I have received from this College and the other 
Colleges has been misplaced. In addition, those who have been and are still working on carrying 
forward my reforms are engaged on a futile task. Among those to whom I am here referring are the 
medical and health practitioners lawyers and insurers who have been carrying forward the reforms as 
part of the Clinical Disputes Forum. They include, a partner in a firm of well known solicitors 
who conduct litigation on behalf of plaintiffs in medical negligence cases, who felt the inquiry into 
access to justice was such an important opportunity that she gave up her practice for 9 months to 
work entirely voluntarily to assist in the preparation of my report.
I had been aware that Professor Zander has been concerned about my recommendation for 
some time. He is a friend and he has been punctilious in keeping me informed of the criticisms that 
he is making. If criticisms are constructive I welcome them. It is for that reason that I invited 
Professor Zander to address a meeting was were held in connection with my inquiry and I have also 
accepted an invitation to appear on the same platform to discuss my report. For the same reason I 
have deliberately restrained my response to his criticisms though I have observed they are becoming 
more strident as time passes. However, last week he gave a lecture for which he invited wide media 
attention which I am afraid I regard as being misleading and inaccurate I therefore propose to devote 
part of the remainder of this evening to responding, insofar as time permits, to the criticisms which 
he makes.
As I understand his thesis, it is that there is nothing very much wrong with the way the civil 
justice system is working but insofar as there is anything wrong, it is unlikely that anything can be 
done about it, because lawyers will not change their ways and, in any event, the recommendations 
which I have made will make the situation worse rather than better.
In making this root and branch attack on the reforms, Professor Zander recognises that he 
is, as he has said himself, a Cassandra figure. He said in his lecture last week “the Woolf project 
appears to have almost universal support including, so far as one can tell, that of the senior judiciary, 
the Bar and The Law Society as well as both the lay and the legal press” . He adds that “one might 
have expected that of all people, practising lawyers would take exception to Lord Woolf’s caustic 
view of the way that they operate. But neither the Bar or The Law Society has raised a peep of 
protest about this calumny. Indeed Lord Woolf’s view was essentially not different from that of the 
independent working party set up in 1992 jointly by the General Council of the Bar and The Law 
Society”. He is here referring to the report brought out under the chairmanship of Miss Hillary 
Heilbron QC and Mr Henry Hodge which reflected the views of 44 highly experienced practitioners.
3
He suggests there has been “remarkably little interest in awkward facts and analysis that suggest that 
this emperor is wearing no clothes” .
In general I must confess the tenor of his lecture reminded me very much of the remark 
attributed to a nineteenth century judge who was reported to have said “reform, don’t talk to me 
about reform, things are bad enough already” . Professor Zander concluded his lecture by saying, 
and I quote :
“ 1. The arguments I have been pressing are very strong ones and that they deserve an 
answer. But they have not been answered - perhaps because they are unanswerable.
2. That the new Lord Chancellor should say, “I want to be told by someone in detail 
and addressing the facts and figures why Zander is wrong”. And Zander should be given an 
opportunity to reply to such an assessment of his argument. And let there be a reply to 
Zander’s reply and let this process go on until both sides have said what they have to say. 
Such exchanges or advice to the Lord Chancellor should be published and then let the Lord 
Chancellor decide which is the better argument.
3. A prudent approach might, for instance, lead us to stand by implementing the 
proposal made in 1979 by the Cantley Committee that attention should be directed first and 
foremost at the small minority of cases that plainly appear to be lagging. If a case has not 
been set down for trial within X months of issue of the proceeding a summons should be 
issued requesting an explanation. The court could then give whatever directions seemed 
appropriate in the light of what it was told about the reasons for delay. That would be a 
reform targeted at the right cases, as opposed to Lord Woolf’s scatter-gun approach which 
would apply the reforms mainly to cases that do not need them. ”
If you heard his lecture you would no doubt be impressed by his eloquence but you 
should not have been impressed by the content. It was not based on any relevant practical 
experience. He is a distinguished academic and contributions from academics can be important. 
However he has not suggested that the views that he holds are based on any research which he has 
conducted himself into the workings of the civil courts in recent time.
By contrast, although I of course accept this does not mean that my recommendations have 
any validity, they were produced after an intense two years consultation process conducted with the 
assistance of assessors with a wide ranging experience of the subject with which my report deals. I 
was also helped by expert working parties of highly experienced practitioners and academic 
consultants of distinction whose findings supported my conclusions.
Those findings were that the civil justice system has become excessively adversarial, slow 
complex and expensive. That this is especially true of litigation over alleged medical negligence in 
the delivery of health care whether by doctors, nurses or other health carers. For example there are 
five respects in which medical negligence actions conspicuously failed to meet the needs of litigants :
1. The relationship between the costs of the litigation and the amount involved was 
particularly disproportionate. The costs were peculiarly excessive, especially in low value 
cases.
2. Delay; the period which regularly elapsed before claims are resolved is more often 
unacceptable in the case of medical negligence claims than other classes of proceedings
3. Unmeritorious cases are pursued and clear-cut claims defended for longer than happened 
in other areas of litigation.
4. The success rate is also lower than in other personal injury litigation.
5. Finally the lack of co-operation between the parties to the litigation and the mutual 
suspicion as to the motives of the opposing party is frequently more intense than in other 
classes of litigation.
I emphasise that the system is not meeting the needs of patients or professional health carers. 
They are both being let down by the civil justice system at present. The pain is not only caused to 
the potential plaintiffs. It is caused also to those who have been responsible for delivering the health 
care of which complaint is made. All too often they find themselves in a nightmare situation. Their
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ambition throughout has been to help the patient but instead they find that they are the subject of 
hurtful allegations of negligent mistreatment. The allegations often only surface after the carer has 
ceased to have any real recollection of what happened. Frequently the carer feels intense frustration. 
They believe that if only they could have an opportunity of discussing the issues with the patient they 
could satisfactorily explain why things turned out as they did. However outdated conventions as to 
behaviour makes this impossible. The concern is, that if there is an apology, or if even an 
explanation is given this could be used in evidence against him or prejudice his position with 
medical defence bodies. The result is patients feel let down. Treatment has gone wrong, sometimes 
because of unrealistic expectations as to what could be achieved and carers react defensively in 
respect of attacks from patients which they regard as unjustified.
I was convinced that a way had to be found for breaking down the barriers which divided 
the patient from his carers so that wherever possible litigation could be avoided. This could only 
help everyone involved. It would save on costs. It could result in those patients who deserve to be 
compensated receiving proportionate compensation voluntarily, and in an atmosphere which did not 
poison relations between the patients and those who had been treating them. Often, where things 
have gone wrong the need for treatment is at its greatest and the breakdown results in the 
professional feeling frustrated in not being able to provide that treatment.
The opposition of Professor Zander to my recommendations is based on his unwillingness 
to accept that the civil justice system has these serious faults that I and virtually all commentators are 
agreed the system suffers from, and his unwillingness to accept that, if the faults do exist, my 
recommendations will improve the situation. Let me therefore deal with these points in turn.
THE FAULTS : At the outset I should make it clear that all the blame for the problems which I 
believe exist is not to be laid at the door of the legal profession. Too often in individual cases 
lawyers are at least partly to blame but more important as a cause of the problems is the 
disproportionate way the present adversarial system operates which encourages excessive delay, 
expense and unnecessary complexity. It is the system, not the lawyers, that explains, for example, 
the hostility and bitterness which distorts medical negligence litigation.
DELAY : On the question of delay Professor Zander in his lecture relies on two reports which 
were into personal injury alone. One published almost 30 years ago (1968 Winn) and the other is 
brief and published 18 years ago without any attempt at consultation (Cantley 1979). Even 18 years 
is a long time ago. The Winn report as Professor Zander accepts did consider that delay was a 
problem and though not coming to identical conclusions substantially shared my views. Cantley was 
a limited exercise there was no consultation and it took a more sanguine view of the position. 
Professor Zander suggests I may have not considered the evidence provided by those reports, I know 
not why he makes this suggestion but it is ill founded. I did however prefer to rely on the up to date 
statistics set out in my Interim Report and what I and my team found to be the position after what is 
suggested to have been the most extensive and thorough examination which has ever taken place into 
the civil justice system. I did not act as Professor Zander suggests on “unsubstantiated opinions” 
which I agree would be “a recipe for getting things radically wrong”.
The statistics included the following figures; High Court cases taking 163 weeks in London 
and 189 weeks elsewhere to proceed from issue to trial. In the county court dealing with smaller 
cases the figure was 80 weeks. These figures were I emphasise for the average case. Many would 
take substantially longer. Research for my inquiry by Professor Genn indicated that in medical 
negligence cases the average time from issue to conclusion was 6 years 5 months and in ordinary 
personal injury actions over 4.5 years. To these figures have to be added the substantial periods 
sometimes years which is allowed to pass prior to the action being commenced.
I said in my report that the figures were unacceptable and as far as I am aware no one has 
sought to suggest the figures are inaccurate or apart from Professor Zander that my criticism is 
unwarranted. I was also concerned about the time cases were taking to settle. Here the figures 
available were for 1993. Of the cases which were set down for trial - that means they had gone 
through all steps necessary to make them ready for trial, only 13% were determined after trial, 9% 
settle at the door of the court or during the trial. That is, after all the expense has been incurred. I 
also referred to the research of Professor Genn which showed that the majority of cases took as long
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as 4 to 6 years to settle - larger cases took longer. Again I regard the figures as unacceptable. In 
doing so, I have very much in mind the trauma that litigation can cause to those involved and why, 
especially in medical negligence cases it can leave both sides with a grave sense of the justice system 
having failed them. In minimising the problem as to delay Professor Zander displays remarkable 
complacency.
Professor Zander however suggests that I am being “Canute like” and defying reality in 
suggesting something can and should be done about this instead of recognising that “the enterprise is 
hopeless.” He also categorises the failures of lawyers in this area as “minor failures” . In 
expressing these views, he refers to the unfortunate experience in relation to the automatic strike out 
provisions. They were introduced into the county court rules in an effort to do something about the 
situation in 1990. The device was simple and crude. If a plaintiff allowed 15 months to elapse after 
the time when the parties had set out their case in writing in documents called pleadings before taking 
the steps necessary to enable the court to fix the date for trial the action would be struck out 
automatically and they would have to apply for it to be restored. What was not foreseen is that in 
some 20000 cases or more the plaintiffs lawyer would delay for over a year and a quarter to take the 
elementary step of setting down the case which is a condition precedent to the case coming to trial. I 
at least here am able to agree with Professor Zander that this result has been a “disaster” there have 
been appeals galore and actions for negligence and numerous applications for the action to be 
restored. However I certainly dissent from his conclusion as to what should be the response. 
Professor Zander suggests we should accept and I quote;
“there is really nothing that can be done about the problem other than the application of 
sanctions that are ridiculously out of proportion to the offence, a policy which, sooner or later has to 
be abandoned because it is manifestly unjust”
• The error which was made when the rule was introduced not appreciating that there would 
be anything like this number of cases which it would affect. The error was understandable because 
the system could not provide the information which was needed to know otherwise. What then 
should be done? First, the lesson should be learnt that there will be a substantial number of the cases, 
in which contrary to Professor Zanders views, if the lawyers for the Plaintiffs are left to their own 
devices they will delay taking even the most elementary steps in the interests of their clients.
Secondly it must be accepted that in the interests of justice, as no one else can take the 
responsibility, the court must take the responsibility for seeing this does not happen.
Thirdly, it must be recognised that the solution is not to impose Draconian sanctions except 
as a last resort but to achieve a situation where sanctions of this sort are not necessary because (a) the 
court does not allow the situation to deteriorate to the extent that they become necessary and (b) the 
court has the wider range of alternative sanctions I propose. Unfortunately this will only be possible 
when the technology I have recommended is in place.
The experience with automatic strike outs is therefore not an argument against case 
management but for case management. Ironically in relation to delay, despite his uncomplimentary 
remarks about my proposals and my own personal qualities (in addition to being Canute like and 
indulging in scatter gun tactics, I am building castles on sand and proceeding like the Generals of the 
first world war, just thoughtlessly blundering ahead) Professor Zander does at least make 2 and only 
2, positive proposals which I hope he will not be disappointed to leam are very much the same as 
my own. They are that dates for trial should be fixed at an early stage in a case’s life and if a case is 
manifestly lagging behind schedule it should be called in for directions. Where we differ, is I do not 
restrict myself to these modest steps because delay is by no means the only subject which has to be 
tackled. There is in particular the need to reduce costs, to simplify the system, to remove 
disproportionate behaviour of differing kinds which identify and to divert cases from the courts when 
there is a preferable alternative method for resolving the dispute.
Costs; The research conducted on behalf of the inquiry established clearly that costs are 
disproportionate to the issues involved in litigation. They are substantially higher than those in some 
other jurisdictions, particularly Germany, with which comparisons were drawn as a result of the
6
research conducted on behalf of the Inquiry by Adrian Zuckerman of Oxford. There is 
incontrovertible evidence that cases frequently involve costs of one party alone in excess of the 
amount in dispute. Unless they are assisted large sections of the community can not afford to go to 
court. This is again especially true of medical negligence litigation. Over 90% of the cases which 
reached the stage of litigation are legally aided. 92% of the successful litigants are legally aided. Yet 
the legally aided section of the community is no more vulnerable than other sections of the 
community to medical negligence. These figures must suggest if those other sections of the 
community were entitled to legal aid more actions would be brought which would succeed. Even as 
things are the April, 1997 edition of Health Law estimates that the costs for 1996 to the Health 
Service are £170m. and the outstanding contingent liability is £lbillion. (these figures include the 
awards of damages but a substantial part of the sum is costs). The author goes on to say ;
“Legal aid does not secure access to justice or ensure compensation for deserving cases. 
Instead it impoverishes the health service”
Professor Zander ignores this situation as he does the other situation namely housing where 
a similar waste of public expenditure can be demonstrated to be occurring. I do not believe he 
would do so if he had the opportunity that I had of learning at first hand from litigants, both patients 
and doctors and health carers, who are embroiled in this class of litigation what the experience is 
like. It is horrendous. Has it occurred to Professor Zander that the explanation for the failure of the 
lawyers and judges not to object to my “calumny” which he finds so surprising, is that as 
practitioners they are all too well aware of what is happening on the ground and they agree with the 
diagnosis of the inquiry? Why does he make no mention of the consumer bodies who were adamant 
that radical action was necessary and who support my programme of reform?. Are they unaware of 
the views of their members?
There are plenty other diseases to which the system is prone, including the lack of certainty 
as to what will be the consequences of becoming involved in litigation, the fact that it fails to allow 
for the inequalities in resources of the parties and it is excessively adversarial. There are problems 
as to discovery and experts. However as the remainder of my diagnosis is not under specific 
challenge but ignored by Professor Zander I will turn now to the reforms or, should I say the 
medicine which I have recommended.
The Medicine: Professor Zander’s criticism to date as far as I am aware is only as to two 
important elements of the package of reforms that have been recommended. They are the related 
subjects of the fast track and case management. However the merits of those two recommendations 
can only be appreciated in the context of the recommendations as a whole. Among the most 
important of these recommendations are the reorganisation of the civil courts, the creation of a single 
Rule Committee for the civil justice system as a whole and the creation of the Civil Justice Council 
and the greater involvement of litigants in their own litigation. These recommendations are intended 
to provide the structure in which a radically reformed system can operate and to then enable that 
system to be kept under review.
Among the more specific recommendations are those as to protocols and expert evidence in 
the case of both of which my recommendations are designed to establish an agreed best practice.
The protocols are a wholly novel concept designed :
1. to focus the attention of litigants on the desirability of resolving disputes without litigation
2. to enable them to obtain the information they need to settle the action or to make an offer to settle
3. and, if settlement is not possible to enable the ground to be prepared for the action to proceed 
expeditiously.
The protocols will receive the support of the court and will be published in practice 
guides issued by the court. It is intended that they should be taken into account by court if litigation 
results on the question of costs. They will be in effect a guide as to how to resolve disputes both 
prior to litigation and during litigation. It is essential if the protocols are to have credibility that they 
should be drawn up by a working group with unquestionable extensive practical experience of the 
problem areas of litigation to which they relate.
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In the case of medical negligence the working party is known as the Clinical Disputes 
Forum. The Forum has members who are distinguished doctors, health carers, lawyers who act for 
plaintiffs and the defendants and insurers. Under this umbrella, representatives of the different 
interests, for the first time working together, have been struggling to find the right way forward 
and are reasonably close to agreeing a protocol which accords with my recommendations. Let me 
quote from a report they have prepared:
“At present there is often mistrust by both sides. This can mean that patients fail to raise 
their concerns with the healthcare provider at an early stage, and pursue a complaint or 
claim which has no or a weak foundation due to a lack of sufficient information and 
understanding. It can also mean that patients become reluctant, once advice has been taken 
on a potential claim, to disclose sufficient information to enable the provider to investigate 
that claim efficiently and, where appropriate, to resolve it.
On the side of the healthcare provider this mistrust can be shown in a reluctance to be honest 
with patients, a failure to provide prompt clear explanations, especially of adverse outcomes 
(whether or not there may have been negligence) and a tendency to “close ranks” once a 
potential claim is signalled.
If this mistrust is to be removed, and a more co-operative culture is to develop:-
• Healthcare professionals and providers need to adopt a constructive approach to 
complaints and claims. They should accept that concerned patients (or their 
representatives) are entitled to an explanation and an apology, if warranted, and, injured 
ones to appropriate redress, and that an overly defensive approach is not in the long term 
interest of their man goal : patient care.
• Patients and their representatives should recognise that some degree of risk is inherent in 
most medical treatment, (even the best practitioners make mistakes) and that 
misdiagnosis or unintended consequences of treatment can only be rectified if they are 
brought to the attention of the healthcare provider quickly.
The openness on the part of both parties which the protocols will encourage will in turn 
provide the information which is necessary for disputes wherever possible to be resolved by recourse 
to the now justifiably' fashionable ADR. This could be dealt with in-house by hospitals. There is 
everything to be gained by the hospital using its resources to make available mediators and neutral 
claim evaluators at their own expense. The CDF is holding a conference on this subject on 3 June 
next and I hope it will receive your support.
Both sides of the legal profession are now providing lawyers who are highly skilled in this 
activity. A pilot mediation scheme of this nature has already been set up. While it may be 
premature for the courts to insist on ADR, ADR is sufficiently established to justify the court taking 
into account an unreasonable refusal to resort to ADR when determining what costs should be 
awarded.
The courts have to offer more specialisation than they have hitherto. Judges in this country 
have always prided ourselves on being generalists. However society has become so complex and the 
issues so sophisticated, we must if we are going to deal with the work effectively have the necessary 
expertise. It takes time to instruct a judge who has no background knowledge of the intricacies of 
this area of negligence and time in court is expensive.
A Master of the Supreme Court has already been earmarked to deal with the interlocutory 
stages of these cases in the High Court and the same thing should happen at major centres in other 
parts of the country. You also need a judge to try the case who understands the medical issues to 
which this litigation can give rise. It is for this reason I recommended and still do recommend that 
there should be a special list for cases of this nature in the High Court so that they can come before a 
judge whose experience they will respect. The judge must be on equal terms with the lawyers for the 
parties.
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That brings me to a further problem area and that is of expert evidence. I have been 
surprised but pleased by the interest the medical profession is taking in my recommendations as to 
expert evidence. I sense that the medical profession are not at all comfortable about the present 
situation. Here again there is an unhealthy polarisation. There is a tendency for medical experts to 
be categorised as plaintiffs or defendants experts. They are looked upon by the side which has 
instructed them - and this can be their own perception of their position - as hired guns, brought in to 
fight to the best of their ability on behalf of the side which is employing them. It is specially 
unfortunate that this should be the situation in medical cases because the court is dependent on 
medical advice for resolving the three issues liability, quantum and causation which are often 
particularly difficult in this area of litigation.
While there has been some improvement, it can still be difficult to find an expert if you are 
a plaintiff. This is because of the understandable reluctance, on the part of healthcare professions, 
to criticise colleagues. The result is those experts who are prepared to give reports on behalf of 
plaintiffs, are diverted from their practice and become, over dependant upon medico-legal reporting 
for their livelihood which can further undermine their independence.
My report seeks to improve the situation by making it clear that the experts first 
responsibility is to the court and not to the side that instructs them. For this reason reports are to be 
made to the court. However I would go further.
There are some issues near the “cutting edge” of medical science where there are two 
schools of thought. However there are many areas where what is proper medical practice is not a 
matter of controversy, the issue is whether that practice has been adhered to. There are many issues 
as to quantum where one opinion is very likely to be very similar to another opinion. I believe there 
is scope for the joint instructing of a single expert, at least in the first place, in those cases where 
there is no controversial medical issue involved. A breakthrough is needed because at present both 
sides contend that they cannot trust the expert instructed by the other side and so instruct their own 
experts. This tends to make agreement of medical issues more difficult instead of less difficult. We 
need a more co-operative approach but that will only arise if the independence of the expert is clear. 
This really should not be a problem where those who are consulted are asked to advise because of 
their professional expertise and standing. At the present time one has the ludicrous position that 
because experts and those who instruct them are not trusted, the parties will not even agree to 
sequential as opposed to simultaneous disclosure of experts reports.
There should also be more frequent meetings between experts to resolve issues. Lack of 
communication between experts often explains their failure to reach agreement
Changes of this nature represent a change of culture. They are suitable subjects for 
protocols They will bring about significant changes to both cost and speed with which disputes can 
be disposed of .More importantly they will help eradicate the suspicion which has been so destructive 
to the relationship between patient and carer.
Case Management: I now turn to the two areas of the recommendations which are the subject
for Professor Zander’s attack. Case management is central to my recommendations because it is the 
means by which cases are handled in the court system. There is nothing new about it. It an essential 
part of any system and is used with differing degrees in every developed system of civil justice. My 
recommendations are criticised because they call for more management by the court. This is exactly 
what is happening in Canada, New Zealand, Australia and has been happening in the USA for a 
great many years. It is also part of civil systems. It is practical today to exert greater case 
management than in the past because of the advances in technology which make it possible for courts 
to monitor the progress of cases. It was the absence of the ability to monitor cases which meant that 
it was not possible to implement the Cantley recommendation which Professor Zander finds so 
attractive. It is this change which explains in part why in my report I attach such importance to 
technology. The other reason is the savings to the system which it will achieve. As in medicine 
technology opens new horizons.
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While I favour greater case management which is now possible I recognise that case 
management does involve the parties in more expense and so it can only be justified if the savings 
and other benefits which can be achieved justify that expense. Therefore as Professor Zander does 
not acknowledge, “ hands on” case management is to be limited to those cases where it is likely to 
produce real dividends. Just because a medicine can be effective you do not use it unless it is 
justified.
In medical negligence cases for example it has a clear role to play which will 
undoubtedly be beneficial. It will weed out the hopeless cases which create unnecessary dislocation 
and expense to hospitals, it will ensure that discovery is controlled, it will confine the parties to the 
real issues and control expense by limiting hearings. It will be used to encourage settlement and 
restrict the issues. Administrative arrangements have already been made to deal with the fear of 
Professor Zander that it will result in inconsistency of treatment by having the same procedural 
judge or Master to deal with all the cases in London and similar arrangements will need to be made 
outside London.
I believe that it would be difficult to find a practitioner who knows what he is talking 
about who would say that litigation of this sort would not benefit from selective case management. It 
is not the schoolmaster type of process which Professor Zander seems to have in mind. It is the 
court providing a forum in which the lawyers and the judge can work out the most satisfactory way a 
case can be dealt with and the judge then supervising the progress to trial in accordance with that 
programme. What the judge will prevent is parties not fulfilling their responsibilities, acting unfairly 
to a weaker party or acting unreasonably. Other types of litigation where case management is 
unnecessary will move directly to a hearing.
In support of his criticisms Professor Zander cites Sir Jack Jacob who he rightly 
describes as “truly a master of civil procedure and wiser in these matters than any of us” but he 
makes no reference to the fact that in his Hamlyn Lecture of 1986 under the heading Prospects fo r  
the Future Sir Jack set out in outline just the sort of changes that I am advocating as being 
necessary in the future.
The other source from which Professor Zander seeks assistance is the Rand Report on 
judicial case management in the USA. Here the selective way Professor Zander cites from the report 
indicates that he has wholly failed to grasp the true nature of my recommendations or he has not fully 
absorbed the contents of the Rand report.
I would not wish litigation in the field of medical negligence or in any other field to be 
handled this country as it is in the States. However even if the situations are comparable which they 
are not I would not have anything to fear from Rand. First Rand indicates that early case 
management reduces time to disposition. It also found that my approach as to early settling of a trial 
date and reduced discovery reduced both delay and costs. While early case management had an 
upward effect on costs, the overall effect was to reduce delay without having any significant effect 
on costs or the perception of fairness.
Why I am however particularly critical of the use by Professor Zander of the Rand report
is that its general conclusion is that it found little change in what was happening before 1990 when it
started its survey and afterwards. The reason being that the act of Congress whose effect they were 
monitoring was loosely worded so judges could interpret what they were doing prior to the act as 
compliance with the act. Furthermore, as Professor Resnick who really does know what she is 
talking about has pointed out, the increase in costs detected by Rand in relation to early case 
management could be the consequence of Congress, making national rules apply to small cases 
when the rules are only appropriate for the large cases for which they were designed.
This unselective approach which Rand examined is wholly contrary to the thrust of my
report. Remarks by Professor Zander suggest he has failed to grasp the elementary point that I am
not recommending that case management shall apply to all cases where a defence is entered. In 
particular hands on case management, in the sense that term is used by Rand, is intended to have no 
application to cases on the fast track. Yet he uses Rand to suggest in his lecture that lawyers would
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not use the fast track because of the additional expense to which they would be put by case 
management.
The fast track in its strict form will not be suitable for medical negligence cases. They 
are too complicated for application to the fast track. The virtues of the fast track would be beneficial 
for small medical claims such as claims against dentists if a suitably modified fast track could be 
devised. The virtues are that they provide a restricted procedure and a no frills form of litigation on 
a fixed timetable at a fixed cost. It provides a litigant with certainty as to what he is letting himself 
in for. A working group of volunteers are conducting an experiment in Birmingham to test whether 
a modified fast track could work in small cases. I should therefore deal briefly with the unjustified 
criticisms heaped on the fast track by Professor Zander.
1. First he seeks to apply the Rand conclusions to the fast track when they have no application.
2. Secondly he seems to think they are to be subject of the Draconian sanctions when the idea is to
call cases in for directions if the timetable is not kept in a way which will prejudice the fixed
date of trial. It is however intended that if a lawyer wants more time he should apply in advance
and not when time has already expired.
3. Thirdly he says lawyers are not capable of working to a time- table. This is not correct. 
Experience now exists that if time- tables are set which are reasonable (and the Fast Track time­
table is being drawn up in conjunction with those with great experience) then lawyers have no 
difficulty in complying with time- tables and they welcome the certainty they produce.
4. Then he says it will produce a sense of unfairness and prevent proper exploration of the issues. 
However this is to ignore the alternative which can be no access to justice at all. It can also 
result in totally disproportionate litigation.
5. Finally he says that I am setting the fixed cost too high citing against me Adrian Zuckerman and 
then suggests the cost will be unfairly low. I do not see how he can make either of these 
criticisms since the cost is still the subject of consultation by the profession.
I know the fast track is unpopular with the Association of Personal Injury lawyers as they see it as a 
threat to their livelihood and I would wish to take their concerns into account insofar as it is in the 
public interest to do so but I do not believe the Association would be happy about all of the 
criticisms which Professor Zander makes.
While I reject Professors Zander’s criticisms I do not suggest the process of 
implementing my report is going to be easy. There are bound to be teething troubles. Modifications 
of detail will need to be made. My proposals are not written in stone. However they do offer a 
practical programme to achieve a dramatic improvement in the way we handle civil litigation and in 
access to justice. That that improvement should happen is important to the public as a whole. It is 
particularly important to medics and all whose work is the provision of health care and those who 
receive that care. A great many right thinking lawyers and medics have worked and are working 
hard in their valuable spare time to ensure the improvements come about.
This is why I do not apologise for spending so much of this lecture in answering that of 
Professor Zander’s of 2 weeks ago. The issue is of great importance to the medical profession. It is 
right that what is being sought to be achieved should be the subject to fair and balanced criticism. It 
is no part of my argument that the new Lord Chancellor should not conduct the review as he 
indicated prior to the election would happen. It would however be unfortunate indeed if the Lord 
Chancellor were to call a halt to all the work that is in progress at the present time as Professor 
Zander suggests. To pay serious attention to what Professor Zander has said would be to give him 
credit he does not deserve. I regret having to say this of a friend but the fact is that his lecture was 
not a balanced consideration of this serious subject and ill considered. Ill considered because he is 
oblivious of what is in fact happening on the ground. Unintentionally he could damage a process of 
change which is already taking place and which while it will not be smooth, offers real hope for the 
future as judges, practitioners and insurance bodies up and down the land recognise.
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